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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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The Domestic Policies of Peter III and His Overthrow

MARC RAEFF

HISTORIANS of Russia have been kind to neither the reign nor the personality of Peter III. The descriptions of Peter as a man are usually based on the portrait sketched by his wife, Catherine II, who had good reason to make him appear as ridiculous and unappealing as possible. The reign, which lasted only from Christmas Day 1761 to June 28, 1762, is usually dismissed in a few sentences, with notice taken only of the end of compulsory service for the nobility and of Peter's fawning admiration of Frederick II and all things Prussian, a mania that robbed Russia of the fruits of her spectacular victories in the Seven Years' War. If we add the dissatisfaction of the Guards regiments with their new Prussian-style uniforms and the threat of their transfer from the capital to fight for the emperor's interests in his native Holstein, we have exhausted the common explanation for his dethronement and violent death at the hands of Catherine's favorites.¹

The historian of peasant attitudes N. N. Firsov has pointed out, however, that

► Mr. Raeff, a specialist in modern Russian history, is professor of history at Columbia University. He studied with Michael Karpovich at Harvard University and received his Ph.D. there in 1950. The research for this article was carried out in 1968 in the course of the author's participation in the academic exchange program between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the American Council of Learned Societies. Mr. Raeff wishes to thank the officers of both institutions as well as the staff of the Central State Archives of Ancient Charters (Ts.G.A.D.A.) in Moscow for their cooperative assistance. Financial support was provided partly by a senior fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

¹S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* (Moscow, 1959-66), XIII, Bk. 25 (1965), Chap. I, 7-102; Robert Nisbet Bain, *Peter III, Emperor of Russia* (London, 1902). A recent attempt at a "rehabilitation" that is not too convincing is H. Fleischhacker, "Porträt Peters III," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge V (1957), 127-89.

while Peter III aroused the bitter enmity of the Guards, the court, and the Church, he was popular with the masses on account of several measures he took during his brief reign.² Historical reputations are notoriously based on myths; yet myths are historical data that should not be disregarded altogether. What are we to say of the popularity of Peter III among the common people, as witnessed by the appearance after his death of a dozen pretenders (Pugachev being only the best known and most successful) claiming to be Peter III, pretenders who received the support of large masses of Russia's common folk?³ Nor were illiterate peasants alone in their devotion to Peter III. In 1801 a young, well-educated member of the nobility delivered before his friends a panegyric to Peter III in which he argued that Peter III had begun the liberation of the individual in Russia; noblemen were freed from compulsory state service while hundreds of thousands of peasants were rescued from the obscurantism and oppression of the Church.⁴ It is also striking to recall that not one of the nobles—for whom the act of February 18, 1762, is alleged to have been the fulfillment of long-cherished hopes and demands—lifted a finger in defense of the ruler who “freed” them. It is true, too, that Catherine II continued Peter's major policies, including even the Prussian alliance that is supposed to have aroused the patriotic ire of the capital.

Such inconsistencies between interpretations and facts suggest that it is time for a new look at what Peter's government tried to accomplish and how it went about doing it. Foreign policy may be left out of the present account, as it has been well summarized by P. Shchebal'skii, S. M. Solov'ev, and, more recently, by H. Fleischhacker.⁵ I shall try to summarize and analyze the most important measures of domestic policy on the basis of unpublished records of the senate and the few remnants of Peter's official correspondence.⁶ These findings may help, furthermore, to explain Peter's overthrow and at the same time reveal more clearly the mainsprings of the system of government of Imperial Russia. Obviously, Peter III did not personally make the major policy decisions, nor did he even define the pattern or determine the ultimate direction of the legislation issued in his name. I shall, therefore, endeavor to determine the nature of the group that formed the effective government. For convenience as well as brevity, I shall use the name of the monarch as synonymous with his government, with the clear understanding that I by no means believe that Peter played a paramount role.

² N. N. Firsov, “Petr III i Ekaterina II—Pervye gody ee tsarstvovaniia,” *Istoricheskie ocherki i eskizy* (Kazan', 1922), II, 43–109.

³ K. V. Sivkov, “Samozvanstvo v Rossii v poslednei tret'i XVIII v.,” *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, XXXI (1950), 88–135.

⁴ Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut istorii russkoi literatury (Pushkinskii dom), Leningrad; Arkhiv Turgenevykh, Fond 309, No. 618, ff. 26–30.

⁵ P. Shchebal'skii, *Politicheskaia sistema Petra III* (Moscow, 1870); Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossi*, Fleischhacker, “Porträt Peters III.”

⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, unpublished documents referred to in this article are located in the Central State Archives for Ancient Charters, Moscow (Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov). They will be cited by Fond (File), No. (*edinitsa khraneniia*), date (if available), and folio pagination.

The best known of all of Peter III's legislative acts was the so-called "Manifesto on the Freedom of the Nobility," dated February 18, 1762,⁷ which put an end to the compulsory nature of the nobility's state service, without, however, encouraging noblemen to take advantage of their new "freedom." Traditionally this act is seen as the culmination of the efforts of the nobility to escape the harsh service obligations imposed by Peter the Great; it therefore appears as a triumph for the nobility who were able to take advantage of the incompetence and weakness of Peter III. Yet contemporaries report that the manifesto came as a shock, disorienting many of its beneficiaries. The contemporary belief that the act was accidental, that it was issued without serious preparation or discussion, is illustrated by the well-known anecdote about its actual drafting. To hide his spending the night with someone else, the story goes, Peter III told his *maîtresse en titre* that he would be busy with state affairs. He then ordered Privy Secretary D. Volkov to draft some legislation and locked him up in a room. The manifesto was the result of Volkov's involuntary house arrest.⁸

But Professor G. Vernadsky, in one of his early articles, has correctly pointed out that, far from being accidental, the manifesto was the deliberate work of an influential group within the government.⁹ He ascribed its authorship to A. I. Glebov, procurator-general of the senate, and saw it as part of the efforts of those dignitaries—the brothers Michael, Roman, and Ivan Vorontsov, and N. Panin, for example—who wanted to erect the legal framework and lay the social and economic groundwork for a genuine aristocracy in Russia. In the opinion of these dignitaries freedom from service would enable the Russian nobility, in particular its richer, better educated, and energetic members, to turn their attention to economic enterprise and the improvement of their estates. This in turn would have the effect of making them a genuine social, economic, and cultural elite with a political role similar to that of the contemporary English aristocracy. The Soviet historian N. L. Rubinshtein has carried this analysis a step further.¹⁰ He has shown that the text of the manifesto is closely linked to the discussions about the rights of estates in the Codification Commission of 1754–66. In contradistinction to the approach taken by the Vorontsov faction, the notion of universal exemption from service was opposed by P. and A. Shuvalov, the influential advisers of Peter's predecessor, Empress Elizabeth, who wanted to divide the nobility into a "service gentry" and a monopolistic, entrepreneurial oligarchy. After the death of Elizabeth, Rubinshtein argues, the idea of freedom from ser-

⁷ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, 1st Ser. (St. Petersburg, 1830), XV, No. 11,444 (hereafter PSZ with number of law or decree). All dates in the present article conform to the Julian calendar, that is, the dates are eleven days behind the corresponding days in the Gregorian calendar for the eighteenth century.

⁸ Prince M. M. Shcherbatov, *On the Corruption of Morals in Russia*, ed. and trans. A. Lentin (Cambridge, 1969), 232, 233.

⁹ G. V. Vernadskii, "Manifest Petra III o vol'nosti dvorianskoi i zakonodatel'naia komissiia 1754–1766 gg.," *Istoricheskoe Obozrenie*, XX (1915), 51–59.

¹⁰ N. L. Rubinshtein, "Ulozhennaia komissiia 1754–1766 gg. i ee proekt novogo ulozheniia 'O sostoianii poddannyykh voobshche' (K istorii sotsial'noi politiki 50kh–nachala 60kh godov XVIII v.)," *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, XXXVIII (1951), 208–52.

vice was separated for tactical reasons from the Shuvalovs' proposed general statute on the rights and privileges of the nobility. Promoted by Roman Vorontsov, the manifesto aimed at reorienting the nobility's attention to greater concern for the economic exploitation of their estates.

Neither Vernadsky nor Rubinshtein paid much attention to the manner in which the manifesto was first suggested to the senate. In the minutes for the session of January 17, 1762, a session that Peter attended (although he came late), we read:

Out of His high mercy towards his loyal subjects, [He] graciously deigned to order the nobles to continue their service according to their [own] wish for as long and wherever they want to; and in wartime they would have to present themselves [for duty]; and draft a form [project] on the same basis as it is done with the nobles from Livland and submit it with all circumstances for the signature of His Imperial Majesty.¹¹

There is no record of any further discussion, debate, or even of any consideration of this imperial command.¹² The minutes for February 19, 1762, record merely the bland and routine order that the Manifesto of February 18, 1762, be printed and distributed.¹³

These records are meager, laconic, and quite inconclusive. The most tantalizing element in the minutes is the reference to the situation prevailing in Livland, a reference that may also suggest that the idea stemmed from the German-Baltic entourage of the emperor. If acted upon, it would have implied introducing into Russia the whole nexus of genuine "feudal" rights and privileges, most significantly those of local self-government and police, rights and privileges that the Baltic nobles had retained even after the Swedish and Russian conquests. But neither the manifesto itself nor any later legislation pursued these implications. The act of February 18 remained silent on those rights and functions that would have offered the nobility an alternative to the service obligation that had been their very *raison d'être*. Seen in this light, the manifesto can hardly be considered to have expressed the point of view of the Vorontsov group, who wanted to give noblemen a greater stake in private and local concerns. But D. V. Volkov, Peter's private secretary and mainspring in the administration, who probably drafted the manifesto, may have expressed the thinking of P. Shuvalov, whose protégé he had been. Shuvalov believed that a small, closed oligarchy should control Russia's economic life by means of monopolies and regalias with rank-and-file nobles continuing to provide most of the military and bureaucratic career personnel.

Soviet historians, Rubinshtein in particular, rightly argue that the manifesto should not be taken in isolation, even though the act appears curiously unconnected to anything else. There is no documentary evidence to show that it was a

¹¹ Fond 248, No. 3426, 17 Jan. 1762, f. 283 (§24). Note elliptic and incorrect syntax.

¹² The only exception is the terse notation, *ibid.*, 18 Jan. 1762, f. 316, that Procurator-General A. Glebov suggested the erection of a golden statue of Peter III in gratitude for his concern for the nobility. There is no record of action taken on this proposal.

¹³ Fond 248, No. 3427, 18 Feb. 1762, ff. 134-38, 19 Feb. 1762, f. 171.

direct response to the demands of the nobility as a whole or even of an important segment of the "ruling classes." Nor do the sources that have come to light so far allow us to draw firm conclusions based on a "class analysis" of the manifesto, that is, that the nobility as the ruling class forced the government to legislate exclusively in favor of the economic interests of the nobles as owners of land and serfs. This, in our opinion, oversimplifies the nature of the Russian nobility and its relationship to the Petrine state. The logical jump from what the sources say to interpretation of what they say in terms of the putative class interests of the nobility is too great for anyone but the most convinced orthodox Marxist to make.¹⁴ But it is possible to relate the act of "freedom of the nobility" to a series of measures in Peter III's own reign dealing with the organization and structure of the machinery of government.

Several decrees indicate the government's desire to regularize the service of civilian officials, to create the basis for what might eventually become a "bureaucracy." Implicit in these decrees is a desire to create an officialdom in place of the old form of "gentry service" that had developed in the seventeenth century and that later had been regularized according to a modern military pattern by Peter the Great. Thus, on April 19, 1762, the senate expressed its intention of drawing up a table of equivalency between the civilian and military branches of the service, so that civilians would cease to be inferior in questions of salaries and preferment. To encourage the professionalization of the civilian branch, the senate plan provided that an officer would suffer no loss in salary if he transferred from the military to the civilian branch on a permanent basis. The senate also intended to re-establish court ranks, as an additional and self-contained branch of the government service.¹⁵ The desire to create a corps of officials not necessarily based on noble status was also evidenced in the senate's proposal that meritorious clerks be promoted to secretaryships, even if it should entail ennobling a commoner. Peter III confirmed the proposal.¹⁶

Naturally the success of this policy required the availability of a pool of trained men from which officials could be drawn. Following a practice advocated by Peter the Great, but neglected in the reign of Elizabeth, the senate now encouraged the recruitment of officials among the graduates of schools, especially the University of Moscow, even if they were not nobles. The importance the senators attached to this practice is indicated by the fact that they reserved to themselves the selection and assignment of promising graduates.¹⁷

¹⁴ Rubinshtein has used the minutes of the Committee on the Freedom of the Nobility of the Commission of Codification, Fond 16, No. 235. His argument rests on the linking of individual dignitaries and high officials to specific interest groups within the nobility. For the latter the evidence is very indirect and at best highly circumstantial.

¹⁵ Fond 248, No. 3429, 19 Apr. 1762, ff. 175, 177-78. See also Peter the Great's Table of Ranks, PSZ 3890.

¹⁶ Fond 248, No. 3428, 14 Mar. 1762, f. 444; No. 3429, 23 Apr. 1762, f. 219.

¹⁷ Fond 248, No. 3426, 10 Jan. 1762, ff. 94-97, concerning the promotion of Ia. Kozitskii and the staffing of the Codification Commission; No. 3429, 30 Apr. 1762, f. 413; No. 3431, 12 June 1762, f. 138, concerning the promotion of V. Ruban.

In the reign of Peter III, then, consistent efforts were made to form a professional corps of officials and to transmute the non-serving nobility into a class of landed gentlemen of leisure who would be merely *honnêtes hommes*. It was decided that one corps of cadets was adequate for the education of *honnêtes hommes*. The several cadet schools were, therefore, combined and consolidated under the direction of I. Shuvalov; they were given more money and the curriculum was reorganized to emphasize "general education" at the expense of narrowly technical fields.¹⁸ This reorganization adumbrates the more comprehensive pedagogical reforms, openly designed for cultured gentlemen, that were introduced by I. I. Betskoi in the reign of Catherine II.¹⁹ At the same time, new technical schools were opened for the professional training of subalterns. A gymnasium that would be attached to the Corps of Cadets was established for the purpose of preparing a civilian service, and the senate's *iunker* corps was re-established. Originally introduced by Peter the Great, the *iunker* corps combined an internship in the senate chancery with schooling.²⁰

Seen against the background of these measures on service and education, the Manifesto of February 18, 1762, appears as another illustration of the government's desire to dispense with the unwilling services of those nobles who might prefer to mind their estates or to lead a life of cultured leisure. Was Peter III not, in effect, saying to the nobility "der Mohr hat seine Schuldigkeit getan, der Mohr kann gehen"? For men who thought primarily in terms of their role in the state and whose economic independence was questionable to say the least, it was a policy that could lead to a sense of frustration and rejection. At the same time the government's policy forced many nobles to go back to their estates and to participate actively in the policing of the provinces.²¹ But the owner's presence and greater involvement in the management of his estate could, and at times did, lead to stricter control over and greater demands on his serfs, provoking resentment and, not infrequently, rebellion among them.²²

The implementation of such a policy made it possible for the government to dispense with the inadequately trained, inefficient, overage personnel. Similar considerations lay behind Peter III's measures concerning the Church. In that area Peter III's own attitude toward the Russian Church and religion no doubt played an important part. Born and brought up a Lutheran, he never fully ac-

¹⁸ I. Shuvalov had already suggested the idea in May 1761. See Leningradskoe otdelenie Instituta istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR (L.O.I.I.), Fond 36, Bk. 398, ff. 182-92. PSZ 11.474 (14 Mar. 1762), which refers to the Manifesto of 18 Feb. 1762; PSZ 11.515 (24 Apr. 1762); Fond 248, No. 3430, 14 May 1762, ff. 226-33, permitting an increase in staff and budget. Thirty-five thousand rubles were to be levied especially for this purpose from state peasants.

¹⁹ Betzky [I. I. Betskoi], *Les Plans et les Statuts des différents établissements ordonnés par Sa Majesté Impériale Catherine II pour l'Éducation de la jeunesse et l'utilité générale de son Empire*, trans. Mr. Clerc (Amsterdam, 1775); PSZ 12.741.

²⁰ PSZ 11.515 (24 Apr. 1762); Fond 248, No. 3430, 14 May 1762, ff. 251-52, concerning the implementation of these measures.

²¹ This function was clearly delegated to them only by the Act on the Provincial Administration of 1775 and the Charter to the Nobility of 1785.

²² As was demonstrated by the Pugachev rebellion, 1773-74.

cepted Russian Orthodoxy, to which he was forced to convert when his aunt Elizabeth selected him as heir to the throne. There are many anecdotes about his practical jokes, teasing, and crude impropriety during church services. It is not impossible that he wished to refashion Russian church life and organization along Lutheran lines. Be that as it may, his government promulgated a series of laws relating to the Church that unquestionably affected Russian life directly.

Various restrictions and disabilities that previous rulers had imposed on the non-Orthodox were relaxed by decree.²³ Most significant among these decrees was the general invitation extended to all Old Believers who had fled abroad, mainly to Poland, to return and settle on free lands in the southeast, in particular in the Irgiz river valley.²⁴ One of the stipulations of the resettlement provisions was that the Old Believers could use their own books of worship and were to be protected against abuses by local authorities.²⁵ To a senate report of February 19, 1762, Peter III added a paragraph on March 22, 1762, that prohibited Russian and Ukrainian monasteries from admitting monks from abroad, a measure taken in part to guard against the influx of 'possible agents from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires and in part in imitation of a policy begun by Peter the Great to restrict further the number of monasteries.²⁶ Similarly, to control the unsupervised proliferation of churches, an *ukaz* prohibited the existence of most chapels that had been established by wealthy noblemen and merchants in private houses in the two capitals.²⁷ More generally, Peter's tone with the Holy Synod was quite brusque and sharp, underlining his dislike of all Russian ecclesiastical institutions and practices.

More significant than the measures affecting the externals of religious life was the legislation that directly impinged on the economic and social situation of the population under Church jurisdiction. This legislation concerned the secularization of land belonging to ecclesiastical institutions, primarily monasteries, and the fate of peasant serfs living there. Seizure by the Russian state of lands and peasants owned by the Church goes back to the sixteenth century, and further significant and radical steps had been taken by Peter the Great. Even the pious Elizabeth had tentatively approved a measure that would have transferred to state control most of the settled lands belonging to episcopal sees and monasteries, to assure greater equity and to stem the abuses and exactions to which their serfs were subject. This step would naturally benefit the state, since a better administration of the peasantry would make for better taxpayers while also increasing the amount of land available for distribution to officials and courtiers.

²³ PSZ 11.434 (1 Jan. 1762), stopping investigation of cases of self immolation and assuring Old Believers that they would not be prosecuted for their beliefs.

²⁴ *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam i poveleniim khraniashchimsia v Sankt-Peterburgskom Senatskom Arkhive*, ed P. I. Baranov (St. Petersburg, 1872-78), III (1740-62), 1878, No. 11.979 (29 Jan. 1762); PSZ 11.420 (29 Jan. 1762). Pugachev took advantage of this decree to legalize his status after escaping from prison in Kazan'.

²⁵ Fond 248, No. 3427, 7 Feb. 1762, ff. 53-61; PSZ 11.435 (7 Feb. 1762).

²⁶ Fond 248, No. 3428, 22 Mar. 1762, ff. 558-79.

²⁷ Fond 203, No. 1, 8 Mar. 1762, ff. 6-7; PSZ 11.460 (5 Mar. 1762).

But it is interesting to note the rationale offered by Peter III for the legislative acts concerning monasteries and their property, a rationale directly related to his own Protestant sympathies on the one hand and to eighteenth-century secular humanitarianism on the other. The argument justifying the upkeep and wealth of monasteries as asylums for the old, veterans, and orphans is dismissed as spurious, since the monasteries do not adequately care for those entrusted to their ministration. Moreover, in the form in which they had developed in early Christian times, monasteries were seen as truly parasitical institutions and as a perversion of the original teachings of Christ. The state, therefore, should assume the social functions of monasteries—the state should, for instance, build insane asylums and remove the unfortunate from monasteries—by converting the latter into institutions where true anchorites might retire, institutions which, consequently, would not need much property. He argued, further, that such provisions would be in line with practices in Western Europe, where it had been discovered that this important function had to be exercised by the state; insane people are ill and cannot be left to their own devices or to the hazards of private and religious benevolence.²⁸

On March 21, 1762, Peter III issued an *ukaz* concerning monastic lands and peasants.²⁹ Thereafter the serfs on monastery lands would be subject to an annual capitation of one ruble, enjoy the usufruct of the land they worked, and be administered directly by the College of Economy. The state, that is, the officials of the college, would collect the peasants' dues and finance those church activities that were recognized as necessary or useful. State subsidies to monasteries were to remain on the low level set in the reign of Peter the Great, without even taking into account the inflation, estimated at thirteen per cent, that had taken place since that time. Under the terms of Elizabeth's legislation, dues from peasants under the college's jurisdiction were to have been collected on a commission basis by local persons, retired officers, or tax farmers. This practice had unavoidably led to considerable abuse and discontent among the peasants. Peter's decree provided that the College of Economy would establish local offices and on the *uezd* and *guberniia* levels it would have its own officials who would be responsible for the collection of dues and the administration of these peasants.³⁰ These officials would be appointed from among former prisoners of war or officers no longer fit for field duty.³¹ This measure, creating an important outlet for the many superannuated and under-educated government servants who were

²⁸ See Fond 248, No. 3429, 23 Apr. 1762, ff. 205–06, for the case of the insane brothers Kozlovskii; *ibid.*, 24 Apr. 1762, ff. 237–38; PSZ 11.509 (20 Apr. 1762).

²⁹ Although the decree referred to the report submitted by the senate to Elizabeth, it spelled out the Protestant-like condemnation of monasteries. Contenting himself with pointing out the abuses, not even Peter the Great had gone this far.

³⁰ PSZ 11.481 (21 Mar. 1762). Note that the senate report that served as the basis for the law was dated 19 Feb. 1762, a date that may indicate some connection with the Manifesto on the Freedom of the Nobility. Fond 248, No. 3428, 22 Mar. 1762, ff. 558–79.

³¹ PSZ 11.525 (4 May 1762), 11.572 (14 June 1762); see also Fond 248, No. 3431, 5 June 1762, f. 68, concerning a petition of former prisoner-of-war Major Jacob Semichov.

no longer useful in the central administration or the active army, would also lead to an increase in the number of local officials, whose inadequacy and scarcity had been a major cause of the abuses and failures of the provincial administration. The law fitted well into the government's long-standing preoccupation with improving controls and administration on a local level.³² In any case, at a stroke of the pen, the decree of March 21, 1762, removed hundreds of thousands of peasants from the jurisdiction of the Church and turned them into state peasants; in a sense this meant that they were to enjoy wide autonomy, even if they had not been given full freedom.³³

It goes without saying that this legislation incensed the Church. But in view of its institutional weakness and the supineness of its hierarchy, this discontent could be easily disregarded. More serious was the fact that application of the law stirred up the peasantry. The peasants thought that the decree had actually granted them full freedom and that it was only the first step toward a general emancipation. They frequently refused to obey local officials charged with implementing the act, and in many instances they revolted. A senatorial clarification spelling out the limitations of the decree only poured oil on the flames.³⁴ Eventually, in the fall of 1762, Catherine II was forced to cancel the act and to start new secularization procedures in 1764 in a more orderly and conservative fashion.

It is difficult to speak of the steps taken by the government of Peter III with respect to social and economic policy without viewing them against the background of plans and measures that go back to earlier reigns. Yet there are still too many gaps in our knowledge of the economic evolution of the Empire to allow a definitive assessment of its main dynamics.³⁵ For our purposes, however, it may suffice to list the most important measures undertaken by Peter III and to evaluate their overall character. In a general way, there is no break with the preceding reign; on the contrary, one may even speak of deliberate continuity, a continuity personified by the role of Peter's right-hand man, D. V. Volkov, who had risen under the patronage of the Shuvalovs in the reign of Elizabeth.³⁶

³² Catherine II shared this preoccupation. One of her earliest measures was to ask Prince Ia. Shakhovskoi, the former procurator-general of the senate under Elizabeth, to make a study of this problem and present recommendations. Although adopted by the senate with only minor changes, Shakhovskoi's recommendations were not implemented at the time. They did, however, serve as an important element in drafting the Statute on Provincial Administration of 1775. Fond 370, Nos. 21, 22 ("Vsepoddaneishii doklad Senata s predstavleniem mneniia d.t.s. kn. Shakhovskogo o preobrazovanii grazhdanskikh shtatov, kotorye Vysochaishimi imennymi ukazami 1762 g. iulia 23 i avgusta 9 poveleno bylo rassmotret' pravitel'stvuiushchemu Senatu"); see also Iu. V. Got'e, *Istoriia oblastnogo upravleniia Rossii ot Petra I do Ekateriny II* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1913-41), II (1941), 165-69.

³³ The latest calculations put Economy peasants—those peasants who formerly belonged to monasteries and episcopal sees—at 1,050,000 male souls in 1767. See M. T. Beliauskii, *Krest'ianskii vopros v Rossii nakanune vosstaniia E. I. Pugacheva* (Moscow, 1965), 82.

³⁴ Fond 248, No. 3431, 17 June 1762, ff. 161-62.

³⁵ The bulk of Soviet historical literature deals with the burdens of serfdom. What is needed is a modern economic analysis of available statistical material. Some hopeful signs that such analyses will be pursued can be seen in the works of A. Kahan, of the University of Chicago, M. Confino, of the Hebrew University, and Soviet historians S. Troitskii and I. Koval'chenko.

³⁶ Dmitrii Vasil'evich Volkov, 1718-85, had been secretary of the Conference at the Imperial Court under Elizabeth. A later memorandum summarizes his general outlook on economic matters fairly

Naturally, the interests of the first class of the realm, the nobility, were uppermost in the minds of the government. The economic needs of noblemen were to receive special attention; efforts were to be made to develop the nobility's resources. In line with the serfs' total subjection to their masters, and with a view toward opening new territories to agriculture and removing surplus population from the central provinces, the decree of January 29, 1762, gave to the nobles the right to transfer serfs without prior permission from the Treasury College.³⁷ Thereafter it would be sufficient to register the transfer with the appropriate local authorities, thereby strengthening the trend toward administrative devolution and encouraging life on the local level. At the same time, in a reaffirmation of earlier legislation and a tightening of the fetters of peasant bondage, serfs were forbidden to file complaints against their masters.³⁸ Nobles benefited further from a liberal loan policy that allowed them to borrow money for ten years without interest on the newly minted copper coinage.³⁹ In a sense this represented a first step toward direct government financial subsidy to the landed nobility, a policy that culminated in the establishment of land banks for nobles in the reign of Catherine II.

Conversely, nothing was done to alleviate the condition of the private serfs. The proposal of procurator-general of the senate, A. I. Glebov, on January 18, 1762, that the capitation should be collected by the serf owners or their bailiffs instead of special officials, was justified in terms of the benefits that would accrue to the peasants freed from the burdens and exactions of periodic expeditions of tax collectors.⁴⁰ Yet the act can as well be considered to have further expanded the landlord's rights and to have tightened controls over his serfs. It is true that some effort was made to protect the peasants from the rapacity of merchants, though such protection would benefit the landlords just as much. Peasants were forbidden to give promissory notes to merchants without the approval of either their lord or the entire commune, and the notes had to be drawn up in prescribed form at specified government offices.⁴¹ Notes issued in violation of this rule could not be collected. That this might also be a handicap to a more active expansion of trade and to the formation of a market economy did not seem to worry the government.

On the other hand it was made easier for a peasant under Church and monastery

well. See his letter to G. G. Orlov, in *Russkaia Starina*, XI (1874), 484-85. Biographical material can be found in "Dmitrii Vas. Volkov. Materialy k ego biografii 1718-1785," *ibid.*, 478-96; *ibid.*, XVIII (1877), 372, 576, 744.

³⁷ PSZ 11.423 (29 Jan. 1762).

³⁸ Fond 248, No. 3431, 14 June 1762, f. 154. Although the necessity to repeat this kind of legislation frequently during the eighteenth century suggests that it was not effectively enforced.

³⁹ Fond 248, No. 3428, 1 Mar. 1762, f. 5.

⁴⁰ Fond 248, No. 3426, 18 Jan. 1762, ff. 349-50; PSZ 11.429 (31 Jan. 1762).

⁴¹ Fond 248, No. 3428, 4 Mar. 1762, f. 101. The purpose of the act was to prevent the exploitation of peasants by merchants who took advantage of the notorious instability and low yields of harvests. On selling grain to the peasants during times of scarcity, merchants bound the peasants for long periods of time. Generally the legislation reflected an opposition to merchants that was shared by nobles and peasants alike.

control to join the ranks of the merchant class. It would suffice to pay five hundred rubles for himself and one thousand rubles for his family.⁴² True, the sum was very high for the times; but it was thought that some peasants would indeed be able to find that amount of money, an opinion that says much about the potential wealth buried in the Russian village. It is questionable that the merchants considered the measure to be in their own interest; we know from the *naказы* and debates at the Commission on Codification of 1767 that the Russian merchantry advocated closed social estates (*Stände*). Another act of Peter III may be interpreted as restricting the merchant class while at the same time raising the hopes of the peasantry. The decree of February 22, 1762, put a temporary halt, allegedly until a final decision was taken on the rights and duties of every estate by the Commission on Codification, to the purchase of villages and serfs for factories.⁴³

The adjudication of an interesting lawsuit seems to indicate that the government wanted to promote what might be called individual property rights to benefit capitalist development. A major handicap in the formation of private capital in Russia was the tradition, sanctified by law, of equal inheritance rights. It led to a constant subdividing and splintering of estates and property, decreasing their economic potential from one generation to the next. An even greater danger threatened factories and mining enterprises because it was impossible to divide up a factory or mine among several heirs without actually destroying it. This was the basic issue raised by a lawsuit involving the fate of several factories in the Urals that had been owned by Baron Alexander Stroganov. The matter had been discussed at various times in the senate before the accession of Peter III. In December 1761 the senate had held that in the case of factories or mines, splintering or dividing up should not be permitted; one person would inherit the entire establishment and compensate the other heirs in cash. The ruling, reminiscent of Peter the Great's law of 1714 on single inheritance, was made general, extended to salt production as well, and given legislative sanction in the decree of April 22, 1762.⁴⁴

The decision reached in the case of Alexander Stroganov's inheritance points to the government's efforts to mobilize the natural and human resources of the country; in so doing the government continued the policy of the previous reign and prepared the ground for the more systematic approach of Catherine II. In this connection it is worth noting that the government was well aware of the advantages of free labor, as compared to compulsory labor and serf work services in kind (*zemskaiia povinnost'*). The senate ordered that, whenever possible, free hired labor be employed in repairing and maintaining the Volkhov waterway, in digging new canals, and in the upkeep of the highway between St. Petersburg and Moscow. In the final analysis, the senators argued, the cost would be less

⁴² Fond 248, No. 3426, 10 Jan. 1762, ff. 108-14.

⁴³ Fond 248, No. 3428, 22 Mar. 1762, f. 552 (§8), ff. 613-14; PSZ 11.490 (29 Mar. 1762).

⁴⁴ Fond 248, No. 3364, 4 Dec. 1761, ff. 21-22, No. 3428, 6 Mar. 1762, ff. 157-59, No. 3429, 23 Apr. 1762, ff. 207-08; PSZ 11.511 (20 Apr. 1762); Fond 248, No. 3397, ff. 166-67.

than if serf labor were used and the peasants torn away from their regular agricultural tasks.⁴⁵ Nor should the labor potential of retired non-commissioned and commissioned officers go to waste. Their settlement along the Lower Volga, in Astrakhan' *guberniia*, was encouraged.⁴⁶

Of greater and more permanent significance was further relaxation of controls over trade. In the reign of Elizabeth internal duties had been abolished, but the peasants still had to present passports and to register with gate-keepers upon entering Moscow and other big cities, even if they came only for the day's market. Passports had to be obtained from the lord or the commune, not always an easy or costless procedure; and then the peasants had to fight their way through bottlenecks at the town gates, so that many preferred not to come to urban markets. These restrictions were now eased to permit peasants to come for trade to Moscow, where they could even stay overnight, without having to register.⁴⁷ But given the commonly held notion that laborers were dangerous and unreliable, hired hands continued to be registered with the police and had to be strictly accounted for, especially in the large cities and the two capitals.⁴⁸ The measure may have had a much greater impact than it would appear to have had at first glance. The fortunes and entrepreneurial activities of peasant industrialists in the early nineteenth century seem often to have begun with grandfathers who plied their commerce between countryside and towns after their access to the latter had been liberalized under Peter III.

A liberalizing policy was pursued with respect to foreign trade, too; it aimed particularly at loosening the fetters of monopoly concessions granted under Elizabeth. Without abandoning mercantilist policies on imports, policies that in general benefited an underdeveloped country like Russia, Peter III encouraged free export of Russian raw materials through all ports and highways of the Empire. Ending the monopoly position enjoyed by Riga and St. Petersburg, the grain trade was allowed to move through the ports of the Black Sea and on overland routes in the Ukraine. The same was true for the export of salted meat across the Ukrainian border. Finally, encouragement was given to trade with Persia and protection offered it by the establishment of Russian consulates in the towns bordering on the Shah's domains.⁴⁹ While the collection of custom receipts was again farmed out to a few persons,⁵⁰ the trend toward greater freedom of domestic and foreign trade was unmistakable; Catherine II was merely to expand it.

⁴⁵ Fond 248, No. 3426, 17 Jan. 1762, ff. 286-92, No. 3427, 30 Jan., 19 Feb. 1762, ff. 197-98, No. 3429, 19 Apr. 1762, f. 156; PSZ 11.455 (28 Feb. 1762), 11.495 (5 Apr. 1762), 11.520 (26 Apr. 1762).

⁴⁶ Fond 248, No. 3430, 4 Mar., 8 May 1762, ff. 168-70; PSZ 11.556 (30 June 1762); see P. Liubomirov, "O zaselenii Astrakhanskoi gubernii v XVIII veke," *Nash krai*, No. 4 (Apr. 1926) (Astrakhan'), 1-24 (available in offprint only).

⁴⁷ Fond 248, No. 3427, 7 Feb. 1762, ff. 73-74; PSZ 11.446 (21 Feb. 1762). By implication the rule was extended to other towns, in Siberia, for example. PSZ 11.545 (22 May 1762).

⁴⁸ Fond 248, No. 3429, 5 Nov. 1761, 4 Mar. 1762, 19 Apr. 1762, ff. 153-55.

⁴⁹ PSZ 11.489 (28 Mar. 1762), 11.557 (1 June 1762).

⁵⁰ Fond 248, No. 3430, 17 May 1762, ff. 273-76.

In connection with the efforts to expand and liberalize trade with Persia, we may mention a project of Count Roman I. Vorontsov that was submitted to the senate and discussed at the very end of Peter's reign.⁵¹ Vorontsov advocated the energetic promotion of Russia's Asiatic trade and, in a sense, the reorientation of the Empire's pattern of trade and economic development eastward. The count bolstered his proposal with the argument that Russia's future and mission lay in the East much more than in the West. While no concrete decision was reached under Peter III, we know that Catherine continued to exhibit a keen interest in the development of Russian trade and agricultural expansion in the East, although her foreign policy definitely favored the West.⁵² One cannot help being reminded of the alternative that confronted Muscovy two centuries earlier when Ivan IV and his *Izbrannaia Rada* had to decide whether to expand on the conquests of Kazan' and Astrakhan' or to turn to the Baltic.

It is well known that, after signing an armistice with Prussia, Peter III concluded a treaty of friendship with Frederick II. On the eve of his overthrow he planned to embroil Russia in another war, this time on the side of Prussia, in defense of his Holstein family interests. Then as now, expenditures and preparations for war meant the retrenchment of domestic programs. Earlier efforts to develop the economic potential of Russia were thus partly negated, so that Catherine II's decision to shun diplomatic entanglements and preparations for war was eagerly welcomed by her subjects. Of all the programs that fell victim to the economy drive in support of military preparations, none had more serious implications for the country's general welfare than the slowing down of the general land survey that had been started under Elizabeth. By a decree of May 17, 1762, surveying operations were restricted because of a shortage of manpower—the officers who carried out the operations had had to rejoin their units for active duty—and were limited to the province of Moscow where they could be carried on by retired officers from the College of Economy.⁵³ If we remember that the nobility, state peasants, and *odnodvortsy*⁵⁴ depended on a definitive land survey for the security of their holdings, Peter III's decision appears a serious backward step that easily could have undone his well-intentioned economic measures. Yet it does not seem that the full effects of this measure were appreciated at the time; in any event, the overthrow, which came so soon thereafter, can hardly be accounted for by the dissatisfaction of the nobility with this action.

What then can we conclude about the character of Peter's domestic policy? Quite obviously, he did not slight the interests of the nobility and did not lift a finger to remedy the wretched conditions of the serf peasantry. One may ask,

⁵¹ L.O.I.I., Fond 36, Bk. 1067, ff. 17-55 (dated 21 June 1762).

⁵² For a general survey of the problems of Russian eastern trade see Clifford M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's Trade with China and Its Setting, 1727-1805* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1969).

⁵³ Fond 248, No. 3430, 17 May 1762, ff. 277-79.

⁵⁴ Literally "single homesteaders"—a class of free peasants who, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, originally had been settled on the frontiers of the state as military servicemen. See T. Esper, "The Odnodvortsy and the Russian Nobility," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XLV No. 104 (Jan. 1967), 124-34.

however, whether his efforts at separating the nobility more sharply into career officials in the bureaucracy and a leisured group of economically active serf-owners met with the approval of all nobles. Some, like the well-known memoirist A. T. Bolotov, were quite happy to devote themselves exclusively to private pursuits. But on Bolotov's own testimony, he was in the minority; most of his friends and neighbors continued to live and think in terms of state service. The same may be said for the peasantry, for Pugachev's "program" definitely emphasized the liturgical character of the Russian polity grounded on universal service. We see, therefore, no new departure in economic policy, but only an extension of trends in the reign of Elizabeth. The main goal was to foster the maximum development of the potential resources of the Empire and its population. Nor was the drive toward secularization and functional institutional organization new. Peter III merely followed the path of all his predecessors since Peter the Great. But, in view of the bad reputation that his reign has been given by Catherine II and later historians, it is worthy of note that the government of Peter III could boast of some accomplishments. Its legislation anchored more securely the evolution toward "modernity," secularization, and increased economic activity, as well as "bureaucratization."⁵⁵ In no sense was the legislation radical, nor did it introduce any notions and practices that were alien to the Russian polity of the eighteenth century. If, in some specific cases, one group of the nobility was favored over another, it is difficult, on balance, to see why Peter's social and economic policies should have resulted in his violent overthrow. Leaving aside the matter of personality and personal conflict with Catherine II (not that this is a negligible matter), was there anything in the methods of government that may yield a clue to the events of June 28, 1762?

The first acts of Peter III signaled a departure from custom and hinted at a distrust of the natural line of imperial succession. The manifesto of accession omitted mention of Grand Duke Paul, Peter's only son and presumptive heir, and so did the oath of loyalty required of all subjects except private serfs.⁵⁶ The bad impression this created was indirectly confirmed when Catherine II made a point of including the name of Grand Duke Paul in both her manifesto of accession and the oath.⁵⁷ Even more curious is the order to bring the great imperial crown from Moscow to St. Petersburg, clear evidence that the tsar intended to hold his coronation in the new capital on the Neva.⁵⁸ This would have been a radical departure from a tradition that even Peter the Great's successors had not violated. In contrast, immediately upon overthrowing Peter III, Catherine II

⁵⁵ At the end of the reign orders were given that government institutions draw up more precise budgets for future needs and review staff requirements. Catherine II only acted on these orders when, on July 23, 1762, she ordered a general survey of the Empire's economic resources.

⁵⁶ *PSZ* 11.390, 11.391 (25 Dec. 1761).

⁵⁷ *PSZ* 11.582 (28 June 1762); *Fond* 248, No. 3377, 1 July 1762, f. 569. It is true that Catherine II may have believed it more politic to bow to the pressure of those who, like Count N. I. Panin, expected her to act merely as regent until Grand Duke Paul came of age.

⁵⁸ *Fond* 248, No. 3364, 26 Dec. 1761, f. 257.

stated emphatically that she would be crowned in Moscow.⁵⁹ More important was the contrast offered by Peter III to the "maternal" image of Elizabeth, an image that Catherine II so assiduously cultivated later. Indeed, the emperor made himself as inaccessible as possible to his subjects. Peter the Great, who did not want to be bothered by petitions that properly fell under the jurisdiction of regularly established institutions, nonetheless remained easily accessible. Peter III, on the contrary, held himself aloof from the nation and threatened with dire penalties anyone who dared to petition for redress of grievances or for rewards; an exception was made only for those officers who were not satisfied with the decisions of their commanders.⁶⁰

Still more significant than these matters of ceremonial and etiquette was the change in the ruling group. Understandably, the accession of a new ruler in an autocracy brings about a change in the inner circle of those who surround the monarch and help him to govern. Immediately upon his accession, Peter III removed Elizabeth's adviser, Alexander Shuvalov,⁶¹ as well as the recently appointed procurator-general of the senate, Prince Ia. Shakhovskoi, one of the most experienced officials of the previous reign. In place of Shakhovskoi another expert in the bureaucratic routine, General Quartermaster Alexander I. Glebov, was appointed procurator-general of the senate.⁶² But unlike his predecessor, Glebov was not destined to play a major policy-making role. That role fell to Dmitrii V. Volkov, for whom the new position of privy-secretary to the emperor was created on January 31, 1762.⁶³ This made him the virtual head of the entire administrative machinery, for everything submitted to or coming from the sovereign had to pass through his hands. A member of the senate as well, Volkov became in fact if not in name the chief minister.

Volkov's position was further enhanced by the abolition on January 29, 1762, of the Special Conference at the Imperial Court, the body that had acted as a kind of war cabinet, coordinating and planning all policies in the last years of Elizabeth's reign. As Peter's trusted factotum, Volkov could decide on who and what was to be brought to the monarch's attention or decision; he could also influence decisions, but by himself he could not coordinate and plan long-range policies, then particularly complicated by Russia's diplomatic and military re-orientation.⁶⁴ Count Mikhail I. Vorontsov advised the creation of a new "con-

⁵⁹ PSZ 11.582 (28 June 1762): Fond 248, No. 3377, [5] July 1762, ff. 629-30, 6 July 1762, ff. 632-38, 647. The latter reproduces the extended version of Catherine's manifesto of accession while, curiously enough, it was not included in the PSZ.

⁶⁰ Fond 248, No. 3428, 1 Mar. 1762, ff. 31-34; PSZ 11.459; *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 12.019 (28 Feb. 1762).

⁶¹ Fond 248, No. 3364, 26 Dec. 1761, f. 261; see also *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 11.910 (26 Dec. 1762). Shuvalov—who died soon thereafter—had been forbidden to attend the senate except in the presence of the emperor. Since Peter III rarely came to senate sessions, this meant that Shuvalov could virtually never attend.

⁶² Fond 248, No. 3364, 25 Dec. 1762, f. 253.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, No. 3426, 31 Jan. 1762, f. 618; *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 11.981 (30 Jan. 1762).

⁶⁴ Fond 248, No. 3426, 29 Jan. 1762, f. 542. See also H. Kaplan *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War* (Berkeley, 1968), 47-48. It is only fair to say that while Volkov was an able official

ference" to coordinate and plan policy, a move Nikita Panin was to suggest later to Catherine II, with the same negative result.⁶⁵ The Vorontsov suggestion was not acceptable to Peter III and his circle. It looked too much like a return to the practices of the previous reign and was interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of action of the new sovereign (or his advisers). Yet there was a desperate need for such an institution, for communications even between various subordinate agencies and commanders were completely disrupted after the disbanding of the conference.⁶⁶

The limited problem of proper channels of communication with his monarch that faced the Russian commander in the field was easily taken care of when a special conference for military matters was appointed in March 1762. The conference consisted of a cousin, Duke Ludwig of Holstein, Prince Georg von Holstein-Beck, the emperor's uncle, Generals N. Trubetskoi, A. Villebois (Vil'boa), I. Glebov, and A. Mel'gunov, and Adjutant Baron Ungarn.⁶⁷ This committee, however, was an informal body; it did not have its own staff or chancery, and it was limited to Peter III's personal concern, military affairs. The perennial need of the imperial government for a regular institution to channel information, discuss proposals, and make long-range plans that would not at the same time impinge on the autocratic authority of the ruler grew more pressing in the case of a sovereign whose understanding of and interest in domestic affairs was, to say the least, limited.

A solution was found in the creation of a new body, similar to the Conference at the Imperial Court of Elizabeth, but its members were not the usual high dignitaries. The *ukaz* of May 18, 1762, that set it up did not even give it an official name; it merely stated that daily meetings of persons closest to the emperor were to be held to make decisions on the basis of reports submitted by Privy-Secretary Volkov.⁶⁸ The persons were Duke Holstein-Beck, Prince Georg von Holstein, Marshal B. Münnich, Prince N. Trubetskoi, Chancellor M. Vorontsov, Generals A. Villebois, Volkonsky, and A. Mel'gunov (when available), and Volkov. There was much overlap with the membership of the military committee; one-third of the members were Germans; and the crucial role devolved upon Volkov, whose position is reminiscent of that held by State Secretary M. Speransky in the reign of Alexander I. The new council was given its own staff, so that it truly could become a governing body.

he was no real statesman. Later, as governor-general of Orenburg, his performance was less than distinguished.

⁶⁵ *Arkhiv kn. Vorontsova*, ed. P. Bartenev (Moscow, 1870-95), XXV, 251-54.

⁶⁶ Fond II, No. 839, 13 Feb. 1762, f. 3 (letter of General Peter I. Panin to Volkov from Königsberg), No. 753 (letter from Panin to Count M. I. Vorontsov, 16 Mar. 1762, from Königsberg).

⁶⁷ *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 12.031 (6 Mar. 1762).

⁶⁸ Fond 248, No. 3430, 20 May 1762, ff. 307-09; *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 12.162 (18 May 1762). The final text, in *PSZ*, 11.538 (18 May 1762), contains a list of members and reads in part: "to work under Our Own direction . . . to gather every day at Court and in Our apartments. . . . Decrees issued from this place [body] We shall sign in Our Own hand; but matters of lesser importance they will sign, also in Our name [and send] to all places, and therefore, they are to be executed as our own decrees; and reports on this to be written simply by memorandum to our name, addressing the envelope to our Privy State Councilor Volkov."

In short, Peter III made significant changes in the composition of his principal advisers. These changes meant the predominance of the Holstein relatives and of the military. The civilian dignitaries N. Trubetskoi and M. Vorontsov had remained during a period in which there were many changes at court and had hardly any coloring of their own—they were typical and perennial, and in N. Trubetskoi's case superannuated, bureaucrats. The most active and important civilian official was Volkov, an able executive, who, however, unlike the famous Artemii Volynskii who had held a similar position during the sway of Biron (Bühren) and Löwenwolde in the reign of Anne,⁶⁹ lacked a political physiognomy of his own. This ruling group reached their decision in closed session, in the chambers of Peter III; their relationship to existing government institutions was not at all defined. It was a "kitchen cabinet," made up of Holsteinians, generals, and Volkov. It bore a strong resemblance to the Supreme Privy Council (*Verkhovnyi tainyi sovet*) in the reign of Catherine I and to the Cabinet of Ministers under Anne. But in the case of the two earlier bodies, there had been a clearer definition of their place within the regular structure of state institutions; Elizabeth's conference had been in the nature of a committee of prominent officials rather than of personal favorites. It is true that the Holstein princes were also given official appointments, but their appointments were exclusively in the military establishment,⁷⁰ a step that only served to underline the very personal basis of their power.

All autocracies need a centralized and efficient police. Russia, both before and after Peter the Great, was no exception. The police organization of Imperial Russia had its beginnings in the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz, established by Peter I. In the eighteenth century it relied heavily on denunciations (*slovo i delo gosudarevo*) as an effective weapon of wide-ranging terror.⁷¹ Under various names, but employing the same methods, the political police continued to be a mainstay of government under the successors of Peter the Great; in the reign of Elizabeth they were called the Secret Investigating Chancery (*Tainiaia rozysknaia kantseleiaria*). Like any political police, this chancery was the most dreaded and unpopular institution, especially among the Old Believers, who were persecuted under Elizabeth. In February 1762 Peter III abolished this chancery in a popular move for which he received plaudits from both high and low quarters.⁷² The decree abolishing the Secret Investigating Chancery stressed the personal character of kingship, contrasting it to the remoteness of a ruler separated by a

⁶⁹ For Volynskii see D. A. Korsakov, "A. P. Volynskii i ego 'konfidenty' 1689–1740," *Russkaia Starina*, XLVIII (1885), 17–54, *Iz zhizni russkikh deiatelei* (Kazan', 1891), 283–330, "A. P. Volynskii," *Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia*, II (No. 6, 1877).

⁷⁰ While Holstein-Beck was also appointed governor-general of St. Petersburg this, too, was primarily a military office.

⁷¹ The best and most recent introduction to this subject is N. B. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I* (Moscow, 1957), where references to earlier monographic literature can easily be found. For a briefer survey, see N. B. Golikova, "Organy politicheskogo syska i ikh razvitiie v XVII–XVIII vv.," in *Absolutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII vv.)*, *Sbornik statei k smidesiatiletiu so dnia rozhdeniia i sorokapiatiletiiu nauchnoi i pedagogicheskoi deitel'nosti B. B. Kafengauza* (Moscow, 1964), 243–80.

⁷² Fond 248, No. 3427, 7 Feb. 1762, f. 60 (§24); *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 11.997 (16 Feb. 1762); PSZ 11.445 (21 Feb. 1762).

bureaucratic hierarchy. In view of Peter's own aloofness, one may question the sincerity of the decree; on the other hand the *ukaz* tried to convey a "medieval" image of the monarch, emphasizing his desire to rule primarily through moral suasion and attention to the major task of a sovereign, that of chief justicer. A personalized conception of authority had been pushed into the background by what Max Weber called the "routinization" of power since Peter the Great; successive autocrats tried to resuscitate the earlier personal character of rulership, the notorious Third Department of Nicholas I being neither the least nor the last effort in this direction.

Still, the police administration underwent an interesting transformation in the brief reign of Peter III. Discussions of a more efficient and "modern" police to replace the *slovo i delo* denunciations had been initiated in the reign of Elizabeth. Discussions focused on increasing the functions and responsibilities of the policemaster of St. Petersburg, who dealt with all matters of welfare as well as with problems of political and social security, and who also controlled the police-master of Moscow.⁷³ The senate suggested complete separation of the two police offices and equalization of their status. The senate recommended further that city policemasters be appointed by and subordinated to the authority of the local administration, that is, the *gubernskie*, provincial, and *voevodskie* chanceries. In short, the senators thought that policemasters who had to deal with day-to-day housekeeping problems of urban centers should be well integrated into the regular administrative pyramid and that therefore they should ultimately come under the senate. Soon thereafter, in the reign of Peter III, Privy Councilor Iv. I. Divov was appointed policemaster-general of Moscow, but subordinated to the policemaster-general of St. Petersburg, the chancery of the *guberniia* of Moscow, and the senate. This arrangement, however, was not put into effect.⁷⁴

In March 1762 the new trend in police administration became apparent with the issuance of directives to the policemasters in provincial cities. General Baron Nicholas A. Korf, chief of the Main Police Administration, policemaster of St. Petersburg, and a personal favorite of Peter III, was authorized to install police-masters in those towns and cities he believed needed them. The investigative functions of these officials were to come under the superior jurisdiction of the policemaster-general of St. Petersburg. Moreover, in all matters concerning police, the governors, too, were to come under the jurisdiction of General Korf's office; his staff was also greatly increased.⁷⁵ Quite clearly, a comprehensive police network was being established throughout the Empire under the personal control of General Korf and removed from direct supervision by the senate. While to some extent this move resulted in a deconcentration of administrative authority

⁷³ Fond 248, No. 3426, 24 Aug. 1761, 7 Jan. 1762, ff. 39-40. The term police is used here as it was used in Russia at the time, in its eighteenth-century French and German connotation, as in *Polizeiordnung*.

⁷⁴ PSZ 11.401 (9 Jan. 1762); Fond 248, No. 3426, 10 Jan. 1762, ff. 119, 120.

⁷⁵ Fond 248, No. 3428, 22 Mar. 1762, f. 553 (§3), ff. 613-14; PSZ 11.477 (21 Mar. 1762) and 11.478 (21 Mar. 1762).

and possibly in an increase in the power of the provincial governors—who were usually personal appointees of the monarch—it meant, above all, tighter police control by the men around Peter III.

The policy, as we have outlined it, clearly aimed at replacing the administrative chain of command that traditionally culminated in the senate with the personal authority of the monarch's new men. As early as January 1762, for example, it was decreed that the sovereign's verbal orders, if transmitted by an individual senator, the procurator-general (A. Glebov, one of the *homines novi*), or the presidents of the first three colleges (war, navy, foreign affairs), would have force of law without being referred to the full senate for recording let alone sanctioning. The implications of the policy for the position of the senate, and more specifically of the thirteen senators, were profound.⁷⁶ Under Elizabeth they had constituted the highest governing (*pravitel'stviushchii*) body of the state, a role that even the Conference at the Imperial Court had not completely undermined, since the latter consisted of regular officials and concerned itself primarily with the conduct of war.⁷⁷

Let us trace the several steps that led to a radical decline in the authority of the senate. A decree of January stipulated that all petitions were to be considered in special departments created within the senate, the College of Justice, and the Estates College (*Votchinnaia kollegiia*),⁷⁸ an action that undercut the power of the *reketmeister*, who was a functionary of the senate. An order issued in the same month—and expanded in April—stipulated that matters concerning promotions be referred to the relevant functional institutions rather than to the senate, where they had previously gone.⁷⁹ Even before this, on January 10, 1762, all promotion files were to be removed from the docket of the senate and turned over to the Office of the Heraldry. The latter was actually a division of the senate, so that while the step was not as radical as those mentioned earlier, it certainly indicated the direction in which the wind was blowing.⁸⁰

But the most significant measure, in my opinion, was the *ukaz* of June 1, 1762, which read: "We, by the Grace of God . . . most highly command that from now on the Senate issue to the public no decree with force of law, or [which] even serves to interpret previous laws, without submitting it to Us and obtaining Our approval for it."⁸¹

⁷⁶ Fond 248, No. 3426, 22 Jan. 1762, ff. 373–74; *Opis' vysochaishim ukazam*, ed. Baranov, No. 11.969 (22 Jan. 1762); *PSZ* 11.411 (22 Jan. 1762). The thirteen senators were Mikhail I. Vorontsov, Roman I. Vorontsov, kn. Nikita Iur. Trubetskoi, kn. Petr Nikit. Trubetskoi, Mikh. Mikh. Golitsyn, Aleksei Dm. Golitsyn, Aleksandr I. Shuvalov, Ivan Vas. Odoevskii, Ivan Iv. Nepluev, Aleksandr Bor. Buturlin, Aleksandr Grig. Zherebtsov, Ivan Iv. Kostiuurin. Note the exclusively "Russian" composition and the high proportion of old distinguished service families.

⁷⁷ See Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War*, *passim*, and *Istoriia Pravitel'stviushchego Senata za 200 let 1711–1911*, ed. S. F. Platonov (St. Petersburg, 1911), I, *passim*. Kaplan rates the role of the conference higher, but admits it was a "regular" governmental institution.

⁷⁸ Fond 248, No. 3426, 29 Jan. 1762, ff. 499–500; *PSZ* 11.422 (29 Jan. 1762).

⁷⁹ *PSZ* 11.409 (18 Jan. 1762); Fond 248, No. 3429, 23 Apr. 1762, f. 219.

⁸⁰ Also *PSZ* 11.561 (5 June 1762).

⁸¹ Fond 248, No. 3377, 1 June 1762, f. 556; *PSZ* 11.558 (1 June 1762); Fond IX, No. 44 (*opis'* No. 5), ff. 22 (1 June 1762), which is the draft of the act, perhaps in Volkov's hand.

Characteristically, the decree was signed by all the members of the inner council. One further step was taken with the decree of June 5, 1762, only three weeks before Catherine staged her coup. The decree provided that no reports be submitted to the senate on matters not directly related to its current work.⁸² In short, the paramount role of the senate in government had been whittled down and its political authority well-nigh eliminated. In the light of this development it is significant that at the time of her coup d'état, on June 28, Catherine delegated the care of the Empire to the senate. Furthermore, after her success, she decreed on July 2, 1762, that for matters of current concern, orders signed by only four members of the senate would have force of law. Her first step as autocrat was, then, to restore the senate to its former position.⁸³

The burden of the argument in the preceding pages has been that the demotion of the senate helped to bring about the overthrow of Peter III. The senators whom Peter inherited from his aunt represented the "in-group" that had been in control since the time of Peter the Great.⁸⁴ They were closely connected with the court and, consequently, with the Guards (and Catherine) as well. Of course, there had been other reasons for dissatisfaction with Peter III—his manners, his scorn for Orthodoxy and for everything Russian, his admiration of Prussia and Frederick II and the threat to send the Guards to fight in Germany, and, finally, his open clash with Catherine. But most of these elements of discontent were personal and to be expected in an autocracy; they could be offset by groupings favorable to the ruler and his style. We have seen, moreover, that in domestic legislation the regime of Peter III offered no serious reasons for complaint or opposition.

The demotion of the senate, however, could have far-reaching political implications, as it touched on a tender spot in the Russian polity. Indeed, to contemporary Russians, Peter III's method of government meant the establishment of a personal regime, personal not only in the sense that any autocracy is personal but in the sense of a small coterie of favorites gaining control over both sovereign and machinery of the state and imposing its will outside the framework of regular institutional order.

The modern Russian state, as shaped by the forceful personality of Peter I, was an autocracy; but by 1762 its routine operations had to a large degree become

⁸² PSZ 11.563 (5 June 1762).

⁸³ *Pravitel'stvuiushchii Senat, Senatskii Arkhiv* (St. Petersburg, 1888–1913), XII (1907), 178; Fond 248, No. 3384, 2 July 1762, f. 395. The senate remained the highest government institution, even if not the main policy-making body. But its procurator-general, Prince A. A. Viazemskii, was for a quarter of a century Catherine II's main minister, so that through his mediation the senate preserved its primary administrative role.

⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, this ruling circle was largely recruited from the same big "clans" (*rod*) that had occupied the major offices in the Tsardom of Muscovy. In the absence of a genuine Third Estate, there were few alternative sources from which the Russian ruler could draw his military and civilian servants. On this little studied and important question in Muscovite times, see the revolutionary posthumous monograph of S. B. Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii klassa sluzhilykh zemlevadel'tsev* (Moscow, 1969), especially 7–36, 465–85.

regularized, well ordered, and grounded in laws and regulations enforced by institutions, not by the ruler's personal whim (although his arbitrary will was still decisive in specific cases). Between 1725 and 1762 a see-saw struggle had taken place between personal regimes of favorites and an orderly administrative system resting on regulations and laws. The latter, triumphing under Elizabeth, appeared under the banner of the senate, in opposition to oligarchies of "accidental people."

Peter III dramatically reversed Elizabeth's system. He set about creating a personal regime, in which foreigners and the military played the dominant role, and he secured control of the Empire by an effective police administration headed by a personal favorite. Modern and efficient as it was in its conception, the police network threatened to undercut the regular institutions and to transform orderly administration into the dictatorship of a coterie. Most important of all, the new regime appeared to undermine the personalism of autocracy by interposing an effective barrier of favorites between ruler and subjects. And was not the promotion of professionalism in the civilian corps of officials a way of isolating those officials from the source of all power and of cutting them off from a broad social base? Fear was abroad that Russia was witnessing the return of the rule of the Supreme Privy Council under Peter the Great's minion, Prince A. D. Menshikov (1725-27), or the dictatorship of Biron and the Germans of Empress Anne, of cliques of "accidental people" who were neither an aristocratic oligarchy nor the representatives of the Russian service nobility. This fear outweighed the benefits of Peter's social and economic policies favoring the dominant social class as well as of those measures that helped the country as a whole. Peter III managed to alienate not only the Guards regiments representing the nobility but the high officials and courtiers as well.

More generally, the question of the methods of government favored by Peter III and his entourage focuses our attention on a basic and constant problem in the political history of Imperial Russia, the relationship between autocracy and nobility. We noted that in the course of the eighteenth century there was a trend to regularize the pattern of institutions, to endow them with some degree of autonomy of action in their daily routine, while always carefully preserving the ultimate authority and control of the autocrat. On the face of it, this seemed an adequate compromise between personalization and routinization of sovereign power—and two centuries of Russian history from the time of Peter the Great validated it. It reflected the ambivalent interests of the nobility, or, more precisely, the two aspects of their interests. There was, first, the desire to free the nobleman from the state, to make him a truly autonomous and independent private individual, to allow him to concentrate his energies and attention on running his estate and to lead in the cultural development of the nation, while at the same time assuming a share in the maintenance of law, order,

and security on the local level. This aspect implied acceptance of routinized political power or of well-ordered institutions whose officials would be guided by precise regulations as well as restricted by the existence of broad areas of autonomous private activity. But equally important and vital to the nobles—especially in view of their economic weakness and dependence on serfdom—was the preservation of their service role. This accounts for their ambivalence and disorientation in the face of the formation of a regular bureaucracy and their “liberation” from service in 1762. To safeguard this aspect of their interests and self-image the nobility also had to rely on the personal elements of political authority, on a strong autocracy. The autocrat was, indeed, seen as the only protector of the economic and social position of the nobility, especially of its lower and middle ranks. He was the safeguard against the threat of a pluralistic and open society that was growing stronger as cultural and economic “modernization” progressed.

The conflict of interest between the nobles’ service role and their private activities could find accommodation in the sort of compromise we have described. The door was left open for direct appeal to the autocrat to intervene in their behalf. Still the nobles were threatened by a personal regime of favorites or by an oligarchy. Indeed, such regimes meant the loss of political influence for large numbers of the rank-and-file nobility and a challenge to their economic and social security by putting them at the mercy of grasping, selfish favorites. At the same time, these regimes cut off the ordinary nobleman from direct access to the monarch on whom he depended for favors, protection, and the hopes of a rise in status through service.

“Successful” rulers—Catherine II, Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II—were fully aware of this situation and acted accordingly. In so doing they perpetuated autocracy and prevented, or at least did not encourage, the transformation of the service-oriented nobility into a “gentry” on the English model. As a result, when outside pressures resulting from the economic and cultural transformation that followed the Emancipation of 1861 became too great, neither autocracy nor nobility were prepared to face it and to devise a new equilibrium of political and socioeconomic power that would prove more responsive to changed circumstances. They were both destroyed. The reign and fall of Peter III provide us with a concrete, almost clinical, example of this pattern; they reveal both the nature of the issue and the character of the basic compromise that dominated the institutional organization of Imperial Russia.

Underlying Themes in the Witchcraft of Seventeenth-Century New England

JOHN DEMOS

IT is faintly embarrassing for a historian to summon his colleagues to still another consideration of early New England witchcraft. Here, surely, is a topic that previous generations of writers have sufficiently worked, indeed overworked. Samuel Eliot Morison once commented that the Salem witch-hunt was, after all, "but a small incident in the history of a great superstition"; and Perry Miller noted that with only minor qualifications "the intellectual history of New England can be written as though no such thing ever happened. It had no effect on the ecclesiastical or political situation, it does not figure in the institutional or ideological development."¹ Popular interest in the subject is, then, badly out of proportion to its actual historical significance, and perhaps the sane course for the future would be silence.

This assessment seems, on the face of it, eminently sound. Witchcraft was not an important matter from the standpoint of the larger historical process; it exerted only limited influence on the unfolding sequence of events in colonial New England. Moreover, the literature on the subject seems to have reached a point of diminishing returns. Details of fact have been endlessly canvassed, and the main outlines of the story, particularly the story of Salem, are well and widely known.

There is, to be sure, continuing debate over one set of issues: the roles played by the persons most directly involved. Indeed the historiography of Salem can be viewed, in large measure, as an unending effort to judge the participants—and, above all, to affix blame. A number of verdicts have been fashionable at one time or another. Thus the ministers were really at fault; or Cotton Mather in particular; or the whole culture of Puritanism; or the core group of "afflicted girls" (if their "fits" are construed as conscious fraud).² The most recent, and in some ways most so-

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¹ S. E. Morison, *The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England* (Ithaca, 1956), 264; Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province* (Boston, 1961), 191.

² Examples of these varying interpretations may be found in Charles W. Upham, *Salem Witchcraft* (Boston, 1867); Winfield S. Nevins, *Witchcraft in Salem Village* (Salem, 1916); John Fiske, *New*

phisticated, study of the Salem trials plunges right into the middle of the same controversy; the result is yet another conclusion. Not the girls, not the clergy, not Puritanism, but the accused witches themselves are now the chief culprits. For "witchcraft actually did exist and was widely practiced in seventeenth-century New England"; and women like Goody Glover, Bridget Bishop, and Mammy Redd were "in all probability" guilty as charged.³

Clearly these questions of personal credit and blame can still generate lively interest, but are they the most fruitful, the most important questions to raise about witchcraft? Will such a debate ever be finally settled? Are its partisan terms and moral tone appropriate to historical scholarship?

The situation is not hopeless if only we are willing to look beyond the limits of our own discipline. There is, in particular, a substantial body of interesting and relevant work by anthropologists. Many recent studies of primitive societies contain chapters about witchcraft, and there are several entire monographs on the subject.⁴ The approach they follow differs strikingly from anything in the historical literature. Broadly speaking, the anthropological work is far more analytic, striving always to use materials on witchcraft as a set of clues or "symptoms." The subject is important not in its own right but as a means of exploring certain larger questions about the society. For example, witchcraft throws light on social structure, on the organization of families, and on the inner dynamics of personality. The substance of such investigations, of course, varies greatly from one culture to another, but the framework, the informing purposes are roughly the same. To apply this framework and these purposes to historical materials is not inherently difficult. The data may be inadequate in a given case, but the analytic categories themselves are designed for any society, whether simple or complex, Western or non-Western, past or contemporary. Consider, by way of illustration, the strategy proposed for the main body of this essay.

Our discussion will focus on a set of complex relationships between the alleged witches and their victims. The former group will include all persons accused of practicing witchcraft, and they will be called, simply, witches.⁵ The category of victims will comprise everyone who claimed to have suffered from witchcraft,

France and New England (Boston and New York, 1902); W. F. Poole, "Witchcraft in Boston," in *The Memorial History of Boston*, ed. Justin Winsor (Boston, 1881); Marion L. Starkey, *The Devil in Massachusetts* (Boston, 1950); Morison, *Intellectual Life of Colonial New England*, 259 ff.

³ Chadwick Hansen, *Witchcraft at Salem* (New York, 1969). See especially x, 22 ff., 64 ff., 226-67.

⁴ Those I have found particularly helpful in developing my own approach toward New England witchcraft are the following: Clyde Kluckhohn, *Navajo Witchcraft* (Boston, 1967); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande* (Oxford, 1937); M. G. Marwick, *Sorcery in its Social Setting* (Manchester, 1965); *Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa*, ed. John Middleton and E. H. Winter (London, 1963); Beatrice B. Whiting, *Painte Sorcery* (New York, 1950).

⁵ This usage is purely a matter of convenience, and is not meant to convey any judgment as to whether such people actually tried to perform acts of witchcraft. Chadwick Hansen claims to show, from trial records, which of the accused women were indeed "guilty"; but in my opinion his argument is not convincing. The testimony that "proves" guilt in one instance seems quite similar to other testimony brought against women whom Hansen regards as innocent. There may indeed have been "practicing witches" in colonial New England, but the surviving evidence does not decide the issue one way or another.

and they will be divided into two categories to account for an important distinction between different kinds of victims. As every schoolchild knows, some victims experienced fits—bizarre seizures that, in the language of modern psychiatry, closely approximate the clinical picture of hysteria. These people may be called accusers, since their sufferings and their accusations seem to have carried the greatest weight in generating formal proceedings against witches. A second, much larger group of victims includes people who attributed to witchcraft some particular misfortune they had suffered, most typically an injury or illness, the sudden death of domestic animals, the loss of personal property, or repeated failure in important day-to-day activities like farming, fishing, and hunting. This type of evidence was of secondary importance in trials of witches and was usually brought forward after the accusers had pressed their own more damaging charges. For people testifying to such experiences, therefore, the shorthand term witnesses seems reasonably appropriate.

Who were these witches, accusers, and witnesses? How did their lives intersect? Most important, what traits were generally characteristic and what traits were alleged to have been characteristic of each group? These will be the organizing questions in the pages that follow. Answers to these questions will treat both external (or objective) circumstances and internal (or subjective) experiences. In the case of witches, for example, it is important to try to discover their age, marital status, socioeconomic position, and visible personality traits. But it is equally important to examine the characteristics attributed to witches by others—flying about at night, transforming themselves into animals, and the like. In short, one can construct a picture of witches in fact and in fantasy; and comparable efforts can be made with accusers and witnesses. Analysis directed to the level of external reality helps to locate certain points of tension or conflict in the social structure of a community. The fantasy picture, on the other hand, reveals more directly the psychological dimension of life, the inner preoccupations, anxieties, and conflicts of individual members of that community.

Such an outline looks deceptively simple, but in fact it demands an unusual degree of caution, from writer and reader alike. The approach is explicitly cross-disciplinary, reaching out to anthropology for strategy and to psychology for theory. There is, of course, nothing new about the idea of a working relationship between history and the behavioral sciences. It is more than ten years since William Langer's famous summons to his colleagues to consider this their "next assignment";⁶ but the record of actual output is still very meager. All such efforts remain quite experimental; they are designed more to stimulate discussion than to prove a definitive case.

There is a final point—about context and the larger purposes of this form of inquiry. Historians have traditionally worked with purposeful, conscious events,

⁶ William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment" (*AHR*, LXIII [Jan. 1958], 283–304), in *Psychoanalysis and History*, ed. Bruce Mazlish (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963).

"restricting themselves," in Langer's words, "to recorded fact and to strictly rational motivation."⁷ They have not necessarily wished to exclude non-rational or irrational behavior, but for the most part they have done so. Surely in our own post-Freudian era there is both need and opportunity to develop a more balanced picture. It is to these long-range ends that further study of witchcraft should be dedicated. For witchcraft is, if nothing else, an open window on the irrational.

The first witchcraft trial of which any record survives occurred at Windsor, Connecticut, in 1647,⁸ and during the remainder of the century the total of cases came to nearly one hundred. Thirty-eight people were executed as witches, and a few more, though convicted, managed somehow to escape the death penalty. There were, of course, other outcomes as well: full-dress trials resulting in acquittal, hung juries, convictions reversed on appeal, and "complaints" filed but not followed up. Finally, no doubt, many unrecorded episodes touching on witchcraft, episodes of private suspicion or public gossip, never eventuated in legal action at all.⁹

This long series of witchcraft cases needs emphasis lest the Salem outbreak completely dominate our field of vision. Salem differed radically from previous episodes in sheer scope; it developed a degree of self-reinforcing momentum present in no other instance. But it was very similar in many qualitative aspects: the types of people concerned, the nature of the charges, the fits, and so forth. Indeed, from an analytic standpoint, all these cases can be regarded as roughly equivalent and interchangeable. They are pieces of a single, larger phenomenon, a system of witchcraft belief that was generally prevalent in early New England. The evidence for such a system must, of course, be drawn from a variety of cases to produce representative conclusions. For most questions this is quite feasible; there is more evidence, from a greater range of cases, than can ever be presented in a single study.

Yet in one particular matter the advantages of concentrating on Salem are overwhelming. It affords a unique opportunity to portray the demography of witchcraft, to establish a kind of profile for each of the three basic categories of people involved in witchcraft, in terms of sex, age, and marital status. Thus the statistical tables that follow are drawn entirely from detailed work on the Salem materials.¹⁰ The earlier cases do not yield the breadth of data necessary for this type of quantitative investigation. They do, however, provide many fragments of evidence that are generally consistent with the Salem picture.

There is at least minimal information about 165 people accused as witches during the entire period of the Salem outbreak.¹¹

⁷ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁸ See John M. Taylor, *The Witchcraft Delusion in Colonial Connecticut* (New York, 1908), 145 ff.

⁹ Some of these episodes are mentioned, in passing, among the records of witchcraft cases that came before the court. See, for example, the references to Besse Sewall and the widow Marshfield, in the depositions of the Parsons case, published in Samuel G. Drake, *Annals of Witchcraft in New England* (Boston, 1869), 218-57. It is clear, too, that many convicted witches had been the objects of widespread suspicion and gossip for years before they were brought to trial.

¹⁰ These findings are based largely on materials in the vital records of Salem and the surrounding towns.

¹¹ In some cases the information is not complete—hence the variation in the size of sample among the different tables. Still the total for each table is large enough to lend overall credence to the results.

Sex	Total	Marital Status	Male	Female	Total	Age	Male	Female	Total
Male	42	Single	8	29	37	Under 20	6	18	24
Female	120	Married	15	61	76	21-30	3	7	10
		Widowed	1	20	21	31-40	3	8	11
Total	162					41-50	6	18	24
		Total	24	110	134	51-60	5	23	28
						61-70	4	8	12
						Over 70	3	6	9
						Total	30	88	118

These figures point to an important general conclusion: the witches were predominantly married or widowed women, between the ages of forty-one and sixty. While the exceptions add up to a considerable number, most of them belonged to the families of middle-aged, female witches. Virtually all the young persons in the group can be identified as children of witches and most of the men as husbands of witches. In fact this pattern conformed to an assumption then widely prevalent, that the transmission of witchcraft would naturally follow the lines of family or of close friendship. An official statement from the government of Connecticut included among the "grounds for Examination of a Witch" the following:

if ye party suspected be ye son or daughter the servt or familiar friend; neer Neighbor or old Companion of a Knowne or Convicted witch this alsoe a presumton for witchcraft is an art yt may be learned & Convayd from man to man & oft it falleth out yt a witch dying leaveth som of ye aforesd. heirs of her witchcraft.¹²

In short, young witches and male witches belonged to a kind of derivative category. They were not the prime targets in these situations; they were, in a literal sense, rendered suspect by association. The deepest suspicions, the most intense anxieties, remained fixed on middle-aged women.

Thirty-four persons experienced fits of one sort or another during the Salem trials and qualify thereby as accusers.

Sex	Total	Marital Status	Male	Female	Total	Age	Male	Female	Total
Male	5	Single	5	23	28	Under 11	0	1	1
Female	29	Married	0	6	6	11-15	1	7	8
		Widowed	0	0	0	16-20	1	13	14
Total	34					21-25	0	1	1
		Total	5	29	34	26-30	0	1	1
						Over 30	0	4	4
						Total	2	27	29

Here again the sample shows a powerful cluster. The vast majority of the accusers were single girls between the ages of eleven and twenty. The exceptions in this case (two boys, three males of undetermined age, and four adult women) are rather difficult to explain, for there is little evidence about any of them. By and large, however, they played only a minor role in the trials. Perhaps the matter can

¹² An early copy of this statement (undated) is in the Ann Mary Brown Memorial Collection, Brown University.

be left this way: the core group of accusers was entirely composed of adolescent girls, but the inner conflicts so manifest in their fits found an echo in at least a few persons of other ages or of the opposite sex.

Eighty-four persons came forward as witnesses at one time or another during the Salem trials.

Sex	Total	Marital Status	Male	Female	Total	Age	Male	Female	Total
Male	63	Single	11	3	14	Under 20	3	2	5
Female	21	Married	39	16	55	21-30	13	4	17
		Widowed	3	1	4	31-40	14	6	20
Total	84					41-50	18	7	25
		Total	53	20	73	51-60	11	1	12
						61-70	2	1	3
						Over 70	2	0	2
						Total	63	21	84

Here the results seem relatively inconclusive. Three-fourths of the witnesses were men, but a close examination of the trial records suggests a simple reason for this: men were more likely, in seventeenth-century New England, to take an active part in legal proceedings of any type. When a husband and wife were victimized together by some sort of witchcraft, it was the former who would normally come forward to testify. As to the ages of the witnesses, there is a fairly broad distribution between twenty and sixty years. Probably, then, this category reflects the generalized belief in witchcraft among all elements of the community in a way that makes it qualitatively different from the groupings of witches and accusers.

There is much more to ask about external realities in the lives of such people, particularly with regard to their social and economic position. Unfortunately, however, the evidence is somewhat limited here and permits only a few impressionistic observations. It seems that many witches came from the lower levels of the social structure, but there were too many exceptions to see in this a really significant pattern. The first three accused at Salem were Tituba, a Negro slave, Sarah Good, the wife of a poor laborer, and Sarah Osbourne, who possessed a very considerable estate.¹³ Elizabeth Godman, tried at New Haven in 1653, seems to have been poor and perhaps a beggar;¹⁴ but Nathaniel and Rebecca Greensmith, who were convicted and executed at Hartford eight years later, were quite well-to-do;¹⁵ and

¹³ The proceedings against these three defendants are included in the typescript volumes, *Salem Witchcraft, 1692*, compiled from the original records by the Works Progress Administration in 1938. These volumes—an absolutely invaluable source—are on file in the Essex County Courthouse, Salem.

¹⁴ See *Records of the Colony of New Haven*, ed. C. J. Hoadly (Hartford, 1858), II, 29-36, 151-52, and *New Haven Town Records 1649-1662*, ed. Franklin B. Dexter (New Haven, 1917), I, 249-52, 256-57.

¹⁵ Some original records from this trial are in the Willys Papers, Connecticut State Library, Hartford. For good short accounts see Increase Mather, *An Essay for the Recording of Illustrious Providences*, in *Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases*, ed. G. L. Burr (New York, 1914), 18-21, and a letter from John Whiting to Increase Mather, Dec. 10, 1682, entitled "An account of a Remarkable passage of Divine providence that happened in Hartford, in the year of our Lord 1662," in *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 4th Ser., VIII (Boston, 1868), 466-69.

"Mistress" Ann Hibbens, executed at Boston in 1656, was the widow of a wealthy merchant and former magistrate of the Bay Colony.¹⁶

What appears to have been common to nearly all these people, irrespective of their economic position, was some kind of personal eccentricity, some deviant or even criminal behavior that had long since marked them out as suspect. Some of them had previously been tried for theft or battery or slander;¹⁷ others were known for their interest in dubious activities like fortunetelling or certain kinds of folk-healing.¹⁸ The "witch Glover" of Boston, on whom Cotton Mather reports at some length, was Irish and Catholic, and spoke Gaelic; and a Dutch family in Hartford came under suspicion at the time the Greensmiths were tried.¹⁹

More generally, many of the accused seem to have been unusually irascible and contentious in their personal relations. Years before her conviction for witchcraft Mrs. Hibbens had obtained a reputation for "natural crabbedness of . . . temper"; indeed she had been excommunicated by the Boston church in 1640, following a long and acrimonious ecclesiastical trial. William Hubbard, whose *General History of New England* was published in 1680, cited her case to make the general point that "persons of hard favor and turbulent passions are apt to be condemned by the common people as witches, upon very slight grounds." In the trial of Mercy Desborough, at Fairfield, Connecticut, in 1692, the court received numerous reports of her quarrelsome behavior. She had, for example, told one neighbor "yt shee would make him bare as a bird's tale," and to another she had repeatedly said "many hard words." Goodwife Clawson, tried at the same time, was confronted with testimony like the following:

Abigail Wescot saith that as shee was going along the street goody Clasen came out to her and they had some words together and goody Clason took up stones and threw at her: and at another time as shee went along the street before sd Clasons dore goody Clason caled to mee and asked mee what was in my Chamber last Sabbath day night; and I doe afirme that I was not there that night: and at another time as I was in her sone Steephens house being neere her one hous shee folowed me in and contended with me becase I did not com into her hous caling of me proud slut what—are you

¹⁶ See *Records of Massachusetts Bay*, ed. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, IV, Pt. I (Boston, 1854), 269; William Hubbard, *A General History of New England* (Boston, 1848), 574; Thomas Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay*, ed. Lawrence S. Mayo (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), I, 160–61.

¹⁷ For example, Giles Corey, executed as one of the Salem witches, had been before the courts several times, charged with such offenses as theft and battery. Mary Parsons of Springfield was convicted of slander not long before her trial for witchcraft.

¹⁸ For example, Katherine Harrison, prosecuted for witchcraft at Weathersfield, Connecticut, in 1668, was reported to have been given to fortunetelling; and a group of ministers called to advise the court in her case contended that such activity did "argue familiarity with the Devil." See John M. Taylor, *The Witchcraft Delusion in Colonial Connecticut* (New York, 1908), 56–58. Evidence of the same kind was offered against Samuel Wardwell of Andover, Massachusetts, in 1692. See the proceedings in his case in the typescript volumes by the Works Progress Administration, *Salem Witchcraft, 1692*, in the Essex County Courthouse, Salem. Margaret Jones, convicted and executed at Boston in 1648, was involved in "practising physic." See Winthrop's *Journal*, ed. J. K. Hosmer (New York, 1908), II, 344–45. Elizabeth Morse, prosecuted at Newbury, Massachusetts, in 1679, was alleged to have possessed certain occult powers to heal the sick. See the depositions published in Drake, *Annals of Witchcraft*, 258–96.

¹⁹ Cotton Mather, *Memorable Providences, Relating to Witchcraft and Possessions*, in *Narratives*, ed. Burr, 103–06; Increase Mather, *An Essay etc.*, 18.

proud of your fine cloths and you love to be mistres but you neuer shal be and several other provoking speeches.²⁰

The case of Mary and Hugh Parsons, tried at Springfield in 1651, affords a further look at the external aspects of our subject. A tax rating taken at Springfield in 1646 records the landholdings of most of the principals in the witchcraft prosecutions of five years later. When the list is arranged according to wealth, Parsons falls near the middle (twenty-fourth out of forty-two), and those who testified against him come from the top, middle, and bottom. This outcome tends to confirm the general point that economic position is not, for present purposes, a significant datum. What seems, on the basis of the actual testimonies at the trial, to have been much more important was the whole dimension of eccentric and anti-social behavior. Mary Parsons, who succumbed repeatedly to periods of massive depression, was very nearly insane. During the witchcraft investigations she began by testifying against her husband and ended by convicting herself of the murder of their infant child. Hugh Parsons was a sawyer and brickmaker by trade, and there are indications that in performing these services he was sometimes suspected of charging extortionate rates.²¹ But what may have weighed most heavily against him was his propensity for prolonged and bitter quarreling; many examples of his "threatening speeches" were reported in court.

One other aspect of this particular episode is worth noting, namely, the apparent influence of spatial proximity. When the names of Parsons and his "victims" are checked against a map of Springfield in this period, it becomes very clear that the latter were mostly his nearest neighbors. In fact nearly all of the people who took direct part in the trial came from the southern half of the town. No other witchcraft episode yields such a detailed picture in this respect, but many separate pieces of evidence suggest that neighborhood antagonism was usually an aggravating factor.²²

We can summarize the major characteristics of the external side of New England witchcraft as follows: First, the witches themselves were chiefly women of middle age whose accusers were girls about one full generation younger. This may reflect the kind of situation that anthropologists would call a structural conflict—that is, some focus of tension created by the specific ways in which a community arranges the lives of its members. In a broad sense it is quite probable that adolescent girls in early New England were particularly subject to the con-

²⁰ Hutchinson, *History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay*, I, 160; Hubbard, 574. There is a verbatim account of the church proceedings against Mrs. Hibbens in the journal of Robert Keayne, in the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. I am grateful to Anita Rutman for lending me her transcription of this nearly illegible document. Manuscript deposition, trial of Mercy Desborough, Willys Papers; manuscript deposition, trial of Elizabeth Clawson, Willys Papers.

²¹ The tax list is published in Henry Burt, *The First Century of the History of Springfield* (Springfield, Mass., 1898), I, 190-91; a long set of depositions from the Parsons case is published in Drake, *Annals of Witchcraft*, 219-56; see also 224, 228, 242. Mary Parsons herself offered some testimony reflecting her husband's inordinate desire "for Luker and Gaine."

²² See Burt, *First Century of the History of Springfield*, I, for just such a map; see Increase Mather, *An Essay etc.*, 18 ff., on the case of the Greensmiths. Also Richard Chamberlain, *Lithobolia*, in *Narratives*, ed. Burr, 61, on the case of Hannah Jones at Great Island, New Hampshire, in 1682.

trol of older women, and this may well have given rise to a powerful underlying resentment. By contrast, the situation must have been less difficult for boys, since their work often took them out of the household and their behavior generally was less restricted.

There are, moreover, direct intimations of generational conflict in the witchcraft records themselves. Consider a little speech by one of the afflicted girls during a fit, a speech meticulously recorded by Cotton Mather. The words are addressed to the "specter" of a witch, with whom the girl has been having a heated argument:

What's that? Must the younger Women, do yee say, hearken to the Elder?—They must be another Sort of Elder Women than You then! they must not bee Elder Witches, I am sure. Pray, do you for once Hearken to mee.—What a dreadful Sight are You! An Old Woman, an Old Servant of the Divil!²³

Second, it is notable that most witches were deviant persons—eccentric or conspicuously anti-social or both. This suggests very clearly the impact of belief in witchcraft as a form of control in the social ordering of New England communities. Here indeed is one of the most widely-found social functions of witchcraft; its importance has been documented for many societies all over the world.²⁴ Any individual who contemplates actions of which the community disapproves knows that if he performs such acts, he will become more vulnerable either to a direct attack by witches or to the charge that he is himself a witch. Such knowledge is a powerful inducement to self-constraint.

What can be said of the third basic conclusion, that witchcraft charges particularly involved neighbors? Very briefly, it must be fitted with other aspects of the social setting in these early New England communities. That there was a great deal of contentiousness among these people is suggested by innumerable court cases from the period dealing with disputes about land, lost cattle, trespass, debt, and so forth. Most men seem to have felt that the New World offered them a unique opportunity to increase their properties,²⁵ and this may have heightened competitive feelings and pressures. On the other hand, cooperation was still the norm in many areas of life, not only in local government but for a variety of agricultural tasks as well. In such ambivalent circumstances it is hardly surprising that relations between close neighbors were often tense or downright abrasive.

"In all the Witchcraft which now Grievously Vexes us, I know not whether any thing be more Unaccountable, than the Trick which the Witches have, to

²³ See Cotton Mather, *A Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning*, in *Narratives*, ed. Burr, 270.

²⁴ See, for example, Whiting, *Paiute Sorcery*; Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande*, 117 ff.; and *Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa*, ed. Middleton and Winter.

²⁵ For material bearing on the growth of these acquisitive tendencies, see Philip J. Greven, Jr., "Old Patterns in the New World: The Distribution of Land in 17th Century Andover," *Essex Institute Historical Collections*, CI (April, 1965), 133–48; and John Demos, "Notes on Life in Plymouth Colony," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XXII (Apr. 1965), 264–86. It is possible that the voluntary mechanism of colonization had selected unusually aggressive and competitive persons at the outset.

render themselves and their Tools Invisible."²⁶ Thus wrote Cotton Mather in 1692; and three centuries later it is still the "invisible" part of witchcraft that holds a special fascination. Time has greatly altered the language for such phenomena—"shapes" and "specters" have become "hallucinations"; "enchantments" are a form of "suggestion"; the Devil himself seems a fantasy—and there is a corresponding change of meanings. Yet here was something truly remarkable, a kind of irreducible core of the entire range of witchcraft phenomena. How much of it remains "unaccountable"? To ask the question is to face directly the other side of our subject: witchcraft viewed as psychic process, as a function of internal reality.

The biggest obstacles to the study of psycho-history ordinarily are practical ones involving severe limitations of historical data. Yet for witchcraft the situation is uniquely promising on these very grounds. Even a casual look at writings like Cotton Mather's *Memorable Providences* or Samuel Willard's *A briefe account* etc.²⁷ discloses material so rich in psychological detail as to be nearly the equivalent of clinical case reports. The court records on witchcraft are also remarkably full in this respect. The clergy, the judges, all the leaders whose positions carried special responsibility for combatting witchcraft, regarded publicity as a most important weapon. Witchcraft would yield to careful study and the written exchange of information. Both Mather and Willard received "afflicted girls" into their own homes and recorded "possession" behavior over long periods of time.

A wealth of evidence does not, of course, by itself win the case for a psychological approach to witchcraft. Further problems remain, problems of language and of validation.²⁸ There is, moreover, the very basic problem of selecting from among a variety of different theoretical models. Psychology is not a monolith, and every psycho-historian must declare a preference. In opting for psychoanalytic theory, for example, he performs, in part, an act of faith, faith that this theory provides deeper, fuller insights into human behavior than any other. In the long run the merit of such choices will probably be measured on pragmatic grounds. Does the interpretation explain materials that would otherwise remain unused? Is it consistent with evidence in related subject areas?

If, then, the proof lies in the doing, let us turn back to the New England witches and especially to their "Trick . . . to render themselves and their tools Invisible." What characterized these spectral witches? What qualities were attributed to them by the culture at large?

The most striking observation about witches is that they gave free rein to a whole gamut of hostile and aggressive feelings. In fact most witchcraft episodes

²⁶ Cotton Mather, *The Wonders of the Invisible World*, in *Narratives*, ed. Burr, 246.

²⁷ Cotton Mather, *Memorable Providences* etc., 93-143; Samuel Willard, *A briefe account of a strange & unusuall Providence of God befallen to Elizabeth Knap of Groton*, in Samuel A. Green, *Groton in the Witchcraft Times* (Groton, Mass., 1883), 7-21.

²⁸ The best group of essays dealing with such issues is *Psychoanalysis and History*, ed. Mazlish. See also the interesting statement in Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (New York, 1964), v-xiv.

began after some sort of actual quarrel. The fits of Mercy Short followed an abusive encounter with the convicted witch Sarah Good. The witch Glover was thought to have attacked Martha Goodwin after an argument about some missing clothes.²⁹ Many such examples could be accumulated here, but the central message seems immediately obvious: never antagonize witches, for they will invariably strike back hard. Their compulsion to attack was, of course, most dramatically visible in the fits experienced by some of their victims. These fits were treated as tortures imposed directly and in every detail by witches or by the Devil himself. It is also significant that witches often assumed the shape of animals in order to carry out their attacks. Animals, presumably, are not subject to constraints of either an internal or external kind; their aggressive impulses are immediately translated into action.

Another important facet of the lives of witches was their activity in company with each other. In part this consisted of long and earnest conferences on plans to overthrow the kingdom of God and replace it with the reign of the Devil. Often, however, these meetings merged with feasts, the witches' main form of self-indulgence. Details are a bit thin here, but we know that the usual beverage was beer or wine (occasionally described as bearing a suspicious resemblance to blood), and the food was bread or meat. It is also worth noting what did not happen on these occasions. There were a few reports of dancing and "sport," but very little of the wild excitements associated with witch revels in continental Europe. Most striking of all is the absence of allusions to sex; there is no nakedness, no promiscuity, no obscene contact with the Devil. This seems to provide strong support for the general proposition that the psychological conflicts underlying the early New England belief in witchcraft had much more to do with aggressive impulses than with libidinal ones.

The persons who acted as accusers also merit the closest possible attention, for the descriptions of what they suffered in their fits are perhaps the most revealing of all source materials for present purposes. They experienced, in the first place, severe pressures to go over to the Devil's side themselves. Witches approached them again and again, mixing threats and bribes in an effort to break down their Christian loyalties. Elizabeth Knapp, bewitched at Groton, Massachusetts, in 1671, was alternately tortured and plied with offers of "money, silkes, fine cloaths, ease from labor"; in 1692 Ann Foster of Andover confessed to being won over by a general promise of "prosperity," and in the same year Andrew Carrier accepted the lure of "a house and land in Andover." The same pattern appears most vividly in Cotton Mather's record of another of Mercy Short's confrontations with a spectral witch:

"Fine promises!" she says, "You'l bestow an Husband upon mee, if I'l bee your Servant. An Husband! What? A Divil! I shall then bee finely fitted with an Husband:

²⁹ See Cotton Mather, *A Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning*, 259–60, and *Memorable Providences* etc., 100.

. . . Fine Clothes! What? Such as Your Friend Sarah Good had, who hardly had Rags to cover her! . . . Never Dy! What? Is my Life in Your Hands? No, if it had, You had killed mee long before this Time!—What's that?—So you can!—Do it then, if You can. Come, I dare you: Here, I challenge You to do it. Kill mee if you can. . . ."³⁰

Some of these promises attributed to the Devil touch the most basic human concerns (like death) and others reflect the special preoccupations (with future husbands, for example) of adolescent girls. All of them imply a kind of covetousness generally consistent with the pattern of neighborhood conflict and tension mentioned earlier.

But the fits express other themes more powerfully still, the vital problem of aggression being of central importance. The seizures themselves have the essential character of attacks: in one sense, physical attacks by the witches on the persons of the accusers and in another sense, verbal attacks by the accusers on the reputations and indeed the very lives of the witches. This points directly toward one of the most important inner processes involved in witchcraft, the process psychologists call "projection," defined roughly as "escape from repressed conflict by attributing . . . emotional drives to the external world."³¹ In short, the dynamic core of belief in witchcraft in early New England was the difficulty experienced by many individuals in finding ways to handle their own aggressive impulses. Witchcraft accusations provided one of the few approved outlets for such impulses in Puritan culture. Aggression was thus denied in the self and attributed directly to others. The accuser says, in effect: "I am not attacking you; you are attacking me!" In reality, however, the accuser is attacking the witch, and in an extremely dangerous manner, too. Witchcraft enables him to have it both ways; the impulse is denied and gratified at the same time.

The seizures of the afflicted children also permitted them to engage in a considerable amount of direct aggression. They were not, of course, held personally responsible; it was always the fault of the Devil at work inside them. Sometimes these impulses were aimed against the most important—and obvious—figures of authority. A child in a fit might behave very disobediently toward his parents or revile the clergy who came to pray for his recovery.³² The Reverend Samuel Willard of Groton, who ministered to Elizabeth Knapp during the time of her most severe fits, noted that the Devil "urged upon her constant temptations to murder her p'rents, her neighbors, our children . . . and even to make away with herself & once she was going to drowne herself in ye well." The attacking impulses were quite random here, so much so that the girl herself was not safe. Cotton Mather

³⁰ Willard, *A briefe account* etc., in *Groton in the Witchcraft Times*, ed. Green, 8; deposition by Ann Foster, case of Ann Foster, deposition by Andrew Carrier, case of Mary Lacy, Jr., in *Works Progress Administration, Salem Witchcraft, 1692*; Cotton Mather, *A Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning*, in *Narratives*, ed. Burr, 269.

³¹ This is the definition suggested by Clyde Kluckhohn in his own exemplary monograph, *Navajo Witchcraft*, 239, n. 37.

³² See, for example, the descriptions of the Goodwin children during the time of their affliction, in Cotton Mather, *Memorable Providences* etc., 109 ff., 119.

reports a slight variation on this type of behavior in connection with the fits of Martha Goodwin. She would, he writes, "fetch very terrible Blowes with her Fist, and Kicks with her Foot at the man that prayed; but still . . . her Fist and Foot would alwaies recoil, when they came within a few hairs breadths of him just as if Rebounding against a Wall."³³ This little paradigm of aggression attempted and then at the last moment inhibited expresses perfectly the severe inner conflict that many of these people were acting out.

One last, pervasive theme in witchcraft is more difficult to handle than the others without having direct recourse to clinical models; the summary word for it is orality. It is helpful to recall at this point the importance of feasts in the standard imaginary picture of witches, but the experience of the accusers speaks even more powerfully to the same point. The evidence is of several kinds. First, the character of the "tortures" inflicted by the witches was most often described in terms of biting, pinching, and pricking; in a psychiatric sense, these modes of attack all have an oral foundation. The pattern showed up with great vividness, for example, in the trial of George Burroughs:

It was Remarkable that whereas Biting was one of the ways which the Witches used for the vexing of the Sufferers, when they cry'd out of G.B. biting them, the print of the Teeth would be seen on the Flesh of the Complainers, and just such a sett of Teeth as G.B.'s would then appear upon them, which could be distinguished from those of some other mens.³⁴

Second, the accusers repeatedly charged that they could see the witches suckling certain animal "familiars." The following testimony by one of the Salem girls, in reference to an unidentified witch, was quite typical: "She had two little things like young cats and she put them to her brest and suckled them they had no hair on them and had ears like a man." It was assumed that witches were specially equipped for these purposes, and their bodies were searched for the evidence. In 1656 the constable of Salisbury, New Hampshire, deposed in the case of Eunice Cole,

That being about to stripp |her| to bee whipt (by the judgment of the Court att Salis-bury) lookeing uppon hir brests under one of hir brests (I thinke hir left brest) I saw a blew thing like unto a teate hanging downeward about three quarters of an inche longe not very thick, and haueing a great suspition in my mind about it (she being suspected for a witche) desiered the Court to sende some women to looke of it.

The court accepted this proposal and appointed a committee of three women to administer to Goodwife Cole the standard, very intimate, examination. Their report made no mention of a "teate" under her breast, but noted instead "a place in her leg which was proveable wher she Had bin suckt by Imps or the like." The women also stated "thatt they Heard the whining of puppies or such like under Her Coats as though they Had a desire to sucke."³⁵

³³ Willard, *A brieffe account* etc., 9; Cotton Mather, *Memorable Providences* etc., 108, 120.

³⁴ Cotton Mather, *Wonders of the Invisible World*, 216-17.

³⁵ Deposition by Susannah Sheldon, case of Philip English, in Works Progress Administration, *Salem Witchcraft, 1692*; manuscript deposition by Richard Ormsbey, case of Eunice Cole, in Massachusetts Archives, Vol. 135, 3; manuscript record, case of Eunice Cole, in *ibid.*, 13.

Third, many of the accusers underwent serious eating disturbances during and after their fits. "Long fastings" were frequently imposed on them. Cotton Mather writes of one such episode in his account of the bewitching of Margaret Rule: "tho she had a very eager Hunger upon her Stomach, yet if any refreshment were brought unto her, her teeth would be set, and she would be thrown into many Miseries." But also she would "sometimes have her Jaws forcibly pulled open, whereupon something invisible would be poured down her throat . . . She cried out of it as of Scalding Brimstone poured into her."³⁶ These descriptions and others like them would repay a much more detailed analysis than can be offered here, but the general point should be obvious. Among the zones of the body, the mouth seems to have been charged with a special kind of importance for victims of witchcraft.

In closing, it may be appropriate to offer a few suggestions of a more theoretical nature to indicate both the way in which an interpretation of New England witchcraft might be attempted and what it is that one can hope to learn from witchcraft materials about the culture at large. But let it be said with some emphasis that this is meant only as the most tentative beginning of a new approach to such questions.

Consider an interesting set of findings included by two anthropologists in a broad survey of child-rearing practices in over fifty cultures around the world. They report that belief in witchcraft is powerfully correlated with the training a society imposes on young children in regard to the control of aggressive impulses.³⁷ That is, wherever this training is severe and restrictive, there is a strong likelihood that the culture will make much of witchcraft. The correlation seems to suggest that suppressed aggression will seek indirect outlets of the kind that belief in witchcraft provides. Unfortunately there is relatively little concrete evidence about child-rearing practices in early New England; but it seems at least consistent with what is known of Puritan culture generally to imagine that quite a harsh attitude would have been taken toward any substantial show of aggression in the young.³⁸

Now, some further considerations. There were only a very few cases of witchcraft accusations among members of the same family. But, as we have seen, the typical pattern involved accusations by adolescent girls against middle-aged women. It seems plausible, at least from a clinical standpoint, to think that this pattern masked deep problems stemming ultimately from the relationship of

³⁶ Cotton Mather, *Memorable Providences* etc., 131.

³⁷ John W. M. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, *Child Training and Personality* (New Haven, 1953), Chap. 12.

³⁸ John Robinson, the pastor of the original "Pilgrim" congregation, wrote as follows in an essay on "Children and Their Education": "Surely there is in all children . . . a stubbornness, and stoutness of mind arising from natural pride, which must be broken and beaten down. . . . Children should not know, if it could be kept from them, that they have a will in their own: neither should these words be heard from them, save by way of consent, 'I will' or 'I will not.'" Robinson, *Works* (Boston, 1851), I, 246-47. This point of view would not appear to leave much room for the free expression of aggressive impulses, but of course it tells us nothing certain about actual practice in Puritan families.

mother and daughter. Perhaps, then, the afflicted girls were both projecting their aggression and diverting or "displacing" it from its real target. Considered from this perspective, displacement represents another form of avoidance or denial; and so the charges of the accusers may be seen as a kind of double defense against the actual conflicts.

How can we locate the source of these conflicts? This is a more difficult and frankly speculative question. Indeed the question leads farther and farther from the usual canons of historical explanation; such proof as there is must come by way of parallels to findings of recent psychological research and, above all, to a great mass of clinical data. More specifically, it is to psychoanalytic theory that one may turn for insights of an especially helpful sort.

The prominence of oral themes in the historical record suggests that the disturbances that culminated in charges of witchcraft must be traced to the earliest phase of personality development. It would be very convenient to have some shred of information to insert here about breast-feeding practices among early New Englanders. Possibly their methods of weaning were highly traumatic,³⁹ but as no hard evidence exists we simply cannot be sure. It seems plausible, however, that many New England children were faced with some unspecified but extremely difficult psychic tasks in the first year or so of life. The outcome was that their aggressive drives were tied especially closely to the oral mode and driven underground.⁴⁰ Years later, in accordance with changes normal for adolescence, instinctual energies of all types were greatly augmented; and this tended, as it so often does, to reactivate the earliest conflicts⁴¹—the process that Freud vividly described as "the return of the repressed." But these conflicts were no easier to deal with in adolescence than they had been earlier; hence the need for the twin defenses of projection and displacement.⁴²

³⁹ However, we can determine with some confidence the usual time of weaning. Since lactation normally creates an impediment to a new conception, and since the average interval between births in New England families was approximately two years, it seems likely that most infants were weaned between the ages of twelve and fifteen months. The nursing process would therefore overlap the arrival of baby teeth (and accompanying biting wishes); and this might well give rise to considerable tension between mother and child. I have found only one direct reference to weaning in all the documentary evidence from seventeenth-century New England, an entry in the journal of John Hull: "1659, 11th of 2d. My daughter Hannah was taken from her mother's breast, and, through the favor of God, weaned without any trouble; only about fifteen days after, she did not eat her meat well." American Antiquarian Society, *Transactions*, III (Boston, 1857), 149. Hannah Hull was born on February 14, 1658, making her thirteen months and four weeks on the day of the above entry. Hull's choice of words creates some temptation to speculate further. Was it perhaps unusual for Puritan infants to be "weaned without any trouble"? Also, does it not seem that in this case the process was quite abrupt—that is, accomplished entirely at one point in time? (Generally speaking, this is more traumatic for an infant than gradual weaning is.) For a longer discussion of infancy in Puritan New England see John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family-Life in Plymouth Colony* (New York, 1970), Chap. 8.

⁴⁰ I have found the work of Melanie Klein on the origins of psychic conflict in infancy to be particularly helpful. See her *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (London, 1932) and the papers collected in her *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis* (London, 1950). See also Joan Riviere, "On the Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy," in Melanie Klein *et al.*, *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* (London, 1952), 37–66.

⁴¹ See Peter Blos, *On Adolescence* (New York, 1962). This (basically psychoanalytic) study provides a wealth of case materials and some very shrewd interpretations, which seem to bear strongly on certain of the phenomena connected with early New England witchcraft.

⁴² It is no coincidence that projection was so important among the defenses employed by the afflicted girls in their efforts to combat their own aggressive drives. For projection is the earliest of all defenses, and indeed it takes shape under the influence of the oral phase. On this point see Sig-

One final problem must be recognized. The conflicts on which this discussion has focused were, of course, most vividly expressed in the fits of the accusers. The vast majority of people in early New England—subjected, one assumes, to roughly similar influences as children—managed to reach adulthood without experiencing fits. Does this pose serious difficulties for the above interpretations? The question can be argued to a negative conclusion, in at least two different but complementary ways. First, the materials on witchcraft, and in particular on the fits of the accusers, span a considerable length of time in New England's early history. It seems clear, therefore, that aggression and orality were more or less constant themes in the pathology of the period. Second, even in the far less bizarre testimonies of the witnesses—those who have been taken to represent the community at large—the same sort of focus appears. It is, above all, significant that the specific complaints of the accusers were so completely credible to so many others around them. The accusers, then, can be viewed as those individuals who were somehow especially sensitive to the problems created by their environment; they were the ones who were pushed over the line, so to speak, into serious illness. But their behavior clearly struck an answering chord in a much larger group of people. In this sense, nearly everyone in seventeenth-century New England was at some level an accuser.

mund Freud, "Negation," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. J. Strachey (London, 1960), XIX, 237, and Paula Heimann, "Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection in Early Infancy," in Klein *et al.*, *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, 122-68.

The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36

ARTHUR MARDER

EVER since its unhappy denouement, the Ethiopian crisis has been turned into a kind of morality play. As an example, a review of a recent work on the crisis concluded that "the verdict of history is likely to confirm [Haile Selassie's] view that the invasion of Ethiopia was a crime and the policy of Britain and France a foolish and in the end pointless betrayal of principles."¹ Without attempting an analysis of the pros and cons of the policy of appeasement, which is quite another matter, this essay will try to demonstrate that the orthodox judgment on British policy is far too simplistic, ignoring as it does powerful military considerations.²

The clash of Italian and Ethiopian troops at Walwal on the undefined frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on December 5, 1934, had been seized upon by Mussolini as the point of departure for the conquest of Ethiopia. Italian intentions were clear as early as February 1935, when large forces were dispatched to Eritrea. The British Services came into the Ethiopian picture for the first time in an important way on July 5, 1935. On this day the Italo-Ethiopian arbitration commission, meeting at Scheveningen in the Netherlands, reached an impasse; it adjourned on the ninth *sine die*. On the fifth Sir Maurice Hankey, the indispensable secretary of the cabinet (as well as of the Chiefs of Staff and Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committees), informed the service chiefs that the prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, wished them to bear in mind the military implications of Britain's carrying out the requirements of Article 16, the sanctions article, of the League of Nations Covenant. On July 30 the chiefs of staff stated their position: the exercise of economic pressure "would almost invariably lead to war" with Italy, as would "any steps taken to interrupt Italy's communications

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¹ *Times Literary Supplement*, Feb. 20, 1969, in a review of A. J. Barker, *The Civilizing Mission: A History of the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936* (New York, 1968).

² My principal unpublished sources have been the Chatfield Papers, through the courtesy of the second Lord Chatfield, the Admiralty (hereafter Adm.) and Foreign Office (hereafter FO) records, the cabinet (hereafter Cab.) minutes, the minutes and papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter CID), of the Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter DPR), and of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter COS), all in the Public Record Office (hereafter PRO).

with Abyssinia." The possibility of war necessitated the active cooperation of the other naval participatory powers (they had in mind France in particular) and preconcerted arrangements with them.³ These conditions became leitmotifs in the months that followed.

On July 31, the day the League Council convened in Geneva, Mussolini trumpeted his defiance of world opinion in *Il Popolo d'Italia*: "Put in military terms, the problem admits of only one solution—with Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva." Italy's war preparations were far advanced by this date. The British government was deeply concerned over the deteriorating situation. Especially were they afraid of an extreme Italian reaction to a possible decision in the coming Anglo-French conversations to uphold the League Covenant even to the extent of applying sanctions. On August 6 the cabinet instructed the chiefs of staff to examine at once what the position would be if Italy "took the bit between her teeth" and what steps should be taken to provide against this contingency.

The chiefs were alive to the ever present possibility of a war brought on by some Italian folly. The first sea lord, Chatfield, afterwards wrote that when the alarm occurred in August, "we were expecting the possibility of hostilities at a moment's notice." But the services were not ready, and in the negotiations by Britain and France with Italy in Paris beginning on August 16 "care should be taken," in Chatfield's words,

not to precipitate the possibility of hostilities, but on the other hand every endeavour should be made to delay this possibility as long as possible. It should also be emphasised that the enforcement of sanctions could not be undertaken at the moment which was necessarily diplomatically convenient, but only when the Services were in a position to back the enforcement.

So far as the Mediterranean Fleet was concerned, it was much below the required strength, especially in cruisers and anti-submarine fitted destroyers.⁴ Some two months were needed to make defense preparations, meaning, essentially, the movement of reinforcements and supplies to the Mediterranean. "It therefore seemed of some importance," declared the deputy chief of the air staff, Air Vice-Marshal C. L. Courtney, "that the Conversations with Italy should endeavour to 'keep the pot simmering' until that period of two months was up." The chiefs reminded the government of the importance of the assured military support of France; her moral and political cooperation would not suffice. Britain must not find herself carrying the risks alone; that is, there must be no unilateral action in support of the Covenant.⁵ To make certain that the Foreign Office got the message, Chatfield repeated the essence of the recommendations and reasoning of the

³ COS minutes, 147th meeting, July 30, 1935. The Cab. 53/5-6 classes embrace the 1935-36 minutes. The COS papers of this period are in the Cab. 53/25-28 classes.

⁴ Ammunition was a bit of a problem, too, the second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, confiding to the British ambassador in Cairo at about this time that his ships had enough ammunition to shoot for fifteen minutes! Lord Vansittart, *The Mist Procession* (London, 1958), 544.

⁵ COS minutes, 148th meeting, Aug. 8, 1935.

chiefs in a personal letter to Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, concluding: "War is not a light measure which we can go into blindfold trusting to luck. I only want to be sure that the Foreign Office are fully apprised of the military situation and they do all they can to delay the danger of hostilities, meanwhile authorising us to prepare."⁶

Sir Samuel Hoare, the foreign secretary, and Vansittart agreed that the admonitions of the service chiefs, and all that lay behind them, must guide their actions in Paris. "We shall have to be exceedingly cautious in Paris and for long after, if there is any prospect whatever of a stiff or drastic line being taken," wrote Vansittart.

What [Chatfield's letter] comes to is this. This country has been so weakened of recent years that we are in no position to take a strong line in the Mediterranean . . . we should be very cautious as to how far and in what manner we force the pace in Paris, with an unreliable France and an unready England.⁷

When Anthony Eden, the minister for League of Nations affairs, met with Laval, the French premier, on August 13 and again, with Vansittart, on August 14, in an attempt to establish a common front, Laval then, as throughout the crisis, was not prepared to adopt a strong stance at Geneva. He would do nothing that might antagonize Mussolini and deprive France of his support against Hitler. In the tripartite discussions on August 16 the British and French offered to support Italian economic and political preponderance in Ethiopia but would go no further. This was not good enough for the Duce, who was bent on annexing the non-Amharic territories of Ethiopia and establishing a protectorate over the rest, and he torpedoed the conference on the eighteenth.

With the possibility of a negotiated settlement increasingly remote, on Eden's initiative the holidaying prime minister was persuaded to summon an emergency cabinet for August 22 to consider precautionary military measures. Chatfield, who was snatching a holiday in Austria, was among those recalled to London. He met Baldwin in the cross-Channel steamer and was told: "We shall have a Cabinet to-morrow and then I shall, I hope, go back to Aix."⁸ There was to be no going back.

The cabinet had before it on the twenty-second the defense measures recommended by the chiefs of staff pursuant to the cabinet directive of August 6. The immediate problem concerned the program of the Home Fleet. As had been announced in the press, the fleet was supposed to leave home ports on September 8 for a cruise in home waters. The cabinet accepted the recommendation of the chiefs that this be scrapped and that the fleet concentrate at Portland on August 29, ready to sail for Gibraltar, with certain units to part company unobtrusively and sail to join the Mediterranean Fleet. The press was in due course informed that these ships were not reinforcing the Mediterranean Fleet, but that the move-

⁶ Chatfield to Vansittart, Aug. 8, 1935, Chatfield Papers, FO 371/19123.

⁷ Vansittart to Hoare, Aug. 9, 1935, *ibid.*

⁸ Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, *It Might Happen Again* (London, 1947), 88.

ment was in accordance with the routine work of the service. A second major decision was to authorize the Admiralty to keep the Mediterranean Fleet at Malta until August 29 and then to send it to the eastern Mediterranean. Finally the cabinet turned down the Admiralty's bid for mobilization of naval reserves, necessary to complete the Home and Mediterranean Fleets to full complement, "owing to the resounding effect it would have on public opinion both at home and abroad."⁹

Further preparatory steps were approved the next day by the recently instituted Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements of the Committee of Imperial Defence¹⁰—the maximum reinforcements in the Mediterranean that would not be considered likely to provoke hostilities on the eve of the September 4 meeting of the League of Nations Council: the aircraft carrier *Courageous*, the Fifth and Sixth Destroyer Flotillas, and the Second Submarine Flotilla. They left home waters on August 30.

The naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, W. W. Fisher, not only wanted all the reinforcements he could get, but he also pressed for the Home Fleet to proceed to Malta, where he apparently expected it would come under his command. "Any hostile act by Italy," he telegraphed the Admiralty,

should in my opinion be met by strongest possible counter offensives within 24 hours if possible. Delay adds to difficulty. If Mediterranean Fleet is in Eastern (bases) and Home Fleet at Malta the latter would be available for immediate counter offensive but major offensive would have to await junction of the two Fleets.¹¹

Chatfield preferred that not all the projected reinforcements go out immediately and that the Home Fleet remain concentrated at Portland, though at short notice. This was the line taken by the Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements on August 23. The first sea lord explained the situation to a frustrated commander-in-chief:

The Cabinet wanted to send you at once *all* the reinforcements I had envisaged. So did I, but *only* if they made France also take military measures such as concentrating aircraft on the Italian frontier. It was their view that to send out everything and the Home Fleet to Gibraltar would act as a *deterrent* to Mussolini but I had to point out the danger if they proved incorrect as the Foreign Office so often are. They would not approach the French however, as they feel the latter would refuse to cooperate in military measures at this time—whatever they *may* be willing to do later on.

Now if the sending of the Battle Cruisers to you and the Home Fleet to Gi-

⁹ Cab. 42 (35) minutes, Aug. 22, 1935. The Cab. 23/82-84 classes embrace the cabinet minutes of 1935-36.

¹⁰ DPR minutes, 5th meeting, Aug. 23, 1935. The cabinet had invited it on August 22 "to consider any matter that might arise in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute." The membership of the sub-committee consisted of eleven cabinet ministers, including the prime minister, who served as chairman, the foreign secretary, the minister for League of Nations affairs, and the service heads, with the chiefs of staff of the three defense services acting as expert advisers. The COS sub-committee and the chiefs of staff individually prepared papers for the committee. The 1935-36 minutes of this committee are in Cab. 16/136, and the papers in Cab. 16/138-40. The latter include many of the COS papers, which are also given a "DPR" number.

¹¹ Telegram No. 426, Aug. 20, 1935, Adm. 116/3038.

braltar had the effect of touching off the excitable Iti we should be plunged into War under the most unfavourable conditions possible, i.e., unready, no French support, no French dockyards for repair of ships, no Greek harbour, the M.N.B. [Mobile Naval Base] organisation not available. For this reason I advised holding up the Battle Cruisers for the present, badly as I wish them to be with you with your weakness in cruisers.¹²

In short, unless the French also took military measures, the first sea lord would not risk a too heavy naval concentration in the Mediterranean.

Fisher was also overridden in his desire to keep Malta as his main base. The Admiralty was seriously concerned about the vulnerability of Malta to air attack from Italy. It was within sixty miles of Sicilian air bases and its defenses against such attack (a War Office responsibility) were slight, owing to the financial stringency of preceding years. Fisher's answer to Admiralty arguments about the untenability of Malta was that he would use the fleet aircraft to defend Malta. Chatfield pointed out on August 25 that he had "*only* the exact number required for the 3 carriers, no reserve pilots other than those with the Fleet doing sea-time. If the aircraft at Malta were lost the Carrier is immobilised." On August 28 the Admiralty overrode Fisher's intention to use Malta as a base and, carrying out the cabinet decision of the twenty-second, sent the Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria. It left Malta in dribs and drabs starting on August 29, with the last unit, the flagship *HMS Resolution*, not arriving in Alexandria until September 24.

The first sea lord was clear in his mind that

Malta is a minor matter in the long run . . . if Italy is mad enough to challenge us, it is at the ends of the Mediterranean she will be defeated and, knowing that her communications with Abyssinia are cut, you yourself will have a freer hand in the Central Mediterranean and Malta, even if it is demolished, will come back again.¹³

This, too, was the position taken by the chiefs of staff, who declared that Malta's defense would probably have no adverse effects on the result of the war—indeed, enemy air attacks on Malta would be a diversion favorable to the operations of the fleet. However, "emphasis should be laid on the probable results to Italy of the cutting of her communications with her forces in Abyssinia and this was likely to be the main cause of bringing Italy to her knees. . . ."¹⁴

¹² Chatfield to Fisher, Aug. 25, 1935, Chatfield Papers.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ COS minutes, 150th meeting, Sept. 13, 1935. Throughout the crisis the chiefs of staff were concerned about the vulnerability of Malta to air attack, but they believed that the best method of relieving this pressure would be by air counter-attacks from southern France on northern Italy. To maintain adequate naval control in the central Mediterranean after the abandonment of Malta by the fleet, the chiefs, led by Chatfield, held that it would be necessary from the start of the war to make use of an advanced base of operations. For security reasons this base was referred to as Port "X." Actually it was Navarino, a large fleet anchorage on the west coast of Greece that the Mediterranean Fleet had frequently used for such events as regattas. The assumption was that the Greeks would cooperate. Greek permission or no, the fleet must have Port "X." "I do not know if Greece will give us Port 'X,'" Chatfield assured Fisher on August 25, "but if not I shall not hesitate (nor will the Cabinet) to seize it. I have told them so. So you can rely on that." In mid-December, however, this item in the war plan was scrapped, temporarily at any rate, after Fisher had convinced the Admiralty that the advantages of Port "X" did not justify the risk of trying to establish and maintain a base there in

Alexandria had important advantages. It controlled the Suez Canal, lay on the Italian line of communications to Ethiopia, and was an easily defended harbor. It had one grave shortcoming: it lacked repair facilities for the fleet, and Malta, the nearest dockyard and naval base, was 815 nautical miles away. Recreational facilities were few, and its narrow-mouthed harbor, if blocked, would trap the warships inside. Alexandria had a further disadvantage. The submarine-detecting apparatus (Asdics) of the anti-submarine forces were rendered ineffective by the varying densities of the sea water in different layers, a condition caused by the outpouring of fresh water from the mouths of the Nile.

Among other elementary precautions taken at this time on Admiralty initiative, the Home and Mediterranean Fleets were ordered to complete to full capacity of naval and victual stores to make them self-contained for four months, the charts that might be required were printed and distributed, and there was an acceleration of the provision of anti-submarine apparatus for small craft.

Meanwhile, in September, the one achievement of the League Council that had convened in Geneva on the fourth was the appointment on the sixth of a conciliation committee of five (Britain, France, Spain, Poland, and Turkey) "to make a general examination of Italo-Ethiopian relations and to seek for a pacific settlement." Italy ignored it. On the ninth the sixteenth session of the Assembly of the League opened. On the eleventh Hoare delivered his now celebrated speech. He made a ringing affirmation of Britain's support of "the League and its ideals as the most effective way of ensuring peace," and in emphatic tones, with raps on the desk of the rostrum for additional emphasis, he electrified the Assembly with these words: "In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations, the League stands, and my country stands with it, for collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression." We know that what struck his listeners as a British pledge to go to war if necessary to stop Italian aggression was only a bluff to scare Mussolini into a more moderate policy. In secret talks on September 10-11 Hoare and Laval had ruled out the adoption of military sanctions and had decided that any economic sanctions imposed by the League must be applied cautiously. The conciliation committee reported back on September 18, calling for administrative reforms in Ethiopia under European supervision and the recognition of Italy's paramount economic interests in that country. Italy found the scheme unacceptable.

British naval preparations were intensified as the crisis deepened during September. Chatfield "felt that all efforts must be sacrificed in the interests of the

the face of the Italian air threat. Thereafter Alexandria was considered the main fleet base in the event of war. From it the fleet would attempt to exert at least an intermittent control of the central Mediterranean. Chatfield anticipated that the fleet might have to be established at Port "X" so that it could "advance closer to Italy in order to force things to a conclusion." This time might arrive when the French were prepared for full military cooperation and were to put pressure on Italy by air attacks on northern Italy. COS minutes, 159th meeting, Dec. 13, 1935; Chatfield to Fisher, Dec. 19, 1935, Chatfield Papers.

Mediterranean. So far as he was concerned he had already burnt his boats in the East. He did not consider that anything should stand in the way of improving our position in the Mediterranean."¹⁵ The Fourth Cruiser Squadron, under the commander-in-chief, East Indies, concentrated at Aden to seal off the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Reinforcements from home waters and the China, Pacific, and America and West Indies stations arrived to join the Mediterranean Fleet, and a Home Fleet detachment consisting of the battle cruisers *Hood* and *Renown*, three six-inch cruisers, and six destroyers arrived at Gibraltar on September 17. The Mediterranean and Home Fleets were completed with ammunition, torpedoes, depth charges, and the like (although the former fleet continued to lack reserve ammunition). They were completed to full complements without mobilizing by denuding all the training schools and, without publicity, by calling up three thousand volunteers. The ships, equipment, and personnel constituting the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation, consisting of boom nets, controlled mines, twenty-two anti-aircraft guns, thirty-three searchlights, moorings, communications, and base staff (largely Royal Marines), also four six-inch coast-defense guns, were sent to Alexandria. The intention was to use them in the defense of Port "X" and other eastern Mediterranean bases. Two flying-boat squadrons from home were sent to Alexandria for eventual cooperation with the fleet, another was dispatched to Gibraltar, and the air squadrons in the Middle East were increased by thirty aircraft. Three battalions were sent to Malta. To intercept contraband destined for Eritrea or Italy, wartime contraband control staffs were established at Aden, Port Said, and Gibraltar. The Admiralty took preliminary steps to enable the control and routing of British shipping to be instituted should an emergency necessitate diversion of through Mediterranean trade to the Cape route.

It certainly looked as though the British meant business. Their ambassador in Rome, however, assured Mussolini on September 20 that the build-up in the inland sea was "not intended to imply any aggressive intention," but was rather a "natural consequence" of the violent Anglophobe tone of the Italian press.¹⁶ The latest study of the Italo-Ethiopian War holds:

The most generous interpretation of the reasons for the concentration of a British naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean during September 1935 was that the British Government considered there was the possibility of Mussolini taking a swipe at Britain if there was any interference at Suez. Yet this explanation seems far-fetched when one considers that with a quarter of a million men on the far side of the Canal in an area where they could hardly get enough drinking water and certainly not enough food, Mussolini had provided a hostage for any maritime power that chose to attack her. More likely the comings and goings of the British fleet, its concentration at Alexandria, and the reinforcements sent to Egypt, were deceptive measures designed to provide the necessary atmosphere at home, where the Conservatives had to be kept quiet, at Geneva, where Britain could pose as a weary Titan with the world's troubles on

¹⁵ COS minutes, 149th meeting, Sept. 6, 1935.

¹⁶ Sir Eric Drummond to Hoare, Sept. 20, 1935, FO 401/35.

her shoulders, and in Rome, where there was still hope that a show of the might of the Royal Navy could call the Duce's bluff.¹⁷

In this case "the most generous interpretation" is the correct one. The naval measures were, in fact, precautionary. "There has been so much wild and threatening talk in Italy of late," Hoare informed Eden, "that we have found it necessary to be on the safe side and to take some precautionary measures."¹⁸ Should the League impose non-military sanctions, the Admiralty believed it was "possible but not probable that Italy would take some action which would bring about a state of war. We must therefore be prepared for war to follow the imposition of any form of sanctions."¹⁹ So little were the British interested in pressuring the Italians with a display of force that they took the various naval measures with as little publicity as possible. So far as was practicable the government and Admiralty were anxious to avoid giving Mussolini an excuse for breaking off the negotiations at Geneva.

On the Italian side,

Mussolini did not want a war with Britain: at this time he had everything to lose and nothing to gain, despite his belief that the Italian air force was capable of inflicting great damage on the British Fleet. But he was irrevocably committed to the success of the Ethiopian campaign and it is not impossible that, had the threat from Britain become critical, out of desperation he might have retaliated.²⁰

Their preparations for war completed, on October 3 the Italians began the invasion of Ethiopia. On the seventh the Council of the League condemned Italy's resort to war as being "in disregard of her obligations under Article 12" (the compulsory arbitration article) of the Covenant. This brought into use Article 16, which called for the application of sanctions in such a case. On the eleventh representatives of fifty nations in the Assembly endorsed this decision; only four were opposed. It was not until November 18 that sanctions were imposed. Although Article 16 provided for military action as well, the only sanctions invoked were economic: the prohibition of Italian imports, of export of certain raw materials to Italy, and of loans and credits to Italians and the placement of an arms embargo. The League Assembly's Committee of Eighteen unanimously agreed in principle to oil sanctions on November 15, subject to further inquiries about the attitude of the United States.

The most critical phase of the crisis, for Britain above all, began with the

¹⁷ A. J. Barker, *The Civilizing Mission*, 131.

¹⁸ Hoare to Consul, Geneva, for Eden, Sept. 16, 1935, FO 401/35.

¹⁹ Admiralty to Cs-in-C., Mediterranean, East Indies, Africa, Sept. 11, 1935, Adm. 116/3038. Hoare believed that "the greatest risk . . . was liable to arise out of the probable lifting of the embargo on the export of arms to Abyssinia by the various nations whenever Italy was declared in the wrong. In that contingency it was quite conceivable that a serious incident might arise if Italy should claim belligerent rights and seize a ship carrying amunitions." DPR minutes, 8th meeting, Sept. 17, 1935. Various European nations, among them France and Britain, had imposed an arms embargo on Ethiopia early in the summer. It was raised on October 11.

²⁰ George W. Baer, *The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 355. That the Italians were not looking for war with Britain is borne out by the fact that as late as February 1936 no war orders had been sent to the Italian naval commander. *Ibid.*, 352-53, n.

adoption of sanctions, as it was obvious that the main burden of enforcing them, should the Italians make trouble, would fall on the Royal Navy. Late in October the British government expressed interest in an Italian overture, conveyed through Laval, to effect a military détente in the Mediterranean by the withdrawal of the two British battle cruisers at Gibraltar in exchange for the withdrawal of one Italian division from Libya (in addition to the one pulled out recently). The existing situation: 56,000 Italian troops in Libya and 15,500 British in Egypt, compared with the normal figures 20,000 and 11,000, respectively. The cabinet was ready to withdraw the battle cruisers if they had French assurance of naval support on the outbreak of war and if the Italians were willing to "effect a change in the attitude of the Press towards this country" and to scale their forces in Libya down to a "reasonable figure." By early November, however, the British had softened their terms considerably, so anxious were they to ease the crisis. French assurance of instant naval support was no longer required ("the proposal of the French Naval Staff that, in the event of an Italian aggression against British interests in the Mediterranean, France should delay going to war until her state of preparedness was improved, is the best we can hope for and should be accepted with good will") and gone was the provision about the Italian press. The withdrawal of one Italian division would be sufficient to order the withdrawal of the two battle cruisers from the Mediterranean, this despite Chatfield's unwillingness to approve any weakening of the fleet in the Mediterranean.²¹ Nothing was achieved, since Mussolini, who was now, Hoare reported, in an "intransigent mood," would not consider the British proposal except as part of a wider agreement covering the future, and this was unacceptable to London. By mid-November the détente was a dead issue.

The situation deteriorated further in the latter part of November and into December, a period when the British regarded an Italian "mad-dog act" as a distinct possibility. The Foreign Office picked up many rumors that Italy might well attack Britain "if sanctions were imposed such as to humiliate Italy or to threaten her national life." Hoare believed they could not ignore this threat, nor should they overrate it, since there was without doubt an element of propaganda in this rumor-mongering. Some of it, at least, was being used to frighten them.²² The cabinet of December 2 had before it secret information that indicated the Italians were making military preparations to back up their threats of active retaliation if oil sanctions were adopted. The Admiralty did not dismiss the possibility of an attack under the stimulus of oil sanctions. "Should they be imposed it is considered that the possibility of an attack on this country will be greater than at any previous period, since, faced by eventual defeat, Italy may

²¹ See especially DPR minutes, 12th and 13th meetings, Oct. 21, Nov. 5, 1935.

²² DPR minutes, 14th meeting, Nov. 26, 1935, Cab. 50 (35) minutes, Dec. 2, 1935. These rumors were what Chatfield may have been thinking of when he remarked long after the crisis: "If I believed all the stories I heard at the time of the Abyssinian crisis and my nerves were less strong I should now be in a lunatic asylum." Chatfield to Vansittart, Jan. 21, 1938, Chatfield Papers.

prefer to go down with her colours flying fighting this country rather than be ignominiously defeated by League action."²³

The pattern of British policy had been set by October and was to undergo no significant change while the crisis lasted. The opposition to military sanctions, the half-hearted espousal of an oil embargo—the only kind of economic sanction that really would have hurt Mussolini—and that futile early exercise in appeasement, the Hoare-Laval Pact of December 8, 1935, under which the League would have asked Ethiopia to sacrifice about half her territory in return for receiving a Red Sea port with a connecting corridor to it—these, as well as the ultimate decision to liquidate sanctions, were in large measure determined by the weakness of the British naval position. Not that this position vis-à-vis the Italian fleet was in much doubt, and therein lies an important facet of this study.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Ernle (afterward first Baron) Chatfield, the first sea lord and chief of naval staff (1933–38), was the finest officer the Royal Navy produced between the wars. He had character, charm (even if he always looked rather severe and lacked a sense of humor), administrative ability, professional knowledge—the lot. Admiral Sir William James, who had been Chatfield's chief of staff in the Home and Mediterranean Fleets, and who became his deputy chief of naval staff on October 30, 1935, has written:

With his unique experience afloat, in peace and war, and of the Admiralty, as Fourth Sea Lord, A.C.N.S. and Controller, he could very quickly master the contents of a docket or disentangle a problem and make his decision. Unlike some of his contemporaries he never wasted time on unimportant matters and so always found time to enjoy the sports and games, at which he was so proficient. . . . He was the best "all-rounder" of his day and age. With his quiet manner, his charm, and friendliness he won the hearts of all who had the good fortune to be on his staff and so in daily contact with him.²⁴

Chatfield completely dominated the Board of Admiralty, and it was he who conducted all the more important business arising from the crisis. Admiral James does not remember any board meetings on it. The first lord of the Admiralty during the Ethiopian crisis was the tall, very handsome, and charming Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell (soon afterward first Viscount Monsell), a onetime naval commander. "The great thing about him," one officer recalls, "was that he was a gentleman, ready to take the advice of the experts." There is a revealing passage in the first volume of Chatfield's autobiography: "Anyhow, I knew I should have a pleasant political chief who would 'give me my head,'"²⁵ and that is exactly what he did. Chatfield also dominated the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee. There is no mystery here. The chief of the air staff (1933–37) was Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington, in every way inferior to Chatfield.

²³ Plans Division, Admiralty, "Summary of Present Situation in Regard to Italo/Abyssinian Crisis," Dec. 11, 1935, Adm. 116/3049.

²⁴ Admiral James's letter in the *Times* (London), Nov. 20, 1967.

²⁵ *The Navy and Defence* (London, 1942), 247.

The same is true of the chief of the imperial general staff (1933-36), Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd. (His original family name was Montgomery, but he tacked on the surname of Massingberd on inheriting a property in Lincolnshire.) The war secretary at this time, Duff Cooper, found him "very inadequate and out of date."²⁶ Sir Basil Liddell Hart says that "when his name comes up, Monty (Bernard Montgomery) is always quick to emphasize that they were in no way related!"²⁷ What it boils down to is that Chatfield's views on strategic matters carried exceptional weight with the government.

The admiral was fully aware of Italy's "disadvantageous general strategical position," the result of her dependence on seaborne trade for seventy-six per cent of her total imports. Sixty-two per cent of her imports came through Gibraltar, three per cent via Suez, and the remaining eleven per cent from the Mediterranean and Black Sea countries.

With our forces based at Gibraltar and in Egypt, her main communications can be cut with comparatively little effort to ourselves, whereas to take any steps (excepting by submarine) to counter our action she would have to send her forces far from their bases where they would be brought to action. This strategical advantage is so great that it is unlikely that Italy could make any serious attempt with Naval forces to interfere with our control of the two exits to the Mediterranean except by the action of her submarines, which could not prove decisive. Further, Italy's object is the prosecution of her Abyssinian war, and the mere closing of the Canal to her by the presence of our Naval forces (whether closing is done in [the] Canal itself or by action outside it) might be decisive within a measurable period.²⁸

On the other hand, he pointed out, "the problem of putting warlike pressure on her is not so simple as might appear above," even if Britain had the support of the principal naval members of the League, because of certain Italian advantages. While Britain was doing nothing, Italy had long been preparing for war, and she occupied an excellent strategic position for operations in the central Mediterranean, since her fleet could operate on interior lines as against the British and French fleets.

These advantages did not signify too much to Chatfield, for he had contempt for the Italians as fighters and did not rate their navy highly. "The modern Italian is an unknown quantity but I cannot believe he is a greatly different fighter than in the past. But Mussolini (like Napoleon to Villeneuve!) may say 'Go to sea and don't return till you have damaged the British Fleet.'" ²⁹ He "thought it improbable that the Italian Navy would ever prove really efficient at sea."³⁰ On

²⁶ Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *Memoirs* (London, 1965), I, 300.

²⁷ Liddell Hart's letter to the author, Jan. 29, 1968.

²⁸ DPR 15, Chatfield's memorandum, "Italo-Abyssinian Dispute. The Naval Strategical Position in the Mediterranean," Sept. 3, 1935.

²⁹ Chatfield to Fisher, Aug. 25, 1935, Chatfield Papers.

³⁰ COS minutes, 150th meeting, Sept. 13, 1935. The other chiefs held similar opinions as regards their own service. The director of military operations and intelligence, Major-General J. G. Dill, representing the chief of the imperial general staff, asserted that "the Italian Army was technically highly developed and the officers were keen and efficient but they still remained Italians, and . . . there was considerable doubt as to how long that efficiency would last under active service conditions." The chief of the air staff agreed. "The Italian airman might start full of confidence, but a few knocks would soon reduce his enthusiasm." *Ibid.*

paper the naval position was fairly satisfactory. Admiralty figures on the relative strength of the two fleets in the Mediterranean late in September (including British ships en route) showed:

	<i>British Empire</i>	<i>Italy</i>
Battleships	5	2 (excluding 2 undergoing long refit and modernization)
Battle Cruisers	2 (at Gibraltar)	—
Aircraft Carriers	2	1
8-inch Cruisers	5	7
6-inch Cruisers	10 (including 3 at Gibraltar)	10
Flotilla Leaders	—	18
Destroyers	54	65
Submarines	11	62

Comparative figures for the two fleets in the Red Sea showed:

	<i>British Empire</i>	<i>Italy</i>
8-inch Cruisers	1	—
6-inch Cruisers	2	2 (5.9-inch)
Flotilla Leaders	—	2
Destroyers	5	3
Submarines	—	4
Sloops	5	2

The battle cruisers were regarded as “a tremendous asset.” The destroyer situation could stand improvement, but no more could be sent without mobilization. The most serious limitations were seen as, first, docking accommodation in the Mediterranean unless they had the use of French ports; second, “in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean aircraft attack was a serious preoccupation, especially as the anti-aircraft armaments of the Fleet were not as much as could be wished.”⁸¹ The French naval factor, which was central to the entire Admiralty outlook, will be discussed elsewhere, as will the air threat. Here it is sufficient to note that neither seriously affected the supreme confidence of the Admiralty in the ability of its fleet to handle the Italians in the Mediterranean, even in a singlehanded war. Chatfield early in the crisis asserted that “the final outcome of a conflict with Italy cannot be a matter of doubt,” and when the crisis was nearly over, he “had no doubts as to the ability of the Royal Navy to carry out its tasks.”⁸²

⁸¹ Figures presented by, and statement of, the First Lord, Sept. 24, 1935, Cab. 43 (35), minutes. On August 25 Chatfield warned Fisher of the Italian coastal motor-boats that might initially be an anxiety to him when he moved to the central Mediterranean. Admiralty figures at the end of October showed there were 544,000 tons of British warships in the Mediterranean and 49,000 tons in the Red Sea (compared with 208,000 and 2,000, respectively, on August 5) and 382,000 tons of Italian warships in the Mediterranean and 23,000 in the Red Sea (370,000 and 9,100, respectively, on August 5). Figures (prepared at Foreign Office request) attached to Sir E. Drummond's telegram No. 672, Oct. 30, 1935, Adm. 116/3038. Early in October nine submarines and a depot ship were sent out to increase the “very limited” submarine strength in the Mediterranean.

⁸² Chatfield's memorandum, “The Naval Strategical Position in the Mediterranean,” COS minutes, 174th meeting, May 13, 1936.

The Mediterranean Fleet shared this confidence. An officer who served in that fleet during the crisis is positive on this point:

I am quite sure everyone in the Fleet felt more than ready to take on the Italian Fleet and was confident that the Fleet would be successful in any sea operation that took place. Morale was high. Little was then known about the efficiency of anti-aircraft defence, the Italian bombers were based a great distance to the west and they were not considered much of a menace.³³

The commander-in-chief had not the slightest doubts about the outcome of a war. Shortly before the fleet sailed to Alexandria, Fisher received from the chiefs of staff "a very pessimistic, not to say, defeatist, view of the Mediterranean Fleet's capacity to deal with the Italians." (This mood in London vanished quickly.) An angry commander-in-chief told one of his flag officers that he had signaled "their Lordships telling them I disagree with every word of this pusillanimous document. The Mediterranean Fleet is by no means so powerless as is here set out."³⁴

Fisher's confidence was based on the efficiency of the fleet, for which he was himself in large part responsible. Admiral Sir William Wordsworth Fisher, commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean since 1932, was an officer of magnificent, if somewhat aloof, presence, known to his contemporaries as "W.W." and "the tall Agrippa." (The latter from Heinrich Hoffman's children's classic, *Struwwelpeter*: "Now tall Agrippa lived close by—/So tall, he almost touch'd the sky . . ."). Among his diversified interests was tennis, which he played every possible afternoon, three or four sets at a time, even in the intense heat of the Alexandrian sun. More to the point, Fisher had a most attractive personality, immense energy, and a first-class brain, and he was an inspiring and understanding leader who possessed the confidence and affection of all who served under him. By continually exercising his fleet at sea, he kept it at peak efficiency, ready for any emergency. When he left for home in the *Queen Elizabeth* on March 20, 1936, his departure was an unforgettable experience for the officers and men. Cunningham had "never heard cheers more hearty nor heart-felt. We were losing a friend, and a great commander."

Fisher's successor, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, who had been commander-in-chief designate, had been serving as Fisher's chief of staff since October 1935, a most extraordinary arrangement. Pound was, in Cunningham's judgment, "a master of detail, which at times led him into trying to do too much himself. He was not, perhaps, a man of great imagination or insight. . . ."³⁵ But, as Cunningham admits, Pound succeeded in keeping the Mediterranean Fleet in the

³³ Admiral Sir Guy Grantham's letter to the author, Aug. 21, 1968. Grantham was in the Mediterranean from the end of 1935 and joined the staff of Fisher's successor in March 1936.

³⁴ Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, *A Sailor's Odyssey* (London, 1951), 173-74. Cunningham was then rear-admiral, Destroyer Flotillas, Mediterranean. A few weeks earlier, on August 14, the Duce had received the opinion of his chiefs of staff that a war with Great Britain would prove disastrous to Italy: the British fleet was far superior to Italy's; the Italian air force, though larger, consisted mostly of obsolete planes; Italian cities, ports, and industrial centers would be heavily damaged. Baer, *The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War*, 253-54.

³⁵ *A Sailor's Odyssey*, 583-84.

same high state of efficiency in which Fisher had left it. The forceful and tireless Pound (he never went to bed until 1:00 or 2:00 A.M. and normally would be up fully dressed and working by 6:30 A.M.) continued the routine in the fleet as before. Ships were ordered to be ready to sail in not more than two and a half hours, leave was very restricted, and all shore leave ended at 10:00 P.M., there being no night leave at all. "There was a great deal of exercising at sea," writes an officer on his staff, "firings of all kinds, and a general atmosphere of tension, perhaps due to Dudley's eagle eye which resulted in 'bottles' being flashed to ships the moment he spotted anything amiss. Ships' companies were driven hard all the time and a sense of tension was maintained."³⁶

The naval war plan that emerged during the autumn as a result of Admiralty guidelines and Fisher's definite ideas assumed that Britain must be ready to act singlehanded, at least in the early stages of a war. It is perhaps enough to say that the plan gave the main role to Fisher's fleet, which had the principal concentration of force, and that it called for an aggressive offensive against the Italians with the object of securing and maintaining naval control in the central Mediterranean to bring "every means of pressure to bear upon Italy." Economic pressure and naval action alone were not counted on to defeat Italy; but severing communications with her armed forces in East Africa and Libya would force a surrender before long, and this would probably cause her to sue for peace.³⁷

Fisher saw no need to wait for the outbreak of a war provoked by Italy. He was confident that if told to do so, he could stop Italian ships carrying troops and war materiel through the Canal and put an end to Italian aggression in Ethiopia. He was prepared to deal with the Italians even if he had to go it alone. As he telegraphed the Admiralty: "Without underrating characteristics of enemy vessels or morale of Italian Navy I feel content that on receiving suitable reinforcements from Home Fleet any situation at sea could be dealt with without active assistance of other Powers—provided that France was friendly."³⁸ Nor did Cunningham have any doubts.

To us in the Mediterranean Fleet it seemed a very simple task to stop [Mussolini]. The mere closing of the Suez Canal to his transports which were then streaming through with troops and stores would effectively have cut off his armies concentrating in Eritrea and elsewhere. It is true that such a drastic measure might have led to war with Italy; but the Mediterranean Fleet was in a state of high morale and efficiency, and had no fear whatever of the result of an encounter with the Italian Navy.

But the order was never given. Cunningham continues: "Had we stopped the passage of Italian transports through the Suez Canal, and the import of fuel oil into Italy, the whole subsequent history of the world might have been

³⁶ Admiral Grantham's letter to the author, Aug. 21, 1968. To give an officer a "bottle" means to rap him on the knuckles. The origin of the expression is obscure.

³⁷ A convenient résumé of the evolution of the naval war plan will be found in an Admiralty paper, "History of the Italian-Abyssinian Emergency, August 1935 to July 1936," Pt. A, "Commander-in-Chief's Narrative," Dec. 20, 1937, Adm. 116/3476 (hereafter "History of the Emergency").

³⁸ No. 426, Aug. 20, 1935, Adm. 116/3038.

altered." "No one was in doubt about the outcome," Admiral Grantham writes, "if H.M. Government was prepared to grasp the nettle and declare war regardless of world opinion." Meanwhile, the fleet took out its frustrations by showing contempt for the Italians when it had the opportunity. On one occasion, when a transport passed across the bows of two British warships and the troops cheered defiantly and sang the Fascist anthem, the hundreds of British sailors shouted at them. "It is impossible to describe the withering contempt the British blue-jacket can put into his applause if he dislikes the entertainment or entertainer, and on this occasion their sarcastic shouts penetrated even the thick hides of the Italians."³⁹ Fisher and his fleet must have found a *Punch* cartoon of this period highly apropos; it showed Baldwin sitting at his desk—on the wall, a model of a battleship in a glass case labeled HMS *Unriskable*.

The order to Fisher to intercept the Italian transports and supply ships as they approached Port Said was never sent because it was, Hoare has written, "our fixed resolve to avoid unilateral action against a potential ally in a war with Germany. The naval staff, considering the crisis from a wider angle, could not have been more insistent with their warnings against diminishing or dissipating our limited strength."⁴⁰ Indeed the chiefs of staff at no time so much as contemplated any forcible measures "short of war," whether by enforcement of an oil embargo or denial of the Suez Canal to the Italians. Their energies were focused on the strategy to be employed against Italy in the event of the war that they and the government were determined to avoid. We have come here to the crux of the matter so far as the navy was concerned.

To begin with, Chatfield, in common with the other service chiefs, had little use for the League and none for the policy of sanctions, even if, as he admits, the nation "stood solidly behind sanctions. The principle of the League and so-called Collective Security had been well planted in the public mind, and watered by every national leader continuously for fifteen years." The first sea lord considered this "a dangerous attitude": the armed forces of the League powers were not "so strong as to enable them to fight for a common cause, *as well as to safeguard their own vital interests*."⁴¹ By "vital interests" he meant the vast responsibilities of imperial defense with special reference to a restless and potentially hostile Japan. These responsibilities had to be met with a navy that was up to a one-power standard only—the consequence of the "Ten-Year Rule," which had lapsed in 1932, the building restrictions imposed by postwar naval conferences, and the policy of economy-minded governments. It had been planned that in a Far Eastern emergency most of the fleet would be sent out, leaving in home waters a "nucleus" of ships; the hope was that there would be no complications until the other ships returned. Chatfield could not appreciate the wisdom of creating a

³⁹ Cunningham, *A Sailor's Odyssey*, 173, 177; Admiral Grantham's letter to the author, Aug. 21, 1968.

⁴⁰ Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), *Nine Troubled Years* (London, 1954), 191.

⁴¹ Chatfield, *It Might Happen Again*, 87.

danger on their main line of communications to the Far East "for a moral motive." "Personally," he confided to Fisher on August 25,

I have mixed feelings about a war. The bumptiousness of Italy is so great that it may be worth fighting her now to re-assert our dominance over an inferior race. But against that a hostile Italy is a real menace to our Imperial communications and defence system. We have relied on practically abandoning the Mediterranean if we send the Fleet east. For that reason I do not want to go to extreme measures and hope the Geneva Pacifists will fail to get unanimity and the League will break up.

The first lord shared the admiral's feelings about the strategic unwisdom of going to war with Italy or, what was almost as bad, making an enemy of her. "I was," he says,

strongly against sanctions for the following reasons. (1) It was most important for the Navy to have a non-hostile Mediterranean and all war time arrangements for reinforcing places like Singapore were based on using the Suez Canal. (2) At the time Italy was opposed to Germany and I feared that sanctions might well unite the two dictators. Unfortunately, as I think, only one other member of the Cabinet supported me.⁴²

There were three ways in which a strong sanctions policy could hurt British imperial interests: (1) Creating hostility in Italy, a power of growing naval and air strength, would stretch British naval resources too thin in the event of a war in Europe and the Far East simultaneously. (2) A war with Italy would make it practically impossible to protect British interests against a hostile Japan. "Our strategic plans in the Far East," declared the chiefs of staff,

are based upon the possibilities of conflict with an increasingly powerful Japan. . . . Our problem in the Far East is now further complicated by the apparent possibility of our becoming involved in additional commitments in support of the League of Nations, and the prospect of being faced with a war in the Far East at a time when complications in Europe necessitated the retention of part or the whole of our Fleet, is one of the gravest significance.⁴³

⁴² Lord Monsell's letter to the author, Dec. 1, 1968. The "other member of the Cabinet" was Ramsay MacDonald, lord president of the council.

⁴³ COS 405, "Strategical Situation in the Far East, with Particular Reference to Hong Kong," Oct. 10, 1935. The service chiefs never lost sight of the possibility that Japan might be tempted to use the occasion of a British embroilment in Europe to take action contrary to British interests. As the CIGS remarked, "It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it would be beyond our powers to secure our communications in the Far East, and still more to bring a war with Japan to a successful conclusion, if at the same time we were involved in a war in Europe." The British strategic position in such an eventuality would be desperate. Singapore could be defended but was "dangerously weak"; Hong Kong could not withstand a "determined attack." Montgomery-Massingberd's memorandum, Sept. 16, 1935, and letter to Hankey, Sept. 25, COS 403, 398, respectively. Looking back when the peak of the crisis had passed, Chatfield outlined how shaky the Far Eastern situation would have become had war broken out with Italy. "When the Italian situation arose, he had been forced to pay off a considerable proportion of the battlefleet to man the light craft required in the Mediterranean. Further, on the termination of the Ten-Year Rule in 1932 the Admiralty had started a system of laying up battleships in rotation for extensive modernisation, and this programme would not be completed till about 1941. The consequent weakness in battleships had been accepted in order that we should be at maximum strength at the critical time (then estimated at 1942). If war were to be declared to-day against Japan, we should have only seven battleships available for operations in the Far East. This position was a dangerous one. . . ." COS minutes, 174th meeting, May 13, 1936. Or, as Chatfield told a friend of Baldwin's, "the cable of Imperial Defence was stretched bar taut. Italy was the gnat whose weight could snap it." Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, *Baldwin: A Biography* (London, 1969), 876.

(3) A war with Italy would leave the fleet weakened, since it was bound to suffer losses and damage. This was too high a price to pay even in a victorious war, given the possibility of trouble with Japan or Germany.

The third consideration bulked very prominently in the strategic thinking of the Admiralty. Ships could not be built overnight; it took some four years to construct capital ships and aircraft carriers. The first lord informed his colleagues that there could be no doubt that the fleet had the capacity to win command of the Mediterranean. The difficulty was that they "might sustain serious losses, since our forces were not in a proper state of readiness for war in a land-locked sea." The air secretary uttered a similar warning.

From the Naval and Air point of view [the Cabinet minutes record], it was represented that our defence forces and defences in the Mediterranean were not in a proper condition for war, and from this point of view it was urged that an effort should be made to obtain peace, holding the threat of the oil sanction over Italy, and that the fixing of the date should not be decided until after a failure of peace discussions. . . . The Cabinet ought to give the greatest consideration to the grave observations of the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for Air and their warning of the possibility of serious losses, for if we proceeded with the oil sanction and it brought about a serious reverse, the public would not easily forgive the Government, especially when the serious warnings of the Defence Departments become known.⁴⁴

So seriously did the Admiralty take the possibility of losses and damage in a Mediterranean war that a naval staff appreciation, endorsed by the chiefs of staff, emphasized the need to start a large construction program immediately if a singlehanded war were forced on Britain, so that the navy would be able to fulfill its commitments in the Far East when the war ended.⁴⁵

The government was in sympathy with the strategic views of the Admiralty. A cabinet minister of those days has stated in a private letter to the author that it would

probably be true to say that the naval aspect weighed with the Government in relation to the Far East. To that extent, any losses in the Mediterranean, even minor ones, could have had significance, for we had also to be able to meet our responsibilities in the Far Eastern Seas.

The Admiralty's fear of ship losses and damage in a war with Italy brings us to a consideration of the air threat. Chatfield had a reputation for underestimating the air danger in a future war. At a dinner party in 1933 Liddell Hart overheard him dismissing that threat with the remark that it was "All rubbish. What we

⁴⁴ Cab. 50 (35), Dec. 2, 1935. The Admiralty, keen on not provoking Mussolini, continued to oppose oil sanctions vigorously, as through the first lord at the cabinet of February 26, 1936 (Cab. 11 [36]), which examined all the pro and con arguments. The cabinet on this occasion, while expressing their concern for the naval difficulties in the Mediterranean, instructed Eden, who had succeeded Hoare as foreign secretary on December 18, to vote for oil sanctions at the Committee of Eighteen meeting fixed for March 2. Nothing came of this halfhearted venture.

⁴⁵ COS minutes, 150th meeting, Sept. 13, 1935.

want are battleships." This attitude to air power was not peculiar to him. Liddell Hart continues,

I also came to realise that to most admirals the respective value of battleships and aircraft was not basically a technological issue, but more in the nature of a spiritual issue. They cherished the battle-fleet with a religious fervour, as an article of belief defying all scientific examination. . . . A battleship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop.⁴⁶

This is not the whole story. The commander-in-chief, India, Sir Philip Chetwode, wrote in August 1935 that "the Navy laughs at the Air now. They have got protected decks, and with their 'blisters' and multiple machine-guns and multiple anti-aircraft guns, they don't fear them in the slightest."⁴⁷ There is another facet in the naval thought of the time, the valor of ignorance. The air threat was still pretty much of an unknown quantity and therefore regarded as one that need not alarm the service. "No doubt," Chatfield maintained, "under certain circumstances attacks from the air will be a very serious menace to warships, but it is at present pure conjecture as to what those circumstances will be, and what the degree of the vulnerability of the ships will be."⁴⁸ Cunningham says that "the Regia Aeronautica was of course an unknown quantity; but we were not disposed to attach too much weight to its ability to affect the issue. As the war was to prove we were right."⁴⁹ The Admiralty expected that, at least at the start of a war with Italy, it was unlikely that the air menace would interfere seriously with the operations of the fleet.

Despite the confident, even supercilious, attitude to the threat from the air, in practice the Admiralty and Fisher did not take it lightly. A statement by the three commanders-in-chief in the Mediterranean reflects Fisher's position: "The effect of air attack on a fleet in harbour is an unknown quantity and one to which a fleet should not be subjected without the strongest reasons."⁵⁰ Admiralty and fleet concern over air attacks was shown by the Mediterranean Fleet's quick abandonment of Malta and by the decision on September 27 to rearm the cruiser *Coventry* with anti-aircraft guns and send her to the Mediterranean Fleet. (She did not arrive until January 1936.) A similar decision was announced for the cruiser *Curlew* on November 8. Since the navy had no surplus personnel, the commander-in-chief sent home the battleship *Revenge* in December to provide the crews for these specially fitted anti-aircraft vessels. A particular reason for the concern over what Italian air power might achieve was the anti-aircraft ammunition position, which Chatfield on September 3 described as "serious." The

⁴⁶ Liddell Hart, *Memoirs*, I, 325, 326.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 329.

⁴⁸ Chatfield's letter, signed "Sailor," in the *Times* (London), Mar. 19, 1935.

⁴⁹ *A Sailor's Odyssey*, 173. The total British air force in the Middle East, including the fleet air arm, was numerically equal to the Italian air force. The Italian machines, especially the long-range bombers and possibly the fighters, had a better performance, but the British personnel were superior. Cab. 50 (35) minutes, Dec. 2, 1935. In fleet aircraft the Mediterranean Fleet outnumbered the Italian fleet.

⁵⁰ COS 419, "Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Appreciation of the Situation which Would Arise in the Middle East in the Event of War with Italy," Dec. 6, 1935. The chiefs of staff took the same line. COS 426, "Defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East," Jan. 22, 1936.

war secretary designate, Duff Cooper, and the first lord gave particulars at a meeting of the Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements on November 26. They were anything but reassuring. The stocks of anti-aircraft ammunition available in Malta, Egypt, and Aden were not sufficient for extended operations, and it would be some months before a reasonably satisfactory position could be reached. Monsell's estimate was that the fleet had only enough anti-aircraft ammunition for each long-range gun to permit 22 minutes continuous fire; the corresponding figure for each short-range gun was 13 minutes. By January 1936 the latter figure could be raised to 16 minutes, and by the end of the financial year, to 25.⁵¹

Another factor that contributed heavily to the navy's opposition to the imposition of oil sanctions was that the prolongation of the emergency would seriously affect the efficiency of the fleet. Almost from the commencement of the crisis we find the Admiralty making representations to the government on the decreasing efficiency of the fleet, in both the Mediterranean and home waters. The longer the emergency continued and the fleet was kept in a state of war readiness, the more intolerable the position of the fleet in the Mediterranean and the more dismal the prospect for the whole fleet when the crisis was over. The first sea lord put the problem in a nutshell when he said that

the longer the resumption of the refit programmes and reliefs of personnel were postponed, the more congested would this action become ultimately . . . the present situation could not be continued. . . . At the same time if steps were now taken to bring back personnel and ships from the Mediterranean, there would be a weakening in both the political and military position. It was a question for the Government whether they were prepared to take that risk.⁵²

The situation worsened progressively as there was no relaxation in the crisis. The Home Fleet ships that were not in the Mediterranean were denied their usual autumn cruise to Scottish waters and were kept at Portland for months in "execrable weather" that was depressing to the men and militated against efficiency. The normal procedure was to send the Home Fleet on a spring cruise to the Gibraltar area. All they were able to do to avoid inflaming Italian susceptibilities was, in January, to send four ships and a destroyer flotilla to Gibraltar, where they relieved four units of the Home Fleet. In August the Admiralty had brought the Mediterranean Fleet up to war strength without mobilization. The result by the New Year was that the leave of many of the personnel was long overdue. The situation had reached the point where, if a ship needed docking, she steamed to Malta at high speed; twenty-four hours was the maximum allowed there, "and then she rushed back to join the fleet as if the Italians were chasing her."

The Admiralty would have played a different tune had they been able to

⁵¹ DPR minutes, 14th meeting. Duff Cooper afterward "thought that it was easy to exaggerate the importance of the shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition, as the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns was doubtful, and there were occasions when clouds, and so forth, rendered them of little value." Cab. 50 (35) minutes, Dec. 2, 1935.

⁵² COS minutes, 155th meeting, Nov. 19, 1935.

count on wholehearted French cooperation in the air and at sea. It was Chatfield's constant refrain that the political discussions should not get ahead of military arrangements, that is, sanctions should not be carried as far as an oil embargo before the solution of the question of military cooperation with the Mediterranean powers in the League, France above all. The Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements had early laid down as the condition for the adoption of sanctions that there must be "a clear understanding that if Italy, as a consequence, should attack any of the nations concerned, all the participating nations will declare war on Italy." Yugoslavia, Greece, and France "in particular" were mentioned specifically.⁵³ Had this become a reality, the government, with the backing of the services, in all probability would have responded fully to the moral fervor of the country and have gone in for oil sanctions and very likely a blockade of the Suez Canal as well. It must be stressed that, although the chiefs of staff and the government were from the start keenly interested in obtaining naval, military, and air assurances from all those Mediterranean powers who were members of the League, in the event of aggression by Italy, it was French cooperation that constituted the key element and missing link in British policy. This was so for three principal reasons: (1) With Malta not to be used as a fleet base if it came to war, docking and repair facilities would be practically non-existent for Fisher's capital ships, and indifferent for other units of his fleet, in a singlehanded war fought in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean. The only docks available would be those at Gibraltar, which could not take capital ships, and one at Alexandria, which could take nothing larger than a small cruiser. Repair facilities would be similarly limited. Damaged ships most probably would have to return to England for repairs, if they were able to do so, or remain out of action for an indefinite period. The availability of the French naval bases of Toulon and Bizerta would have solved this problem. (2) Offensive French air operations (with the participation of an RAF contingent) against suitable targets in northern Italy would divert to an important degree the Italian air threat to Malta and to the Mediterranean Fleet when operating in the central area. (3) Allied French naval forces in the western Mediterranean, along with the Gibraltar force, would constitute a threat to Italy's west coast that would prevent her withdrawing all her warships from that coast and concentrating them against the British Mediterranean Fleet.

Discussions with the French naval staff with a view to concerted action were started in Paris on September 18. The question became pressing after Italy went to war. Eden had obtained a resolution "from both the Committees concerned" that all nations that had adopted sanctions would carry out Article 16, paragraph 3: "The Members of the League will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their Members by the Cove-

⁵³ DPR minutes, 6th meeting, Sept. 5, 1935. Hoare later assured the committee that he had this principle "continuously in mind." DPR minutes, 9th meeting, Sept. 23, 1935.

nant-breaking State.” Pressed by the British, Laval had pledged on October 15 that France fully subscribed to the paragraph, but his reservation baffled them and “made a deplorable impression.” He would not consider Article 16 applicable if the Italians alleged that the British naval build-up in the Mediterranean went beyond the steps agreed upon at Geneva for the execution of Article 16. In addition, the French Admiralty refused to discuss the question of cooperation with the British naval attaché. Hoare was particularly annoyed at Laval’s reservation because the French premier had in early September not only concurred in the British naval reinforcements but had expressed surprise that they had not been sent out earlier. “Moreover, he seemed to be constantly intriguing behind the back of the League of Nations and ourselves with a view to some accommodation with Signor Mussolini.” Anger against Laval mounted in the course of the cabinet discussion. It was brought out that his attitude, of which the Italians would be almost certain to learn, would lead to a breakdown of the whole scheme of sanctions.

It was suggested that it was necessary in these circumstances to let the French know that if the Covenant were to break down for this reason the Locarno Treaty would also break down and there would be left no effective obligations. If it was arguable that our reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet was so provocative as to enable Italy to attack us without bringing paragraph 3 of Article XVI into operation, it might be argued that in the event of a German attack on France the French fortifications and other defensive preparations were equally provocative to a German attack.

With the first lord taking the lead in urging that Laval be made to clarify his position, the cabinet agreed (1) that the British ambassador should “insist on a categorical and explicit withdrawal” of his reservation to paragraph 3 of Article 16, and explain to Laval “what were likely to be the consequences and reactions of adherence to his present attitude on the sanctity of international engagements,” and (2) that until the French position was cleared up, “it would be desirable not to press sanctions too actively at Geneva.”⁵⁴

Pressured by the British, Laval gave them an assurance of military support on October 18 and agreed a few days later to conversations between the two naval staffs. At a meeting in London on October 30 between Chatfield and Rear-Admiral Decoux, representing the French naval staff, it quickly developed that, although the collaboration of the two navies was assured, and France would mobilize her forces simultaneously with Britain’s, the French armed forces were so unready that they would be in no position to go to war for several weeks after the outbreak of an Anglo-Italian war. This did not much disturb the Admiralty. French mobilization in itself would contain Italian surface and air forces and thereby have “the same effect as the proposed operations off the Western coast of Italy.” Moreover, Decoux had been able to assure Chatfield that French bases, “either in France or North Africa,” would be at the disposal of the Royal Navy in time of war for docking, repair, and, if need be, operational purposes. The Sub-

⁵⁴ Cab. 46 (35) minutes, Oct. 15, 1935.

Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements agreed with Chatfield's evaluation that this being the best that could be hoped for—simultaneous mobilization, French entry into the war when ready, and the use of French bases by the Royal Navy—they should not try, in his words, to get France “to commit herself irrevocably as soon as we were attacked.”⁵⁵ Soon afterward an agreement was reached in principle that the British Mediterranean Fleet would be responsible mainly for the eastern Mediterranean, the French fleet mainly for the western Mediterranean, from Cape de Gata in the west to the Cape Bon-Sicily line in the east, with the Gibraltar force free to cooperate with either fleet as required.⁵⁶ On November 22 the French naval staff indicated willingness to exchange information on naval bases in the Mediterranean. The Admiralty suggested a questionnaire that included information on the defenses, fuel supplies, and fueling arrangements at the French bases—Toulon, Bizerta, Philippeville, Bona, and Algiers. The information was forthcoming.

Yet the situation at the end of November was, from the British point of view, far from satisfactory. The French Ministry of Marine had agreed that military and air conversations would be required, yet conversations between the military and air staffs had not begun. Chatfield found it disturbing that in the naval conversations the French representatives had stressed the need to insure complete secrecy as regards the talks, claiming that the repercussions in France, if they became known, would, in Chatfield's words, “queer the pitch.” They were even withholding the existence of the talks from their own Foreign Office. Moreover, they did not wish to pursue the talks further for the time being but were willing to resume them at the London Naval Conference that was to begin on December 9, when secret talks could be carried on without the possibility of a leak. After accepting this plan, the first sea lord had discovered on November 25 that the French representative would not be their deputy chief of naval staff, as had been first proposed, but an officer who was not a member of the French naval staff. This looked to Chatfield “as if after all the French again wished to burke the issue. . . . Generally, the conversations had brought quite clearly to light the acute anxiety of the French not to become involved in hostilities with Italy.” It was his belief that if the French entered an Italian war as Britain's ally, the only advantage the British would gain would be the use of French bases. He appreciated that “the exchange of naval information did not, of course, carry with it any executive [that is, official approval to implement in the event of war agreements reached now], and while we knew what the French Naval Authorities could do in the event of hostilities it did not ensure that they would be permitted to carry out the co-operation they envisaged.” There appeared to be a consensus at this meeting that Britain could not rely on French cooperation

⁵⁵ DPR 45, “French Naval Co-operation in the Mediterranean,” Nov. 2, 1935.

⁵⁶ Telegram No. 1544/2, Director of Plans, Admiralty, to C.-in-C., Mediterranean, Nov. 2, 1935, Adm. 116/3038.

in the event of Italian aggression against her. What emerged was agreement that the time had come to know precisely where they stood with the French and that if they received no satisfaction, they should adopt a go-slow policy on sanctions and, as Monsell put it, "try and approach the whole problem from another angle—that of finding ways and means of improving the general international situation."⁵⁷

In the course of the next few days the British ambassador saw Laval and received from him a "categorical affirmative" in reply to the specific question whether they could count on French assistance if Italy attacked and whether the French would in that eventuality regard themselves as in a state of war with Italy. Laval had gone a step further and repeated his assurances to the Italian ambassador. This was reported at the cabinet of December 2. The "efficacy of the French undertaking" would be checked by their readiness to continue the naval conversations and to extend them to military and air talks, though from the general staff's point of view the military talks were not essential. At the same cabinet, which accepted an oil sanction in principle, it was "strongly urged, from the point of view of the Defence Services, that no decision to apply [oil] sanctions should be taken until effective co-operation by France had been secured, in accordance with previous Cabinet decisions."⁵⁸

At his celebrated meeting with Laval on December 7, and before they got down to working out the details of their Ethiopian scheme, Hoare asked the wily Frenchman "categorically whether in the event of an attack we could depend upon French help. His answer, though it was in general terms satisfactory, avoided any undertaking to make military preparations, and obviously assumed that French co-operation would depend upon Anglo-French agreement as to our immediate policy."⁵⁹ Laval did agree to open military and air staff conversations, but these, held on December 9 and 10, were unproductive.⁶⁰ The military conversations made it clear that "the French can, if they wish, carry out certain measures which will not only shew that they are prepared to come to our assistance if we are attacked by Italy, but that they themselves are committed to stand side by side with us on an equal footing." The air conversations were equally barren, it being obvious that

the French wished to limit the war to the Mediterranean and to avoid any action which would entail retaliatory measures against France itself. This was made more evident by the way in which they suggested that they might take action from Tunisia against Sicily, but were reluctant to take any action against Northern Italy unless France was first attacked.

⁵⁷ DPR minutes, 14th meeting, Nov. 26, 1935.

⁵⁸ Cab. 50 (35) minutes.

⁵⁹ Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years*, 179.

⁶⁰ British reports on the conversations are in DPR 75, "Report on Conversations between Representatives of the British and French General Staffs in Paris on 9th and 10th December, 1935," Dec. 18, 1935, and DPR 77, "Report on Air Aspects of the Conversations in Paris, 9th and 10th December 1935," Jan. 10, 1936. These reports were later circulated to the chiefs of staff for their consideration as COS 423.

Neither French service was prepared to concert any concrete measures beforehand. This *non possumus* cast suspicion on the sincerity of Laval's assurances of French military support in the event of an Anglo-Italian war, besides compounding the difficulties of Allied cooperation in this contingency. Nor, with the exception of Turkey, were assurances forthcoming from the other Mediterranean powers of active military cooperation.

The situation as of mid-December was summarized in a telegram from the chiefs of staff to the three commanders-in-chief in the Mediterranean:

It appears that our own forces will have to sustain the war for a not-inconsiderable period. France and Greece, however, have promised full use of their ports, and Turkey is willing to co-operate with her limited air forces. The situation as regards the military co-operation of France is at the present time profoundly unsatisfactory. She has made no preparations for a war with Italy, and it is very unlikely that any precautionary measures will be taken before an emergency rises, as this involves mobilisation, which, under the existing political situation in France, is not feasible.⁶¹

The naval, military, and air conversations, which continued into January, only confirmed the hopelessness of expecting active military support from the French. The French air staff confessed that they wanted to assist but could not get their government's permission to take the steps they wished to take. The French naval staff, Chatfield was informed by his opposite number, was anxious to cooperate fully but the preparatory steps their navy was taking were being kept from their own minister of marine! Chatfield, who with the other chiefs had by now practically given up hope of active French support in a showdown with Italy, had second thoughts about the value of getting a firm commitment.

If ultimately the threat of hostilities with Italy was likely to disappear, then it would clearly be best that we should have committed France to as little as possible. The more she was committed, the more likely would she be to use her co-operation as an argument for similar aid on our part in the event of French difficulties with Germany at some future date. The alternative was merely to express dissatisfaction with the steps France had taken to-date.⁶²

The last important contact with the French naval authorities occurred in mid-January, when two French senior officers met at the Admiralty with Chatfield, the deputy chief of the naval staff, and the director of plans.⁶³ These agreements were reached: (1) British naval assistance would cover the transport of two divisions from North Africa to France (Bordeaux), beginning some ten days after the outbreak of war; (2) liaison officers would be appointed to the staffs of the commanders-in-chief of the two countries, effective "in emergency or on the outbreak of war"; (3) as regards operations in the western Mediterranean, the French might send a destroyer force to assist in the anti-submarine work in the Straits of Gibraltar, and, once their transport operations were over,

⁶¹ COS minutes, 159th meeting, Dec. 13, 1935.

⁶² COS minutes, 161st meeting, Jan. 13, 1936.

⁶³ "Record of Meeting held in C.N.S.'s Room on Wednesday, 15th January, to discuss questions of co-operation with the French in the event of hostilities," Adm. 116/3398.

they would be ready to carry out offensive operations against the Italian coast or ports; (4) they might cooperate in the eastern Mediterranean by sending one or two submarine flotillas to attack Italian communications with Libya; (5) the Mediterranean would be divided into an area east of the line from Cape Bon in Tunisia to Maritime Island, some twenty miles west of Sicily, where the British would be responsible, and the western basin of the Mediterranean, which would come under the French commander-in-chief, except for the area westward of a line drawn eighty degrees from Cape de Gata, Spain, about seven miles east of Gibraltar, where the British Home Fleet would be responsible.

This, for the duration of the crisis, was as far as conversations with the French got. Arrangements for cooperation in war were left in general terms, and even these were not worth much, since they were never officially approved by the French government, and there was no certainty when, if at all, France would enter an Anglo-Italian war provoked by Italy. The negotiations with the other Mediterranean powers early in 1936 showed some progress. Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia accepted the British interpretation of Article 16—that in case of an unprovoked attack by Italy, they had an obligation to support Britain. “Unqualified assurance that we should have the use of Greek harbours and repair facilities and the support of the Greek forces. The extent of military co-operation from Turkey and Yugo-Slavia must depend on conversations between General Staffs.” From Spain only vague assurances were received.⁶⁴

On March 7, 1936, the Germans took advantage of the Ethiopian crisis to denounce the Locarno Pacts and reoccupy the Rhineland. On March 12 Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium in turn denounced Germany’s violation, which meant nothing to the Germans. For the Royal Navy the Rhineland crisis was very nearly the last straw, since it highlighted the precarious position of the navy in the event of a war with Germany while so much of its strength was disposed in the Mediterranean. There was insufficient naval force in home waters effectively to protect British trade routes or to prevent German naval bombardment of British coasts. And there was the patent impossibility of simultaneously fighting in East Asia against Japan and in home waters against Germany, unless Britain could count on a friendly, or at least a neutral, Italy.

The chiefs of staff reported on March 12 that

any question of war with Germany while we are as at present heavily committed to the possibility of hostilities in the Mediterranean would be thoroughly dangerous. As regards naval operations against Germany, our minimum requirements could only be carried out by weakening naval forces in the Mediterranean to an extent which would jeopardise our position there *vis-à-vis* Italy. Even so, there would not be sufficient naval forces available to ensure that we could safeguard our coasts or trade against serious depredations of the German Fleet, small as it is.

The resources of the army and air force had been stretched so thin by the Mediterranean crisis that they would not be able to dispatch a field force or pro-

⁶⁴ “History of the Emergency,” 22–23.

vide "any proper defence in the air"; anti-submarine defenses were lacking at various important ports; anti-aircraft guns and searchlights were inadequate to deal with the German air threat. The conclusion was that "if there is the smallest danger of being drawn into commitments which might lead to war with Germany, we ought at once to disengage ourselves from our present responsibilities in the Mediterranean, which have exhausted practically the whole of our meagre forces."⁶⁵ The nub of the matter for the navy was the fact that the battle cruisers at Gibraltar, the *Hood* and *Renown*, were the only capital ships in European waters that could deal with *Deutschland*-class "pocket battleships," three ten thousand-ton battleships with long endurance and heavy guns. But to withdraw them from the Mediterranean would jeopardize Britain's security there. The service chiefs deemed the country to be so "defenceless" while a large proportion of their forces was locked up in the Mediterranean that they saw little point in staff conversations with the Locarno powers. "Conversations were of little practical value as a means of assessing our effective contribution to the allied cause." The upshot was the affirmation: "If we are seriously to consider the possibility of war with Germany, it is essential that the Services be relieved of their Mediterranean responsibilities, otherwise our position is utterly unsafe."⁶⁶ When Eden expressed his anxiety over the naval position in home waters and asked if it would be possible to withdraw some ships from the Mediterranean, the Committee of Imperial Defence decided it would be undesirable "at the present time, and in the existing political situation," to bring naval units home from the Mediterranean.⁶⁷

The Rhineland crisis focused attention on the German naval threat in home waters and confirmed the Admiralty in its view that "we must recover our relations with Italy, if such a thing is possible; that Italy must, for the stability of Europe, be persuaded to come back into military alliance with France. Should we not be taking steps now to implement this *recovery* policy?"⁶⁸ In passing, we should note that the Mediterranean situation helps to explain the British unwillingness to resort to military action in defense of the Locarno treaties.

⁶⁵ COS 442, "The Condition of Our Forces to Meet the Possibility of War with Germany," Mar. 18, 1936. The conclusion of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff was: "If war with Germany were to break out while our forces are disposed as at present, we should be perilously exposed in the air and completely open to attack at sea. The French would be equally susceptible to naval attack. It would be impossible to send overseas any army formations. If mobilisation is ordered without withdrawal from the Mediterranean the situation on the naval side would be considerably improved, but the forces available would still not be sufficient to secure the British Isles and our trade routes (or those of the French). The increase in our air strength and improvement to our air striking power at Home which would result from mobilisation would do little to reduce the seriousness of the air defence situation. A small Field Force, but lacking in modern equipment, could be despatched overseas." "The Condition of our Forces to Meet the Possibility of War with Germany," amended and approved by the chiefs of staff at their 168th meeting, March 17, 1936, enclosure to COS 442. The existing position was that the only forces readily available in home waters were one six-inch cruiser, seventeen destroyers, and nine submarines.

⁶⁶ COS memorandum, "Staff Conversations with the Locarno Powers," Apr. 1, 1936, CID 1224-B, Cab. 4/24.

⁶⁷ CID minutes, Apr. 3, 1936, Cab. 2/6(1).

⁶⁸ Deputy Chief of Naval Staff memorandum for the Board, "Easement of Mediterranean Situation," Apr. 22, 1936, Adm. 116/3042.

During April and May the sanctionist front began to crack. Ecuador lifted sanctions and others appeared eager to do likewise. The Italian entry into Addis Ababa on May 5 for all practical purposes ended the war. Yet the state of tension for the services was not relaxed. In particular, the efficiency and well-being of the Mediterranean Fleet, on a war footing since August, was bound to suffer as the weather turned hot and the terrible strain on personnel continued indefinitely. Chatfield viewed the prospect of "a further period at concert pitch" with grave concern. If the existing situation continued, it would be necessary gradually to call up six thousand reservists.⁶⁹ It made little strategic sense to continue the fleet in a highly keyed-up state throughout the summer at a time when the political necessity no longer existed and when the fleet must be ready for use elsewhere. Actually, the Admiralty, without cabinet approval, had started to bring ships home for repair and to give leave and relaxation, but not all the ships were so fortunate. Many men had had neither Christmas nor Easter leave.

The Admiralty put pressure on the Foreign Office late in April to agree to an easing of the naval situation through such measures as returning the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet to Malta and the Home Fleet detachment at Gibraltar to England. The cabinet, however, decided against any major redistribution of the fleet, though they had no objection to some relaxation of the state of "instant readiness" in the Mediterranean, nor to the "unostentatious movements of ships" of the sort the Admiralty had been carrying out, "providing that these were not on such a scale as to reflect on our foreign policy."⁷⁰ The Admiralty almost immediately (May 1) took advantage of this policy to put into effect a relaxation of fleet routine on the Mediterranean, East Indies, and home stations: the notice for "steam of ships" (readiness to sail) was extended and ship leave was liberalized. Further pressure was applied through an Admiralty memorandum for the cabinet over the first lord's signature. It urged that the grave personnel situation be solved either by liquidating British commitments in the Mediterranean, thereby enabling the fleet "to return to its normal peace-time routine of recommissionings and training," or by recognizing that, though the country was not at war, the fleet was being maintained on a war footing, and accordingly authorizing the Admiralty to call up sufficient reserve men to ease the manning situation.⁷¹ No further relaxation was possible, however (the Admiralty would have liked, for instance, to return the cruisers *Sydney* and *Achilles* to Australia and New Zealand, respectively), in the face of Eden's strong statement that "the present time was still very inopportune for giving any impression to the world that we were weakening our position in the Mediterranean."⁷²

⁶⁹ COS minutes, 174th meeting, May 13, 1936.

⁷⁰ Cab. 31 (36) minutes, Apr. 29, 1936.

⁷¹ CP-134 (36), "Position of the Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean," May 14, 1936, Cab. 24/262. The CP series (PRO) contains memoranda and other papers circulated to the cabinet.

⁷² Cab. 37 (36) minutes, May 18, 1936. In his memoirs Eden wrote that it was not "acceptable for Great Britain to reduce her strength in the eastern Mediterranean. Our position in Egypt, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins, and the Middle East, had been assured by British

In the early days of June, when it became apparent that an Ethiopian government no longer existed, that sanctions were not serving any useful purpose, and that the sanctionist front was disintegrating anyway, a speech on the tenth by Neville Chamberlain, the chancellor of the exchequer, with its reference to the continuation or intensification of sanctions as "the very midsummer of madness," was a turning point, the beginning of the end. In addition to political and strategic arguments, there were economic pressures on Britain to abandon the sanctions: unemployment was high, especially in South Wales, which was suffering from the embargo on coal exports to Italy. The chiefs of staff contributed to this denouement with these conclusions:

(1) Our interests lie in a peaceful Mediterranean, and this can only be achieved by returning to a state of friendly relations with Italy. This should be our aim even in the earliest steps we take to liquidate the Mediterranean situation.

(2) One of the objects of raising sanctions is to enable us to withdraw our extra forces at present in the Mediterranean, and to return to a state of normal distribution which will permit us to be more ready to defend our interests at Home or in the Far East.⁷³

On June 19 the Admiralty indicated its general intentions to all commanders-in-chief as regards the movements and disposition of the fleet, should a change in the international situation make it no longer necessary to maintain the existing state of readiness in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. On July 4, with forty-four votes for, one against (Ethiopia), and four abstentions, the League Assembly lifted the sanctions against Italy. On July 8 and 10, after reaching agreement with the Foreign Office, Admiralty signals went out to implement the June 19 directive. The main body of the Mediterranean Fleet left Alexandria on July 18 (just as soon as their annual regatta was finished, not a day earlier!), the reinforcements from the China station were sent back, and other measures were taken to end the state of war readiness.

And so the crisis had run its course, and the might-have-beens have been warmly debated ever since. Generally the argument has claimed that it would have been wiser had the British adopted a strong sanctionist position, lead where it would, since Italy was highly vulnerable to a blockade with teeth in it, and that, had the British made the right turn in 1935-36, the League and the system of collective security would have been strengthened. This would have discouraged Hitler from marching into the Rhineland. Writing in his diary in 1943 on receiving the news of Mussolini's resignation, Eden reflected: "Looking back the thought comes again. Should we not have shown more determination in pressing through

sea power. Events had now placed in doubt our ability and determination to maintain that predominance and I refused to agree to any weakening of our position." Lord Avon (Anthony Eden), *Facing the Dictators* (Boston, 1962), 431.

⁷³ COS minutes, 178th meeting, June 16, 1936. These conclusions were contained in a report of June 18 that was put before the cabinet on June 23. COS 477, "Problems Facing His Majesty's Government in the Mediterranean as a Result of the Italo-League Dispute."

with sanctions in 1935 and if we had could we not have called Musso's bluff and at least postponed this war? The answer, I am sure, is yes."⁷⁴ To the question "Why was not more determination shown?" the reply usually given is that "faint-heartedness" on the part of the government and the services was responsible.

Faintheartedness there was—there is no denying that the service chiefs badly wanted to postpone a war—but it was not of the pusillanimous sort. It was founded on compelling considerations of strategy and fleet efficiency. The Far Eastern strategic factor, the German problem, the personnel situation, and the failure to secure a definite guarantee of French naval cooperation—these factors complicated tremendously the British naval problem and argued strongly for a restoration of a friendly Italy and a secure Mediterranean. The attitude of the services and more particularly of the Admiralty contributed powerfully to the government's weak sanctionist policy and the decision to liquidate the whole venture. One cannot read the minutes of the cabinet or of the Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee without appreciating that military considerations, mainly naval factors, were very much in the minds of the decision makers. They were just as anxious as the service heads not to challenge Mussolini or incite him to anger.⁷⁵

So far as the navy was concerned, the principal lessons of the crisis were, in Chatfield's opinion: (1) Their "foreign policy had not been in line with our defence policy of the last few years," and (2) "Collective security showed itself but a heavenly dream, as it was the British sailor's nightmare."⁷⁶ The latter point was spelled out by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff:

The whole theory of collective security rests upon the assumption that each Member of the League . . . will be prepared in the last resort to take up arms to repel aggression against any other Member, irrespective of whether the particular aggression seems to

⁷⁴ *Facing the Dictators*, 350. Similarly, Liddell Hart: "That wobbling course was bound to bring the maximum risk with the minimum insurance. Never again would there be so good a chance to check an aggressor so early, and the failure to do so in this case was the most fateful turning point in the period between the two world wars." *Memoirs*, I, 290.

⁷⁵ As Baldwin's biographers point out: "Up to 22 August, he was inclined to play a strong hand but was then much deterred by the military advisers, whose recommendations about the threat to Imperial Defence, both then and in the autumn [and beyond, I would add], he took as more important than any other consideration." Middlemas and Barnes, *Baldwin*, 898-99. An incident that occurred early in 1936 is revealing of the Foreign Office position. The DCNS afterward recalled: "The Foreign Office were very anxious not to provoke Mussolini. I had an odd experience in connection with this. Fisher had asked that the *Hood* should be sent to him as a reinforcement. Chatfield was not well and told me to go over and obtain the consent of the Foreign Office. During periods of diplomatic crises the Admiralty are not free to move ships from one area to another without F.O. consent. I found Eden in his room and told him that I wanted his concurrence to ordering *Hood* to join Fisher. He at once demurred and said that the situation was very inflammable and that Mussolini's reactions when he heard that *Hood* might join Fisher might cause a flare up. He then rang for Sir Lancelot Oliphant [assistant under-secretary of state], who was, I suppose, dealing with the crisis, and asked his view. He seemed to me rather an ass when he said, 'I believe that Mussolini is far more afraid of a battle cruiser than a battleship.' Then he rang for Vansittart, the Permanent Secretary, and he supported me. So I came away with my mission fulfilled. The situation changed and so far as I can remember the *Hood* did not join Fisher. But I had an insight into the anxiety of the F.O. to avoid a showdown with Mussolini at all costs." Admiral Sir William James's letter to the author, Nov. 7, 1963. See his earlier, briefer version: *The Sky Was Blue* (London, 1951), 184.

⁷⁶ Respectively, COS minutes, 174th meeting, May 13, 1936, and Chatfield, *It Might Happen Again*, 90.

be a matter of vital concern to himself. The fallacy of this assumption has been proved by the events of the past four years.

Moreover, "the indefinite liabilities entailed in the League Covenant hold great dangers for us," and therefore their military liabilities ought to be limited to a clear recognition of the vital interests for whose protection they should be prepared to go to war, "freed from the vague, wholesale and largely unpredictable military commitments which we at present incur under the League Covenant."⁷⁷ The practical consequences of these lessons for the navy were the conviction that Britain must look after her own interests, be prepared to go it alone if need be, and, above all, speed up her naval rearmament.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ COS 491 (JP), "Strategical Review by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee," July 3, 1936.

⁷⁸ Naval rearmament now went into high gear. A white paper of March 3, 1936, announced that it would be "necessary not only to proceed with new construction at a more rapid rate than in recent years, but also to make good existing deficiencies in ammunition and stores of all kinds." When the London Naval Treaty of 1930 expired on December 31, capital-ship building would become possible: two new capital ships (battleships) would be laid down early in 1937. Cruiser strength would be increased from fifty-four to seventy, beginning with five in the 1936-37 program (increased to seven in July). The navy estimates, introduced on March 4, were, at £69,930,000, nearly £10 million above those of 1935-36; they were raised to £80,230,000 by supplementary navy estimates on April 30. The estimates made heavy provision for expediting ships under construction and for the Fleet Air Arm. Obviously, all that was set in motion in 1936-37 would need time—much time.

White Liberals and Black Power in Negro Education, 1865-1915

JAMES M. McPHERSON

ALTHOUGH the phrase "black power" is of recent origin and has acquired ambivalent and emotional overtones, the issue is in some respects not new. Reduced to its lowest common denominator, the concept of black power means greater control by Negroes themselves of the major institutions and processes that shape their lives. During the two generations after the Civil War there were many disputes over control of the freedmen's schools and colleges founded and supported by Northern abolitionists, missionaries, and other "white liberals" interested in advancing the Negro's status and improving race relations through education. Many Negroes desired a larger role in managing these schools; their demands produced clashes that foreshadowed some current racial controversies in the field of education. The earlier black-power drive did not aim toward a restructuring of the methods, content, or purposes of education; Negroes desired not to change the system but to achieve greater participation in it as teachers, deans, presidents, and trustees.¹ While retaining considerable control over the schools they had founded, white liberal educators three-quarters of a century ago began gradually to yield most faculty and administrative posts to blacks. This article will try to describe and evaluate that transition.

The freedmen's aid societies of Northern Protestant churches established more than a hundred institutions of college and secondary education for Negroes after the Civil War² (see table following text). The foremost of these societies was the American Missionary Association (AMA), organized in 1846 by abolitionists protesting the lack of antislavery zeal in existing Congregational mission societies. In 1861 the AMA committed most of its resources to freedmen's education; the Northern branches of the Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian churches soon joined the effort by setting up freedmen's aid societies or adding a freedmen's department to an established home mission body. The schools founded

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¹ The major curricular debate in Negro education three-quarters of a century ago concerned the relative merits of academic versus industrial education. This issue was unrelated to the "black-power" controversy treated in this article.

² A few of these schools were originally founded by the freedmen themselves but were soon adopted, at the request of Negroes, by Northern mission societies.

by these churches (plus a few supported by Quakers and minor sects) provided nearly all the college education and most of the high school training for Southern Negroes until well into the twentieth century. This was the "finest thing in American history, and one of the few things untainted by sordid greed and cheap vainglory," wrote W. E. B. Du Bois, a graduate of the AMA's Fisk University.

The teachers in these institutions came not to keep the Negroes in their place, but to raise them out of the defilement of the places where slavery had wallowed them. The Colleges . . . were social settlements; homes where the best of the sons of the freedmen came in close and sympathetic touch with the best traditions of New England.³

But all was not well in this educational Zion. Some Negroes resented the patronizing attitude often expressed in the missionary rationale for freedmen's education. "The colored people are yet children, and need to be taught every thing," proclaimed the secretary of the Methodist Freedmen's Aid Society in 1874. "They need that those more favored should take them by the hand and lead them . . . up from debasement and misery into purity and joy." Frederick Douglass was angered by such statements. "We have been injured more than we have been helped by men who have professed to be our friends," he told a black audience in 1875. "We must stop these men from begging for us. . . . We must stop begging ourselves. If we build churches don't ask white people to pay for them. If we have banks, colleges and papers, do not ask other people to support them. Be independent. . . . I am here to-day to offer and sign a declaration of independence for the colored people of these United States."⁴

Though Douglass soon receded from this rhetorical venture into separatism, some Negro leaders turned increasingly to the concept of independent, black-owned institutions as the overthrow of Reconstruction and the onset of reaction blocked access to power and achievement in white American society. "There is not as bright and glorious a future before a Negro in a white institution as there is for him in his own," E. K. Love told the National Baptist Convention (the body representing black Baptist churches) in 1896.

We can better marshal our forces and develop our people in enterprises manned by us. We can more thoroughly fill our people with race pride . . . by presenting to them

³ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York, 1903), 100. In the 1920's Du Bois became critical of white teachers and administrators at some Negro colleges, including his alma mater. In 1924 he accused Fisk of humiliating students and curbing their aspirations by authoritarian restrictions; he demanded the hiring of more black faculty and the installation of black presidents at colleges still headed by whites. Francis L. Broderick, *W. E. B. DuBois: Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis* (Stanford, 1959), 163-64. But when Du Bois published his autobiography in 1940, he recalled with fondness and gratitude his own student days at Fisk (1885-88, when all faculty members but one were white): "The three years at Fisk were years of growth and development. . . . My personal contact with my teachers was inspiring and beneficial. . . . I knew the President, Erastus Cravath, to be honest and sincere." Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New York, 1940), 30-31. Du Bois reiterated this praise of Fisk in the later version of his autobiography, written near the end of his long life. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois*, ed. Herbert Aptheker (New York, 1968), 112-13.

⁴ *Seventh Annual Report of the Freedmen's Aid Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (Cincinnati, 1874), 8-9; Douglass quoted by *New York Tribune*, July 7, 1875, and *Weekly Louisianian*, July 17, 1875.

for their support enterprises that are wholly ours. . . . The world recognizes men for the power they have to affect it. . . . Negro brain should shape and control Negro thought.⁵

This impulse toward self-help and race pride did lead to the founding by the AME (African Methodist Episcopal) and AME Zion churches of several colleges supported and controlled entirely by Negroes.⁶ But the black community lacked the financial resources to sustain major projects, and most of these schools were poor in quality and starved for funds. The colored A & M colleges established by Southern states to provide Negroes with their share of the appropriations from the Morrill Land-Grant Act afforded another quasi-separatist outlet for black ambitions. In 1870 a district secretary of the AMA reported that some Negroes in Mississippi, dissatisfied with white control of Tougaloo College, were pressing the state legislature for the creation of a college "of *their own*" where nobody "but themselves run their machine."⁷ The legislature established Alcorn College the next year. Similar pressures were brought to bear in other states. At the South Carolina constitutional convention in 1895, black delegates urged the withdrawal of the state appropriation from Claflin University (controlled by Northern Methodists) and the creation of a school for blacks in which the "professors and instructors shall be of the negro race." Benjamin Tillman supported the proposal for a separate Negro college, and at his behest the convention authorized the establishment of the Colored Normal, Industrial, Agricultural and Mechanical College of South Carolina. By the end of the century every Southern state supported some kind of institution of higher education for Negroes. Most presidents of these schools and all but a handful of teachers were Negroes, presenting a facade of black control.⁸ The reality of black power in such institutions was dubious, however, since their faculties and administrations were beholden to state legislatures. All the state Negro colleges in this period were woefully under-financed and devoid of genuine college-level offerings. The major institutions of higher education for Negroes were and are those founded by Northern missionaries. The struggle for black power and against white paternalism in education, therefore, took place primarily within the schools established and supported largely by Northern whites, not outside them.

As the Negro colleges began turning out graduates who were denied positions of authority and influence in a Jim Crow society, the schools themselves

⁵ Lewis G. Jordan, *Negro Baptist History, U.S.A., 1750-1930* (Nashville, 1930), 124.

⁶ The AME colleges were Wilberforce University (Wilberforce, Ohio); Morris Brown College (Atlanta); Allen University (Columbia, S. C.); and Paul Quinn College (Waco, Texas). The AME Zion school was Livingstone College (Salisbury, N. C.). Wilberforce had been founded by Northern white Methodists in 1856; it was sold to the AME Church in 1863. The AME and AME Zion churches also established elementary and secondary schools.

⁷ Edward P. Smith to Oliver O. Howard, Apr. 2, 1870, AMA Archives, Fisk University Library.

⁸ George B. Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900* (Columbia, S. C., 1952), 229-30; *Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of South Carolina* (Columbia, S. C., 1895), 580-81; Clarence A. Bacote, "The Story of Atlanta University: A Century of Service, 1865-1965," unpublished manuscript generously lent by the author, 128-30; Earl Edgar Dawson, "The Negro Teacher in the South," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Iowa, 1931, pp. 74-75.

became the focus of black ambitions. Despite their professed and, in most cases, sincere belief in racial equality, white missionaries yielded only gradually and sometimes reluctantly to black demands for greater control of schools. There were both subjective and objective reasons for this gradualism. Subjectively, some missionaries shared (perhaps subconsciously) the widespread conviction that black people were deficient in organizational and executive skills. They were especially hesitant to entrust Negroes with outright control of funds contributed by Northern philanthropy. Moreover, many teachers were slow to believe that the "grown-up children" for whom the schools were founded had matured to the point of readiness for adult responsibilities. Objectively, the first and even second generations of freedmen could not produce enough able teachers to staff the schools with personnel equal in average ability and training to Northern teachers, who came from middle-class, New England-oriented backgrounds that stressed education and achievement. A genuine concern for maintaining the highest possible standards for freedmen's schools was a major reason for the slowness to supplant white teachers and administrators with blacks. Indeed, two contemporary experts on education thought that some mission societies yielded too readily to demands for black power and that the quality of many schools suffered as a result.⁹ Black communities served by mission schools were themselves frequently divided on the question; many Negroes, especially parents of students, considered white teachers superior to black instructors and were opposed to the drive for black control of schools. The interplay of these various attitudes produced smoldering tensions in several schools.

The issue first surfaced on the question of hiring black teachers. From 1865 to 1870 the freedmen's aid societies operated several hundred elementary schools with support from the Freedmen's Bureau. Perhaps one-fourth of the teachers in these schools were black. But when the Bureau's educational work ceased in 1870, most of the common schools were absorbed into the South's new public school system and the mission societies began to concentrate their resources on a smaller number of secondary schools and colleges. At first nearly all the teachers in these higher schools were white, even though the societies often did try to employ black teachers when they were qualified. The American Missionary Association's Avery Institute in Charleston, for example, had an interracial faculty headed by a black principal in the 1860's. The trustees of Howard University made an effort to recruit black professors, and four Negroes were on the staff in the early 1870's. The Methodist Freedmen's Aid Society stated in 1878 that "as rapidly as we have been able to prepare our own students, we have introduced them . . . as teachers in our schools."¹⁰

⁹ Amory D. Mayo, "The Work of Certain Northern Churches in the Education of the Freedmen, 1861-1900," in *Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Education for the Year 1901-02* (Washington, 1903), I, 312; *Negro Education: A Study of the Private and Higher Schools for Colored People in the United States*, ed. Thomas Jesse Jones (Washington, 1917), *passim*.

¹⁰ South Carolina file, 1865-68, AMA Archives; William J. Wilson to George Whipple, Aug. 13, 1869, AMA Archives; Walter Dyson, *Howard University: The Capstone of Negro Education* (Wash-

But by 1880 there was still only a handful of black teachers in the better missionary schools, a sore point in several Negro communities. A black minister in an AMA church at Mobile reported disaffection among his flock because the Association's school had no Negro teachers. "This is the great reason for all the prejudice that exists," he wrote. "The employment of a colored teacher would increase the influence of the school and the church" and "shut the mouths of those who are murmuring." A Negro educator in Virginia wrote a paper in 1876 entitled "Colored Teachers for Colored Schools," which sharply criticized Hampton Institute for its shortage of black instructors. The paper was endorsed by the Virginia Educational and Historical Association, a Negro organization. A black lawyer in South Carolina went the whole way in 1883 and demanded that "Negro teachers exclusively be employed to teach Negro schools."¹¹

This drive for more black faculty met a mixed response from white philanthropists. Some urged a crash program to recruit and train Negro teachers. The secretary of the Baptist Home Mission Society wrote to the president of Richmond Institute: "You do not know how resolutely colored leaders have pressed us to employ and pay colored teachers. . . . I pray you take your strongest and ablest students . . . and drill them, and *drill* them, and DRILL them privately" until they are competent to join the faculty. This policy was carried out, and when Richmond Institute became Virginia Union University in 1899, half the faculty was black. The white principal of the AMA's Storrs School in Atlanta advised the Association's secretary to yield to black pressure: "It will be well for them to try to manage the school for they will never be satisfied until they do," she wrote, and if the board "is wise in its selection of teachers I think they will do well. Certainly we are not the ones to oppose them, for it is for this work that we have been educating them. I only condemn the ungrateful spirit exhibited by many."¹²

Other white administrators counseled a cautious policy in hiring black teachers on the ground that few Negroes were yet qualified. Laura Towne, founder of Penn School on St. Helena Island in South Carolina, wrote in 1873 that schools taught by Negroes on the sea islands "are always in confusion, grief, & utter want of everything. It is hard to imagine schools doing so little good." Miss Towne kept white teachers at Penn School until their black replacements were thoroughly trained. The president of Straight University (a forerunner of Dillard) in New Orleans urged the AMA not to employ black teachers in the law and theological departments just because of "this clamor for colored teach-

ington, 1941), 348, 371; *Eleventh Annual Report of the Freedmen's Aid Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (Cincinnati, 1878), 19-20.

¹¹ William H. Ash to Michael E. Strieby, Feb. 26, Mar. 13, 1878, AMA Archives; *People's Advocate*, Aug. 26, 1876; Augustus Straker, in *New York Globe*, Oct. 13, 1883.

¹² James B. Simmons to Charles H. Corey, Dec. 27, 1872, in Charles H. Corey, *A History of the Richmond Theological Seminary, with Reminiscences of Thirty Years' Work among the Colored People of the South* (Richmond, 1895), 97-98, 173-79; Amy Williams to Mrs. Thomas Chase, quoted in Thomas Chase to Michael E. Strieby, Mar. 19, 1878, AMA Archives.

ers. . . . We can't have any humbug about this department for the sake of color. . . . Colored teachers are not generally successful."¹³

Some black leaders discounted the argument that educational quality would suffer if Negro teachers were employed too soon; they insisted that Anglo-Saxon academic standards should not be the only criteria for hiring teachers. Francis Grimké declared in 1885 that the development of race pride should be a major objective of Negro education. The low self-image with which the black man had emerged from slavery was perpetuated by schools with white faculties, Grimké complained. "The intellects of our young people are being educated at the expense of their manhood. In the classroom they see only white professors," which leads them "to associate these places and the idea of fitness for them only with white men." In their slowness to appoint black professors, the schools "are failing to use one of the most effective means in their power, of helping on this race." J. Willis Menard, who had been the first Negro elected to Congress, asserted in 1885 that while many white teachers were sincere and dedicated, others were selfish hypocrites, and in any case, no white teacher could achieve the rapport and empathy with black students that a Negro teacher could. "We demand educated colored teachers for colored schools," wrote Menard, "because their color identity makes them more interested in the advancement of colored children than white teachers, and because colored pupils need the social contact of colored teachers."¹⁴

But Negroes were not united behind this viewpoint. A black woman, herself a teacher, condemned as a "peculiar error" the argument that Negroes should be given jobs "without due regard to their fitness." She did not want "the standard of excellence lowered for us. To admit the necessity is to insult the Negro. Our youth have the right to the best possible training, and we should not allow a mistaken race pride to cause us to impose upon them inferior teachers." A Negro in Atlanta pleaded with the AMA to retain control of Storrs School "with the understanding that we have Northern teachers." The school inspector for the AMA reported in 1878 that blacks in Atlanta "have again, as last year, arrayed themselves on both sides of the question and each party has petitioned . . . one for colored teachers & the other for Northern whites." There was "no doubt," the inspector stated, that in most cities where the AMA maintained schools the "parents prefer to send their children to Northern white teachers instead of colored." In a few cases after the mission societies had turned their schools over to Negro teachers, the deterioration in quality prompted black leaders to ask for the return of whites. "Since the cessation of your work among us," wrote one Negro to a white

¹³ Laura Towne to William C. Gannett, Feb. 9, Dec. 14, 1873, William C. Gannett Papers, Rochester University Library; James A. Adams to Erastus M. Cravath, Nov. 17, 1874, Jan. 11, 1875, AMA Archives.

¹⁴ Francis Grimké, "Colored Men as Professors in Colored Institutions," *A.M.E. Church Review*, II (Oct. 1885), 142-44; Florida *News*, Dec. 5, 1885, clipping in the American Baptist Home Mission Society (hereafter ABHMS) Archives, American Baptist Historical Society, Rochester-Colgate Theological Seminary. Menard was editor of Florida *News*.

educator, "the schools have degenerated, and the system as operated here is a mere farce."¹⁵

Because of divided opinion among both races on the issue of black teachers, the AMA decided at a conference in 1877 to "make haste slowly in this regard." In subsequent years the AMA emphasized "slowly" more than "haste." As late as 1895 only twelve of 141 teachers in the Association's seventeen secondary schools were blacks; only four of 110 faculty members in its five colleges were Negroes. A black journalist stated in 1901 that the AMA's small percentage of Negro teachers had long been an "eyesore" to the race, and that "only the splendid work of the association has kept down an agitation of this matter."¹⁶

It was not only the high quality of AMA schools but also the tiny black constituency of the Congregational Church that minimized Negro criticism of the Association. The Baptist and Methodist societies, on the other hand, were under greater pressure from the large black memberships of their denominations. By the mid-1890's approximately half the teachers in the schools of these societies were black. The Presbyterians and most of the small denominations also moved faster than the AMA in the appointment of Negro teachers. In 1895 there were ninety-four schools for Negroes of nominal high school or college grade in the South established by the abolitionist-missionary impulse and largely supported by Northern Protestants. In the ninety institutions for which statistics are available there were 1,046 teachers, of whom 370 (thirty-six per cent) were black.¹⁷

Viewed in one way, this represented significant progress. A race barely one generation away from slavery and illiteracy had advanced to the point of supplying more than one-third of the teachers for the higher schools founded or supported mainly by the missionary efforts of another race. Yet progress was less impressive than it appeared on the surface. Most students in the ninety-four schools, including the "universities," were in elementary grades, and at least ninety per cent of the black faculty were teaching these grades rather than secondary or college classes. Even in schools with a sizable Negro faculty, major policy decisions were normally made by whites. Power flowed from the purse; Northern whites contributed most of the money, and Northern whites occupied the major

¹⁵ Josephine Turpin, "Teaching as a Profession," *A.M.E. Church Review*, V (Oct. 1888), 108; Junius Alexander to Michael E. Strieby, July 7, 1878, AMA Archives; Thomas N. Chase to Michael E. Strieby, July 5, 1878, Nov. 26, 1877, AMA Archives; Henry L. Shrewsbury to Ednah D. Cheney, Feb. 19, 1886, Ednah D. Cheney Papers, Boston Public Library.

¹⁶ Thomas N. Chase to Michael E. Strieby, Nov. 26, 1877, AMA Archives; *Cleveland Gazette*, Jan. 19, 1901. The AMA required higher qualifications for its teachers than the other mission societies, which was one reason for its relatively small number of black teachers and for the superior reputation of its schools. Many of the students in AMA schools were Baptists or Methodists who had left the schools of their own denominations for the better education offered in AMA institutions.

¹⁷ In 1894-95 there were twenty-nine colleges and professional schools and sixty-five secondary schools. For details, see table. Bennett College was not ranked as a college-level institution in 1894-95, which places the percentage of black faculty in Methodist colleges lower than indicated in the table. The missionary societies maintained many elementary schools in the South not included in these statistics. The statistics also do not include schools supported by the Roman Catholic and Protestant Episcopal churches, nearly all of which were parochial elementary schools sustained by local parishes or dioceses in the South rather than by Northern mission societies. Nor do the figures include independent institutions like Tuskegee, which were founded and conducted by Negroes, even though they received most of their support from the North.

administrative posts of the mission societies and colleges. Although Negroes were represented on the local boards of trustees of most schools and colleges, these boards usually had little power; ultimate control rested with the mission societies. Most Negroes who benefited from these schools accepted the fact that the greater administrative experience and financial resources of white philanthropists made a large degree of white control inevitable, at least for a time. Some felt differently. Virtually from 1870 on a black minority struggled behind the scenes for greater influence in the management of some schools.

Occasionally these conflicts broke into the open, as in the search for a successor to General Oliver O. Howard as president of Howard University in 1874-75. Black trustees and students supported John Mercer Langston, dean of the law school and vice-president of the university, for the job. But the white Congregationalists (most of them members of the AMA) who had founded the institution and dominated its board of trustees felt that Langston, despite his Oberlin degree and eminence as a black leader, lacked talent as a fund raiser and "was not the man to hold the institution to the religious and moral ideas on which it was founded."¹⁸ The board offered the presidency to three white men in succession; two of them declined and the other died before he could fully assume office. Embittered by what he considered the paternalism, prejudice, and religious narrowness of white trustees, Langston resigned from the university and denounced the AMA, which "relieve[s] the object of their sympathy of the pressure of responsibility and the honor due its efficient discharge, and thus weaken[s] him, as an over-affectionate and indulgent father does his son." The black man, concluded Langston, "seeks release from such associations and their self-assumed control of his affairs." In an editorial reply that unwittingly conceded the partial truth of Langston's charges, the AMA's monthly magazine declared that some friends of Negro education might be tempted to say, "If this is all the thanks we get, we will waste no more on such a people." But "we intend to go on with our efforts for the colored race. . . . With the abolitionists we endured persecution for the slave, and, now that he is free, we shall toil for his elevation and happiness, as undeterred by his fault-finding as we formerly were by the opposition of his foes."¹⁹

While the trustees were agonizing over the selection of a president, Howard University, which had been in serious financial straits since the cessation of Freed-

¹⁸ *The Congregationalist*, XXVII (July 1, 1875), 204. See also Edward P. Smith to Oliver O. Howard, Nov. 23, 1874, Apr. 13, June 9, July 16, Nov. 5, Dec. 1, 20, 1875, Jan. 14, 1876, Oliver O. Howard Papers, Bowdoin College Library; Rayford W. Logan, *Howard University: The First Hundred Years, 1867-1967* (New York, 1969), 59-62, 71-76.

¹⁹ Logan, *Howard University*, 77-79; Dyson, *Howard University*, 58-59; John Mercer Langston, *Emancipation and Citizenship. The Work of the Republican Party, Address at Chillicothe, Ohio* (Washington, 1875), 7-8; *American Missionary*, XIX (Sept. 1875), 197-98. Though the AMA did not control Howard University, it played an important role in the school's affairs. Howard was an independent institution governed by its own board of trustees, but all presidents until 1903 were Congregational ministers (except General Howard, 1869-74, who was an active layman in the church), and the Association at various times provided financial support to the normal and theological departments of the university and paid part of the president's salary.

men's Bureau support and the panic of 1873, was on the verge of collapse. Believing that only a white man of prominence and administrative experience could tap the springs of Northern philanthropy and save the school, black and white trustees finally joined to elect William W. Patton president of Howard in 1877. Patton was a Congregational minister, a veteran abolitionist, and former district secretary of the AMA. He was a good administrator, but his relations with the black community were strained. He raised money in the North, persuaded Congress to make annual appropriations for the school, brought the university from the brink of disaster, and built it into a major institution. But Patton ran Howard with a strong and sometimes domineering hand. Some black trustees and alumni disliked his "overbearing ways," and there were periodic demands for his resignation. The *People's Advocate*, a Negro newspaper in Washington, declared in 1883 that "there are very few *white* men who possess the qualifications of a president of a college where *colored* men principally are educated," and concluded that Patton was not one of the few.²⁰

Negro criticism of Patton intensified in 1885 when the president forced through the appointment of a white professor of Greek instead of a black candidate whom Negroes on the board of trustees thought was at least as well qualified as the white man. Francis Grimké, a member of the board, published an angry article blasting Patton as a "hypocrite" and a "pseudo-friend" of the black man. "If this is philanthropy," declared Grimké, "then I, for one, think we have had quite enough of it. If this is the treatment we are to continue to receive from our friends, then it is time for us to begin to pray to be delivered from our friends."²¹

Regarded by many Negroes as their national university, Howard continued to be a center of controversy. When Patton retired in 1889 black trustees wanted Jeremiah E. Rankin as his successor. A white man, Rankin was a former abolitionist and pastor of the integrated First Congregational Church in Washington who had won the unanimous respect of the Negro community. Frederick Douglass believed that Rankin had "done more to secure the rights of my race than all the legislation of Congress." Black leaders were pleased when Rankin was elected to the post; Richard Greener considered Rankin "the grandest type of man ever connected with the Institution." But faculty politics, rumor, and Rankin's own

²⁰ District of Columbia file, 1874-78, AMA Archives; *Advance*, X (May 3, 1877), 9; Logan, *Howard University*, 83; Dyson, *Howard University*, 301-06, 386-88; *People's Advocate*, June 9, 1883; for the reference to Patton's "overbearing ways," see Jeremiah E. Rankin to Oliver O. Howard, Oct. 15, 1889, Howard Papers.

²¹ Grimké, "Colored Men as Professors in Colored Institutions," 147-48. Negroes who criticized Patton on this matter may have had a good case. The black candidate for the professorship was William S. Scarborough, the author of a Greek textbook and the possessor of a modest reputation as a classical scholar. Scarborough later became president of Wilberforce University. The white man who won the professorship was Carlos Kenaston, a relatively obscure member of the Ripon College faculty who happened to be the son-in-law of James H. Fairchild, president of Oberlin College and a friend of Patton. A major factor in Scarborough's failure to get the job was a letter of recommendation from Fairchild that damned him with faint praise. Carlos Kenaston to James H. Fairchild, Mar. 19, 27, 1885, J. B. Johnson to Kenaston, June 6, 1885, James H. Fairchild Papers, Oberlin College Library; Francis Grimké to William S. Scarborough, June 16, 1885, Scarborough Papers, Wilberforce University Library.

mistakes in judgment dissipated much of this good will and provoked a verbal attack on the president by black leaders, particularly Calvin Chase of the *Washington Bee*. Even though Rankin tripled the number of black teachers during his administration (1890–1903), Negroes were angry when he appointed his own daughter and several other whites to staff positions sought by Negroes. The president's alleged vendetta against a black professor stirred up a storm, and Calvin Chase asked angrily, "What claim has Dr. Rankin to the presidency of that institution? Is it not set apart for colored people?" But when Rankin retired in 1903 the *Bee* apologized for earlier attacks based on misinformation and praised the retiring president for having "done more . . . for the negro" than any other man in the country. "You have been a faithful public servant," Chase told Rankin, "and to you the negroes owe a debt of gratitude."²²

By the first decade of the twentieth century several black deans at Howard had carved out spheres of power within their colleges or departments. Rankin's successor as president, a white Presbyterian minister named John Gordon, moved to restrict the growing autonomy of the Teachers College under Dean Lewis B. Moore and the "Commercial Department" under Dean George W. Cook. The *Bee* supported Gordon because of its editor's declared conviction that inefficiency and intrigue in these departments had grown to scandalous proportions (Chase's role in this affair may also have been related to feuds among Washington's Negro leaders). The attempt to reform the departments led to a bitter power struggle that, though not specifically racial in origin, took on racial overtones as it became a showdown between a white president and two black deans. Moore and Cook rallied many students behind them, but the *Bee* continued to back Gordon and charged that "personal pique . . . selfishness, cupidity and ambition" motivated the deans' recalcitrance. When a hundred students demonstrated against Gordon and called for his resignation, the *Bee* urged the expulsion of the students and the firing of the "teachers who encouraged or inaugurated that disgraceful scene." Also supporting the white president, another black newspaper declared that "a negro mob in college looks, to the *Independent*, just like a white mob around a stake burning a negro. . . . Colleges were never intended to create and organize mobs. They were instituted for the purpose of disseminating Christian education."²³

Instead of expelling the students, the shaken and exhausted president submitted his own resignation. A battle for succession shaped up amid demands that a Negro be appointed to the position. In a reversal of his stand a decade earlier, Calvin Chase of the *Bee* ridiculed the intrigues among black aspirants for the presidency. Alluding to alleged power struggles, backstabbing, and cor-

²² *Washington Bee*, Jan. 4, 1890, Sept. 7, 1895, July 3, 1897, Jan. 13, 1900, Feb. 28, 1903; Richard T. Greener to Francis J. Grimké, Dec. 27, 1890, in *The Works of Francis James Grimké*, ed. Carter G. Woodson (Washington, 1942), IV, 25. Greener, a prominent Washington Negro, was former dean of the Howard Law School. For the support of Rankin by black leaders, see J. M. Gregory to Oliver O. Howard, June 8, 1889, L. Deane to Howard, July 2, 5, 1889, Rankin to Howard, Oct. 15, 1889, Howard Papers.

²³ Dyson, *Howard University*, 64–65; *Washington Bee*, Nov. 18, 25, Dec. 9, 16, 30, 1905, Jan. 27, 1906; *Atlanta Independent*, quoted in *Washington Bee*, Feb. 10, 1906.

ruption in the Negro public schools of Washington under a black superintendent, Chase predicted that a similar situation would prevail at Howard under a Negro president. To the advocates of a "colored president for a colored school," the *Bee* stated: "If the existence of Howard University depended upon the colored people, the institution could not exist a day. . . . White men have done far more to ameliorate the condition of the negro, and to elevate him in the social scale than negroes themselves have ever done."²⁴

After several months of discussion, the Howard board of trustees unanimously elected as president Wilbur P. Thirkield, a white Methodist minister and former secretary of the Methodist Freedmen's Aid Society. An able and sensitive administrator, Thirkield retained the confidence of all parties. But when he was elected a bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1912, an "unholy scramble"²⁵ for his job took place between Moore, Cook, and Kelly Miller. (Miller had been dean of the College of Arts and Sciences since 1907.) Each faction of the black community, including the *Bee* (which favored Miller), backed one of the deans. Surprisingly, only two of the eight Negro trustees supported any of the black candidates, while a majority of white trustees desired the election of a Negro president. If any two of the three deans had withdrawn from the contest in favor of the third, a black man would have been elected president of Howard in 1912. Since each of them preferred a white man to one of his rivals for the presidency, a white president was finally elected.²⁶ Though two-thirds of the faculty was black by this time, another fourteen years passed before Howard had a Negro president.

Events at Howard received wide publicity in the Negro press, but the black-power struggle in Methodist and Baptist institutions was in some respects even more intense. Black militancy reached high tide in these two churches between 1880 and 1900, as the frustration born of the failure of Reconstruction and the intensification of Jim Crow produced compensatory strivings toward self-help, race pride, and separatism among Negroes and focused these strivings on two of the institutions in American society that offered some access to power, the school and the church. Since more than ninety per cent of Negro church members were Baptists or Methodists, the schools of these denominations became major arenas of conflict.

The Methodist Episcopal Church (Northern branch of the denomination) moved aggressively into the South after the war and recruited a black membership of nearly a quarter of a million by 1890. Under the leadership of Methodist abolitionists, the church established a Freedmen's Aid Society that by 1890 was maintaining twenty-two schools for freedmen, ten of them nominally colleges or professional schools. These institutions had interracial boards of trustees, and a few of the boards had a *de facto* black majority because some Northern

²⁴ Washington *Bee*, Dec. 30, 1905, Jan. 27, 1906.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1912.

²⁶ Dyson, *Howard University*, 65, 375; Washington *Bee*, June 8, 15, 22, July 6, 13, Aug. 3, 1912.

trustees rarely attended meetings. Since real control was exercised by the Freedmen's Aid Society and white college presidents, however, tension mounted until it broke into the open after the Society overruled the trustees of Claflin University and Atlanta's Clark University in matters concerning Negro professors in 1890.

The white presidents of both schools were unpopular with a part of the black community, a situation that added fuel to the controversy. The president of Claflin, exasperated by Negro criticism, said privately: "I do not suppose that it is wrong for them to aspire to teach their own schools and manage their own concerns, but unfortunately for them not one in 1,000 has enough executive ability to manage the concerns of his own household successfully. It is not really their fault, as they have had but little experience in independent management." The president feared that "an effort will be made to tear up things at our next trustee meeting. But they must not be allowed to have their own way in this matter. Until they furnish a considerable proportion of the funds necessary to conduct the school, they should be content to allow others to manage it." When a refractory black professor was fired from Clark University in 1890, a local Negro leader deplored this "attempt to crush down negro manhood" and denounced the president of Clark as a "cheap and incompetent" man who had come to Atlanta "to boss southern negroes."²⁷

Black militants urged their fellow Methodists to leave the Northern church and join the AME or AME Zion denominations. While the school controversy plus the unwillingness of the Northern church to elect a Negro bishop caused a small exodus to the black denominations, most Negro members of the Northern church rejected separatism. "The M.E. Church is doing more for the moral, educational, and religious elevation of the colored people," wrote one black minister, "than all the different colored bodies presided over by colored Bishops and all other colored churches in the United States. . . . What little I have learned was taught to me by the agencies of white people."²⁸ Another moderate pointed out that most of the AME and AME Zion leaders had themselves been educated in Methodist Episcopal schools at the expense of Northern whites. The foremost Negro minister in the Methodist Episcopal Church, E. W. S. Hammond, was opposed to the drive for separatism even though his disappointment at the church's failure to elect him bishop had tempted him in that direction. "I can conceive of no calamity so appalling," said Hammond, "so calculated to blast the hopes and retard progress in the great struggle for manhood, as to be let alone," cut off from white help.²⁹

²⁷ L. M. Dunton to William Claflin, Mar. 24, 1890, William Claflin Papers, Rutherford B. Hayes Library, Fremont, Ohio; letter from R. T. Adams in the *Atlanta Times*, undated clipping in the Joseph C. Hartzell Papers, Drew University Library.

²⁸ Letter from B. J. Dennell in *Southwestern Christian Advocate*, XVIII (Apr. 5, 1883), 1. *Southwestern* was the organ of the Negro conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It usually took a moderate stand on the black-power issue, perhaps because its editor was elected every four years by the General Conference.

²⁹ A. E. P. Albert's editorial in *ibid.*, XXIII (Aug. 9, 1888), 4; *Christian Educator*, II (Apr. 1891), 106-08.

Despite the loyalty of moderates, the Freedmen's Aid Society was under increasing pressure to concede more power to Negroes. In 1891 the Society responded by appointing M. C. B. Mason, a talented black minister, as a field agent. This appointment reduced but did not end criticism.³⁰ The impotence of local boards of trustees remained a festering issue. One black trustee said in 1895 that "we are no more than figure-heads. . . . It is only a question of time when there will be revolt. . . . We believe in distribution of authority, and not centralization."³¹

"Home rule for our colored schools" had become a powerful slogan by 1895. But one Northern Methodist editor, an old abolitionist, advised caution in granting greater power to local boards. The Freedmen's Aid Society had been successful in raising money, he said, because contributors had confidence in the Society. There would be no such confidence in twenty-two separate boards of trustees. "Liberal Methodists" in the North, he asserted, "will not risk \$300,000 annually to the tender mercies of the rhythmical phrase, 'Home rule for our colored schools in the south.' They will give cash confidently [only] so long as the cash is wisely expended." Decentralization might lead to "educational calamity." A black leader replied that proponents of "home rule" did not demand entire control of the schools; they wanted more authority in "the appointment of teachers and other matters pertaining to the local management of our schools," but were willing to leave financial affairs in the hands of the Freedmen's Aid Society.³² Here was the troublesome point: Southern Negroes considered the mission schools "our schools" because they served the black community; Northern whites were reluctant to relinquish control of these schools, which they had founded and still supported. It was an example of the difficult, delicate relationship between benefactor and client that creates tensions not easily resolved to the complete satisfaction of both parties.

In 1895 the Freedmen's Aid Society committed itself in principle to decentralization. It decided to grant enlarged powers to local boards in proportion to increased financial support by Negroes themselves for "their" schools, with the ultimate aim of transferring ownership of the institutions to local boards when they became largely self-supporting.³³ The amount of money contributed by black Methodists to the schools grew from about fifteen per cent of the total income (not counting tuition, room, and board) in the 1890's to one-third of the total by 1916. The authority of local boards rose in rough proportion to this growth

³⁰ The *Southwestern* reacted with a "thrill of joy" to Mason's appointment, announced that this "flattering recognition" showed "what comes to loyal and patient merit," and asserted that it "sternly rebukes the turbulent disposition of those who argue that the way to ecclesiastical recognition is by intriguing to overthrow those who happen, by virtue of age and experience, to be just before them." *Southwestern Christian Advocate*, XXVI (July 23, 1891), 4. This reaction seems a bit over-enthusiastic in view of the modest responsibilities of Mason's job—the raising and disbursing of education funds in the Negro conferences of the church.

³¹ *Western Christian Advocate*, quoted in *Southwestern Christian Advocate*, XXX (July 25, 1895), 1.

³² *Northwestern Christian Advocate*, XLIII (Aug. 7, 1895), 1 (Aug. 21, 1895), 1. (Arthur Edwards was editor of the *Northwestern*.) *Southwestern Christian Advocate*, XXX (Aug. 29, 1895), 4.

³³ *Ibid.*, XXX (July 25, 1895), 1; *Christian Educator*, VII (June-July, 1896), 88.

of self-support, but in 1916 the Society still owned and controlled most of the schools. That black dissatisfaction with this situation declined after 1896 was due to the appointment of M. C. B. Mason as one of the two executive secretaries of the Society in that year and to the increasing number of black teachers and administrators in Methodist schools (see table). By 1915 six of the twelve colleges and professional schools had black presidents. Although the schools were not yet wholly under Negro leadership, the movement in that direction appeared steady enough to moderate the black-power controversy in the church.³⁴

It was in the Baptist schools that the drive for black autonomy produced the greatest discord. After the Civil War the American Baptist Home Mission Society sent missionaries to the South to help organize Negro churches and state Baptist conventions. These churches and conventions were independent of Northern control, but some were dependent upon missionary aid in the early years. The Home Mission Society also founded thirteen Negro schools of secondary or college level in the South, which were supported mainly by Northern money and owned by the Society. In addition, the local black churches and state conventions established nearly fifty schools, mostly of elementary grade, by 1895. At the same time that these institutions were owned by Negroes, fifteen of the higher-grade schools received aid and supervision from the Home Mission Society.

The younger generation of black leaders that emerged in the 1880's became restless in the leading strings of missionary and educational agencies controlled by Northern Baptists and demanded greater power in these agencies or advocated total separation for black churches and schools. As E. M. Brawley, the foremost Negro Baptist minister in South Carolina, who tried to lead a revolt against the white president of Benedict Institute in Columbia, put it in 1882: "[We] do not wish any longer to be treated like children but like men." D. Augustus Straker, a lawyer and teacher, wrote in 1883 that

we are willing to return thanks to the many friends who have assisted us in educating ourselves thus far, but we have now reached the point where we desire to endeavor to educate ourselves, to build school houses, churches, colleges and universities, by our own efforts . . . ere we sacrifice our manhood.³⁵

The issue was exacerbated by the ineptness or unpopularity of white administrators at four Home Mission Society schools between 1882 and 1891. The

³⁴ Statistics on the increase of Negro support for the schools can be found in various issues of the *Christian Educator*, the magazine of the Methodist Freedmen's Aid Society, and in Frank K. Pool, "The Southern Negro in the Methodist Episcopal Church," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1939, 130-31. Because of the Society's method of reporting various categories of income and expenditure under a single head, it is impossible to be precise about the proportion of black support. If tuition and room and board are included, Negroes had contributed nearly forty per cent of the cost of their education in Methodist schools down to 1908. Richard R. Wright, *Self-Help in Negro Education* (Cheyney, Penn., 1908), 14-15. Information on ownership and control of various Methodist schools can be found in *Negro Education*, ed. Jones, II, *passim*.

³⁵ Brawley quoted in C. E. Becker to Henry L. Morehouse, Nov. 27, 1882, ABHMS Archives; Straker quoted in *New York Globe*, Jan. 20, 1883. For discussions of growing militancy and separatism among Negro Baptists in the 1880's and 1890's, see Carter G. Woodson, *The History of the*

worst flareup occurred at Roger Williams University in Nashville, where a threatened student strike in 1887 brought the forced retirement of the president and the bursar, the expulsion of several students, and the angry resignation of four black trustees who resented the Home Mission Society's action against the students. At the height of the controversy, the hapless president and bursar received anonymous notes from students warning that "this is our house and you dirty pup we will kick your ass out if you do not act better" and informing the bursar that "[your] daughter makes love to one of us niggers."³⁶

The issue of separation versus continuing cooperation with the Home Mission Society split black Baptists into two factions. In an effort to conciliate the separatists and strengthen the cooperationists, the Society moved in 1883 to share some power with its black constituency by creating local boards of trustees for its schools to prepare for the time when Negroes "may maintain and manage these institutions for themselves." The Society also increased its support for several schools owned entirely by black Baptists. Such support involved a degree of supervision, however, and one militant separatist announced that "if Negro schools cannot get money from the Home Mission Society without making cowards and bootlicks of all the men connected with them it were far better that they never get a dime."³⁷ The black-power rhetoric of such separatists as Harvey Johnson of Baltimore, Walter Brooks of Washington, and R. H. Boyd of San Antonio generated great enthusiasm in some Negro Baptist circles, but financial agents for independent schools and mission organizations complained that these institutions could not exist on enthusiasm alone. Two of the most influential cooperationists, both of them presidents of black-owned schools that survived only with help from the Home Mission Society, pointed out the perils of rejecting white help. "I state from positive knowledge that the colored people are not able to support the schools now maintained in the South," wrote William B. Simmons of Kentucky Institute. "Don't for want of discretion destroy our friends' interest in us, by biting off more than we can chew." Charles L. Purce of Selma University ridiculed the claim that blacks could sustain their own schools: "How many have we supported ourselves that have attained to anything of importance? . . . It is all nonsense for any of us to say we can support them, and then will not do it." In Georgia one of the leading Baptist advocates of black power, E. K. Love, was disillusioned by his failure to raise funds for a separate, black-owned institution to rival Atlanta Baptist Seminary, and confessed in 1887 that "we are simply attempting too much. . . . We are poorly

Negro Church (2d. ed., Washington, 1945), 235-41; and James D. Tyms, *The Rise of Religious Education Among Negro Baptists* (New York, 1965), 150-66.

³⁶ The anonymous notes are in the Roger Williams file, ABHMS Archives. The other three schools where trouble occurred between students and presidents were Benedict Institute, Wayland Seminary, and Bishop College. Correspondence, memoranda, and newspaper clippings on all of these developments are in the ABHMS Archives.

³⁷ *Home Mission Monthly*, V (Feb. 1883), 35; undated clipping of *The Christian Organizer* in the ABHMS Archives.

prepared to control and manage high schools financially and intellectually. Graduation is not a sufficient guarantee that one is prepared to manage the school from which he graduates."³⁸

The struggle between separatists and cooperationists intensified in the 1890's and was a major cause of the formal division of the Negro Baptists of Texas and Georgia into rival state conventions. The Home Mission Society came under increasing pressure from separatists and cooperationists alike, pressure that prompted the secretary of the Society, Thomas J. Morgan, a former abolitionist and commander of Negro troops in the Civil War, to explain in 1894 why the Society could not yet turn over its thirteen academies and colleges to black control. Negroes had shown commendable initiative in establishing many small schools on their own, wrote Morgan, but "it must be said . . . that the management of these schools is not in every case what it should be." Funds had been stolen, teachers were unskilled, principals incompetent. The blacks, said Morgan, had not yet acquired the experience necessary to manage larger schools effectively without white assistance. Relinquishment of control by the Society, he feared, would "result in a rapid retrograde movement, if not the immediate ruin of the schools."³⁹

In an effort to head off a renewed attempt by Georgia separatists to found their own college, Morgan proposed a plan under which the two state conventions would jointly form an education association to work with the Home Mission Society in the coordination of all educational efforts in Georgia. The board of trustees of Atlanta Baptist College would then be enlarged by the addition of more black members and given increased powers. If this was unsatisfactory, Morgan suggested as an alternative the lease of the college to the state's black Baptists for one dollar per year, provided they would assume its entire financial support. This suggestion may have been a bluff; if so, the Georgia militants failed to call it. The majority of Negro Baptists did not wish to drive the Home Mission Society from the state, and the two conventions agreed to Morgan's first proposal in 1897.⁴⁰

The idea of an education association seemed to work out so well in Georgia that the Society helped black Baptist conventions in other states establish similar cooperative associations. But the Georgia accord almost broke down in 1899 when the separatists, resentful of the Negroes' continued subordinate position on the reorganized board of Atlanta Baptist College and only token representation on the Spelman board, carried out their threat to found a rival in-

³⁸ *People's Advocate*, July 28, 1883; *Home Mission Monthly*, X (Dec. 1888), 348; clipping of a letter from Love published in the *Georgia Baptist*, Nov. 24, 1887, ABHMS Archives. Love later resumed his separatist efforts.

³⁹ *Home Mission Monthly*, XVI (Aug. 1894), 321-22. In the archives of the ABHMS there is some evidence—part of it from black sources—to back Morgan's charges of dishonesty or incompetency against a few black missionaries, principals, and financial agents.

⁴⁰ *Home Mission Monthly*, XIX (June 1897), 237-38 (July 1897), 271-72 (Oct. 1897), 342-43, XX (Jan. 1898), 27-30 (Apr. 1898), 109-17; Benjamin Brawley, *A History of Morehouse College* (Atlanta, 1917), 88-92.

stitution, Central City College at Macon. Hailed as a grand new venture in self-help and independence, Central City College failed to receive adequate financial support and existed essentially as a marginal secondary school.⁴¹ Most black Baptists in Georgia remained loyal to the Home Mission Society and its schools. Atlanta Baptist College (renamed Morehouse College in 1913) and Spelman grew under the Society's guiding hand to become two of the best Negro colleges in the South.⁴²

A dissident group of black Baptists in Virginia also denounced the Home Mission Society as paternalistic, demanded more influence in the running of Virginia Union University, carried a majority of the state Baptist convention with them in 1899, and disassociated the Negro-owned Virginia Seminary at Lynchburg from Virginia Union when the Society declined to make the required concessions (whereupon the cooperationists seceded to form their own convention). Shrill rhetoric by militants in Virginia and other states caused Morgan to deplore "a spirit of unreasoning racism" among Negroes and to charge that a "few noisy, ignorant, ambitious, self-seeking would-be leaders" were trying to turn the race against its Northern friends. R. H. Boyd replied to Morgan's outburst with an assertion that

the race movement which you so much dread and stigmatize . . . is simply a determination on the part of the Negroes to assume control of their race life and evolve along such lines and such ways as their spirit and genius may dictate and unfold, and not as the Anglo-Saxon may outline. . . . Hitherto the Home Mission Society has led and the Negroes have followed; henceforth the Negroes must lead and the Home Mission Society may follow . . . if it will.⁴³

Fearful that anti-white tirades by black radicals would dry up Northern support for Baptist schools, Negro moderates rallied to the defense of the Home Mission Society. The president of a school receiving aid from the Society said the militants were motivated only by a "greed for office. . . . The fellow that makes the bitterest race speech gets the most applause, and he is honored as a champion of the rights of the race." This black educator believed in self-help, "but it is possible to separate self help from self foolishness; it is possible to practice self help and yet receive the generous aid of able friends." Black independence did not mean that Negroes can "take all we can get from the whites and abuse them as much as we please." He hoped the militants' conduct would not "discourage our white friends who have stood by us so loyally during the dark and bitter past." In 1902 the president of the National Baptist Convention, E. C. Morris, who had once leaned toward the separatists, expressed his desire

⁴¹ A government survey of Negro education in 1915 found Central City College operating on a budget of about \$1,700 a year with only sixty-five students, all in elementary and secondary grades, and plagued by "poor equipment and ineffective management." *Negro Education*, ed. Jones, II, 194-95. E. K. Love led the movement to found Central City College.

⁴² Willard Range, *The Rise and Progress of Negro Colleges in Georgia, 1865-1949* (Athens, Ga., 1951), 109-10; Ridgely Torrence, *The Story of John Hope* (New York, 1948), 137-38.

⁴³ *Home Mission Monthly*, XX (Aug. 1898), 254, XXI (July 1899), 264; clipping of an open letter from Boyd to Morgan, published in the *Christian Banner*, Dec. 22, 1899, ABHMS Archives.

that "all of the misunderstandings cease and all the hard sayings indulged be left in the forgotten past."⁴⁴

The Society reciprocated these signs of good will by stepping up efforts to bring Negroes into posts of greater responsibility. "I am not at all prepared to admit the false philosophy that a white man cannot teach a Negro," wrote Morgan in 1900, but "I recognize that race feeling is very strong, and that other things being equal, a Negro will have more influence upon his race than a white man." Atlanta Baptist College hired more black faculty and began grooming John Hope for its presidency. Hope assumed the office in 1907, the first Negro president of a Home Mission Society college. By 1915 nearly half the faculty in the Society's nine colleges was black, and three of the college presidents were Negroes.⁴⁵

Though the Northern Presbyterians had only a small black membership in the South, the church's Board of Missions for the Freedmen was also confronted by the black-power issue. In 1888 the white secretary of the Board, Henry N. Payne, urged a positive response to black demands for greater power and responsibility in the schools. Because of the effects of slavery, said Payne, Negroes "have been weak and dependent; only in this way can they be made strong and self-reliant."⁴⁶ The Board decided to begin phasing out white teachers earlier than any other mission society, and in 1891 Daniel J. Sanders, born a slave, was installed as president of Biddle University (later renamed Johnson C. Smith University). Several new Negro faculty members were also appointed in 1891, and within three years the Biddle faculty was entirely black. Some Presbyterians criticized this development as a "rash experiment"; the Board of Missions for the Freedmen conceded that it was a "bold experiment," but hoped it would not turn out to be rash. In 1893 the Board pronounced the venture a success; administrative control of Biddle was thenceforth in black hands, though major financial and policy decisions were still made by the Northern Board.⁴⁷

The other major Presbyterian college, Lincoln University (the only white-supported Negro college outside former slave territory), took a radically different position on the issue of black teachers and administrators. Lincoln's faculty and board of trustees were virtually one hundred per cent white until the 1930's (a few Negroes were appointed earlier as instructors or assistants, but none as professors). This caused considerable dissatisfaction among Lincoln alumni and students. In 1916 Francis Grimké, an alumnus, said that Lincoln's lily-white

⁴⁴ C. S. Brown, president of Waters Institute, Winton, N. C., to Thomas J. Morgan, in *Home Mission Monthly*, XXII (Apr. 1900), 123-24; pamphlet copy of Morris' address to the National Baptist Convention, 1902, ABHMS Archives.

⁴⁵ *Home Mission Monthly*, XXII (Dec. 1900), 336, XXX (Nov. 1908), 439-40; Brawley, *Morehouse*, 95; Torrence, *John Hope*, 142-57, 164, 185. See table for 1914-15 statistics. The figure of nine colleges for 1915 includes Jackson College, not classified by the Jones report as a full-fledged collegiate institution. Several of its secondary students were taking college courses in 1914-15, and shortly thereafter the school became a four-year college. *Negro Education*, ed. Jones, II, 355-56.

⁴⁶ *Church at Home and Abroad*, III (Mar. 1888), 270.

⁴⁷ Andrew E. Murray, *Presbyterians and the Negro—A History* (Philadelphia, 1966), 188-89; *Church at Home and Abroad*, VI (Dec. 1889), 549, IX (Mar. 1891), 248, XIII (Apr. 1893), 208-09.

policy was "a standing argument against the professed friendship and Christian character of the men who have permitted this condition of things to continue as long as it has."⁴⁸ Lincoln was entirely unconnected with the Board of Missions that supervised freedmen's education in the South; it had been founded before the Civil War by the Old School Presbyterians (most of the antislavery sentiment in the denomination was concentrated in the New School faction) and was governed by an independent board of trustees.

All the mission societies rapidly increased the ratio of Negro faculty and administration in the first decade of the twentieth century, an increase that helped reduce the intensity of the black-power controversy in education. (The issue remained alive, however, and flared up again in the 1920's.) The change was most dramatic in the secondary schools of the American Missionary Association. In 1895 only nine per cent of the teachers in these institutions were black; by 1905 the proportion had risen to fifty-three per cent, and seven of the twenty-one principals of AMA high schools were Negroes.⁴⁹ This change was in part the result of a deliberate policy decision to begin an orderly transition of "mission" schools to "native" control, but it was also a pragmatic response to continuing black pressure. In AMA schools with interracial faculties, young Negro teachers were often impatient with the continued presence of white veterans who blocked their promotions. One black male teacher wrote in a private letter: "If that old bitch from Massachusetts would ever die or get through here, I could begin to live."⁵⁰

Not all Negroes connected with AMA schools favored the conversion to black faculties. In fact, resistance from parents of students helped bring a virtual halt for several years to the relative increase of black teachers in AMA secondary schools, and in 1915 the percentage of Negro faculty was about the same as it had been in 1905. Many Negro parents believed that white teachers were better than black; some of them said privately, "My child shall not go to school to a nigger." The AMA's assistant superintendent of education reported that when Negro teachers replaced whites in some communities, enrollment decreased and parents complained that "their Harvard was being taken from them and they were being pushed back into the log cabin school." On more than one occasion parents formed a "Committee to Save Our School" and obtained hundreds of signatures on petitions urging retention of white teachers.⁵¹ This phenomenon was perhaps less an objective index of the relative quality of white and black teachers than a reflection of the self-distrust and self-hatred ingrained into many Negroes by centuries of white supremacy. In any case, the cross-pressures between

⁴⁸ Grimké to George Johnson, dean of Lincoln University, Mar. 25, 1916, in *The Works of Grimké*, ed. Woodson, I, 530-31.

⁴⁹ *Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Education for the Year 1905* (Washington, 1906), 1310-17; *American Missionary*, LVIII (Feb. 1904), 35.

⁵⁰ Quoted by Lura Beam, in *He Called Them by the Lightning: A Teacher's Odyssey in the Negro South, 1908-1919* (Indianapolis, 1967), 153-54. Lura Beam was the AMA's assistant superintendent of education from 1910 to 1919, after having taught for two years in AMA schools.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 150-52.

younger Negroes ambitious for places in the schools and parents who wanted white teachers to stay caused many headaches for officials of the AMA.

A set of factors related to broad developments in American education had some impact on the changing ratios of white and black teachers in Negro schools. In the two decades before 1900 an "academic revolution" diminished the role of the nineteenth-century Christian college, whose curriculum emphasized the classics, moral philosophy, and theology, and led to the rise of the modern university, which has emphasized physical sciences, social sciences, vocational-professional training, and a commitment to secularism. An important part of this revolution was the increasingly self-conscious professional status of teachers at both the secondary and college level. Normal schools became teachers' colleges, which granted bachelor's degrees to prospective high school teachers; colleges were increasingly staffed by Ph.D.'s or at least M.A.'s instead of B.D.'s.⁵²

Negro colleges and secondary schools were not unaffected by these changes. By the second decade of the twentieth century the AMA (whose standards were higher than those of the other mission societies) required a college degree for its secondary school teachers and post-graduate training for its college instructors.⁵³ As teaching qualifications, missionary zeal counted less and professional education more than in earlier days. Curiously, this development did not lead to an improvement in the quality of white teachers; indeed, the opposite seems to have occurred. It was generally agreed by contemporaries and alumni that the first generation of missionary teachers, who had a genuine humanitarian commitment to their work, were more effective than the later, more professional generations, who were less interested in helping the poor than in getting a job. There was an unfortunate and growing tendency among discards from Northern colleges to go South to teach in Negro colleges. As racism in white America hardened, some whites attached a stigma to teaching in a black school. Thus one reason for the partial conversion to Negro faculties was a relative decline of willing and able white teachers.

This factor should not, however, be overemphasized. Secularism and professionalism were slow to penetrate Negro education. Missionary and humanitarian motives remained the most important ones impelling Northern whites to teach at Negro schools, at least before 1915. Of course there is no necessary contradiction between thorough professional training and missionary dedication; many white teachers successfully combined both. And while the percentage of white faculty in the schools covered by this study declined between 1895 and 1915, the actual number of white teachers increased at a rate almost equal to the growth of the middle-class Protestant population from which most of these teachers came. The most important reason for the rising percentage of black

⁵² Lawrence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago, 1965); Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957* (New York, 1961), especially 168-76; Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York, 1955), especially 277-479. The phrase "academic revolution" is from Veysey, 267.

⁵³ Beam, *He Called Them by the Lightning*, 140.

teachers in the schools was not a relative shortage of white teachers, but pressure from strong segments of the black community coupled with the conscientious desire by many officials of mission societies to transfer responsibility to their former protégés.

By 1915 sixty per cent of the teachers in all secondary schools and colleges founded by or receiving support from Northern missionary sources were black. The proportion of Negro faculty in the colleges alone had nearly doubled from twenty-seven per cent in 1895 to fifty-one per cent in 1915. Nine of the thirty college presidents were black, while fifty-two of the eighty-five secondary schools had Negro principals. But most of the schools and colleges, including those with black administrations, were still governed mainly by the mission societies or by independent boards on which white trustees predominated.

In 1915, a half century after the beginnings of Negro education in the South, white influence was still paramount in the major institutions of higher learning. This was doubtless due in part to the paternalism inherent in all mission enterprises and to a reluctance by those in authority to give up power, but it was due also to a desire to maintain high standards and to a continued dependence on Northern financial support. Adam Clayton Powell, Sr., recognized the importance of this last factor in 1930 when he estimated that "Negroes have paid only 10 per cent of the cost of their [higher] education during the last sixty-five years. . . . There are only two worth-while educational institutions in America receiving their chief financial support from Negroes." Powell said that black people owed "our white friends a unanimous vote of thanks," but that "this kind of charity cannot and should not go on forever"; the Negro should do more to support his own institutions.⁵⁴

Of course, white sponsorship did not necessarily preclude black control of finances, though it was on precisely this point that the mission societies were most reluctant to yield authority. At the same time that the societies moved steadily forward with the appointment of Negro teachers and administrators, they maintained a close watch over funds and general policy. This was perhaps the result of an unjustified and patronizing distrust of the Negro's competence to manage things for himself. Nevertheless, several black leaders, admitting their lack of experience, urged the mission boards and white trustees to continue their supervision of Negro colleges. Kelly Miller lamented as late as 1933 the "failure of Negroes to handle successfully practical projects which they had assumed" and stated that "the race is not yet sufficiently experienced . . . to justify assuming complete guardianship of higher institutions of learning. . . . This is not a race question, nor one of discrimination, but only one of common sense and prudence."⁵⁵

An important government survey of Negro education in 1915 concluded that

⁵⁴ Article by Powell in Jordan, *Negro Baptist History*, 306. Powell's estimate of ten per cent probably understated the Negro's actual contribution to his higher education.

⁵⁵ Kelly Miller, "The Past, Present, and Future of the Negro College," *Journal of Negro Education*, II (July 1933), 418-19.

some of the mission boards had actually been premature in promoting black teachers and appointing black presidents. The Methodist and Presbyterian schools had the highest percentage of Negro faculty and administrators; the survey declared that in many of these institutions "the standards of administration and educational work" had "not been satisfactory." In several Methodist colleges the change from white to black faculties "has been too rapid for the good of the schools." At the Presbyterians' Biddle University, the first mission college to have a Negro president, "the work is poorly organized and the large plant is ineffectively used." The experience of this and other schools "shows clearly that the white boards render their best service when they send not only their money but also their capable men and women to have a vital part in the instruction of colored youth." On the whole the weakest schools, according to the survey, were those controlled entirely by Negro denominations—the Baptist state conventions and the AME and AME Zion churches—while the strongest were those founded by the American Missionary Association, in which white influence prevailed longest.⁵⁶

This evaluation, by a white educator, could perhaps be dismissed as the product of white racism.⁵⁷ It was, however, echoed several years later by Kelly Miller, who asserted that the transition from white to black faculties "was too sharp and sudden. It was a misfortune barely short of a calamity." As white teachers were replaced by blacks the "colleges were shifted from a Puritan to a pagan basis" and the "moral stamina" of the first generation of Negro education declined. (E. Franklin Frazier made a similar point in *Black Bourgeoisie*.) "Painful observation," wrote Miller, "convinces us that the later crop of college output falls lamentably short of their elder brothers in this respect. The inducing process was cut short before the induction had become permanently effective."⁵⁸

It may be impossible to reach a consensus on whether the transition of power from white to black in Negro colleges was too fast, just right, or not fast enough. Evidence regarding administrative efficiency and the ability to impart skills and mastery of subject matter seems to indicate that white administrators and teachers were better qualified than their black colleagues, at least before 1900 or 1910.

⁵⁶ *Negro Education*, ed. Jones, I, 15, 17, 135, 139-40, 143-45, 151-52. II, 424. It should be noted, however, that Morehouse College and Wiley University, with Negro presidents and about ninety per cent black faculties, were among the best Negro colleges in 1915. And a major factor in the superiority of the schools owned by the AMA and other mission societies to the institutions owned by black denominations was the greater financial resources of the former. The degree of support by Negroes themselves for the Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian schools was greater than for the AMA schools; there were very few Negroes in the Congregational Church, so nearly all the denominational support for AMA institutions still came from the North. This was a significant factor in the longer persistence of white influence in these schools; the AMA remained a "mission" enterprise longer than any of the other societies.

⁵⁷ The director of the survey, Thomas Jesse Jones of the US Bureau of Education, was basically more in sympathy with the Hampton-Tuskegee program of industrial education than with the academic orientation of Fisk, Atlanta, and other colleges, and was thus somewhere to the right of center in the spectrum of friendly white attitudes toward Negro higher education. Nevertheless, he praised the work of the academic colleges when he thought their program was of high quality.

⁵⁸ Miller, "The Past, Present, and Future of the Negro College," 414; see also E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Collier Books ed., New York, 1962), 73-76.

On the other hand, proficiency in these areas may have been purchased at the cost of restricting the development of black initiative, self-reliance, and pride. It is not easy to say which objectives should have been uppermost in Negro education. It can be said, however, that the schools and colleges discussed in this article could not have been sustained by pride alone. Despite discord, these institutions survived and grew, keeping Negro higher education alive through difficult times. From the viewpoint of today's black-power movement, persistent white influence in Negro education perpetuated the blacks' colonial dependence on white liberals. But without this educational "colonialism" there would have been little higher education for Negroes; there would have been no Howard, no Fisk, no Lincoln, no Morehouse, no Spelman, no Atlanta University. From the schools founded by whites were graduated many twentieth-century leaders of the black community, including W. E. B. Du Bois (Fisk), James Weldon Johnson and Walter White (Atlanta), James Farmer (Wiley), Martin Luther King (Morehouse), Thurgood Marshall (Lincoln University and Howard Law School), and Stokely Carmichael (Howard). This was their main bequest to our generation. It was no mean legacy.

SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGES AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED BY NORTHERN MISSION SOCIETIES^a

MISSION SOCIETIES AND SCHOOLS	1894-95										1914-15									
	Faculty and Administration						Students				Faculty and Administration ^b						Students ^c			
	Total	Negro	White	% Negro	President or Principal	Total	Elementary	Secondary	College and Professional	Total	Negro	White	% Negro	President or Principal	Total	Attendance ^d	Elementary ^d	Secondary ^d	College and Professional ^d	
American Missionary Association: Colleges																				
Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn. ^e	31	1	30	3%	White	539	221	263	55	45	14	31	31%	White	505	505	112	205	188	
Straight University, New Orleans, La.	24	2	22	8%	White	569	367	152	50	30	13	17	43%	White	758	578	364	203	11	
Talladega College, Talladega, Ala.	20	1	19	5%	White	581	509	66	6	41	12	29	29%	White	668	561	382	124	55	
Tillotson College, Austin, Tex.	13	0	13	0%	White	193	153	40	0	20	6	14	30%	White	314	223	135	70	18	
Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Miss.	22	0	22	0%	White	377	332	45	0	31	2	29	6%	White	455	444	275	149	20	
Total	110	4	106	4%	Black: 0 White: 5	2,259	1,582	566	111	167	47	126	28%	Black: 0 White: 5	2,700	2,311	1,268	751	292	

AMA Secondary Schools: 1895 (17); 1915 (22) ^f	141	12	129	9%	Black: 1 White: 16	4,327	3,743	584	246	132	114	54%	Black: 10 White: 12	5,977	4,743	3,892	851	
Total: All AMA Schools ^f	251	16	235	6%	Black: 1 White: 21	6,586	5,325	1,150	413	179	234	43%	Black: 10 White: 17	8,677	7,054	5,160	1,602	292
Freedmen's Aid Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church: Colleges ^f																		
Bennett College, Greensboro, N. C.	10	10	0	100%	Black	203	198	5	0	15	12	3	80%	Black	312	235	67	10
Clark University Atlanta, Ga.	19	8	11	42%	White	341	246	91	4	24	14	10	58%	Black	304	128	144	32
Clafin College, Orangeburg, S. C.	20	10	10	50%	White	570	473	74	23	27	21	6	78%	Black	866	597	191	26
Gammon Theological Seminary, Atlanta, Ga.	4	1	3	25%	White	84	0	0	84	6	2	4	33%	White	78	0	0	78
Meharry Medical College, Nashville, Tenn. ^f					White					30	28	2	93%	White	505	0	0	505
Morgan College, Baltimore, Md.	9	2	7	22%	White	160	96	3	61	11	4	7	36%	White	128	81	0	55
New Orleans University, New Orleans, La.	24	12	12	50%	White	603	531	65	7	24	11	13	46%	White	557	432	125	9
Philander Smith College, Little Rock, Ark.	15	4	11	27%	White	312	259	37	16	18	17	1	94%	Black	491	268	132	39
Rust College, Holly Springs, Miss.	10	4	6	40%	White	230	127	97	6	18	10	8	56%	White	378	196	128	8
Samuel Huston College, Austin, Tex.										20	19	1	95%	Black	405	377	267	18
						Founded in 1900												

SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGES AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED BY NORTHERN MISSION SOCIETIES* (Continued)

MISSION SOCIETIES AND SCHOOLS	1894-95										1914-15									
	Faculty and Administration					Students					Faculty and Administration ^b					Students ^c				
	Total	Negro	White	% Negro	President or Principal	Total	Elementary	Secondary	College and Professional		Total	Negro	White	% Negro	President or Principal	Total	Attendance ^d	Elementary ^d	Secondary ^d	College and Professional ^d
Central Tennessee College, Nashville, Tenn. ^g	11	2	9	18%	White	326	115	158	53		17	8	9	47%	Black	107	107	30	77	0
Wiley University, Marshall, Tex.	12	3	9	25%	Black	284	89	139	56		30	28	2	93%	Black	439	384	176	170	38
Total	134	56	78	42%	Black: 2 White: 9	3,113	2,134	669	310		240	174	66	73%	Black: 6 White: 6	4,570	4,029	2,127	1,113	789
Methodist Secondary Schools: 1895 (11): 1915 (11) ^f	72	35	19	72%	Black: 4 White: 4 Unknown: 3	1,650	1,203	447			135	94	41	70%	Black: 5 White: 6	2,493	2,401	1,864	537	
Total: All Methodist Schools ^f	206	91	97	48%	Black: 6 White: 13 Unknown: 3	4,763	3,337	1,116	310		375	268	107	71%	Black: 11 White: 12	7,063	6,430	3,991	1,650	789
American Baptist Mission Society: Colleges																				
Benedict College, Columbia, S. C.	8	1	7	13%	White	135	0	135	0							595	507	254	205	48

Bishop College, Marshall, Tex.	18	7	11	39%	White	368	270	65	33	22	10	12	45%	White	421	371	176	153	42	
Hartshorn Memorial College, Richmond, Va.	9	2	7	22%	White	97	22	75	0	15	3	12	20%	White	188	169	73	96	o ^h	
Morehouse College, Atlanta, Ga. ⁱ	11	6	5	55%	White	150	72	50	28	19	17	2	89%	Black	277	277	110	111	56	
Richmond Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va.	4	2	2	50%	White	50	0	0	50	Merged with Wayland Seminary in 1899 to form Virginia Union University										
Roger Williams University, Nashville, Tenn. ^j	16	7	9	44%	White	227	141	67	19	17	17	0	100%	Black	123	107	27	80	0	
Shaw University, Raleigh, N. C.	26	10	16	38%	White	362	129	175	58	30	16	14	53%	White	291	221	52	123	46	
Spelman Seminary, Atlanta, Ga. ^k	38	4	34	11%	White	491	416	52	23	51	3	48	6%	White	631	595	330	254	11	
Virginia Union University, Richmond, Va.	Formed in 1899 of merger between Wayland Seminary and Richmond Theological Seminary										16	7	9	44%	White	265	255	35	145	75
Total	130	39	91	30%	Black: 0 White: 8	1,880	1,050	619	211	200	85	115	43%	Black: 2 White: 6	2,791	2,502	1,057	1,167	278	
Baptist Secondary Schools: 1895 (20); 1915 (16) ^l	122	97	25	80%	Black: 15 White: 5	2,483	1,951	441		208	195	13	94%	Black: 15 White: 1	4,040	3,009	2,243	766		
Total: All Baptist Schools ^f	252	136	116	54%	Black: 15 White: 13	4,363	3,001	1,060	211	408	280	128	69%	Black: 17 White: 7	6,831	5,511	3,300	1,933	278	
Presbyterian College: Biddle University, Charlotte, N. C.	11	11	0	100%	Black	260	19	172	69	16	16	0	100%	Black	221	207	24	131	52	

SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGES AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED BY NORTHERN MISSION SOCIETIES* (Continued)

MISSION SOCIETIES AND SCHOOLS	1894-95										1914-15									
	Faculty and Administration					Students					Faculty and Administration ^b					Students ^c				
	Total	Negro	White	% Negro	President or Principal	Total	Elementary	Secondary	College and Professional	Total	Negro	White	% Negro	President or Principal	Total	Attendance ^d	Elementary ^d	Secondary ^d	College and Professional ^d	
Presbyterian Secondary Schools: 1895 (7); 1915 (20) ^f	75	41	34	55%	Black: 4 White: 3	1,515	953	562		218	173	45	75%	Black: 16 White: 4	4,798	4,197	3,516	681		
Total: All Board of Missions for Freedmen, Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., Schools ^f	86	52	34	60%	Black: 5 White: 3	1,775	972	734	69	234	189	45	81%	Black: 17 White: 4	5,019	4,404	3,540	812	52	
United Presbyterian College: Knoxville College, Knoxville, Tenn.	21	0	21	0%	White	317	186	108	23	29	5	24	17%	White	327	327	187	110	30	
United Presbyterian Secondary Schools: 1895 (1); 1915 (5)	14	3	11	22%	White	686	622	64		77	57	20	74%	Black: 3 White: 2	1,726	1,344	1,137	207		
Total: All Board of Freedmen's Missions, United Presbyterian Church, Schools	35	3	32	9%	Black: 0 White: 2	1,003	808	172	23	106	62	44	58%	Black: 3 White: 3	2,653	1,671	1,324	317	30	
Quakers: Secondary Schools: 1895 (3); 1915 (4)	37	20	17	54%	Black: 0 White: 2 Unknown: 1	655	297	358		64	54	10	84%	Black: 2 White: 2	1,464	1,243	924 ^m	94 ^m		

Other Denominations: ^a Secondary Schools: 1895 (3); 1915 (4)																			
16	8	8	50%	Black: 1 White: 2	379	259	120	64	30	34	47%	Black: 1 White: 3	917	862	614 ^m	142 ^m			
Independent, Nondenominational Colleges																			
Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga.	16	0	16	0%	White	217	149	48	20	33	4	29	12%	White	586	182	360	44	
Howard University, Washington, D. C.	64	21	43	33%	White	587	129	126	332	106	73	33	69%	White	1,401	1,401	0	373	1,028
Leland University, New Orleans, La. ^o	13	4	9	31%	White	439	357	59	23	14	4	10	29%	White	298	298	203	91	4
Total	93	25	68	27%	Black: 0 White: 3	1,243	635	233	375	153	81	72	53%	Black: 0 White: 3	2,285	2,285	385	824	1,076
Independent Secondary Schools (including Hampton Institute) ^p 1895 (2); 1915 (3)	70	19	51	27%	Black: 0 White: 2	1,067	751	316		250	93	157	37%	Black: 0 White: 3	1,167	1,115	710	405	
Total: All Independent Schools	163	44	119	27%	Black: 0 White: 5	2,310	1,386	549	375	403	174	229	43%	Black: 0 White: 6	3,452	3,400	1,095	1,229	1,076
All Colleges and Professional Schools ^q	499	135	364	27%	Black: 3 White: 26	9,072	5,606	2,367	1,099	805	408	397	51%	Black: 8 White: 21	12,894	11,661	5,048	4,096	2,517
All Secondary Schools ^q	547	235	294	44%	Black: 25 White: 35 Unknown: 4	12,762	9,779	2,892		1,262	828	434	66%	Black: 52 White: 33	22,582	18,914	14,840	3,683	
Total: All Schools ^q	1,046	370	658	36%	Black: 28 White: 61 Unknown: 4	21,834	15,395	5,291	1,099	2,067	1,236	831	60%	Black: 61 White: 54	35,476	30,575	19,948	7,773	2,517

^a These statistics have been garnered from *The Report of the U. S. Commissioner of Education for the Year 1894-95* (Washington, 1896), 1338-45, and from Negro Education: *A Study of the Private and Higher Schools for the Colored People in the United States*, ed. Thomas Jesse Jones (Washington, 1917), *passim*. The government

figures for 1894-95 are not wholly reliable and have been checked and supplemented whenever possible by the scattered statistics available in the annual reports and other materials published by the mission societies. The statistics in this table do not include elementary schools.

^b Includes clerical staff for a few schools.

^c The Jones report applied stricter criteria for classifying students in secondary or college classes than the earlier reports of the Commissioner of Education, so there are fewer students listed in the higher grades than if earlier standards had been applied.

^d Students in attendance on day of visit.

^e Acquired an independent status in 1909.

^f Statistics incomplete for 1894-95.

^g Name changed to Walden University in 1900.

^h Hartshorn was the girls' college of Virginia Union University; several students took college courses at Virginia Union.

ⁱ Named Atlanta Baptist Seminary until 1897, Atlanta Baptist College 1897-1913.

^j Taken over by the state Negro Baptist convention in 1908; continued to receive some Home Mission Society aid.

^k Supported mainly by the Woman's American Baptist Home Mission Society, an affiliate of the American Baptist Home Mission Society.

^l Fifteen Baptist secondary schools in 1894-95 and fourteen in 1914-15 were owned by Negro state Baptist conventions and partly supported and supervised by the Home Mission Society.

^m Statistics on students incomplete.

ⁿ Christian Missionary Society; American Christian Convention; Free Baptist Church; Reformed Presbyterian Church.

^o Partly supported and controlled by the American Baptist Home Mission Society until 1887. Leland always maintained close ties with the Baptist Church.

^p Hampton Institute was founded by the American Missionary Association, which continued to appropriate some funds to the school until 1894.

^q Statistics on faculty incomplete or not available for one of the colleges and three of the secondary schools in 1894-95; statistics on students incomplete for one of the colleges and six of the secondary schools in 1894-95, and for two of the secondary schools in 1914-15.

Review Articles

Two Southern Historians

GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON

DEMOCRACY IN THE OLD SOUTH AND OTHER ESSAYS. By *Fletcher Melvin Green*. Edited by *J. Isaac Cope-land*. ([Nashville, Tenn.:] Vanderbilt University Press. 1969. Pp. xx, 322. \$8.50.)
THE SOUTH AND THE SECTIONAL CONFLICT. By *David M. Potter*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1968. Pp. xi, 321. \$7.50.)

It would be difficult to think of two men who have contributed more to the study of the Old South and related subjects than Fletcher Melvin Green and David M. Potter. Green, whose major work, *Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860*, was published almost forty years ago, ranks as the elder statesman among historians of the South, not only because his own writing has been influential, but also because an exceptionally large number of his students have gone on to do important work of their own. David M. Potter has acquired a deserved reputation as a historian of unusual intelligence, versatility, and open-mindedness. His first book, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis* (1942), was one of the finest monographs to emerge from the "revisionist" ferment in Civil War historiography; and his *People of Plenty* (1954) may well be the most significant study of the American national character that has appeared in recent years. In addition to their highly regarded books, both Potter and Green have published over the years a number of important articles and essays, relating mostly to the South and the sectional conflict. These articles have heretofore been available only in the journals or symposium-type books in which they originally appeared. Now at last we have at hand, in well-arranged and attractive volumes, selections of their most significant shorter writings.

A reading of these collections reveals that Potter and Green have one quality in common. Although both men were born and raised in the South and have devoted much of their professional careers to a study of the South and its role in American history, their work has not suffered from a constricting sectional bias or emphasis. Potter has characteristically seen "the South and the sectional conflict" in a broad context of national and even international experience. In his brilliant essays, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa" and "The

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Civil War in the History of the Modern World: A Comparative View," Potter demonstrates an ability, sadly lacking in some historians of the United States, to see both the Southern and the larger American experience in terms of general trends in the history of the Western world. Green's explicit frame of reference does not extend much beyond the borders of the United States; but for a historian of his generation who has spent his entire career in the South, he has been notably free of a defensive preoccupation with Southern peculiarities. He has been primarily a student of American democracy, who has used the South as an example of national developments, rather than a historian of the South in a limited and parochial sense.

Although they possess in common a broad outlook and a freedom from defensive "Southernism," Potter and Green are in other respects quite different kinds of historians. Green's approach to history is essentially factual and descriptive; he is more concerned with rendering the texture and "feel" of historical reality than with discovering hidden relationships or subjecting conventional historical concepts and categories to critical analysis. His essays on "Democracy in the Old South" and "Cycles of American Democracy" provide admirable accounts of the extension of political rights and the growth of popular participation in politics, but they do not attempt an explanation of these developments beyond the suggestion that Americans felt an inner need to realize their own principles as set forth in the Declaration of Independence. Obvious ambiguities in the American and Southern concepts of democracy are not fully explored; nor is there much concern with relating political manifestations to social and economic institutions. In his well-written articles on Southern economic development, "Gold Mining: A Forgotten Industry of Antebellum North Carolina" and "Duff Green: Industrial Promoter," Green as always marshals his facts with great skill and with an eye for the right illustrative detail, but he passes up the chance to raise basic questions about the factors that encouraged or inhibited capitalistic activity in the ante-bellum South. Such an approach has not prevented Green from making an original contribution to the understanding of American history; as we shall see, he has played an important role in the development of one interpretation of the fundamental values of the Old South. But if it is permissible to categorize historians as having a basic inclination that is either fact-finding and descriptive or analytical and interpretive, then it would appear that Green belongs in the former class and Potter in the latter.

Potter, as a matter of fact, is as able an exponent as one is likely to find of an analytical approach to the writing of history. His perceptive discussion of the work of other historians, in the brilliant "historical forays" contained in *The South and the Sectional Conflict*, provides evidence of his conviction that the historian should not only be fully aware of his fundamental assumptions but also be willing to subject them constantly to the closest critical scrutiny. His essay on "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa" contains an incisive critique

of the popular concept of nationalism and describes how scholars have allowed themselves to be misled by it. As he demonstrates in this essay, and even more dramatically in his book, *People of Plenty*, Potter believes that historians should try to give to their work the same conceptual precision that has been characteristic of some of the best work in other, more systematic disciplines, and furthermore, that they should be willing at times to seek the direct aid of the behavioral sciences in bringing rigor and clarity to that sense of pattern and norm in human behavior upon which most of them rely whether or not they realize it.

It is easier to describe the basic approach of each historian than to discuss adequately the content of the articles that have been brought together in these two volumes. Each and every essay is worthy of comment. But since they cover such a multitude of subjects, it is obviously impossible even in a comparatively long review to do justice to the full achievement of either man. Green, as has already been suggested, is no narrow specialist. His essays specifically on the South cover the period from 1776 to 1955 and deal with such varied subjects as Fourth of July celebrations, the reading habits of Confederate soldiers, the education of women in the Old South, the convict lease system in the post-bellum South, Reconstruction historiography, and recent manifestations of Southern sectionalism. He also pursues his interest in the growth of American democracy outside the South in his general discussion of "Cycles of American Democracy" and in his delightful and vivid account of Andrew Jackson's presidential tour through the Northeastern states. Potter's book is more sharply focused because almost all the essays deal either with general aspects of "Southernism" or with the Civil War crisis, but he treats so many facets of his interrelated areas of interest that his book likewise defies summarization. All that can be said here, for example, about his essays on Lincoln, John Brown, Horace Greeley, and Jefferson Davis is that each contributes significantly to our understanding of the Civil War and the legends to which it has given rise. Since, however, there are several pieces in each book that are concerned directly or indirectly with the Old South and its relation to the rest of the Union, it may be possible to convey a further impression of the work of Potter and Green by centering our attention on what each man has contributed to an understanding of ante-bellum "Southernism" and its role in the coming of the Civil War.

Green has helped to shape our image of the Old South mainly by calling attention to the democratic tendencies that developed between the Revolution and the Civil War. In his essay on "Democracy in the Old South," he elaborates on the significance of what he revealed about political and constitutional trends in his book, *Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860*. To counter the image of an aristocratic, semifeudal South that was handed down with differing judgments by the abolitionists and by conservative Southern apologists, Green depicts a region that before the Civil War was in the throes of a peaceful democratic revolution. Unlike Frank Owsley and his followers, Green makes no

claim that the white South was, in any full sense, an economic and social democracy; but he does demonstrate that political democracy made as much progress in the South during the Jacksonian period as it did in the rest of the country. As a result of popular pressure, much of it coming from the non-slaveholding yeomanry, white manhood suffrage was established, property qualifications for officeholding were abolished, all public offices were made elective, the apportionment of representation in state legislatures was changed to give more power to the back country, and a stridently democratic tone was imparted to political life. According to Green, such changes "dealt a death blow to the power of the landed, slaveholding aristocracy of the Old South. No longer could the members of that class dictate to the great majority of free white men." Green admits that the planters continued thereafter to be an influential social aristocracy but argues that this made them no different from their wealthy counterparts in the mercantile and industrial North. Although Green does not address himself directly to the question of what caused the Civil War, his portrayal of the South as a region that shared fully in a national growth of democratic ideals and practices tends to support those historians of the sectional conflict who deny that the war could have resulted from deep-seated cultural and ideological differences. In his attack on the abolitionist image of a feudal South, for example, Green implicitly rejects the thesis that the Civil War was the result of an "irrepressible conflict" between a "democratic" North and an "aristocratic" South.

Potter also subscribes to the view that the Old South shared many values with Americans in general, but he argues that lack of a separate culture did not prevent the South from developing an authentic nationalism of its own. Nationalism, Potter contends in his most important essay, does not necessarily require an awareness of cultural distinctiveness. The powerful sense of conflicting "interests" that arose in the struggle over slavery was enough, in his opinion, to give Southerners a genuine and deeply-felt desire to establish an independent nationality. In another essay, Potter affirms that the "democratic" facet of Southern consciousness, as described by Green and some of his most distinguished students, was a reality but that it was only one side of a perennially divided Southern psyche. In one of the wisest comments ever made about the Southern character, Potter writes that

the South has been democratic as well as aristocratic, fond of "flush times" and booms as well as tradition; it has lusted for prosperity, bull dozers, and progress, while cherishing the values of stability, religious orthodoxy, and rural life. Southerners have existed historically in a state of ambivalence, even of dualism. . . .

If this is true, Green's emphasis on the democratic aspects of Southern experience invites a one-sided view that overlooks the important conservative elements in the Southern tradition. In *The Southerner as American*, Charles Sellers, who was one of Green's students, has tackled the difficult question of how the South could have embraced slavery and democratic values at the same time, and he has perceived

a painful state of ambivalence. But Sellers, as Potter points out, suggests that the "real" South was democratic while the hierarchical, aristocratic, and racist South was somehow unreal. "There is abundant evidence," Potter concludes, "that both images have been real."

Potter's concept of Southern mentality as fundamentally dualistic is, I think, more convincing than the view of those influenced by Green who see the South as a basically democratic section that betrayed its own real values by upholding slavery. It also strikes me as more persuasive than the opposite monistic interpretation, recently set forth by Eugene Genovese, which holds that the Old South was a fundamentally aristocratic region, thoroughly dominated by a seigniorial landowning class and sincerely devoted to the defense of a quasi-feudal world view that clashed directly with the Northern ideology of bourgeois democracy. Although it constitutes an enormously stimulating new way of looking at the South, this interpretation, in my opinion, does not take full account of the democratic characteristics of Southern thought and politics that Green and others have described.

In considering only the ante-bellum period, however, it may be that Potter's emphasis on ambivalence implies more of a conscious conflict of values than really existed. Perhaps the Old South harmonized what seem to us antithetical principles more effectively than we have wanted to believe. The political democracy that Green describes was certainly no sham; or, in any case, historians have not yet been able to demonstrate that it was a sham. As a result of popular commitment to certain democratic values and procedures, the class of large slaveholders was in no position to impose a consistently conservative world view on Southern society in general; the presence of an enfranchised yeomanry with a powerful distaste for aristocratic privilege was, as Green suggests, a factor of real importance. Potter's dualism, therefore, may have developed originally from the ideological conflict between the conservative heirs of the colonial aristocracy and the progressive proponents of nineteenth-century democracy. But this conflict, which might have torn the South apart and resulted in an internal challenge to the institution of slavery, was in fact resolved. Well before the outbreak of the Civil War the South succeeded in developing a community of feeling and interest that bound planters and non-slaveholders tightly together in defense of the slave property of a privileged minority. One of the things that made this possible was what a lover of paradox might describe as the democratization of the hierarchical principle inherent in slavery. There is much evidence to suggest that the majority of ante-bellum Southerners accepted a coherent ideology that was simultaneously racist and egalitarian; the sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe, in his *Race and Racism* (1967), has called this ideology "*herrenvolk* democracy." That inherent Negro inferiority made the subordination of all blacks compatible with the political, legal, and social equality of all whites was often asserted and widely believed in the Old South. Such a viewpoint was aristocratic in Tocque-

ville's sense of an *aristocratie de peau* but democratic and egalitarian in its implications for the white community. Potter is of course right in pointing out in one of his historiographical essays that recent studies have demonstrated beyond all question that the North shared the racist attitudes of the South, but I think his own deduction that racism therefore does not help explain the breach that resulted in the Civil War is open to question. To the extent that the South sincerely believed—wrongly as it turned out—that slavery was absolutely necessary to preserve biracialism or "*herrenvolk* democracy" when large black populations were present, the defense of slavery for racial reasons would have constituted part of the South's separate "interest" and thereby would have contributed to its growing national consciousness.

American Expansion in China

THOMAS J. McCORMICK

THE MAKING OF A MYTH: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 1897-1912. By *Paul A. Varg*. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 1968. Pp. 184. \$6.00.)

INQUIRY into the historical dynamics of American involvement in the Far East has produced a continuing debate between traditionalist historians seeking to rescue American expansionism from some threatening Hobsonian trap, and revisionist historians playing variations on some materialist theme. Climaxing a recent revival of traditionalism is this interesting book by the deservedly well-respected Paul A. Varg.

Varg's general thesis emerges most clearly in Chapter III, a chapter published earlier in this journal in substantially the same form ("The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914," LXIII [Oct. 1967]). Its chief argument is that the United States had no substantive economic interests in China at the time of the first dynamic American involvement in that Asian country; that the gap between the myth and reality of the China market "attained dimensions of so great a scope as to suggest that the sheer joy of the discussion and not facts sufficed as a propellant." To substantiate his analysis, he points to (1) the "formidable obstacles facing trade in China" and the alleged lack of "familiarity" Americans had with those obstacles; (2) his impression that governmental support was "usually little more than an expression of good will"; (3) the supposed "apathy of American business"; and (4) the generally unimpressive "figures on trade with China."

Two additional points are made as corollaries to his major thesis. First, whatever economic interests did exist were, in the main, no more important than the "political aim" of preserving "the security of the nation as a Pacific power." Second, most policy makers, as well as "the educated and reasonably well-informed" outside government, understood the "cursory" character of American interests, took rhetoric about the China market with a grain of salt, and acted accordingly. They were "realists" in the fashion of Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. Unhappily, a few, like William Howard Taft and Philander C. Knox, were "legalists" or "idealists" who, failing to comprehend reality, acted quixotically.

Space does not permit arguing the finer points of Varg's arguments. In general

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they are judiciously presented, grounded in genuine research, and buttressed at many points by the recent works of Raymond A. Esthus and Charles E. Neu. Nevertheless, his conclusions are impressionistic, and the impressions are not universally shared. Two recent doctoral dissertations, for example, Helen Dodson Kahn's "The Great Game of Empire: Willard D. Straight and American Far Eastern Policy" (Cornell University, 1968) and Jerome M. Israel's "Progressivism and the Open Door: The United States and China, 1901-1921" (Rutgers University, 1967), that offer analyses that are superbly researched and persuasively argued differ radically from the work of Varg and other traditionalists in selection and interpretation of evidence.

The purpose of this review, however, is to pose some larger questions about Varg's book and the traditionalist genre generally. Does Varg's interpretation come to grips with the central question of why America became a Pacific power in the first place, and why it was important that it remain one? The manner in which he separates "security" and "economic" motives suggests not. It suggests that America's status as a Pacific power is accepted as a given, either to be left unexplained or implicitly ascribed to chance—"the accidental empire." Nowhere does it confront the materialist interpretation that America's position as "a Pacific power"—its acquisition of the Philippines, for example—was hardly accidental, that it was, instead, the product of a conscious, pragmatic effort to provide an entrepôt for the China market and for integrated, protectible trade routes across the Pacific. Viewed through this revisionist lens, the political and economic goals become inextricably one and the same, and treating "security" as an independent variable becomes somewhat artificial. Since the survival of the nation-state was admittedly not at stake, treatment of political goals in a vacuum fails to answer, except metaphorically, the question, Security for what?

Is the traditionalist distinction between the "realistic" Roosevelt administrations and the "legalistic" Taft administrations useful? To divide the question: Are such abstract terms ever helpful devices that sharpen analysis or are they merely normative conveniences—borrowed uncritically from political scientists—that make it possible to impose value judgments? Are such distinctions valid in this instance or, as Kahn's work suggests, do not the essential changes in American policy occur in 1908, not in 1909, as Varg asserts, and are not Taft's policies a logical extension of his predecessor's? Granting conflict within consensus, is it not more accurate to describe that conflict in terms of means rather than ends? Israel thinks so, and he argues that changes in policy reflected not realism or idealism, but an ongoing dialectical tension over tactics among "competitionists" who favored an aggressive, unilateral American policy to secure the Open Door; "cooperationists" who, in the typical Progressive's "Search for Order," favored a community of interests, with Russia and Japan included in that community; and the inevitable compromisers who usually sought a partial concert of powers with Japan and/or Russia excluded. In other words, what Varg sees as abstract legalism, Israel sees what Henry Adams called "the instinct of what might be named

McKinleyism; the system of combinations, consolidations, trusts realized at home and realizable abroad."

Does Varg's traditionalist restatement adequately appreciate—as historians must—the powers of inertia and the difficulties of change over time? For example, despite America's accelerating industrialization in the period with which Varg is concerned, and despite the consequent enshrinement of efficiency as a national cult, a great many American captains of industry were slow to accept the bureaucratization of decision making, to change the traditional layout of plant equipment, or to see the possibilities of assembly-line production. Moral? Change takes time! Yet one senses time and again that Varg's assessment of the unreal quality of American international economic interests is based on America's failure to create in a twinkling a full-blown system of a professionalized consular service, a scientific tariff, an integrated overseas banking and credit system, a sophisticated merchandising network, and an effective division of labor between government and business, in short, the kind of complex system that it took the British decades to put together and to learn to operate.

Finally, do Varg and other traditionalists adequately appreciate the long-term character of American Open Door expansionism in the Pacific, and if so, do they satisfactorily explain it? Certainly Varg is aware of this characteristic. He quotes approvingly from Elihu Root that "the interests to be preserved are the future interests of the Open Door and there is no present interest which would justify our exhibiting undue excitement in this quiet, firm maintenance of our policy." But one intuitively wonders whether Varg and other traditionalists fully understand the cosmopolitan quality of the people about whom they write. The men, in and out of government, who most affected America's position in the Far East in the Progressive era were often the same men who promoted the integration of domestic industry and a working relationship between business and government. They carried this same capacity for integrative, systematic thought into the world arena. Moreover, they were able to project their systems and world orders over time, often into the quite distant future. Why did they feel the need to take such a long-term view? Because, ironically, they accepted the very materialist interpretation of American world involvement that traditionalists have tried so manfully to undo. They perceived of themselves as leaders of a political economy, of a system that structurally would require rather continuous and rationalized economic expansion overseas to guarantee prosperity and stability at home. As Huntington Wilson wrote President Taft in 1910:

The home market will ultimately be entirely inadequate for the American manufacturer and producer and for that reason it would be suicidal not to be provident enough to make the effort to build for the future and now to gain a foothold in what must be our future markets. This task falls to our diplomacy.

In other words, much of American interest in China—like the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America earlier—sought the preservation of a long-term option there, to see that no combination of nations or circumstances or forces pre-empted that

potential market, to keep a foot in the open door to insure that we would not find it closed in our face at some future point. Any analysis of American Far Eastern policy at this century's beginning that does not fully come to grips with such an interpretation—with what is the very heart of contemporary revisionism—cannot be wholly satisfying.

So the historiographical dialectic continues its staggered course, with Professor Varg's contribution perhaps raising more questions than it answers. But at the same time it has raised the tone and level of the debate. Publication of the Kahn and Israel manuscripts should make the next round very interesting.

Reviews of Books

General

THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND MODERNIZATION: A COMPARATIVE VIEW. Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt. (New York: Basic Books. 1968. Pp. viii, 407. \$10.00.)

PROFESSOR Eisenstadt has done a service to the scholarly community concerned with "modernization" by bringing together a collection of essays, including a useful bibliography, documenting the wealth of analysis provoked in the 1950's and 1960's by Max Weber's thesis on the Protestant ethic. He has also offered a useful demonstration of the state of the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of comparative studies.

The opening essay by the editor establishes the perspective for the widening application of the Weber thesis to the theme of "modernization." Instead of relating the spirit of capitalism and Puritanism, Mr. Eisenstadt deals with the "internal transformative capacities of Protestantism and their impact on the transformation of the modern world." The significance of Protestantism, he argues, lay "not in any direct effect it had on economic, political, or scientific activity, but in the contribution it made toward the restructuring of European society in general." This line of thought brings him to an analysis of Japanese and Chinese civilization, and of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The following three essays by S. Andresky, E. Fischhoff, and H. Lüthy put Weber's theme into the context of his work and methodology. M. Walzer, introducing Marx as an additional factor, views Puritanism, like Bolshevism, as a fanatical response to disorder, a way of organizing man's mind and energy for overcoming an acute dread of chaos. Sidney Burrell, concerned with the Marxist interpretation of Puritanism, stresses the role of the economically backward Scots in the Calvinist advance, showing into the bargain how easily "scholarship becomes the masked weapon of ideological controversy." C. and K. George deal with the meaning of the term "calling" between 1580 and 1640. David Little probes the relations between Puritanism and capitalism through the study of English law, sometimes supporting the Weber thesis and sometimes not. Emilio Willems takes the reader to Chile and Brazil, showing that in the great transformation after the First World War, the Protestant missionaries supplied some of the traits required for successful adaptation. R. Hooykaas, next, returns to Europe, proving that the religious attitude of the so-called Protestantism furthered the advancement of science.

A distinguished essay by R. N. Bellah introduces the final section, which deals with the application of the Weber thesis to non-European societies. Aware that economic development in underdeveloped areas implies a basic transformation in the underlying value structure, Bellah indicates that nationalism and Communism, otherwise hardly mentioned in this volume, may be as important as religion in providing the ideological underpinnings for the cultural "reformation" of "modernization." As for the seemingly successful case of Japanese "modernization," he stresses the frequently overlooked structural imbalances accompanying it. R. Pieris, however, finds some relationship between the successful secularization of Japanese religion and Japan's phenomenal economic growth. E. F. Wertheim, by contrast, again goes far beyond

Weber, preferring to inquire why the East has followed a way to modern development so different from the West; he would have us reappraise our understanding of European development in the light of Asian experience. M. Ames, dealing with Ceylon, observes a defensive reinterpretation of religious ideology under the impact of Westernization, finding "no simple correlation between modernization, increased secularization, and decrease in magic." E. Gellner, next, deals with a saintly sheik from western Algeria whose life would indicate that traditional saintliness did not promote Algerian nationalism. Of all these essays C. Geertz' study of a small Javanese town is the most empirical. Characteristically it ends with a series of questions rather than conclusions. With Gino Germani's essay on "Secularization, Modernization, and Economic Development" the reader is back in the thick of sociological jargon. The volume ends with an essay on Afrikaaner puritanism by J. J. Loubser, who proves that in the adversity of their South African setting seventeenth-century Dutch Puritans produced anything but "modernization." Who at this point still has faith in the Weber thesis?

The cause of our dissatisfaction becomes clear from the essays by Andresky, Fischhoff, and Lüthy, the latter clearly the outstanding author in the volume. At the heart of Weber's thesis we find an existentialist antimodern insight born of the tormented and ambivalent admiration of the German intelligentsia for a *Lebensmethodik* that seemed to give the English-speaking peoples their superiority in the world. The ultimate criterion for the selection of the essence of "the spirit of capitalism"—for the abstraction of the *Idealtypus*—was in short no more than a poetic bit of sociopolitical envy. In his definition of "capitalism" Marx, incidentally, had performed a very similar mental trick, with less methodological awareness. In his subsequent work Weber tried to offset the onesidedness of his original insight, introducing non-religious factors as well. Yet at his death his conclusions were left in suspense, encouraging a spate of scholarly speculation that, as this volume shows, has strayed far afield and has as yet yielded no confirmation.

Weber, we might say then, has misled the scholarly community on several grounds. He has picked, from the perspectives of a German *intelligent*, certain rather limited aspects of Western European (and mostly English) development as the essence of "modernization." He thereby contributed to the fallacy of trying to sum up the direction of Western European and North American history in the past five hundred years by the redundant term "modernity." He was also caught in a similar Marxist oversimplification by using the term "capitalism" as the quintessence of that historical development. He has, moreover, unwittingly strengthened the imperialist Western, liberal, Marxist assumption of a universal single track of "development," patterned after the Western European and North American model. He and his followers above all have overlooked the basic distinction, essential to any analysis of global Westernization, between a course of sociocultural evolution nurtured organically from a thousand strands within a given society or culture and one imposed by force from without. In his thesis on the Protestant ethic he, like most liberal and socialist theorists, was blind to the effect of power politics and, even less excusably, to the cultural and political tensions arising out of the clash of different cultural orientations. The catastrophes that he foresaw for Germany are not inherent in the course of Western European history. They are the peculiar product of the impact of the Western European, and above all English-speaking, way of life upon an unprepared German society. They have their parallels in other countries caught in similar conflict.

In view of these flaws in Weber's thought, common sense might call for a new start altogether. A reflective reading of Mr. Eisenstadt's volume would suggest that in

trying to answer the big question of why Western civilization prevailed over all others we must recognize the vast number of interrelated factors at work. Whether we are ready or not, we are dealing with totalities of cultural development based, in the last analysis, on chance. It is time that the great pool of talent and knowledge hitherto yoked to the Weber thesis be tried out on that more promising perspective.

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THEODORE H. VON LAUE

THE IRON CAGE: AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF MAX WEBER.

By *Arthur Mitzman*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1970. Pp. xii, 328, ix. \$7.95.)

PROFESSOR Mitzman has written a psychoanalytically organized study of Max Weber, linking Weber's personal anxieties to the development of aspects of his work and placing him in the context of a bourgeois generation faced with particularly severe psychic conflicts. In general, it is Mitzman's contention that as long as the bourgeoisie struggled for power against the traditional order, the aggression generated within the repressive bourgeois family could legitimately be directed against the social structure. Once the bourgeoisie had achieved power or had made accommodations with those who held power, a stable social situation resulted, and this aggression could only be expressed outside the structure, in imperial quests or in war. The author elaborates two themes in connection with this thesis. One theme deals with "the suppressed hostilities of sons against fathers" and the resolution of this conflict through the adoption of a nationalist and imperialist posture in Germany, allowing aggression to be directed against external enemies. Weber was very much enmeshed in both aspects of this problem. The other theme deals with the "suffocation of Weber's generation of late-liberals in the institutions created by its parents." This led, in turn, to a change in the world view of European liberal intellectuals away from prior commitments to rationality and progress, a move reflected in some of Weber's later important sociological concerns.

The idea of examining these social problems through Weber and of linking Weber's conflicts to his work in psychoanalytic terms is entirely laudable. In relating Weber's conflicts to his work, however, and in establishing the broader generalizations, the execution of the idea fails. This failure is in itself very interesting: it is essentially the failure of psychoanalytic theory, in the form in which Freud left it, as an explanatory tool for historical investigation. The shortcomings that can be observed in this work are bound to occur unless psychoanalytic insight is restructured in terms not wholly psychoanalytic, a possibility implied in the post-Freudian ego psychology and in the work of Talcott Parsons, Anne Parsons, Erik Erikson, and others. Mitzman refers briefly to ego psychology and to Parsons, but his own work is not much affected by these points of view. Indeed, Mitzman has not said any more about Weber than Freud might have said forty years ago.

The book is organized in two parts, covering two periods of Weber's life that are separated by his father's death and his subsequent psychic collapse. In the first part, the author traces very closely the course of Weber's conflict with his father and the attempt to deal with this conflict in his work, and especially in his political and social commitments. The second section, dealing with the sense of "suffocation," covers the period in which Weber did his greatest work, but stresses primarily Weber's attempts to deal with the problem of ascetic morality. In this second part the psychoanalytic interpretation is pursued in a cursory fashion. The apparent reason for this is that, after recovery from the breakdown, Weber achieved a greater measure of control over his

conflicts; he was much more removed from them, and his work is obviously much more rigorous, exacting, abstract, and penetrating.

There are several problems involved in this organization of the work. One is that psychoanalytic theory has almost as much to say now about controlled ego functions as it does about the failure of these functions. One wants to know how Weber managed to do this work in the later period, considering in particular that not all of Weber's problems were under control (he never consummated his marriage, for example.) Analysis would have revealed a much more complex situation than is indicated in Mitzman's portrayal of Weber's conflicts, especially with regard to the role of Weber's mother and what she represents. For example, the author is often unclear about what Weber is railing against and what, in fact, is provoking anxiety and aggression among the members of his generation. Sometimes it is the position of Weber's father that is the source of trouble (authoritarian despotism at home, bureaucratic subservience at work); the enemy is then identified in social terms as "the stultifying machinelike character of the German state and society, i.e., paternal despotism writ large." But sometimes it is his mother's demands—and the way these demands are structured at the social level—that are in question. His mother is the primary representative to Weber of ascetic morality, expressed in compulsive attention to duty, rigid control of emotion, and so on. Mitzman deals with the problem finally by stating that both commitments together are really the source of conflict for Weber's generation in Germany. The fact is, however, that these commitments are quite antithetical to each other—despotism leading to passivity and dependence, and secular asceticism leading to autonomy. The problem was that one of these moralities would have to be discarded. The authoritarian, bureaucratic role especially was dysfunctional in terms of continued industrialization (that is, economic and familial differentiation). That it was the conflict between these two internalized moralities that was at the heart of the problem in Germany is not considered.

Mitzman ignores this conflict because he must also explain the aggression that existed elsewhere in Western Europe; since this aggression could not have resulted from the kind of bureaucratic despotism peculiar to Germany, it must have come from the ascetic morality. The contemporary rejection of reason and progress confirms this for the author. But what is missing is a satisfactory discussion of the question of what people were rejecting in the dominant "Victorian" morality. Was it the repressiveness, or was it the autonomy that this morality encouraged and that proved for so many to be intolerable? Contemporary complaints about the repressiveness of the morality were too often "regressive" complaints, and what was sought was not so much freedom from "Victorian superego" as the consolations of dependency. The fact that Tönnies, for example, as the author notes, preferred *Gemeinschaft* and that *Gemeinschaft* for Tönnies was based on the mother-child relationship, provides a significant clue. Mother-child here, of course, refers to pre-oedipal mother and pre-oedipal dependency.

While Mitzman has difficulty resolving the problem of values in general, it is Weber's mother in particular who gives him trouble. At one point, for example, Mitzman states that Helene Weber was not successful in imprinting her personality on her household. At a later point, however, he states that her "paternalistic, authoritarian code dominated his [Max Weber's] soul through his harsh and punitive superego." This latter position is no doubt correct, but it is difficult to talk about aggression stemming from a libidinally repressive morality in terms of "Victorian morality,"

"Victorian superego," "oedipal hostilities," "rebelliousness which bordered on patricide," and "the psychological locus of paternal authority, i.e., the superego," and then try to get past the fact that this classically paternal Victorian superego (see Freud) was not represented by Weber's father, but by his mother.

Mitzman does try to deal with the issue, and in a very logical way. He makes Helene Weber, as the source of morality, into a masculine figure ("in this respect she was no more feminine than Jehovah"). But this raises a second problem, one that is primarily methodological rather than substantive. Helene Weber, who was so important in Weber's development, is an idiosyncratic factor with regard to the development of the rest of this generation. Further, many other crucial factors on which the analysis hinges are idiosyncratic as well (Weber's solution to oedipal conflict and, quite likely, the harshness of superego, for example). The factors that Mitzman typically selected to link Max Weber to his generation cannot be systematically applicable; the generalizations cannot possibly rest on what are manifestly idiosyncratic qualities. Weber undoubtedly is representative to a significant degree of others of his time, but this cannot be established in the traditional psychoanalytic terms employed in the book. This is not to say that such generalizations cannot be established in what may now be called psychosocial terms. But a different frame of reference and a different way of structuring evidence would be necessary.

That the method led to such results is very clearly a function of the reductionism implied in traditional psychoanalytic theory, namely, that activity at the social level reflects directly oedipal conflict within the family. This leads, in turn, to another very important aspect of reductionism, specifically, that what a man does is based defensively on anxiety mobilized against threatened internal violations. But not all work stems from, remains tied to, or leads to internal conflict. The dominant, lasting sociological generalizations contributed by Weber and by others of his generation are based largely on controlled observation. At this point, that is, the insight is rather removed from instinctual sources. It is too refined to be otherwise. Mitzman was quite right to attempt to integrate the psychic dimension in his analysis, but he failed to deal with this dimension in all of its ramifications.

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FRED WEINSTEIN

IDEALISM, POLITICS AND HISTORY: SOURCES OF HEGELIAN THOUGHT. By *George Armstrong Kelly*. [Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics.] (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1969. Pp. x, 387. \$13.50.)

ALTHOUGH studies exist of the political thought of individual German idealist thinkers—Franz Rosenzweig's *Hegel und der Staat*, for example—and of German idealism as a philosophic movement—Richard Kroner's *Von Kant bis Hegel*, for example—this is the first comprehensive analysis of the political philosophy of German idealism in English or German.

Professor Kelly states as his primary concern the study of the "political consequences" that follow from the idealist conception of history. In modern idealism, he suggests, the notion of history as an immanent teleology came to the fore. Idealism posited a tension between given reality and moral goals that created a "motor of history and incidentally a purposive pattern of political life" aiming at recovering the lost harmony. Central to the idealistic conception, Kelly thinks, is the idea of a "chimera," a term used by Rousseau to denote a vision of order in which "man feels

intact, harmonious, a valid part of the world," and contrasted by Rousseau with the "prejudices" embodied in the existing social order. It was Rousseau, according to Professor Kelly, who tore apart the harmony of nature and man postulated by Enlightenment thought. But while Rousseau "sought to reintegrate man and nature by attacking civilization, and consequently history," Kant and Fichte, Kelly argues, projected the chimera into the future and "regarded civilization as a means of a not yet actualized 'morality.'" History itself became the rational standard for a philosophically purposive politics. Man's liberation required his moralization, which, in turn, could be achieved only through coercion, through education (*Bildung*), and discipline (*Zucht*). The state was no longer viewed as "a convenient aggregation of individuals or corporations" but as the indispensable school in which the "natural harmony" of society" is "created, taught, enforced, and transmitted." The present was, in a sense, sacrificed to the future. Hegel, Kelly insists—and Karl Popper would doubtless disagree—negated the futuristic elements of this chimera, recognized the morality already contained in the present, and thus rejected the authoritarian and totalitarian aspects of a tutelary *Notstaat* that would force men to be free "on behalf of an infinite endeavour."

This is a remarkable work of erudition. Nevertheless, I have certain misgivings. Kelly insists that he does not intend to write *Ideengeschichte*. But, except in the excellent section on Fichte and in occasional general references to the French Revolution and Napoleon, this is what he does. It is questionable, however, on methodological grounds, whether the history of ideas can be understood in terms of its own inner development without reference to the concrete social and political realities that are reflected in this development. I also wonder whether the concept of the chimera is peculiar to Rousseau and the German idealists or is not implicitly contained in all progressivist thought, in Condorcet, Comte, and Marx. The authoritarian aspects of German idealist thought seem to me to be much more deeply rooted in an anti-eudaemonistic ethics which, as Kelly himself suggests, denies welfare and happiness as goals of human existence in the place of "the Idea that *ought* to prevail in History."

Notwithstanding these criticisms, I consider Kelly's book to be both an admirable and a significant work.

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GEORG G. IGGERS

THE TRIUMPH OF THE DARWINIAN METHOD. By *Michael T. Ghiselin*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. 287. \$7.50.)

MICHAEL Ghiselin argues that Darwin's scientific work was informed by a coherent methodology, the wisdom of which it is essential to appreciate in order to understand the historical impact and scientific import of *On the Origin of Species* together with his other writings. The author gives no full statement either of his own philosophy of science or of the one that he infers from Darwin's investigations, but, if it is permissible to judge by the merits attributed to the several theories discussed, both of them bear a marked resemblance to the views of Sir Karl Popper. The bugbears of Plato coupled with essentialism, and idealism coupled with tyranny stalk through recurrent pronouncements about the historical process as a whole.

Historical readers unfamiliar with Darwin will do better to begin with Sir Gavin de Beer's biography. For historians who already have some familiarity with the theory of natural selection, the chief value of this book will lie in Ghiselin's account of Darwin's writings other than the *Origin*. To accord these writings emphasis and survey the

Darwinian corpus as a whole was an excellent idea. Ghiselin observes that Darwin's researches fell into the six main areas of natural history, geology, zoology, evolution, botany, and psychology and contends that a largely consistent conception of scientific explanation guided his inquiries as he moved, with much carryover, from one to the other. I found the discussions of Darwin's theory of coral reefs and of his comparative anatomy of barnacles particularly informative, and I was further impressed with the emphasis on Darwin's grasp of biogeography in enabling him to impose the credibility of the phenomenon of evolution. Ghiselin's account of the theory of natural selection, on the other hand, adds nothing to what is widely admitted. One welcomes an additional defense of Darwin's originality and probity as a scientist against the detractors who impugn his character or intelligence. At the same time, one feels uneasy about the tendency to associate soundness of scientific method with soundness of political outlook. It is not clear that a defense of Haeckel's theory of recapitulation which draws on his supposed battle against Prussian despotism is to be preferred to attacks that other writers have directed at Darwin because of political or moral overtones that they impute to his writings.

Ghiselin finds little merit in previous work on Darwin's role in the history of science. His own writing, however, falls into ambiguity through faults of literary composition more frequently than is becoming in a book that accords decisive importance to method and philosophy.

Princeton University

CHARLES C. GILLISPIE

IN GEGENWART DER GESCHICHTE. By *Herbert Lüthy*. [Historische Essays. Essay 9.] ([Cologne:] Kiepenheuer & Witsch. 1967. Pp. 311. DM 18.50.)

MOST of his American readers know Lüthy as the author of a best-selling critique of modern France and of numerous articles in *Encounter*, *Commentary*, and other periodicals. Fewer know his more technical work, like the two-volume history of the French Protestant Bank in the eighteenth century. His gift for condensing problems and periods by vivid characterizations and judgments, without obtruding his learning, has gained him a large professional and lay audience. The extended essay, best suited to this style, is evidently his preferred medium. *In the Presence of History* is his second major collection of pieces of this kind; in their original version they appeared in Swiss and German publications between 1953 and 1966.

The thesis of the first of the five essays, that "history can be conceived by us only as a function of the present," is familiar, as are the epistemological arguments advanced in its support. But the ramifications of "History as Self-Consciousness," as the essay is entitled, are worth pondering. Our present interrogation of the past has extended the framework of historical reference to non-European areas and to interdependent entities like economies and cultures. The appropriate shift in our study program is not, for Lüthy, at any rate, simply to do more history of non-European countries, but to restudy history as the history of mankind, as the interaction of Europe with Third World cultures. Take history textbooks for the new African nations, for example. Our classic national historiographies would make bad models: "Nos ancêtres, les Gaulois . . ." leads to its hate-filled opposite. Better to make available the new insights into our share of the history of humanity, so that colonization becomes a meaningful part of the new nations' own history—just as Roman colonization, despite Vercingetorix, is not a national disgrace but a meaningful element in French history, and two centuries of British rule in India are an organic element of the Indian past. The integration of our

world and the establishment of world order are not possible without the prior unity of an informed consciousness of a common history. Like an individual, society cannot come to terms with itself unless it comes to terms with its past.

The longer essay that follows, "Variations on a Theme by Max Weber," is a defense of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Its positive side, a survey of the relevant social, economic, and church history, presents persuasive evidence and needs no footnotes to show that Lüthy is arguing from extensive, specialized knowledge of Calvinism. The negative side, where and especially why Weber's critics went wrong, is mostly an original reappraisal. Even the standard error of Weber's critics, the imputation of a casual connection to religious and economic behavior, becomes more vivid when we hear it described as "the red thread of history that led dialectically from the nailing up of the theses at Wittenberg to the conveyor belts of Detroit." Two shorter pieces bracket the chief and longest essay in the book, "The Epoch of Colonization." The first of these pieces consists of three independent sketches of Montaigne, Quesnay, and Rousseau, each an original and lucid appreciation of its subject. The other, "The End of the World: 1914," is about the puzzling destruction of political and economic order by the outbreak of the First World War, a war that had no rational cause whatever. Experts in war-guilt literature may have some reservations. But in design of the argument and in literary effect, sustained by citation of the Kaiser's documentary marginalia, this essay raises diplomatic history to the tragicomic dimensions of a morality play.

The theme of the essay on colonization, as readers familiar with Lüthy's contribution to the *Journal of Economic History* (1961) will recognize, was adumbrated in "History as Self-Consciousness": the historical interdependence of colonizer and colonized. The generic concept of colonization as settlement, soil culture, and the taming of nature—never to be confused with "colonialism"—must be emphasized. Colonization was the genesis of mankind. The history of all countries and continents, and the beginning of modern history in India, Egypt, Nigeria, Japan, and the United States, is the history of colonization. These and other considerations transpose the concept to enable Lüthy to sketch his survey of European colonial expansion on a wider canvas. Cultural phenomena acquire explanatory power in place of the dismal chatter about gunboat diplomacy and administrative details, to which the reader of traditional books on colonial history has not infrequently been condemned. The prestige of Western technology and the non-European rulers' desire for modernization and Europeanization are made significant factors in European penetration. Imperialism—misunderstood by its theorists, except for Marx, as the last phase of capitalism—was in fact the first; its celebrated final phase, which saw the partition of Africa, was relatively unimportant, and was based merely on pseudorational economic, political, and strategic arguments. On decolonization also, Lüthy presents bold and unequivocal points of view. In the conclusion, the historical survey is laid aside and the significance of the story is developed. The European epoch in world history was "neither a series of crimes nor a series of benevolent deeds," but a great chapter in the integration of the earth. The modern world—including its anti-Western manifestations—is the product of European movements. With Europe's domination gone and the monologue of civilization having become a dialogue, are we, Lüthy asks, nearer to the prospect of a universal civilization or not? The answer will in part depend on Europe, for she still has more accumulated substance, centuries of intellectual and spiritual reserves, than the currently great centers of power. She can refuse to give it only at her peril.

Lüthy has updated the past in the light of present needs. Having exchanged national histories for the history of mankind, he has used the theme of colonization as a means of presenting the European experience as coterminous with the history of our civilization or very nearly so. That might be called the moral of the essay and, together with subsidiary themes in economics and political sociology, the moral of this sophisticated book. It is consistent with the intellectual palindrome that governs Lüthy's writings: our knowledge of the past must be a function of what we do and think today, and what we do and think today must be a function of our knowledge of the past.

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GEORGE H. NADEL

HUMAN NATURE AND HISTORY: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL POLITICAL THOUGHT. In two volumes. By *Robert Denoon Cumming*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1969. Pp. viii, 352; vi, 457. \$10.00 each.)

In this impressive study, Cumming confronts the problem of identifying that protean concept, "liberalism." Should it be identified with "a view of human nature" or with "a view of social history"? That question clearly relates to the further question of the nature of the much discussed "crisis" of traditional liberalism. Does the crisis follow from the inadequacy of the psychological or moral basis of liberal theory or from the fact that liberal theory had its origin in socio-historical situations that no longer exist? Cumming's answers to these questions become increasingly complex as his account proceeds.

Since John Stuart Mill is generally regarded as the most distinguished representative of traditional liberalism, the study begins with the intellectual problems he faced. It concludes with a long section on his attempts to resolve those problems. Between these two sections comes, first, a section on historicism, devoted largely to Machiavelli and Polybius on the relevance of history to political theory. This is followed by a section on humanism, centering on Cicero and the humanistic preoccupation with "the internal culture of the individual" rather than with "the ordering of outward circumstances." A section on individualism deals chiefly with Hobbes and Locke. Before returning to Mill, there is a section on Utilitarianism that deals with Mill's immediate predecessors, Hume, Smith, and Bentham.

This may begin to sound like a standard study of intellectual history or of the history of political theory with some familiar writers missing or relegated to a minor role. It is definitely neither. Cumming's concern is less with the substantive ideas that come into his account than with the "modes of thought which compose the methodological context in which an idea is put to use." His method of analysis—hence his criterion for the selection of evidence—he describes as "topological," by which he means analysis of substantive material in terms of the relation of political study to "other studies" (Mill's phrase), especially to moral theory, and in terms of a political thinker's relations to his predecessors and his contemporary opponents. "A tradition can only be defined precisely by reference to the place some theorist occupies within the tradition." This emphasis upon a methodology that seeks to define in terms of relations and transitions is the unifying framework of his analysis without which much of his detailed discussion of earlier theories might seem irrelevant or a bit precious.

The method is well adapted to an analysis of liberalism and particularly well adapted to an analysis of the liberalism of Mill. Cumming stresses Mill's constant preoccupation with his relation to the liberal tradition he had inherited from his father and Bentham and the transitional "adjustments" that he had to make. The first of these was his recognition of the relation of "other studies" to the study of politics. This led Mill to his demand for the development of a systematic theory of politics which would follow the example of physical science. The second adjustment grew out of Mill's awareness, after Macaulay's attack upon his father's *Essay on Government*, of the relevance to political theory of historical evidence. The impact of this adjustment comes out strongly in Mill's famous essay *On Liberty* in which he confronted the disconcerting "tendencies of modern civilization" and in his review of Tocqueville's account of "the great existing fact" of American democracy. The third adjustment was Mill's rejection of Bentham's simple theory of human nature. Although much has been written about Mill's revision of the tradition he inherited, no earlier study has brought to bear on Mill's problems such a wealth of material from earlier "modes of thought." And, since tradition and transition frequently appear at different levels of analysis, the relevance to nineteenth-century liberalism of a Polybius or a Cicero, for example, will often depend upon stretching the analysis to another level. Cumming is adept at such stretching; but he is always aware of what he is doing and scrupulous in warning the reader of where the argument is moving.

Mill acknowledged that he had not succeeded in constructing either a scientific theory of politics or a systematic theory of the development of moral character ("ethology"). Cumming sees in this failure "the final and fatal weakening" that led to the death of British political philosophy as a structure of knowledge. But he also reminds us from time to time that, in spite of the failure, Mill found it possible to remain loyal to his father's "practical political creed." Cumming himself does not deny the utility of the "piecemeal examination of specific political arguments" that has been taking the place of comprehensive systematic political philosophy. His last chapter sums up the ways in which Mill made his affirmative adjustments and, although this was not Cumming's purpose, this chapter might well suggest a tenable position for contemporary liberalism.

It would be remarkable if one did not find in such an ambitious book some things to disagree with—such as Cumming's acceptance of the unity of Hobbes's psychological and political theories or his tendency to lump together Polybius, Cicero, Locke, and Montesquieu as supporters of mixed government with little concern about the differences among them on the subject, or his failure to consider Coxe's interpretation of Locke that would seem relevant to his own. More generally, one can readily agree with him on the importance of the relation of "other studies" to the study of politics without accepting what appears at times to be his conception of "political." Having said early that "no simple location of its subject matter is feasible" he remarks later that "problems of the relation between the individual and the state, which are the characteristic problems of modern political theory," are not political problems because "they are not problems of the state itself." This is a curiously restrictive conception of the nature of the political. It is not one that many contemporary students of politics would accept; nor does it seem to be one that Cumming adheres to.

Cumming's interpretations, at times controversial, are always convincingly argued, stimulating, and at times brilliantly original. His voluminous footnotes, conveniently located at the end of each chapter, range over a wide area and greatly enrich what appears in the text. To report the bare skeleton of such a comprehensive and complex

study does little justice to the subtlety and sophistication of the book or to the originality, keen penetration, and thorough scholarship of the author.

Oberlin College

JOHN D. LEWIS

INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF CITY DEVELOPMENT. Volume IV, URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: ITALY AND GREECE. By *E. A. Gutkind*. (New York: Free Press. 1969. Pp. xvii, 642.)

THIS series was conceived in the belief that "About 5000 years have passed since the Urban Revolution and . . . the origins of the first cities. . . . [The] original conception of a city . . . is now approaching its end. . . . The twilight of the cities as mankind has known them . . . is spreading over all countries, and it is our task . . . to begin a new chapter in the history of human settlement. This task demands understanding of and insight into the development and destiny of cities; and they cannot be gained without knowledge of what cities have been in the past and of the disintegrating forces in the present." (See the reviews of Vols. I-III in *AHR*, LXXI [Oct. 1965], 218; LXXII [Oct. 1966], 166-167; LXXIII [Dec. 1967], 500-501.) The series is "a history of urban development, and in particular, of the physical transformation through which cities and towns have passed. Its aim is . . . to convey a complete picture of how urban communities originated, grew, stagnated, declined—and often revived."

In pursuit of these aims this volume alone has almost five hundred illustrations, of a variety and quality equal to those of its predecessors. The author warns that these are not "picture books," maintaining "that this visual documentation is more important for scholarly research in this field than most of the available written evidence and that its wise interpretation is more enlightening than the usual old records and other similar sources." (As in earlier volumes, the accompanying bibliography is spotty and of uneven quality.) The book's greatest strength lies in its treatment of changing concepts of the utilization of space and in the relationships between a city's street patterns, streets, roads, walls, gardens, parks, squares, markets, and various public and private buildings.

This volume treats classical and Christian Italy (to the nineteenth century) and classical Greece. General introductions to Italy and Greece precede brief discussions of numerous selected towns. The section on Italy suggests that "Nothing is perhaps more symptomatic of the diametrically opposed Greek and Roman attitudes to the relationship of streets and buildings than the tangential approach of streets toward public buildings and squares in Greece and the axial approach of the Romans. From tangent to axis—this antithesis of two basic architectural conceptions says more about the contrasting mentality of these two civilizations than all learned treatises on stylistic differences." It also asserts that "The *castrum* or military camp was the principal and perhaps the only contribution of Rome to the art of city planning." The rapid survey of the Middle Ages from 476 to the end of the fourteenth century is best quietly passed over. One should, rather, dwell on the very lucid discussion of the differing utilizations of space in the principal squares of Pisa, Florence, and Siena. The author also contrasts a medieval with a Renaissance "conception of a town." The former, "with the exception of those [towns] laid out by the will of one person as deliberately limited entities from the beginning, developed gradually by increasing the originally small nucleus through the inclusion of suburbs, whereas the Ideal City of the Renaissance was conceived from the start as one unit that was not supposed to grow beyond its intended size. But this new theory and rationalism led to a certain

formalism and finally to a drawing-board routine that lost all contact with reality." The Renaissance section contains an interesting survey and summary of various Renaissance plans for new, remodeled, and ideal cities, which includes the stark generalization that Leon Battista Alberti's "theories were a halfway house between the Age of Faith and the Age of Rationalism." Willingness to generalize clearly and even baldly, however, is one of the strengths of this volume and helps to make it stimulating reading.

University of California, Davis

WILLIAM M. BOWSKY

DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES MODERNEN JUDENTUMS: GEISTESGESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN JUDEN, 1650-1942. By *Heinz Mosche Graupe*. [Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Juden, Number 1.] ([Hamburg:] Leibniz-Verlag. 1969. Pp. 386.)

It is a final irony of the fascinating but ultimately tragic history of German Jewry that academic respectability for Jewish studies in Germany should be gained only after the decimation of its Jews. Not until after the Jewish holocaust did numerous major German universities introduce courses in Judaica. The author of this comprehensive intellectual history of the German Jews heads a special institute for the study of German Jewry at the University of Hamburg, and this volume is the first of a forthcoming series of *Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Juden*.

Graupe comes to history from a background in modern Jewish philosophy and theology, having done work especially on two Jewish Kantians, Ludwig Steinheim and Hermann Cohen. Yet in this volume he has moved easily from philosophical analysis to a history of ideas that takes into account the social, economic, and political circumstances without which the *Geistesgeschichte* of modern Jewry cannot properly be understood. Even if his treatment of the two realms in separate chapters makes for a somewhat loose integration, the interrelationship is correctly emphasized.

Although East European Jewry is given some peripheral attention, the author's focus from beginning to end is upon Germany. He agrees with Azriel Shochat that the origins of Jewish modernity are to be sought in pre-Enlightenment Germany, when community discipline and rabbinical authority first began to break down and the earliest impingements of secular culture appeared among Jews of the larger cities. Graupe thus raises again a much disputed issue that seems unlikely to be resolved. Those scholars who seek the origins of modern Judaism in the initial exposure to the world outside the ghetto will continue to marshal their evidence for a watershed occurring even before 1750, while others will hold that the break occurs only thereafter, when the countervailing values of the environment are seen to challenge Jewish tradition, produce attempts at the reinterpretation of Judaism, and reduce Jewishness from an all-encompassing identity to a religious identification.

But Graupe's history of modern German Jewry is not limited to its origins. He lucidly discusses the emergence of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* in terms of the new concept of a dynamic tradition which the scholar must view from a perspective of distance. His treatment of the movement for religious reform makes an important and often neglected distinction between the motivations of rabbis and laymen, the latter usually failing to share the historical sense of their religious leaders. In this regard, Graupe fails only in grasping the complexity of left-wing reformers like Samuel Holdheim and—more seriously—in estimating the political and intellectual forces that brought religious reform to decline after 1848. Finally, Graupe is surely

right that the self-portraits of Judaism, to which he devotes two chapters, are, by their nature, most highly characteristic of Judaism in its modern phase. Whether drawing upon Kant, Hegel, or other prevailing intellectual influences, they represented the response of a specifically modern Judaism, immersed in the surrounding cultural milieu, which could no longer assume that its continued existence was self-understood or that it required no intellectual justification.

Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati

MICHAEL A. MEYER

THE VOYAGES OF DAVID DE VRIES: NAVIGATOR AND ADVENTURER.

By *Charles McKew Parr*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1969. Pp. vi, 280. \$8.95.)

MANY historians of my acquaintance love a good detective story and take pride in their cultivation of Simenon and Sayers. They would do well to add this book to their shelf of light reading, for it is filled with high adventure of the most romantic sort. For those requiring a more professional excuse, *The Voyages of David De Vries* will prove useful to students of seventeenth-century seafaring, diplomacy, the expansion of Europe, and comparative colonization. Mostly, however, it is a good story well told and carefully founded upon original sources. Although Charles Parr has only the credentials of an amateur historian—a career in business, politics, and travel—his instincts are those of a thorough professional. His book, the third in a trilogy on oceanic adventurers, required six years of research in many libraries and archives, as well as consultation with specialists in diverse fields. Although Parr gives no citations, he has provided an ample bibliography to indicate how and where he did his homework.

David De Vries, patroon in Surinam and Staten Island, was in many ways the Dutch counterpart of Jamestown's Captain John Smith. He came from Hoorn and early acquired skills as a sea captain, supercargo, military tactician, and linguist. His natural shrewdness, courage, coolness, tact, and integrity with native peoples all helped him to survive one critical adventure after another. At times, in fact, De Vries is almost too good to be true. When bedecked squaws are offered for his crew's pleasure, only our hero abstains from their charms. There are hints throughout; however, that this abstemious and devout Calvinist did engage in privateering, contraband trade, and occasional acts of cruelty. But these are only hints, since the narrative depends heavily upon one major source: David's own *Journal*, begun in 1618 when he was 26, and later published in 1655. He kept the journal, apparently, in the hope that details of his difficult navigations would ultimately be helpful to other Dutch seamen who might follow in his wake. In many cases, fortunately, De Vries's exploits can be confirmed by independent surviving sources, and Parr has used the journal with skill and discretion.

The author has organized his narrative according to the geographical areas penetrated by De Vries—the Arctic Sea, the Mediterranean, the Grand Banks, the Rhone, the Gironde, the Monsoon Seas, the Delaware, the Caribbean, the Guyana, Connecticut, Hudson, and James Rivers—a scheme which works quite well except in the last two chapters, for De Vries visited Virginia and New Netherland on many different occasions during the 1630's and 1640's. In consequence, the final quarter of this book becomes chronologically choppy. It does, however, convey a sense of development or decline in areas revisited by De Vries over a decade and more.

Cornell University

MICHAEL KAMMEN

THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION. Volume II, THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM. By *Peter Gay*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1969. Pp. xxii, 705, xviii. \$10.00.)

WITH this second volume of *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, Peter Gay completes the ambitious re-evaluation commenced with such verve in *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (1966). As one would expect, he again displays the features of his scholarship so impressively revealed in the earlier volume. Professor Gay writes superbly and has an enormous range; he combines a taste for generalization with a sense for the revealing byways of intellectual history; his work is a mine of insights and suggestions for further research; he has written a seductive book. Unfortunately, Gay's approach is teleological. Modernity is the yardstick against which the Enlightenment is to be measured in his interpretation, yet his work lacks an adequate definition of modernity and tends to set the philosophes against an unreal logic of development that does not altogether fit the facts of their respective environments. As a result, despite his admirable intention to write the social history of the philosophes' ideas, Gay fails to clarify their fundamental concern with the immediate issues of their time. Rewarding and suggestive as a pioneering attempt to integrate much of the new work of recent years, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* does not yet provide a satisfactory synthesis.

The subject of *The Science of Freedom* is "the social history of the philosophes' philosophy," their environment and their program. Gay's thesis can be simply stated. Eighteenth-century Europe experienced improved conditions and a sense of power over its environment which Gay characterizes as the "recovery of nerve," a term chosen in counterpoint to the "failure of nerve" that Gilbert Murray ascribed to the period of the earlier Roman empire and the spread of Christianity. The philosophes shared in this general recovery of nerve, while experiencing a parallel recovery of their own in consequence of their improved status as men of letters. For them, progress was a reality, a problem, a practical program, but rarely a theory. They celebrated the general experience of progress, but were often conscious that its benefits were not unambiguous; they accepted the reality of progress as the basis for a program of humanity, decency, toleration, and political reform, seldom falling into the trap of elevating imperfect reality into a theory of inevitable advance. As a result, "the Enlightenment and its world moved toward modernity together, with the philosophes, goading and guiding, a single but decisive step ahead." Appropriately to this conception, then, the finale of Gay's book presents the program of the Enlightenment in practice in the American Revolution.

This is an attractive and in some ways an accurate picture, but it seems to prove either too much or too little. In its most general form, Gay's definition of the eighteenth-century "recovery of nerve"—"it was a century of decline in mysticism, of growing hope for life and trust in effort, of commitment to inquiry and criticism, of interest in social reform, of increasing secularism, and a growing willingness to take risks"—comprises a list of characteristics many of which might apply with as much justification to other centuries. Much depends upon the way in which eighteenth-century flesh is imparted to these rather abstract bones. Yet here Gay's analysis is often puzzling. At a time when theories of modernization are being minted like new pennies, his conception of modernity appears to remain (perhaps deliberately) vague. One result of this vagueness is that an example can be chosen only at the risk of placing far more emphasis on it than does Gay himself. At the risk of such distortion, we may take the example of industrial development. While nowhere defined explicitly in these

terms, Gay's conception of modernity seems to have much to do with industrialization ("The factory, the minute division of labor, industrial discipline for workers and managers . . ." were "in the Enlightenment's sense of the word, *philosophical*"; "the philosophes . . . had not shed the mentality of a pre-industrial age: modernity was still struggling to be born"). Less and less applicable the further east one moves from England, this implied definition of modernity leads to some rather strange conclusions. "As society grew more complex—one of the prices exacted by modernity—class barriers grew steeper; mines and factories were voracious for the labor of children and the respectable classes resisted the aspirations of the lower orders. Many political radicals, therefore, concerned over the labor supply and the threatened decay of deference, began to display a streak of social conservatism. It is notorious that Voltaire objected to the education of laborers' children. . . ." This is an odd statement, since Gay knows as well as anyone that France remained overwhelmingly rural throughout this period; that the watchmaking establishment that Voltaire set up at Ferney for refugees from Geneva was hardly "voracious for the labor of children"; that the patriarch's most telling fears of popular education involved the threat of a peasantry that might wish to rise above its station. It could hardly be otherwise in a country in which, even in 1790, there were only nine hundred spinning jennies.

What, then, has happened? I would suggest that Gay has been carried away by his own argument. The implicit logic of *The Science of Freedom* seems to go something like this. The philosophes believed in modernity and admired England, which in the second half of the eighteenth century was moving toward industrialization. Industrial England must therefore be the model implied in their conception of modernity, even though few of them lived to see very much of this industrial development even in England, still less elsewhere. The effect of this implied argument runs exactly counter to Gay's conception of what the social history of ideas should be. Rather than integrating them more closely into their environment, it takes the philosophes out of their world (one step ahead) by measuring them against a model that does not yet fit; it underplays the structural ambiguities and social tensions actually existing in their respective environments, which it is surely the function of their ideas to mediate; it slips unwittingly into making them heralds of an unreal logic of development to the neglect of their fundamental concern with the more immediate issues of their time.

The same tendency reveals itself in Gay's discussion of French politics, the troubled soil from which sprang the most robust specimens of the philosophe and the most radical expressions of their creed. He presents the constitutional struggle in France as an unambiguous battle between two competing positions, royal and noble, modern and traditionalist, one "largely sound" and the other "fanciful . . . bad history and bad law . . . a transparent defense of privilege in the guise of constitutional principles." With the exception of Montesquieu, Gay suggests, most of the philosophes adhered to some version of the royal thesis, attacking the pretensions of the *parlements*. Logically, then, they should have applauded Maupeou's attack upon the *parlements* in 1771. Voltaire did, Diderot did not; Voltaire was therefore consistent, Diderot inconsistent. But Diderot was inconsistent only if the situation was unambiguous, which it is only in Gay's analysis. Many of the philosophes feared Maupeou, distrusted his motives, and were uncertain of their response to his methods: as Diaz has shown in *Filosofia e politica nel Settecento francese* (1962), the philosophes became increasingly disoriented and disunited in the early 1770's over this and other issues. To see the suppression of the *parlements* as an attack on the principle of liberty, as Diderot did,

was not necessarily to see these bodies as champions of liberty, which Diderot did not. Nor, judging by the public support the *parlements* were able to rally throughout the century, was their defense of privilege so transparently self-interested as Gay seems to suggest. Had it been, the French constitutional crisis would have been less protracted, the questions it raised concerning the nature of man and society less fundamental, and the philosophes' attempt to come to grips with the issues in their capacity as men of letters less creative. Paradoxically, Gay's rather one-sided clarification of the battle for France seems almost to make the philosophes redundant.

Yet the greater part of this book deals not with the philosophes' environment but with their program. Here the general outlines of Gay's thesis will be already familiar to readers of *The Rise of Modern Paganism*. The philosophes, he argues, pursued their program for modernity by "a dialectical struggle" in which they "first pitted classical thought against their Christian heritage that they might discard the burdens of religion, and then escaped their beloved ancients by appealing to the science of nature and of man." *The Rise of Modern Paganism* dealt with the dialectical interplay between Christianity and classical paganism in the consciousness of the philosophes. Gay devotes the present volume to the resolution of this dialectic through science: to the philosophes' view of the natural sciences and their pioneering attempts to establish the sciences of man. Although he does not make the meaning of his subtitle entirely clear in the text, Gay's "science of freedom" would therefore seem to be twofold in its signification. It is first the natural science that won the philosophes, as moderns, their title to freedom from the tutelage of the ancients. It is secondly, and more substantively, their science of man: the insights and endeavors in psychology and esthetics, anthropology and sociology, history, economics, and political science through which they tried to articulate and implement their newfound freedom in thought and action.

From this perspective, Gay's chapter on science is critical for his interpretation. He first points to the process by which the elaboration of Newtonian science came gradually to "transform the contours of religious belief" by eliminating Newton's God. One corollary of this process was that science became increasingly specialized, mathematical, and abstract, while facts became separated from values. The result, Gay suggests, was a tension in the philosophes' thinking. On the one hand, they had "an enormous investment in science as an ally in their war against religion." On the other, there were those among them who were disquieted by its specialization, uneasy with its abstract neutrality, unhappy with its separation of facts from values, and inclined to look to nature as a refuge from science. This tension "created some anxiety . . . but no panic." If not resolved, it was at least alleviated by the philosophes' determination to rise from facts to values in the social world by the application of the scientific method to the study of man and society, an endeavor, Gay rightly insists, that lay at the very heart of their program.

Much of Gay's book, together with many of his most stimulating interpretations, is therefore devoted to the philosophes' enterprise in the social sciences, in which "they laid the foundations and wrote the classics." This is a valuable emphasis, one long needed in general works on the Enlightenment, and one that requires much further exploration, especially in the light of Foucault's challenging contention in *Les mots et les choses* (1966) that there were—and, indeed, by the very nature of eighteenth-century thought, there could be—no truly human sciences in this period. By bringing together material from the various social sciences in the eighteenth century, *The Science of Freedom* will doubtless stimulate such exploration. Yet the real problem

in this field—one on which a more systematic statement of Gay's views would have been particularly instructive—is to know exactly how to define social science in this context. Here there seem to be a number of possible approaches, each of which is touched upon but none of which is consistently followed in this book. One such approach is to consider those writings that focus consciously on the achievement of a social science, the authors of which aim explicitly at a theory that meets eighteenth-century definitions of science. In this case, we need a more precise analysis of what the eighteenth century understood by science than Gay has given us. Not all the philosophes, for example, held a view of science that necessarily implied that the science of society was less exact than the science of nature, as Gay suggests in his discussion of Beccaria. Another possible approach is to decide upon the characteristics of social science as we know it—objectivity, secularism, and the search for general laws would be some characteristics included under this rubric by Gay—and measure the eighteenth-century classics against them. In this case, as Foucault has warned, we run the risk of misrepresenting their real meaning for the structure of thought in their time. Is Montesquieu better understood, for example, as a theorist aiming at scientific objectivity who “no doubt unconsciously, smuggled ideology into his science,” or as an ideologist whose aim was not objectivity but the objectification of a particular view of French society and its preservation in that image? If he is, in one and the same book, “a historian, political scientist, social critic, and political theorist as well as sociologist,” must we not ask in what precise sense he was any of these? Yet another approach is to take those writings that seem to offer specific methodological or interpretative insights or that deal with the classic problems of the social sciences as we know them. In this latter case, we need a more systematic statement of the criteria for inclusion in this canon and a fuller comparison of the insights of the philosophes in this respect as compared with the important nonphilosophes (Vico, for example) whose work also ranks among the classics of social science.

This brings us to the final aim of *The Science of Freedom*. Gay's purpose here, as in his earlier volume, is to clarify the relationship between philosophes and nonphilosophes, between the culture of the Age of Enlightenment in its widest sense and that narrower Enlightenment of the extended family of philosophes which constitutes his true subject. The philosophes, he insists, enjoyed the same general experience of progress as did nonphilosophes, shared many of the same assumptions and concerns, and were supported by enlightened nonphilosophes in many of the campaigns for decency in which they served as “the perfectionist conscience of their day” (abolition of the slave trade being perhaps the clearest example, though this is complicated by the fact that many American philosophes found themselves in a quandary over the issue). Others in the eighteenth century were, to a greater or lesser extent in individual cases, secular in their thinking, disenchanted with religion, intimate in their acquaintance with the classics, impressed by the model of science. What, then, is the precise definition of the philosophe? Gay's answer would seem to be that it is not the possession of these characteristics, as such, but their fusion in a sense of identity. What Hume and Condorcet had in common, or Holbach and Lessing, was the consciousness of modernity in a premodern society, a sense of their identity as moderns which proved more potent than any individual differences in program, politics, or philosophy. The definition of a philosophe was a self-definition and the philosophic family an elective family. But would Lessing have identified himself as a philosophe in England, or Hume in France? Why indeed did some men of letters identify themselves in this way in some environments, while others did not? If we wish to understand the sense of identity

that made the philosophes what they were and marked them off from other enlightened contemporaries, we need to know far more about their respective environments and social experiences than Gay has been able to tell us in a general interpretation.

As an attempt to show what made the philosophy of the Enlightenment "relevant and in fact inevitable," this book has many weaknesses. Yet to suggest that Gay has not achieved what he set out to do is not to minimize the significance of what he has done, its value as a pioneering attempt at synthesis, its humanity, subtlety, and power to stimulate. In the years he has devoted to the study of the Enlightenment, he has (like the philosophes) goaded and guided us toward new and fruitful concerns. He has given us a work that is rich in the brilliantly sympathetic interpretations of men and books that constitute his great strength as a writer. He has underlined and explored the philosophes' debt to the classics, and he has stressed the importance of approaching them through the social history of ideas. He has, in short, produced a work that will challenge the scholar and stimulate the layman for many years to come.

University of Chicago

K. M. BAKER

PANAFRIKANISMUS: ZUR GESCHICHTE DER DEKOLONISATION. By *Immanuel Geiss*. ([Frankfurt am Main:] Europäische Verlagsanstalt. 1968. Pp. 489. DM 48.)

ALTHOUGH introducing his subject as "among the most complex but also vague phenomena of modern history," Dr. Geiss has defined the Pan-African movement in a reasonably coherent and more or less standard manner. The proponents of Pan-Africanism are black intellectuals inhabiting the "classic Atlantic triangle" of West Africa, the New World (specifically the United States and the West Indies), and Western Europe (mainly London and secondarily Paris). The movement itself consists of their attempts to project concepts of development, emancipation, and unity through various publications, organizations, and general congresses.

Others, particularly Pan-African activists, have previously attempted to write about this subject, but Geiss's researches into published and unpublished materials from all corners of the Pan-African universe are unique. The result is a monumental work that should serve as an indispensable reference source for some years to come. Fortunately for those who will have to consult it, Geiss writes in a clear and well-organized manner. A somewhat abbreviated English translation is also scheduled to appear soon.

The most fascinating dimension of this book is the evidence of intensive and mutually reinforcing efforts by black thinkers from as early as the late-eighteenth century to define their role in the modern world. On the other hand, Geiss's detailed accounts of Pan-African organizational activities, while probably necessary, become somewhat tedious. The author himself concludes that these sporadic and largely ephemeral efforts seldom achieved anything more than providing occasional (and not always fruitful) contacts for their rather limited body of participants.

By concentrating on politics and formal ideology, Geiss has neglected what might be considered the most vital bond of black Atlantic civilization: the common cultural heritage expressing itself in esthetic and religious practices and beliefs. To some extent the geography of this cultural realm does not coincide with the political world with which this book is primarily concerned. Geiss thus has little to say about the Congo, Cuba, or Brazil because these areas played no active role in Pan-African politics before 1945, when his detailed account ends. When, however, various Pan-Africanists do

reveal an interest in traditionalistic literature, music, and religious cults Geiss tends to denounce them as backward-looking "romantics."

In fact, Geiss's general analysis of Pan-Africanism is built around the polarity of modernism/traditionalism and his instinct (carried over partly from his position in modern German historiography as an antinationalist revisionist of the Fritz Fischer camp) is to see only the modernizing, that is, Westernizing, tendencies as healthy.

From this standpoint Geiss finds it necessary to attack (at least partially) some of the best known Pan-Africanist thinkers, including Edward Wilmot Blyden, W. E. B. Dubois, Kwame Nkrumah, and the French-speaking "negritude" group, all of whom indulged in romantic fantasies about Africa. While much of this criticism is refreshing and probably justified, the formula upon which it is based seems simplistic in general and particularly unsatisfactory for the subject at hand. The failures of Pan-Africanism spring less from a lack of modernizing attitudes on the part of its leaders than from the sheer impossibility of small, weak groups of intellectuals gaining major political influence over the vast areas in which they operated. Indeed, from some of the evidence in this book, it seems that the Pan-African movement made its most important contributions to black political consciousness precisely through its romantic dimensions. Thus Geiss gives great credit to the undeniable fantasies of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association for awakening the pride of black intellectuals as well as as uneducated masses in both North America and various portions of Africa.

The vagueness and complexity, as well as the ultimate historical significance of Pan-Africanism lies, therefore, somewhere outside the movement itself, which Geiss has usefully and perhaps definitively delineated. This movement, as an organized force, explains little about the practical achievement of black independence in either the New World or Africa. It is, rather, the unattainable symbol of integration into an idealized "Pan-Africa" which has, at critical moments, inspired both black nationalists and Western thinkers to realize that Africans and Afro-Americans have a creative as well as an imitative role to play in the modern world.

University of Chicago

RALPH A. AUSTEN

THE LORDS OF HUMAN KIND: BLACK MAN, YELLOW MAN, AND WHITE MAN IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE. By V. G. Kiernan. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1969. Pp. 336. \$7.95.)

WESTERN Europeans of the century and a half before the First World War were "lords of human kind," at least in their own eyes. Most of the world they conquered and absorbed into their empires; over much of the rest they won economic control. As their rule expanded, they gained impressions and formed opinions about the diverse peoples with whom they came in contact and adopted particular attitudes and modes of behavior toward them. It is the nature and development of these attitudes and this behavior—of what might be called Europe's intellectual posture vis-à-vis non-Europe—that is the subject of this unusual and stimulating book.

An introductory essay establishes the preconceptions with which Europeans entered upon the era of their world dominion. They began in confidence, which was itself remarkable for a people so long confined in a corner of Eurasia by hostile Berbers, Arabs, and Turks. This confidence derived from the ease of the American conquests of the sixteenth century and from the technical superiority over all rivals that Europeans were able to develop in arms, ships, and organization during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Europe's control of

the seas and of East-West trade was being increasingly supplemented by control over territory. The process by which this took place and the impact it had on European thought is analyzed in successive chapters dealing with India, the Muslim world, East Asia, Africa, the South Seas, and Latin America.

The author has relied almost exclusively on European-language sources written by Europeans. This was no doubt inevitable, since what "natives" thought about "white masters" was not often recorded during the age of imperialism. On occasion, however, we are left in doubt about where the author himself stands. We learn, for example, that an uncle of the Shah of Persia "as governor of Shiraz . . . cut off seven hundred hands, and walled men up alive." For this statement we are told the source (E. G. Browne, *Year among the Persians*), but not whether or not to believe it. Again, "well-fed mullahs ordered the execution of wretches driven by hunger to cannibalism" and Central Asia was "a dismal anarchy of petty despots." True or false? If true, and no indication is given that these remarks are the result of the malice or prejudice of foreign observers, then it is hardly surprising that nineteenth- and twentieth-century accounts of Persia and Central Asia were sometimes censorious. In these and in other cases the argument could have been clearer; a more precise distinction could have been drawn between criticisms resulting from specifically European ignorance and complacency, and general strictures in which all enlightened men, European and non-European alike, may be presumed to have concurred.

A major strength of the book is that it is not another catalogue of imperialist inhumanity, pride, obtuseness, and self-satisfaction. Dr. Kiernan has succeeded in a much more difficult task; he has explained not merely what the overseas white man thought about the peoples he ruled and lived among, but why he thought as he did. The author is learned, dispassionate, and epigrammatic ("China looked 'inscrutable' because foreigners blindfolded themselves"; "the Anglo-Saxon businessman, that double-dyed philistine"), and his book is a delight to read.

Columbia University

GRAHAM W. IRWIN

HISTOIRE DE LA MAISON ROTHSCHILD. Volume II, 1848-1870. By *Bertrand Gille*. [Travaux de droit, d'économie, de sociologie et de sciences politiques, Number 56.] (Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1967. Pp. 619.)

THIS is a sequel to Mr. Gille's earlier volume on the rise of the great banking family and covers most of the period of its greatest influence and affluence. It was a period of rapid change in the structure and technique of banking. The opening year, 1848, was the occasion of a traumatic financial and speculative crisis that saw some of the best houses in Europe, including the Rothschilds, driven to the wall. There followed almost a decade of recuperation and euphoric expansion. The political uncertainties of the year of revolutions gave way to the stability of reaction, and the inflow of bullion from California and Australia fueled the fires of speculation and made possible an unprecedented ease of credit. It was these elements of political change and economic optimism that encouraged the diffusion of the joint-stock investment or credit bank as a major institutional innovation, an innovation that the Rothschilds (as Rothschilds, not as merchant bankers) deprecated and denounced. In particular, the chief promoters of the new way of finance, the brothers Pereire, were seen by the Paris Rothschilds as ingrates (Émile Pereire had been a Rothschild employee and associate) and upstarts. In the subsequent struggle for power and profit, which continued into the disturbed and uneven decade of the sixties, the *Crédit Mobilier* fell and the Roth-

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schildts stood triumphant. But so did the joint-stock investment bank as a force in industrial promotion and international finance. Mr. Gille does not carry his story to the financial transactions attending the great French indemnity of 1871; but as Jean Bouvier has shown, these were at once the occasion of the Rothschilds' greatest triumph and the first major, and successful, challenge by the joint-stock banks in the area that had always been the most valuable preserve of the merchant banks and especially of the Rothschilds.

At the same time as this new kind of banking institution effectively undermined the monopoly position of the Rothschilds and their syndicates, the general course of economic expansion strengthened enormously the fiscal positions of the major European states and rendered them far more independent of private banking enterprise. This showed itself most obviously in the changing conditions of the market for state loans: not only did bidding become more competitive, but a number of countries (France, Prussia, and Belgium) were now able to follow the example of Britain and sell their bonds by public subscription. The banks could, if they wished, join the subscription, but this fell far short of the speculative profits of fixed-price contracts. (The French indemnity loans were in part a temporary return to the earlier system, necessitated by the special urgency of the terms imposed by Prussia on a country whose credit had been hurt by defeat, revolution, and social unrest.)

With financial independence went political independence. In the 1830's and 1840's the Rothschilds had been able to cool the bellicose ardor of a number of European governments by threatening to withhold their credit and money. When they tried the same thing with Bismarck in the 1860's, they merely persuaded him to look elsewhere for help.

All of this and more is recounted by Gille in fast-moving prose that, as in the first volume, gives less attention to analysis and explanation than the reader needs and wants. The work, it is now clear, is more in the nature of a first approximation to a history of the bank rather than a final product. Gille has gone far and wide for his evidence, and he sweeps through all the major transactions with impressive expertise and efficiency. Yet there is not one aspect of the story that could not be the subject of a much more detailed, analytic treatment, while some, like the history of the Russian loans, need badly to be completed by the still unavailable records of the London house. So that what Gille offers us is a résumé. As such it is immensely valuable to those of us who labor in the field of banking history (I find myself going back to these volumes repeatedly), and it is of interest to the general European historian who wants to know something about the relationship between money and power. But it is only a pretaste of what Gille can and perhaps will do with this material; or what other historians will do when the archives are once again available to scholars. (They have been inaccessible for some years now, waiting in storage for the new quarters of the Rothschild bank to be completed. These new quarters are in themselves the symbol of a new era: the *hôtels particuliers* of the Restoration and July Monarchy have given way to the high-rise stone, concrete, and glass of the Fifth Republic. The exclusive, family merchant bank is reversing the experience of the mid-nineteenth century and challenging the triumphant joint-stock banks in their special preserve—the provision of banking services to the general public. The house is no longer a house; it is a business company.) One hopes that the reopening of the archives will not be long delayed, because the next part of Mr. Gille's story takes him into a far less known period and promises to be even more valuable than the earlier volumes.

Harvard University

DAVID S. LANDES

EAST AND WEST OF SUEZ: THE SUEZ CANAL IN HISTORY, 1854-1956.

By D. A. Farnie. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. ix, 860. \$11.75.)

No reader of this book can complain that he does not get his money's worth. It fully lives up to its title and seems to chronicle every event that occurred East or West of Suez in over a century. Do you wish to know on what occasion Clough wrote: "Say not the struggle naught availeth"? When the Oriental Cricket Club was founded in Bombay? What kind of reception Disraeli had at Manchester in 1872? When Kesub Chandra preached in the Unitarian chapel in Westminster? Why free drinks were abolished on P&O ships in 1871? How George F. Train's journey around the world in eighty-one days provided a theme for Jules Verne? Or, coming to more recent times, which countries supplied the rails for the Hijaz Railway and when and why Aramco enforced prohibition on its employees? These and many more tidbits are supplied.

Mr. Farnie has not used the archives, but he has evidently read an enormous amount of printed matter in English—though there are some notable and surprising omissions—a good deal in French, and some in German, Dutch, and Italian. This material has been, in the main, well processed and is reproduced in a coherent and balanced narrative. As a result, anyone interested in political and economic developments in the areas surrounding the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean—and even beyond—will do well to consult this book very carefully, for he will almost surely find in it some interesting fact or figure, some bibliographical reference, or some useful lead. Those working on the Canal itself will be grateful not only for the historical account but also for the statistical tables, maps, and bibliography. They will, however, note the absence of any thoroughgoing discussion of the impact of the Canal in the last thirty years on the country most directly affected, Egypt. By the early 1950's, the contribution of the Canal to employment, government revenues, and, above all, foreign exchange earnings was by no means negligible, and estimates of the respective magnitudes are available.

Most of the book consists of straightforward narrative, but some of the earlier sections also contain valuable analysis. Particularly good is Chapter 9, which discusses the impact of the opening of the Canal on the trade of the Mediterranean and suggests that, contrary to expectations, the net effect was rather adverse. All too often, however, the book reads more like stream of consciousness than analysis. One idea suggests another (see, for example, the erudite but rather unnecessary discussion of U and non-U modes of life on page 731), and the author cannot resist sweeping generalizations and *obiter dicta* that struck me, at any rate, as faintly amusing: "The Asiatic period of European culture (1771-1835) ended in 1835 . . ."; "The first revolution in Chinese history began in the hills of Kwangsi, near Canton . . . in the 1840's"; Russian policy was dominated by "a Chinese belief that the power and the glory were inseparable"; "Japan preserved its independence because of its poverty"; The withdrawal of the British navy "left the Mediterranean to France and Italy, the ally and the client of Britain"; and "Fuad's zeal for history after the birth of his son Farouk in 1920 and the discovery of Tutankhamen in 1922." (As a matter of fact, Fuad had sponsored both historical and geographical research well before the First World War.) Further examples include: The development of Persian Gulf oil in the 1950's "sterilized the oil resources of Europe, Africa, Asia Minor" and "Indonesia, the greatest island power in the world." (What about Japan? Or, for that matter, Great Britain?) And finally: The Suez crisis "diverted American attention from the invasion of Cuba

by Fidel Castro on 2 December 1956 and so helped bring new centres of world-revolution into existence."

In addition, there are a few errors. Farnie mentions "the massacre of the Maronite clients of France in Syria" in 1860, although most of those massacred in Lebanon were Maronites, while in Syria almost all belonged to other Christian denominations. Abbud Pasha is described as a Palestinian—he was as Egyptian as one can be. The author states that Suez Canal revenues helped the UAR national income to grow at the rate desired in the first Five-Year Plan introduced in 1960; they did not. And can one think of a more fatuous ending than: "Thus the unity of mankind was restored, and Suez ceased to mark the dividing point between the worlds of East and West"?

All this is perhaps only to say that the author has his prejudices, likes, and dislikes, which often do not coincide with mine. Accepting this, one can still admire his industry and erudition and be grateful for the rich mine of information that he has opened up for students of economic and political history.

Columbia University

CHARLES ISSAWI

THE FENIAN MOVEMENT. By *Mabel Gregory Walker*. (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Ralph Myles Publisher. 1969. Pp. ix, 215. Cloth \$5.95, paper \$2.95.)

FENIANS AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION. By *Brian Jenkins*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1969. Pp. 346. \$10.50.)

DURING the last half of the nineteenth century, it was the revolutionary "Black Irish" who were being hauled away to prison. The extremists among them who wanted an Ireland completely divested of all associations with Great Britain were known as Fenians, named after the legendary giant Fion McCuol who organized the Feonin Erin or Irish militia in pre-Christian times to assure Ireland's freedom. The Fenian Brotherhood was instituted in 1858 to re-establish Irish independence and was no less feared by Englishmen than are the Black Panthers by Middle America.

Mabel Walker's book largely retraces in shorter form the older study by William D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement in the United States: 1858-1886* (1947). Her research is not new, and her sources are not entirely reliable. Brian Jenkins' study, however, covers new ground and focuses on the international impact of the Fenian movement. It is based on English and Irish diplomatic sources, unused by D'Arcy.

Much of the history of the Fenian Brotherhood resembles the plot of an *opera bouffe*—from the launching of their navy, a cannon-bearing tugboat on Lake Erie, to the gospel of Patrick "Pagan" O'Leary, a figure overlooked by both authors, who denounced the "Eyetalian" Church and proclaimed that St. Patrick had demoralized the Irish by teaching them to forgive their enemies. Jenkins, however, demonstrates the importance of Fenian history in the Anglo-American naturalization controversy. Much to their chagrin, the Brothers, rather than provoking an Anglo-American rupture, had provided an incentive for Britain's settlement of the dispute as England signed a treaty recognizing that people naturalized under American law should be held by Great Britain to be American. This treaty, along with the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869 and the Irish Land Act of 1870, was a direct accomplishment of Fenianism.

Jenkins' study is largely a standard diplomatic history of the years 1865 to 1870. Its introduction and postscript, however, are well written surveys of the impact of

Irish revolutionary movements from 1800 to 1922. An interesting side light is the attitude of Charles Francis Adams toward the Irish. Concern for law and order controlled his judgment as he commented on the execution of the "Manchester Martyrs" in 1867 that "this matter of killing policemen seems to be getting habitual with these people." Though he had rejected the Know-Nothings, by 1867 the massive Irish immigration into the United States, together with the large number of "Negro freedmen entirely unfitted for responsibility," made him despair for the future of American institutions.

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

JOSEPH M. HERNON, JR.

THE CHANAK AFFAIR. By *David Walder*. ([New York:] Macmillan Company. 1969. Pp. x, 379. \$7.95.)

In September 1922 Britain was on the verge of war with Turkey over an area it had already decided to return to the Turks. Moreover, the British forces at Chanak, in western Asia Minor, were too small to defend their positions, and the British government did not have the support of its nominal allies, France and Italy. Australia and Canada rejected the British call for assistance, and South Africa did not even reply. The Chanak Affair blew over, but it had created grave risks for the British. David Walder believes that Britain had become involved because of Lloyd George's pro-Greek prejudices, rather than because of long-term British interests. This involvement assumed added importance in August 1922, with the collapse of the Greek armies situated between the Turks and the British.

The most significant contribution of this book is its detailed examination of the military position in Asia Minor, which is based on interviews and on unpublished regimental records. The author illuminates the difficulties the British had, using maps that did not show all the roads, trying to keep the Turks out of the neutral zone without firing a shot in case it should lead to an open conflict, and trying to follow the confused and contradictory orders from London. Mr. Walder also points out the usefulness of cavalry as reconnaissance and transport units in a country with poor roads, and in doing so, he clarifies at least in part why the British army was reluctant to drop the cavalry in the early interwar period.

The book is less strong on the political and diplomatic side, especially in assessing Lloyd George's motives. The author does not distinguish as often as he might between the fairly moderate aims of Venizelos, which Lloyd George supported, and the expansionism of King Constantine, which he did not. The Cabinet records outline the change in his position after the restoration of Constantine in 1920. Although Lloyd George still favored the Greeks, he did not encourage their penetration of central Anatolia. The Greeks caused their own defeat by pushing deep into a hostile area without adequate supply lines or a clear strategic aim, and it is unfair to blame Lloyd George for this. It also seems unfair to blame him because the Greeks misread his speech of August 4, 1922, in which he said that he wished to act as a referee. The minutes of the Cabinet of August 3 confirm that he was more concerned with maintaining order in the Near East than with preserving the Greek conquests of 1919-21.

Mr. Walder explains Winston Churchill's position more convincingly and shows that in 1921 he favored a blockade of Greece to force them to a truce. By 1922 he had become the most forceful partisan in the Cabinet of anti-Turk measures, because British prestige was involved. The second phase of Churchill's position is well

known, but the first has not been examined in such detail. The author also singles out the British commander in Turkey, General Harington, for special praise, and shows how he managed to neutralize some of the Cabinet's blunders.

The author concentrates on the Anglo-Turkish aspect of the Chanak Affair and does a thorough and largely accurate job. He mentions the position of France and the Balkan states briefly, but it would be interesting to know more about Poincaré's position and the reasons for his interference in what seemed, on the surface, to be only a minor French interest.

The author has used the recently opened Cabinet records and the Lloyd George papers as well. The major disputable point is that of Lloyd George's ultimate goals, a subject that remains as debatable after the opening of the records as it was when they remained secret.

University of Manitoba

MICHAEL KINNEAR

COMBATS INACHEVÉS. Volume I, DE L'INDÉPENDANCE À L'ALLIANCE; Volume II, DE L'ESPOIR AUX DÉCEPTIONS. By *Paul-Henri Spaak*. (Paris: Fayard. 1969. Pp. 315; 444. 22 fr.; 25 fr.)

AN exception to most memoirs, which are seldom revealing and often less so in terms of the author than the era in which he functioned, are those of Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian national statesman and originator and/or leader of various regional or international movements and organizations. These two volumes, covering Spaak's involvement and activities on the European and world scene in the thirty years from 1936 to 1966, constitute a major historical document for any researcher in the ultratemporary era. The 750-odd pages contain an abundance of detail on diverse events, personages, and movements. The prime value of these efforts is related to Spaak's concern with what he was involved in directly, the intimate insights, and the critical analyses he supplies. The richness of these two deceptively small books resides in their refreshing candor and stark clarity.

All students of recent Europe and the Atlantic Community should consume the Spaak memoirs, and those interested in Belgian history should study them carefully. The politics of independence in the age of appeasement, the royal question of Leopold III and the wartime and postwar Belgian government and society, and the seemingly endless cultural-ethnic-linguistic struggle of the Flemings and Walloons are exposed with striking new evidence and commentary that will eventually cause some significant revisionist activity in all three problem areas. But this is not a work of parochial scope; it is especially rich in its revelations about the reconstruction and rebirth of a new Europe after World War II. Historically, this era is a wasteland of personal documents, in that most autobiographical portraits (Adenauer, Macmillan, Eisenhower, Pearson, and even De Gaulle) offer puny bits of anecdotes, large doses of politeness toward contemporaries, mammoth quantities of boasting, cautious and planned avoidance of sensitive themes, and plain rhetoric. Spaak's account of the war and postwar generation of leaders is useful because controversy is at the heart of his careful and sincere "instant replay" approach.

Volume I covers the national period of Spaak's life and gives some of the first inside portraits of the interstate wartime cooperation of the governments-in-exile in London. Spaak's transition from nationalist to internationalist is explained, just as his transformation from federalist to functionalist is exposed in the second volume. An integral (and, again, historically valuable) portion of Volume I is devoted to the birth

of Benelux and of the United Nations. The growing pains of these institutions occupy the author not only because of his extensive participation, but also because they were the two "models of union" for the future.

The second volume is even more valuable, for it contains a small yet illuminating history of the United Europe movement. Political and economic integration and Western defense policy are detailed in numerous unedited letters and notes previously unpublished (Dulles-Spaak, Mendès-France-Spaak on EDC; Spaak-Adenauer on Germany in the fifties; Spaak-De Gaulle on supranationality and Europe as a third force in the sixties). The longest treatment of any theme, the Congo decolonization process, allows Spaak to contribute new evidence while reviewing Belgian (and Western) imperialism and its errors. This volume, however, also shows Spaak as the arbitrator of national and ideological differences in the Council of Europe, the EDC debacle, and the creation of the Common Market and NATO during his Secretary-Generalship in 1956-60. In his efforts never to affront or alienate France, to get British participation in economic and political integration, and to maintain and simultaneously revise the European-American partnership, the Belgian socialist gives clear supplementary evidence that he not only mediated but frequently utilized his extraordinary gifts of leadership. While his talents at the conference table and speaker's podium emerge from the pages, Spaak does not seem consciously to build his own image. In his and his colleagues' successes, as in their failures, Spaak relates judiciously and objectively his blow-by-blow accounts of conflict and accommodation. Very little seems to be swept under the rug.

In short, this literary masterpiece (one wishes that it will not lose too much in its inevitable translation) is a valuable addition to the materials on the last three decades. Hope and achievement are scattered in its pages with uncertainty and disillusionment. The art of statecraft and the process of policy making in supra- or transnational diplomacy are explored for the first time, not in theoretical or metaphysical speculations, but in concrete historical experiences. This publication is a most welcome development, packed with detail which will make it universally rewarding.

Tufts University

PIERRE-HENRI LAURENT

Ancient

THE SACRED MARRIAGE: ASPECTS OF FAITH, MYTH, AND RITUAL IN ANCIENT SUMER. By *Samuel Noah Kramer*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. Pp. xv, 170. \$7.50.)

THIS book is an expanded version of the Patten lectures delivered at Indiana University during the fall of 1968. The first two chapters deal with general matters, such as history, culture, and literature of the Sumerians and with the poetic forms of Sumer. They lead indirectly to the next four chapters, which take up the main theme of the book: the sacred marriage rite as part of the Mesopotamian fertility cult, whose major protagonists were the shepherd-king Dumuzi (Tammuz in later tradition) and the goddess Inanna or Innin (Ishtar in later tradition). The main theme is interwoven with much extraneous matter, such as the discussion of the Sumerian love lyrics and Solomon's Song of Songs.

Kramer, the rediscoverer of the Sumerian literature and one of the most meritorious scholars in the field, has written a disappointing book. It is badly organized

and teems with exaggerated and one-sided opinions. What is one to make, for instance, of the statement that Agade was "the richest and most powerful city in the ancient world," when, as a matter of fact, the ancient site of Agade has not yet been discovered and the site may have been no more than a glorious royal residence during the period of some Sargonic kings? Kramer calls his book a pioneer effort to collect and interpret the Sumerian material. But a scholar versed in the fields of comparative religion and mythology—which I am not—would wish to see full documentation and argumentation for each controversial point provided first in a scholarly journal. On the other hand, the interested layman will have—I fear—a most difficult time disentangling the significant from the extraneous and incidental in order to get at the main theme of the sacred marriage.

University of Chicago

IGNACE J. GELB

SOME PROBLEMS OF GREEK HISTORY. By *Arnold Toynbee*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. xii, 538. \$19.50.)

ARNOLD Toynbee has written on such a wide range of subjects that one easily forgets that he was trained in the classics and that his first major publication nearly sixty years ago was a lengthy article on Sparta. The problems that engage Professor Toynbee's attention in this volume embrace all periods of Greek history. The book is divided into four parts, each of which is a separate entity. Part IV consists of a series of essays on what might have happened if Philip II, Artaxerxes Ochus, and Alexander the Great had each lived a full life and died a natural death. These speculations will be of greater interest to students of Toynbee than to students of Greek history and need no further comment here.

In Part I Professor Toynbee considers some problems connected with the post-Mycenaean migrations. His acquaintance with the archeological evidence is limited, and, as a result, this section is disappointing. Few will find his arguments for dating the Catalogue of Ships to the latter part of the seventh century compelling; his attempt to prove that Pylos was really a Cretan colony is no more successful now than when first suggested in Volume I of *A Study of History*. His explanation of the origin of the name Dorian and the presence of the same three *phyle* in all Dorian communities is ingenious, but assumes far too much and leaves too many questions unanswered. Part II is more homogeneous and more successful. In it the author attempts to trace the spread of the Greek language, and, by extension, to follow the course of Hellenization throughout the area inhabited in antiquity by Macedones, Pelagones, Paiones, and Epirots. The evidence consists largely of personal and geographical place names and, except for Macedonia, is scanty. But Toynbee has skillfully combined his evidence with a keen appreciation of the geographical features of the area, and where the evidence does not permit firm conclusions to be drawn, he does not hesitate to say so. Part III, the longest and most important section of the book, is devoted to Sparta. Most of the author's attention is focused on constitutional, political, social, and military developments in the period between the seventh and third centuries B.C. Professor Toynbee is familiar with most of the modern works on Sparta; he has mastered the ancient literary evidence, used it judiciously, and on occasion, as in his dating of the Lycurgan reform, brought fresh insight to it. Yet many of his assumptions are open to question, and some of his conclusions are overstated. It is by no means certain, for example, that the office of ephor was established in 755/4

B.C., nor that Hysiae was one of the three "major military disasters" suffered by Sparta. A chapter on the social effects of the Lycurgan reform is nicely done, but the author's guess that one of these effects, a declining birthrate, was a factor as early as 550 B.C., is not supported by any evidence. These are minor matters, however; much of what the author has to say far surpasses anything that has been written about Sparta in the decade of the sixties.

On the whole this is an exciting and stimulating book. It is lucidly written; the notes are full and abound with astute observations on the ancient evidence and the modern literature. It is clear, however, that Toynbee is at his best when dealing with the literary evidence; archeological evidence is used only sparsely and then cited from secondary works, and not always the best of those. Professor Toynbee's answers will not please everyone, but he has demonstrated once again that when it comes to posing questions he has few peers.

University of Minnesota

THOMAS KELLY

GREEK PIETY. By *Martin Persson Nilsson*. Translated from the Swedish by *Herbert Jennings Rose*. [The Norton Library.] (Reprint; New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1969. Pp. vi, 200. \$1.95.)

THIS English translation of *Greksk Religiositet* was originally published by the Oxford University Press in 1947, and it is a noteworthy addition to a series of paperbacks that already includes the same author's *History of Greek Religion* and *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology*. Its purpose, in Nilsson's own words, is "to set forth the religious attitude towards the world and the religious view of the life of man, as these changed with the times." It has, therefore, as he says, a special character among books on Greek religion, and it makes greater demands on the reader than does his admirable little book on *Greek Folk-religion* (now available in Harper Torchbooks).

After a short introductory chapter, "The National Religion of Greece," which is designed to explain the older religion in its "most universal form," the remaining three chapters are concerned with the individual developments and variations that make the study of Greek religion both interesting and difficult. The chapter on the archaic period discusses, among other things, the Orphic and Dionysiac mysteries, the influence of Delphi, and such ethical ideas as *hybris* and *nemesis*. A chapter entitled "The Dissolution" presents the fifth and fourth centuries as a critical period in religion as well as in politics, ethics, and literature. Some may think that Nilsson exaggerates the extent of skepticism and unbelief in the Athens of Euripides and Plato, but it would be a poor book on this subject in which readers found nothing with which to disagree, and Nilsson's views are always worthy of respect, even when they are difficult to accept. The final chapter, "Rebuilding," shows how old beliefs survived, transformed but still recognizable, in later times.

Nilsson occasionally expresses himself in a way that will puzzle the beginner, as when he says that "Apollo could not understand" the profundity of a movement "because he was an Olympian" or "towards the end of the Hellenistic age the gods no longer appeared in their own person to perform marvellous acts." Students must learn to recognize that a scholar who has penetrated deeply into the religious thought of antiquity has also learnt to speak its language.

Stanford University

LIONEL PEARSON

ANTIGONE ET DÉMÉTRIOS. By *Claude Wehrli*. (Études et documents publiés par l'Institut d'Histoire de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Genève, Number 5.) (Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1968. Pp. 265.)

THIS book, by a young Swiss scholar, does not claim to be a history of the age of Antigonus Monophthalmus and Demetrius the Besieger, nor even a full biography of the men themselves; it claims to follow *les lignes principales*. The first long chapter, "The Rise of Antigonus," in fact goes down to his death in 301. It is much the least satisfactory part of the book and would have been better omitted. The existence of problems (which admittedly cannot all be discussed) is often not noted; thus a view of the arrangements after Alexander's death in 323, which would be resisted by many as an unsatisfactory interpretation of the sources and as a historically implausible reconstruction, is stated as simple fact; and such crucial events—crucial for the policies of Antigonus himself—as the proclamation of the freedom of the Greek cities by Polyperchon are not even mentioned. Chapter II, "The Kingdom of Antigonus," concentrates on his foundation of cities, since there is little evidence on anything else. Antigonus' work in this respect receives a juster appreciation than in the standard accounts. Chapter III deals with the oldest chestnut of all: Antigonus' relations with the Greek cities. Though unsatisfactory in some details (such as the genesis of the slogan), this chapter is the most sensible discussion of the political fact behind the propaganda that could be wished. The author demonstrates in detail (as he later does for Demetrius) that the slogan was pure propaganda in a world of *Realpolitik*.

The first three chapters on Demetrius are arranged chronologically. They work through the scattered material with industry and competence, leaning heavily (to their advantage) on the work of great French scholars, notably Louis Robert and Pierre Lévêque. But they contribute little that is new in detail and nothing in interpretation. The final chapter, summing up Demetrius' achievement, argues rather unconvincingly for his interests in founding cities and in Greek cultural life (this by making the most of a contested interpretation of the wall paintings from Boscoreale). The argument for his real contribution to siege warfare and shipbuilding is more successful, though this contribution is admitted to be a vast expansion of existing practice rather than original thinking. There are appendixes on iconography and numismatics. This book will have to be taken into account by anyone working on the early Successors. It is to be hoped that, despite the deficiencies of our evidence, it brings a historical synthesis a little nearer.

State University of New York, Buffalo

E. BADIAN

THE GREEK TEMPLE BUILDERS AT EPIDAUROS: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF BUILDING IN THE ASKLEPIAN SANCTUARY, DURING THE FOURTH AND EARLY THIRD CENTURIES B.C. By *Alison Burford*. ([Toronto:] University of Toronto Press. 1969. Pp. 270. \$22.50.)

BUT for Rostovtzeff, J. M. C. Toynbee, and the Italians Bianchi Bandinelli, G. Ricci, G. Gullini, and Calabi Limentani, the social and economic aspects of artistic activity engaged in the elaborate building programs of classical antiquity have been largely ignored. The great architectural commissions of the Greeks and Romans are usually treated in emphatically descriptive publications with an apparatus of historical analysis but without reference either to considerations of patronage and expense or to the composition of the responsible workshops and the relations of their members to the

artistic director and the paymaster. Often this information is lacking or, as in the case of the Athenian inscriptions, has been applied to other purposes. Fortunately, sufficient evidence survives for the construction of the temple and tholos within the sanctuary of Asklepios at Epidauros to permit the author to provide a convincing analysis of the economic and social effects of an expensive building program on a small community, simply organized and relying on semiskilled labor and imported experts.

This clear, well-written, carefully documented monograph by Alison Burford departs from the conventional focus on the great monument as built and turns, instead, to a patient examination of how it was done, by whom, under whose management and direction, regulated by what kind of contractual arrangements, at whose cost, how paid, and for whose benefit. To establish the setting for the creation of the Epidaurian Sanctuary, the author discusses the recovery of Greece about 370 B.C. from the severe depression that followed the Peloponnesian War, the relation between the international and parochial aspects of a major sanctuary, the impact of public works projects on the local and foreign labor market, the conception, development, and administration of a building program, and the implications of contractual obligations beyond the legal definitions established by Pringsheim. Her greatest contribution lies in the sensitive presentation of the building contract which gives shape to the program as it unfolds, in the careful identification of the contracting parties who direct and administer finances and operations, and in the interpretation of the on-going contract price in terms of materials, transportation, and performance. Complementing this extended analysis of the social and economic dimensions of the Epidaurian building program are four useful appendixes which provide the inscriptional evidence and the author's detailed interpretations of that evidence. In all, Alison Burford has written an excellent book and laid the human foundation of the buildings at Epidauros.

University of Pennsylvania

RICHARD BRILLIANT

PHILOPOEMEN. By R. M. Errington. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. x, 314. \$8.75.)

THE purpose and achievement of this book are well stated in the preface: a political rather than a psychological biography of a dominating statesman of the Achaean League. The policies of the League, within Greece and toward Macedon and Rome, are centered around Philopoemen, eight times strategos of the League. (Relations with the other Hellenistic states and internal affairs of the League are virtually ignored.) The League's early dependence on Macedon was supported by Philopoemen in Greece and perhaps in his shadowy career as a *condottiere* in Crete. But as Philip V's conflicts with Rome reduced Macedonian domination in Greece, Philopoemen recognized the declining usefulness of Macedon. Knowing the helplessness of the League alone against the great powers, Philopoemen sought a protector in Rome who would support without interference the League's rising ambitions and independence. Rome welcomed alliance with a peaceful, dependent client. But the intentions of the two states proved incompatible. The League, using Philopoemen's reorganized army, expanded over the Peloponnesus without Roman approval. Sparta, wracked by factional strife, was taken. Repeated delegations brought the League's internal squabbles before the Senate, which, reluctantly but increasingly, dictated policies. Philopoemen, until his violent death, defied Roman intervention in Achaean internal affairs.

Errington's main contribution is a restatement and assessment of the effectiveness

of Philopoemen and his policy. He has meticulously worked through the ancient and modern sources and offers sound criticisms. He tempers Polybius' adulation of the democratic League, noting its aristocratic leadership and policy. He appraises the myopia of Philopoemen's vision of independence as freedom for local fighting, which sacrificed individual safety and prosperity for a dubious League dignity and which failed to realize the inevitability and advantage of Roman control. His final damnation of Philopoemen's policy is that it died with him. Errington is not new in most of his judgments and research. But he has clarified many minor issues and has presented a comprehensive study of a tangled period. His style reflects Polybius more than Plutarch. However sound the political analyses, the personality and dynamism of the leader Philopoemen fail, regrettably, to emerge. As promised, this is political, not psychological, biography.

Michigan State University

ELEANOR G. HUZAR

ROMAN LAW: LINGUISTIC, SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS.

By *David Daube*. (Edinburgh: University Press; distrib. by Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago. 1969. Pp. 205. \$7.95.)

THE volume presents the Gray Lectures, delivered at Cambridge in 1966, displaying the charming style and meaty content we have come to expect of this scholar. A start is made with the distinction between the "agent noun" and the "action noun," the former with narrower range of meaning than the verb from which it derives, the latter connoting an abstraction or systematization that is found later in time than the verb to which it relates. The tie of *spondere* with *sponsor* and *sponsio*, the chronological sequence in the use of *alienatio* and *acquisitio*, and the process of nominalization are among the topics that make this first lecture on linguistic aspects of Roman law intriguing reading.

The second lecture deals with economic factors that underlie the development of the law of damages, then points out the narrow range of individuals who were actually concerned with the making of wills or whose sons were incapable of holding property, the rather minute portion of the society to whom the "Roman" law was directed. The have-nots are not present in the law as we know it. Daube continues with a discussion of a number of devices designed to circumvent an established legal rule: to save an insolvent debtor from infamy, to enable a freedman to escape burdensome duties, to permit a person to bequeath his estate to one who could not lawfully succeed as heir or legatee. These are instances in which a creditor, a patron, or a testator flouts the law, as Daube says, "from altruistic motives," and the jurists condone, even approve, their efforts. Another instance of the same type of practice is the absence of mention of the "undowered bride" in our legal sources. The lecture concludes with an exposition of the way in which a person who did not desire to be overly generous or to dissipate his means was protected.

A third lecture delves into the nature of Roman legal thought, analyzing, for example, the difference between Roman concepts of *dolus*, *culpa*, and *casus* and Greek ideas of liability. Again, the observation is made that ancient legal systems, including the Roman, recognized negligence without necessarily making it a standard of conduct to assess liability. Similarly, Daube demolishes the nineteenth-century view that the ancients placed no legal significance on intention, that, for example, they did not distinguish between murder and accidental homicide. His concluding contribution in his consideration of philosophical aspects of Roman law is his attempted restoration

of the idea—in the face of Beseler's generally accepted views to the contrary—that the argument of *reductio ad absurdum* was well known to the Roman jurists, even if employed as a second argument.

The lectures comprise a series of fascinating vignettes of Roman legal institutions that, by and large, have not been taken into account in the usual handbooks. We may expect consideration of many of these topics in the future, for Daube's ideas are very well documented. This volume is pleasant reading for the lay historian as well as the legal student.

Columbia Law School

A. ARTHUR SCHILLER

LA STRUTTURA DELLA PROPRIETÀ E LA FORMAZIONE DEI "IURA PRAEDIORUM" NELL'ETÀ REPUBBLICANA. Volume I. By *Luigi Capogrossi Colognesi*. [Università di Roma, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano e dei Diritti dell'Oriente Mediterraneo, Number 42.] (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore. 1969. Pp. iv, 541. L. 5,500.)

FROM the Institutes of Gaius, the Digest of Justinian, and a few other legal sources we are able to see fairly well the Roman legal principles concerning the law of property. Colognesi does not assemble and interpret the workings of the law in his very scholarly book, but, rather, he tries to discover the original notion of what property and possession meant to the early Romans of the Republican age. For this investigation the sources are not very illuminating. After an exhaustive and at times too full account of modern scholarship from the fourteenth to the twentieth century and its approach to the whole problem of the Roman law of property, Colognesi examines in great detail the evidence for the structure of the Roman family and the legal powers of the *paterfamilias*. He then searches for the original ideas behind *manus*, *potestas*, *mancipium*, *dominium*, and related terms in their applicability to Roman law, trying always to understand the method by which the terminology developed in archaic times. The results of his long and complicated analysis are inconclusive, beyond the fact that the abstract terminology used in the legal sources was a relatively late development. It is difficult for the modern reader with an easy mastery of abstract legal terminology, he concludes, to recapture the stages of thought involved in the development of the Roman terminology. Hence, I might add, it is somewhat rash to use those terms to make assumptions about early Roman society. In this book the student of Roman law will find a rich and satisfying feast. The social historian will eat a little less. All others will go away hungry. It is an important book, well written and fully documented, but oriented toward the narrow specialist in Roman law.

State University of New York, Buffalo

ROBERT K. SHERK

VIOLENCE IN REPUBLICAN ROME. By *A. W. Lintott*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1968. Pp. x, 234. \$6.25.)

THIS is a scholarly study of the legal and constitutional history of violence in the Roman Republic. Lintott maintains that "Roman tradition tolerated and even encouraged violence in political and private disputes, and both the law and constitutional precedent recognized the use of force by private individuals." Legal violence was rooted in the primitive concept of self-help (*Selbsthilfe*) that was quite strong in Republican Rome, particularly because there was no regular police force.

The bulk of the book deals with the legal aspects of violence under such headings as "Popular Justice," "Violence and the Law," "Control of Violence by the Executive," and "Legislation Against Violence." This part of the book will be valuable to historians in the future. Lintott's familiarity with the law is impressive, and he has helped to clarify many ambiguous legal problems, for example, the constitutional basis of the *senatus consultum ultimum*.

The weakness of the book is that Lintott fails to explain adequately the outbreak of political violence in the late Republic. Although Roman tradition had always tolerated a certain amount of violence, the violence that began in 133 B.C. was truly exceptional. But Lintott explains it by saying that violence was a traditional part of Roman politics, and that "the constitution was unequal to controlling violence." Unfortunately, his conclusion is neither new nor enlightening.

Occasionally Lintott's analysis is naive: "Violence was in the air. . . ." His argument that the politicians of the late Republic (before 49 B.C.) were not seeking absolute personal power is well argued but not entirely convincing. Much more interesting and original is his contention that Tiberius Gracchus "saw himself as the patron of the oppressed rustics" rather than the urban plebs, and that "he was ready to use violence in defence of what he conceived to be his rights and theirs."

The author has demonstrated wide familiarity with the primary and secondary sources of Roman law. Ancient historians should read the book, but it is not intended for the general reader.

University of Washington

ARTHER FERRILL

POMPEY IN CICERO'S *CORRESPONDENCE* AND LUCAN'S *CIVIL WAR*.

By *Vivian L. Holliday*. [Studies in Classical Literature, Number 3.] (The Hague: Mouton. 1969. Pp. 100. 18 gls.)

THERE is an initial lack of clarity about Miss Holliday's intentions in publishing this book. Though it is not intended as a biography of Pompey, she says, her purpose is to produce "a clearer, more accurate understanding" of his career. Apparently she intends to do this by reviewing Lucan's poem and the letters (but not the speeches) of Cicero—only a fraction of the source-material. It comes as no surprise, then, that she fails to produce as clear and accurate an understanding of Pompey's career as do many textbooks, let alone a clearer and more accurate one. Early in the book, however, it emerges that what she really thinks she can do is show that Lucan read and made use of Cicero's letters, a view previously argued by V. Ussani (1903) and E. Malcovati (1953). The reviewer has striven in vain to find any useful point that Miss Holliday has added to these and other earlier discussions of Lucan's sources. Indeed, she has little notion of the methods by which such a point can be established, and there is virtually no discussion of what other origins there may have been for Lucan's statements about Pompey.

Columbia University

WILLIAM V. HARRIS

GREEK SOPHISTS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By *G. W. Bowersock*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. x, 140. \$6.25.)

THIS book, which grew out of a series of lectures, given at Oxford in 1966 on "Sophists and the Roman Government in the Second Century A.D.," is "directed to

placing the sophistic movement as a whole within the history of the Roman empire." The author begins with a discussion of Philostratus and two works attributed to him, the *Life of Apollonius* and the *Lives of the Sophists*. Bowersock agrees that the former, suggested to Philostratus by Julia Domna yet only completed after her death, was written earlier than the *Lives*, a conclusion that places Philostratus well down in the period of the Severi. However, he cannot resist the temptation to disentangle the genealogy of our biography, a "notorious snare," by identifying Philostratus' father with the sophist of the same name said by the *Suda* (our only authority) to have flourished in the reign of Nero. Bowersock avoids this truly patriarchal generation spread by moving the sophist father down into the time of the Antonines because he is said to have written a work on Nero. Granted that this might have been a dangerous subject during Nero's lifetime, it is still reckless to assume that, because Herodes Atticus, sophist of the Antonine Age, proposed to take up the Corinth canal project adumbrated by Nero and because his interest in the canal revived an interest in Nero, it was therefore at this time that Philostratus' father wrote his *Nero*. And yet the biographer of sophists says nothing of his own father, allegedly a sophist, because he "... may have had no importance."

Chapter 8, on the other hand, contains an admirable piece of historical detective work. The author has punctured the long-accepted view of Julia Domna as an enlightened patroness, the center of a "circle" that included virtually every leading literary figure of her day. Instead we are shown a much less cultivated empress with a "circle," to be sure, but one from which the distinguished men of letters have been eliminated. Bowersock completes his proof by pointing to a passage in Victor Duruy's *Histoire de Rome* (Paris, 1879) as the origin of this romantic view of Julia Domna.

Other chapters gather together useful information. For example, we learn that, while the sophists were ubiquitous, they were concentrated in Athens, Smyrna, and Ephesus. We also hear of the privileges that these sophists enjoyed, privileges accompanied, however, by the traditional obligation of rich men to volunteer large sums for public purposes. Of special interest is the account of leading sophists and their relations with individual emperors, especially Hadrian, not an easy man to understand then or now.

Other topics discussed include the Roman friends of these Greek sophists (Chapter 6) and the position of literary men who were not sophists (Chapter 9). The sophist emerges as a highly important figure, "a virtuoso rhetor with a big public reputation." The society in which the sophist moves is as wide as the empire itself, an empire in which Greeks could live on acceptable terms with other peoples under the same government without in any way losing their identity.

Bowersock, like his distinguished predecessor Samuel Dill, finds something very wrong behind the attractive exterior of the Age of the Antonines, and he sees this reflected in the number of persons suffering from hypochondria. Among these he cites the sophist Aelius Aristides and the physician Galen. But may this not reflect, rather, the preoccupations of our own times? Dill, while not blind to Aristides' psychological problem, commends him for the "extraordinary toughness" that sustained him over thirteen years of barbarous treatments in the name of Asclepius and that eventually brought about his cure (*Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* [New York, 1956], 463, 466). But Dill wrote as an Edwardian.

University of California, Los Angeles

TRUEDELL S. BROWN

CONSTANTINE. By *Ramsay MacMullen*. [Crosscurrents in World History.] (New York: Dial Press. 1969. Pp. vi, 263. \$7.95.)

No scholarly, non-technical biography of Constantine the Great has appeared in English since A. H. M. Jones's study of 1948. Students will therefore welcome this book, which is published appropriately in a series intended to illuminate pivotal personalities in world history. General studies of Constantine have traditionally been concerned with the implications of his reign for Christianity. Without slighting religious matters, Professor MacMullen has approached his subject so as to portray Constantine in the round, to analyze his career "on its own terms and for its own sake." Thus, he discusses the crisis besetting classical antiquity during the third century A.D., the Tetrarchy, Constantine's struggle to attain sole power, his religious conversion, and subsequent relations between Church and state. He concludes with a bibliographical note citing pertinent ancient sources in English translation and modern works in that language.

MacMullen's assessment of Constantine the ruler makes sense. While an innovator, he followed many policies imposed on him by forces beyond his control. Barbarian recruitment for the armies, bureaucratic reorganization, and the founding of new imperial residences were part of the imperial tradition before his time, yet the final ensemble of change and the permanent shift of political gravity to the East bore his own stamp. The author regards Constantine's conversion to Christianity as the act of a man who, like many of his contemporaries, was interested not so much in moral implications of religious doctrine as in the ability of divinity to bestow power and success. This is an attractive alternative to interpretations of certain scholars, like J. Burckhardt, who have been unable to reconcile many acts of Constantine with Christian dogma as understood in the fourth century. Professor MacMullen's view of Constantine as an epochal figure in the history of Christianity is compelling. His sense of mission as "bishop of those outside the Church" induced him to promote the spread of his religion within the Empire and beyond its frontiers, the result being frequent intermeshing of the operations of Church and state. One of the most attractive features of this book is the author's sensitivity to the subtle interplay of cultural, religious, and secular developments on institutions and men. His ability to evoke the spirit of Constantine's age through discussion of artistic and literary genres is outstanding.

The general reader or beginning student of late Rome will profit most by reading this lucidly written book. Scholars will enjoy it, too, as an attractively presented synthesis, impressionistic in the best sense, of the ancient sources and modern contributions to Constantiniana.

Hunter College

WILLIAM G. SINNIGEN

Medieval

TRADITION AND AUTHORITY IN THE WESTERN CHURCH, 300-1140.
By *Karl F. Morrison*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1969. Pp. xvii, 458. \$12.50.)

It is impossible to do justice in a short review to the scope and variety of this work, which is both a study in the dynamics of institutional change and a history of early

medieval political thought and ecclesiology, particularly of the consequences for the Church and its teachings of the conversion of Constantine and the acquisition by the clergy of political and military power. The author argues that the Church was basically unprepared for the "symbiotic union" with the state which was forced upon it in the fourth century and that its charismatic role was consequently overwhelmed by its administrative development. During the long series of politico-theological conflicts in which it became involved, in both East and West, various views of the structure of the Church were formulated. These involved not only written tradition, both scriptural and patristic, but also contrasting collegial and hierarchical (or magisterial) views of the basis of ecclesiastical integrity. Almost from the beginning, therefore, there was a diversity within tradition, which the author studies in Book I, on the later Roman Empire, as "a warrant for schism."

The papacy in particular was caught in a "Janus complex," looking backward to a tradition of episcopal consensus and deference to civil authority and forward to a self-consciousness of papal supremacy and the immediate apostolate of Peter and his successors. The "latitudinarianism" of Gregory the Great is presented here as something of an anomaly in the growth of papal power and increasing stress on hierarchical order that prevailed over collegial ecclesiology in the ninth century and triumphed in the full-blown papalism of Gregory VII. Thus the Carolingian "counterpoint" between discretion and tradition, as the author puts it, was replaced in the eleventh and twelfth centuries by the "counterpoint" between discretion and accountability that became the only check on papal absolutism.

The chapters on the Investiture Controversy are among the most stimulating in the book, though not all scholars will agree that the Gregorian view of Church law was the antithesis of tradition or that the reformers' appeals to the example of the primitive Church simply masked their efforts to imperialize the papacy and to identify the pope with his office. If the term *dissimulare* in Gregory's letter to Wratislav of Bohemia meant to cover up rather than to disregard or neglect, he may have had in mind a development from, rather than a rejection of, the early Church. In either case, however, he was aware of a new situation against which his opponents, in both his own and the imperialist camps, cited the old ideals of consensus, universality, and antiquity. The author gives an interesting analysis of the successive disputes that racked the Church in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, showing how the central issue moved successively from moral reform to the relation of papal and temporal powers and to the nature of the papacy itself, which was at stake in the schism of 1130-38. The views that emerged from these disputes set the stage for the later history of the Church and marked the end of the early medieval concept of tradition.

Harvard University

GILES CONSTABLE

BEITRÄGE ZUM PÄPSTLICHEN KANZLEI- UND URKUNDENWESEN IM DREIZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERT. By *Peter Herde*. [Münchener historische Studien, Abteilung geschichtl. Hilfswissenschaften, Number 1.] (2d rev. ed.; Kallmünz: Verlag Michael Lassleben. 1967. Pp. xv, 326. DM 34.)

"All roads lead to Rome" was a saying already old in the thirteenth century but never truer. No matter where one begins today to pursue whatever topic concerning that century, sooner or later some document from the papal chancery will have to be considered. Too often such evidence is insufficiently exploited because its interpretation

involves one in a labyrinth of technicalities. But who would write modern history from the acts of a legislature without being able to distinguish between bills, statutes, laws, and resolutions? The modern historian will certainly know where to find the authentic text of official acts, but he will also want to know the inner workings of the body that produced them, so he can understand an enactment as the product of a complex legislative process in which parliamentary procedures play no less a part than the personalities of lobbyists and legislators.

No less relevant are the elaborate operations of the papal chancery, but unfortunately for the medievalist, they are imperfectly understood, though not for want of effort. The picture presented by the systematic and still indispensable treatises by H. Bresslau (1912-31) and L. Schmitz-Kallenberg (1913) has been re-touched incessantly by two generations of diplomatic studies, to the point where only a specialist can control the intricate literature. As an aid to the medievalist who must deal with papal documents without specializing in them, Dr. Herde published this collection of his studies in 1961; in 1967 it was reissued with substantial additions, consisting for the most part of articles that had appeared during the intervening years. The author did not attempt to replace the old manuals with a new and complete synthesis, but rather he supplemented and revised them by analytic studies of certain crucial aspects of chancery practice and theory during the latter two-thirds of the thirteenth century.

The longest of Dr. Herde's studies details stage by stage the production process of a papal letter. Another demonstrates that the distinctions recognized by the chancery between kinds of documents were less rigid than once was thought. One personnel study collects fugitive biographical data on the chancery staff, while another lists the proctors who represented Bavarians at the *curia*; these agents for the most part were Italians. To the original brief notice on the measures taken by Innocent IV against forgers, the new edition now appends (pp. 86-124) the author's article on the crime of forgery in medieval Roman and canon law (*Traditio*, XXI [1965], 291-362). The result is a constellation of technical studies that demand the attention of all who would use papal documents of the thirteenth century, but nonspecialists will regret that the way to diplomatic is not a royal road.

University of Kansas

RICHARD KAY

THE NORMAN ACHIEVEMENT, 1050-1100. By *David C. Douglas*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. xvi, 271. \$8.50.)

IN 1915 Charles Homer Haskins wrote a remarkable book, *The Normans in European History*, that was the first synthesis of the Norman achievement in Europe and Syria from the early tenth century down to the middle of the thirteenth. Now D. C. Douglas, undoubtedly inspired by Haskins' study, devotes himself exclusively to the second half of the eleventh century when the Normans conquered and established themselves in England, Southern Italy, Sicily, and Syria. This undertaking is valuable because it rightly calls attention to significant Norman movements and contributions in a period when they are too often obscured by the investiture struggle, the reform of the church, the economic revival, and the First Crusade. It must be remembered that the Norman Conquest brought England into the continental mainstream and thereby stimulated urban life and commerce (a point strangely ignored by Douglas), that Robert Guiscard could have, if he had so desired, made Gregory VII a military and political victor in the struggle with Henry

IV, and that without the able military leader Bohemund, the First Crusade could have been a disaster.

Douglas correctly argues that in the second half of the eleventh century intrepid military adventurers and entrepreneurs—who, except for Duke William the Bastard of Normandy, came from obscure feudal families in Normandy and who were motivated principally by greed for land and power—created a Norman world. There was the Norman-Angevin state of England and northern France and the Norman kingdom of Sicily which dominated northern and southern Europe throughout the twelfth century. Douglas emphasizes the extraordinary dynamism and the exceptional military and political capacity of these Norman leaders, especially their shrewdness, or perhaps intuition, in adapting quickly to local conditions, retaining the best of what they found and fusing it to what they brought with them. He does not underestimate the cynical toleration that enabled the Normans to get along with the Anglo-Saxons, Greeks, Arabs, Jews, and even the popes. Nor does he forget that out of the common feudal background and mentality of these Normans, who were from the most highly feudalized state of Western Europe, came the formation of feudal states where previously there had been no feudal institutions (notwithstanding the recent arguments that feudalism or a proto-feudalism existed in England prior to 1066).

But there are some shortcomings in this study. Much that Douglas says here has been said recently in his *William the Conqueror*, in the various studies of Haskins or of Claude Cahen, or in the histories of the Crusades. He frequently attempts to credit the Normans with more than the evidence warrants. It is well known, for example, that whenever possible the Normans wrapped the Christian banner about themselves so as to impress all with the Holy undertaking of their ruthless campaigns. But they had no monopoly on this propagandistic device; it was used by all Christians, whether they were the French knights who pushed over the Pyrenees into Moslem Spain, the Genoese, the Pisans, the Venetians, the Germans, or those who went on the First Crusade. While it is interesting to learn what scholars and artists were doing in Norman England, Italy, and Sicily, few of them were Normans. In the case of England, the Normans merely moved it into the ecclesiastical and intellectual stream of the Continent. In the cases of Italy and Sicily, they conquered lands already rich in cultural tradition, lands whose strategic location made them a bridge for the passage of Greek and Arab culture into the West. The Normans simply adapted and used this cultural tradition as they did the political, social, and economic institutions which they took over. Their role in the Middle Ages resembled that of the Romans in the ancient world. Having been convinced by Douglas that the Norman Conquest was “a good thing for England,” that it wrought a revolution politically, socially, institutionally, legally, and spiritually, one is jolted when he then reads that “the Normans, by linking England more closely to Latin Europe, may have helped the Romance-speaking lands to achieve that dominance in western culture which they exercised during that brilliant and productive period.” Is it permissible, even for a medievalist, to be this patriotic?

Brown University

BRYCE LYON

ESSAYS IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY PRESENTED TO BERTIE WILKINSON.

Edited by T. A. Sandquist and M. R. Powicke. ([Toronto:] University of Toronto Press. 1969. Pp. 405. \$9.00.)

THIS is a handsome *Festschrift*. Including as frontispiece a photograph portraying

Bertie Wilkinson's intellectual energy, friendliness, and humanity, an inclusive bibliography of his works, and twenty-three essays on medieval topics by historians of the English-speaking world, it is a fitting tribute to a scholar who has stimulated and challenged medieval research since he began his own work at Manchester in the 1920's. The contributors range from scholars who have recently studied with Professor Wilkinson to senior friends among English medievalists, including V. H. Galbraith, E. F. Jacob, and Sir Goronwy Edwards. The emphasis, appropriately in view of Wilkinson's own interests, is on the "use and interpretation of contemporary sources" for late medieval English history. Nine essays deal with English constitutional history from the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. Fourteen others deal directly or indirectly with English political, intellectual, religious, social, and economic history in the centuries where Wilkinson's main interests lie.

Five essays (and a note on *in consimili casu* appended to Galbraith's essay) interpret thirteenth-century developments. R. F. Treharne refutes J. E. A. Jolliffe's treatment of the Mise of Amiens and recapitulates his own. Bryce Lyon summarizes his view that Edward I was a constitutional king, not because he was any more enlightened than his French contemporary, Philip IV, but because he was forced to become so. A "unified and resourceful baronage" joined by knights and burgesses in a parliament that "held the trump cards" on taxation and fundamental legislation, demanded that he do so. Galbraith, basing his essay on a manuscript of the statutes of Edward I in the Huntington Library, counters with the thesis that constitutional advance in the thirteenth century was "in great part an achievement of papal concern and suzerainty over England." Papal urgings encouraged the "growing sense of community participation in government." Two essays emphasize the importance of chronicles, however inaccurate, as sources for the thirteenth century. C. R. Cheney demonstrates that the Dunstable Annals can help us to understand John's relations with his barons, and John Brückman shows that the third recension of the Coronation Oath, dismissed by H. G. Richardson as never used, was, on the evidence of chronicles, the basis for coronations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Constitutional developments of the last two medieval centuries account for four essays. E. B. Fryde examines the background of the 1340-42 crisis. Though the years 1336 to 1338 were good harvest years, they were years of popular financial stress because of "heavy taxation and other royal exactions." In 1339, a year of dearth, Commons, magnates, and king seem finally to have agreed on a tithe on corn, wool, and lambs and on important concessions to the Commons on purveyance. E. F. Jacob shows how the Commons exerted pressure on Convocation in 1406 to insure that stipendiaries in the archdiocese of Canterbury should not be exempt from Convocation's grant of a tenth but should be required to pay one-half mark each. J. G. Edwards examines with his customary care about the meaning of words an indenture and certificate supposedly reporting the parliamentary election of 1450 in Huntingdonshire. He concludes that sheriffs' indentures allegedly drawn up *in pleno comitatu* are not to be taken literally because the sheriff often drew up the indenture some time after the court met and did not necessarily report what had happened there. J. A. Sandquist discusses the growth of the legend concerning the holy oil of St. Thomas of Canterbury but dismisses the idea that it was discovered by Richard II and used in Henry IV's coronation to strengthen the title of Lancastrian kings.

The remaining fourteen essays range widely in time and topic. Of the three written with characteristic carefulness on characteristic subjects by N. B. Lewis, J. A. Raftis, and M. R. Powicke, the last is the most interesting. Indentures and

payments to Lancastrian captains during and after the Agincourt campaign provide the evidence for a conclusion that "the ruling parties in the nation and the county," "the solid core of the English nation," were losing interest and withdrawing their support from the war. Small wonder that England failed! Fourteenth-century political history elicits two essays. One shows that Queen Isabella's ultimate alienation from Edward II may have been caused in part by controversy over her finances. The other shows that Richard Lyons had in 1376 considerable wealth that was entirely independent of royal favor or finances.

Of the remaining nine essays, four have to do with ecclesiastical politics and five with intellectual history. J. G. Rowe presents the essential facts about the temporary rapprochement between the papacy and the Byzantine Empire in the years of Hadrian IV's primacy, a move that might have led to reconciliation. Brian Tierney, in a telling analysis of theological factors involved, argues that *Haec Sancta* was a somewhat tangled "assertion of the Council's authority at moments of crisis and a proposal for future cooperation between pope and council in more normal times." Giles Constable's and W. A. Pantin's essays both illustrate the internal politics of the archdiocese of Canterbury. The first gives evidence that not all of the Cluniac order opposed Hubert Walter's attempts to set up a collegiate chapter in Canterbury. The second informs us that the formulary of John Mason, monk of St. Augustine, is made up of original letters and thus has a historical usefulness beyond its seeming importance. It exemplifies, among other things, the struggle of the monks between 1329 and 1337 to assert their exemption from the archbishop's jurisdiction.

The remaining five essays contribute to intellectual history. Two deal with medieval commentaries on Aristotle: Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* (Essay IX, by J. R. O'Donnell) and Walter of Burley on the *Politics* (Essay XVI, by L. J. Daley). Both medieval commentators seem to have been more concerned to make clear Aristotle's meaning than to put forward original ideas of their own. Both acknowledge Thomas Aquinas as their master—Giles directly, Walter indirectly—by incorporating Aquinas' commentary. Hugh McKinnon discusses medieval teaching methods as illustrated by William de Montibus, master in Paris, later Chancellor of Lincoln, to whom he ascribes the *Peniteus cito*. J. J. Saunders adds to Matthew Paris' portrait as a historian by showing how effectively he used the material on the Mongols available to him in his remote Benedictine monastery, where he neither saw a Mongol nor witnessed any of the events he describes. Peter Brieger extracts double value for English and Italian literary and art history from a curious statue-like portrait of Henry of Almain, son of Richard of Cornwall, in the Altona Codes of Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

Festschriften are notoriously package deals in which may lie buried treasure. In this one, rather surprisingly in view of their great number, all the essays are of interest and of high quality.

Rutgers, The State University

MARGARET HASTINGS

THE KING'S LIEUTENANT: HENRY OF GROSMONT, FIRST DUKE OF LANCASTER, 1310-1361. By *Kenneth Fowler*. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969. Pp. 312. \$11.00.)

DR. Fowler's important book is very difficult to classify. It is not biography in the traditional sense, for only occasionally does the protagonist emerge from the crowded scene as a real flesh-and-blood individual. This is due largely to the nature of the

materials from which the author has reconstructed the life of the man who for many years stood only below King Edward III and the Black Prince in power and influence. What appears is, for the most part, a stereotyped fourteenth-century noble straight from the pages of Froissart. Only in the chapter dealing with Henry's religious benefactions and his authorship of *Le Livre des Seyntz Medicines* can the reader sense that here at last is the real man.

On the other hand, military and diplomatic historians will rub their hands in glee at the wealth of material here presented for the first time. Dr. Fowler's extensive use of unpublished documents in the Public Record Office, the British Museum, and other repositories in England and France has resulted in a detailed narrative of the military and diplomatic activities in which Duke Henry was a leading participant. Because the exploits of Edward III and the Black Prince have largely overshadowed the achievements of other commanders in the early phases of the Hundred Years' War, this account of Lancaster's military activities is doubly welcome. For example, it was his successful operations from 1345 to 1347 that restored English authority in much of Aquitaine and established a secure base for the Black Prince's campaigns a decade later. While Fowler does not handle military details with the deftness of a Hewitt, his account of these operations, as well as those conducted by the duke in Normandy and Brittany (1355-57) constitutes a valuable addition to the literature of the war. Especially important are the contributions toward a better understanding of the logistical problems faced by English commanders attempting to maintain and control forces in France with inadequate administrative and financial resources.

The diplomatic maneuvering by which King Edward sought to maintain his influence in the Low Countries was exceeded in complexity and deviousness by the negotiations through which the Avignonese papacy sought to bring an end to the conflict. Lancaster was a leading figure in these and other exchanges, but the duke, an abler soldier than diplomat, was, on more than one occasion, the victim of such masters of the tortuous diplomacy of the day as Louis de Male of Flanders and Charles the Bad of Navarre. Diplomatic historians will be grateful for the new light that Dr. Fowler has thrown on these incredibly complicated negotiations. The documentation is impressive and utilized expertly; *The King's Lieutenant* takes its place with the studies of Hewitt and Nicholson, and fills one more gap in our knowledge of war and diplomacy in the fourteenth century.

University of North Carolina, Greensboro

JOHN BEELER

CALENDAR OF INQUISITIONS MISCELLANEOUS (CHANCERY) PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE. Volume VII, 1399-1422. (London: H. M. Stationery Office; distrib. by British Information Services, New York. 1968. Pp. vii, 501. \$37.80 postpaid.)

THIS seventh volume of the Calendar of Miscellaneous Inquisitions (Chancery) covers the reigns of Henry IV and Henry V. An eighth volume for the reigns of Henry VI and the Yorkist kings will complete the series. Materials from other Chancery classes and some Exchequer inquisitions are included and related entries on Chancery rolls indicated by references to calendar volumes.

Although miscellaneous inquisitions concern a wide range of matters, the greater number have to do with rights in land and personal property. The Crown was interested in its rights to lands forfeited by supporters of Richard II, followers of Owen Glendower and other Welsh rebels, and convicted felons; in lands formerly held by

Queen Anne which were to come to Queen Joan as part of her dowry; and, as always, in lands of religious houses. The importance of foreign trade is attested by the inquisitions concerned with merchants and with ships. The various goods carried in vessels seized or wrecked are set out with their value, if known. Likewise, aliens living in or near London are listed with the value of their possessions. There are inquisitions regarding the decayed condition of the towns of Lyme Regis and Melcombe Regis and a detailed survey of Winchelsea, which was made because the town, having suffered a loss in population, wished to reduce its size by building a new wall. Inquisitions concerning the unlawful activities of the governments of Nottingham and King's Lynn, and inquisitions on outlaws, counterfeiters, and other criminals give evidence of the breakdown of law and order. Interestingly enough, the one inquisition on Lollards found no evidence of the sect.

Occupational designations and numerous evaluations of goods, often identified by their vernacular names, make the volume useful. The indexes are extensive, particularly the subject index, whose wide range of entries includes lists of building materials, clothing, containers, drink, fabrics, food, names of ships, weapons and armor, unusual words, and unusual given names. The volume thus gives a broad picture of life in medieval England.

Princeton, New Jersey

ELISABETH G. KIMBALL

THE COUNTRY GENTRY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE HERALDIC ROLLS OF ARMS. By N. Denholm-Young. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. xii, 175. \$5.50.)
CONFLICT AND STABILITY IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND. By J. R. Lander. [Hutchinson University Library: History.] (New York: Hillary House. 1969. Pp. 216. \$4.50.)

MR. Denholm-Young's book is a collection of papers partly along the lines of his early authoritative work on English seigneurial administration and partly forming a kind of prolegomenon to his forthcoming edition of four heraldic rolls relating to participants in the Dunstable tournament of 1334 and in the Scottish campaigns of that year and the next. The aim is to draw attention to the value of heraldry for the social history of this century in providing confirmatory evidence on two matters: from 1340, the question of family relationships and from 1370, when esquires begin to be included on rolls of arms, the question of the rise in social importance of men of that rank. In developing this latter theme, the book is curiously disjointed. Fascinating detail, meticulously documented, jostles broad generalization that for lack of thorough quantitative investigation is left hanging in the air. For example, whereas Stubbs held that only a minority of the members of fourteenth-century parliaments elected as knights of shires had been knighted, Denholm-Young firmly argues the contrary, without any firm figures. He is perhaps at his best in ironical argument where he has no figures at all, as in his remarks about the packing of parliaments.

Professor Landers' book is a welcome survey of the fifteenth century with a useful bibliography stressing recent work that students will find interesting. It disposes of many old textbook fallacies by pleasanter expedients than sarcastic attack, reduces insularity by occasional comparisons with French society, and ably points up continuities with the sixteenth century. As the preface makes clear, there is no pretension of going into constitutional thought or into the technical problems of parliamentary and administrative history. Even with planned omissions, the compression that

any survey demands leads to sharper generalization than would command general agreement; a reviewer is expected to point to examples of these and to light on a few errors. For example, no one who has read the wills of well-to-do villagers leaving money for a small painting of a favorite saint to be hung in their parish church would agree that the saints had become "non-existent." Again, the emphasis on "prosperity" is both right and wrong: the floor-level of poverty remained very low. Examples of a few errors of varying importance: cloth export was expanded, not "pioneered," in the mid-fourteenth century; the London Lombards did not actually remove their business to Winchester in 1456; the epidemics of the age that kept numbers down were not all of bubonic plague; class division between merchants and gentry was not nearly so strong as Landers implies. It seems a waste of space to describe copyhold tenure as it developed in the sixteenth century; the description of it, if the author's reasoning is intended to be retroactive to the fifteenth century, is hardly relevant.

University of Michigan

SYLVIA L. THRUPP

FÜRSTENLEHRE UND POLITISCHES HANDELN IM FRANKREICH HEINRICHS IV.: UNTERSUCHUNGEN ÜBER DIE POLITISCHEN DENK- UND HANDLUNGSFORMEN IM SPÄTHUMANISMUS. By *Ernst Hinrichs*. [Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, Number 21.] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1969. Pp. 385. DM 38.)

THE unusually artful arrangement of this monograph's argument deserves attention. To summarize it by adopting a theatrical metaphor, one half of the cast consists of a series of "theoreticians," with Bodin and Lipsius as stars and a supporting cast of lesser lights grouped as follows: Harault, Le Jay, and Rivault de Fleurance; L'Alouette, Dorléans, and Gravelle; Poisson de la Bodinière, Constant, and Duchesne. The opening scenes are devoted to an exposition of the ideas of these figures on such issues as the prince vis-à-vis the law (divine and natural, fundamental, civil, and the like), sovereignty, and the virtues of the ideal ruler. In the second act, the theoreticians are joined by a series of "practitioners": the king himself plus his close advisers such as Duplessis-Mornay, Sully, De Thou, and Bellièvre. Their thoughts on the same categories of governance and their behavior (especially Henry IV's) in the light of them, are treated contrapuntally with the theoreticians' ideas.

Many readers may be put off by this rather mechanical structuring, but I find that the author defends his method so vigorously, selects his categories with such reasonableness, and carries through his plan with such fidelity that the reader comes away with a rational and coherent notion of this hectic age.

One shortcoming lies in the author's efforts to relate "late humanistic" *Fürstenlehre* to medieval antecedents. The section on the medieval princely office does not mention Kantorowicz's work, and that on the medieval idea of sovereignty ignores the work of Wilks. Another flaw occurs in the analysis of Bodin's chapter "On Sovereignty" (*République*, I, 8). Hinrichs does not deal with the item that occupies more space than any other in that chapter, how the Prince is bound by private contracts, and the author does not tell the reader (or even reveal that he himself knew) that the bulk of Bodin's marginal citations in this famous chapter (about 250 out of 400) refer to Justinian's *Code* or the canon law, plus late-medieval commentaries upon them.

Hinrich's uneven treatment of medieval political and legal traditions puts him in

the company of many famous Renaissance scholars, but his book, happily, is not seriously hurt by this. His main aim is to compare late sixteenth-century theory with the practice of the 1590's; in this he succeeds admirably. The work has verisimilitude and may well establish itself for some time to come as the pattern of ideas according to which the intellectual and political history of this crucial decade or so of French history should be studied. Hinrichs certainly helps sustain the long-standing German pre-eminence in this field of study.

University of Iowa

RALPH E. GIESEY

DIE URKUNDEN DER DEUTSCHEN KÖNIGE UND KAISER. Volume IX, DIE URKUNDEN KONRADS III. UND SEINES SOHNES HEINRICH. Edited by *Friedrich Hausmann*. [Monumenta Germaniae Historica.] (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau Nachf. 1969. Pp. xxx, 824. DM 208.)

WITH the publication of this volume, the MGH Diplomata has reached the threshold of Hohenstaufen ascendancy. The book is the product of a period of preparation longer than the entire reign of Conrad III (1127/1135-52) and as rich in epochal events. The collecting and editing of the documents involved a score of eminent Austrian medievalists for decades, from 1904 through two World Wars and the *Anschluss*. In its present form the volume primarily reflects the editorial skill of Professor Hausmann, who led the work through the difficult period of postwar reorganization when the fate of the whole enterprise was very much uncertain.

The volume contains 298 documents of King Conrad (including 25 later forgeries): 232 charters, 2 *placita*, 16 mandates, 9 writs of mandate character, and 39 letters. In addition, the short vicariate of the young Henry in 1147-49 is represented by eleven pieces, mostly letters. More than half the charters survived in the original; the remainder have been reconstructed from copies, transumps, and prints. The Second World War took a surprisingly small toll of the archival material: four original charters and the only original judicial document were lost.

Only minor changes have been made in the traditional format of the Diplomata. In the regests the year, month, and day (if the record is so dated) precedes the place, as was customary with most notaries in Conrad's chancery. The paragraphing in the introductory remarks to the documents is clearer: tradition, earlier prints, and facsimile editions are set more distinctly. A very valuable amendment has been introduced in the index: a single alphabetical listing now contains all the names of persons and places mentioned in both documents and notes, with useful cross-references to the modern form of the toponyms.

The new insights into the diplomatics of the period that were gained from the editing have been discussed in several monographs, the latest written by the editor himself ("Reichskanzlei und Hofkapelle unter Heinrich V. und Konrad III.," *MGH Schriften* [Stuttgart, 1956], XIV.). The extensive bibliography indicates that the records, which are now made available in the authoritative and critical edition of the Monumenta, have been widely used by historians from their originals and earlier prints. The volume is a worthy tribute to the memory of the historian to whom it is dedicated, Hans Hirsch, who spent literally a lifetime on its preparation and published a series of basic studies on the records included in it, but did not live to see the edition in print.

University of British Columbia

JANOS M. BAK

FREDERICK BARBAROSSA: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICS. By *Peter Munz*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1969. Pp. xix, 422. \$11.50.)

PROFESSOR MUNZ wishes us to consider his book "more a study of the politics of the reign" than "a real biography" of Frederick. He wrote it, apparently, for those who have some knowledge of the period, and with an erudition revealed in a long and helpful bibliography and in formidable footnotes. In the latter he faces the unresolved problems pertinent to his theme and passes judgment, frequently severe, upon his predecessors in the field. I found myself becoming alert to uncomplimentary adverbs and adjectives. Is it necessary, for example, to say of Marc Bloch that "surprisingly [he] is far too sweeping when he calls German society archaic"? And yet earlier we are urged to "return to M. Bloch's description of the German monarchy as archaic." The author, furthermore, often attributes Barbarossa's difficulties to a primitive, backward society "still deeply embedded in a purely natural economy" and to *ministeriales* of "no legal training" whose "cultural outlook remained bucolic and rural."

How, then, are we to understand Frederick's politics? "Not a single historian has seen him as a dexterous and ever-changing politician." Professor Munz thinks he was one of the "most indefatigably enterprising and imaginative minds" of his century, "an extreme pragmatic empiricist in politics," and a leader who, with "political virtuosity," could interpret defeat to mean "the falsification of an hypothesis." At his accession, "the inauguration of a new era," Barbarossa had three plans. The first was to continue the policies of his predecessor. When this failed he experienced what might be called a confirmatory political revelation, the conception of a Great Design of revolutionary import, enabling him "to wash his hands of Germany as such," and to establish a new territorial state in the Land of the Three Rivers (Rhine, Rhone, and Ticino-Po). When the second plan did not work, the emperor turned to the third, although it was not "the instantaneous creative effort" of the second. He would now establish a feudal monarchy, ride "on the crest of the wave of feudalism and . . . turn feudalism, such as it was, into a constitutional principle," "swim with the tide," and "establish himself at the apex of the pyramid." These three plans, however, Frederick had arranged within a larger context. He knew at the outset of his reign that he would have to go on a crusade. He learned from the doleful clerical commentators of his time that the world was approaching its allotted doom. It was his duty, accordingly, as the last Christian emperor, to conclude his reign in an ultimate, mystical, transcendental, and eschatological manner. As a Christian philosopher upon the throne, he could easily discard one plan for another if, as the agent of God, he might bring all worldly things to an end.

The above is inevitably a simplification of Professor Munz's schema, albeit for the most part in his words. This reviewer is left wholly unconvinced that it was really so. Other scholars, however, may be able to respond more enthusiastically. The author seems often to write hurriedly, especially in his last crucial chapter. He appears unaware of those inconsistencies in his text that arise from trying to force so many facts and so many previous notions into a given semantics. Indeed there is too much resort to an outworn diction; there are, in this backward Germany, so many new and various epochs just beginning, so many revolutions everywhere precipitated, that one could understand, if it were suggested, that poor Frederick went mad trying to come to terms with them all. Professor Munz is at his best in assembling the facts. For this enormous effort one must be grateful.

Regis College

EDGAR N. JOHNSON

THE CRUSADER KINGDOM OF VALENCIA: RECONSTRUCTION ON A THIRTEENTH-CENTURY FRONTIER. In two volumes. By *Robert Ignatius Burns, S. J.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1967. Pp. xviii, 305; v, 307-561. \$18.50 the set.)

PROFESSOR Burns has produced a stimulating and beautifully written study of the church as a frontier institution in the newly conquered medieval kingdom of Valencia. Most of the work is dedicated to an analysis of the structure and evolution of Church administration in Valencia from the conquests of the 1230's and 1240's to the end of the century, concentrating on the parish—the cutting edge of the Church's dynamic thrust into the frontier environment—as the basic unit of ecclesiastical administration. There follows a discussion of the economic bases of the diocese, focusing on the complex politics of tithe collection. The role of the military and mendicant orders and some of the social services provided by the Church comprise the final portion of the text and first volume.

The second volume contains a nearly definitive bibliography of thirteenth-century Valencian source and reference materials, in addition to the extremely valuable critical notes. The work also includes a feature too often lacking in scholarly treatises: an exhaustive and truly useful index, 43 pages in length.

The author has examined virtually all extant documentation on early Christian Valencia, and hence the picture he presents is likely to stand for a long time. The principal problem with the presentation is that the reader is left with the impression that the Church was the sole instrument for social and cultural change on the Valencian frontier. This is surely the unconscious bias of the sources, but nevertheless one hopes that Professor Burns will provide complementary perspectives on Valencian life in the promised sequel on the Muslim Mudejar minorities.

University of Texas, Austin

THOMAS F. GLICK

MANUEL II PALAEOLOGUS (1391-1425): A STUDY IN LATE BYZANTINE STATESMANSHIP. By *John W. Barker.* [Rutgers Byzantine Series.] (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1969. Pp. liii, 614. \$25.00.)

USING all of the known printed sources and neglecting none of the vast secondary literature, even the most recent, Professor Barker has produced the first full-length study of Manuel II since the monograph of Berger de Xivrey published in 1853. Barker squeezes the last drop of information from sources that are often refractory and contradictory. He evaluates other scholars' opinions critically, but seldom too harshly. His modest disclaimer in the preface that his "book is not intended to give a detailed account of Byzantine history" during Manuel's lifetime or "to be an all embracing and 'definitive' study" of Manuel as an individual, but merely "to provide a basis for fuller evaluation of Manuel II" cannot be taken altogether at face value. Barker has done far more than that.

In five massive chapters running to 385 pages, he narrates the events from Manuel's birth in 1350 to the end. A brief chapter of conclusions recapitulates the author's and sharpens the reader's view of Manuel as an emperor (a truly impressive leader faced with insoluble problems), and a final chapter deals with Manuel as a human being and as an author (the most distinguished of the intellectual emperors).

Barker provides a chronological outline that will be particularly useful to a novice and no fewer than twenty-four appendixes discussing vexed questions, providing excursuses on matters of interest, establishing precise chronology, publishing the texts of documents, and adding useful comments and bibliographical notes on the thirty-four well-chosen (but often not so well reproduced) illustrations with which the book is embellished. Throughout the text, each statement of fact is scrupulously documented, and arguments for and against a given conclusion are summarized in detail in footnotes. Often Barker will give *in extenso* an English translation—usually rendered literally, and all the fresher for that—of a text, usually one of Manuel's own highly rhetorical and extremely difficult letters.

Manuscript sources may in time, perhaps, provide some modifications. There is as yet no adequate edition of Manuel's own works, nor has Barker, as he himself (p. 143, n. 32) laments, been able to use the full and still unpublished texts of the Venetian documents inadequately registered by Thiriet. His Slavic materials have been read for him. Details are always open to challenge: despite Barker's explanation (pp. 249–50, n. 83), one wonders whether it would not have been preferable to call all the Ottoman rulers "Sultan" rather than "Emir." Sometimes the reader feels that Barker might have condensed his materials to advantage. The book takes too long to get under way, and there is some repetition: was it really necessary to castigate the inaccuracies of poor old Muralt so often and so vigorously?

Perhaps understandably, Barker is a bit of a Byzantine patriot, anti-Latin and anti-Turkish. Thus, for example, he applies (pp. 4–6) the terms "grotesque," "fantastic," "fatuous," and "strange" to the failed proposals of the Emperor John V in 1355 to give his young son Manuel as a hostage to the Pope. Yet in 1366 the Emperor, who already was intending to enter the Roman Church (as of course he later did), actually did leave Manuel as a hostage in Hungary with the promise that he too would become a Catholic. The negotiations with Savoy were based on the same presupposition that both father and son would become Catholics, and in 1369 Manuel was again left as a hostage, this time in Rome. The planned policies of 1355 thus seem no more "grotesque" (etc.) than were the actual policies of later years, and Barker's terms seem unwarranted. Similarly (p. 268), Barker interprets a highly derogatory characterization of Western Europeans by Manuel as showing that "by this time Manuel had a fine understanding of all aspects of the Latin psychology."(!) Throughout the account of relations between Manuel and the Ottoman Turks—obviously the single most important topic running through the book, and in general very well handled—Barker frankly sides with Byzantium, using the terms "fortunate" and "unfortunate" as if he himself were a Byzantine.

He is very good at extracting tiny nuggets of historic information from the piles of unrefined rhetorical ore in Manuel's letters. Scholars often fail to realize that the Byzantine rhetoricians (and the Emperor was a superrhetorician) were simply not interested in telling their correspondents what later historians might wish to know. Though Barker sometimes deplores Manuel's "obscure hyperbole" (p. 134), he gets from the letters all the information that they actually contain. Students of Byzantine literatures will be well advised to read and reread pp. 422 ff. and not to miss the long and important footnote 15 on pp. 308–09. The author's scholarship is admirable, and the book in every aspect (including, alas, its price) a monument. It deserves and will surely get an enthusiastic reception.

Harvard University

ROBERT LEE WOLFF

Modern Europe

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: EUROPE IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT. By *Alfred Cobban et al.* Edited by *Alfred Cobban*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1969. Pp. 360. \$30.00.)

PROFESSIONAL historians should not suppose that this volume is merely a coffee-table book for the carriage trade. The carriage trade will be pleased with it, for it is magnificently illustrated and sumptuously produced. But it is also a book of serious import for historians, containing ten chapters written by highly qualified specialists. These are significant analytical essays, comparable in length and substance to the chapters in the *New Cambridge Modern History*. This volume was one of the last labors of the lamented Alfred Cobban. He planned it, chose the contributors, and edited the whole. His own chapters, ably written as is all his work, are entitled "Kings, Courts and Parliaments from 1660 to the French Revolution" and "Reform and Revolution: The End of the *Ancien Régime*."

Practically all topics of interest in eighteenth-century Europe save music are examined, though a brief essay by Professor Cobban brings out its social history. Art is extremely well treated by Sir John Summerson in a chapter entitled "The Architectural Setting," and by L. D. Ettlinger of University College, London, "Taste and Patronage: The Role of the Artist in Society." Robert Shackleton's chapter on the Enlightenment is masterly in its comprehensiveness, precision, and concision. J. R. Western of the University of Manchester contributes an excellent chapter on "Professionalism in Armies, Navies and Diplomacy," an analytical study of tactical and technological developments affecting the whole world. Scientific discoveries and the impact of technology upon productivity is ably discussed by W. H. G. Armytage of the University of Sheffield in "The Technological Imperative: Scientific Discoveries in the Service of Man," as is also economic history in two informative and well-written chapters by D. C. Coleman of the London School of Economics on "The Economics of an Age of Change," and by K. G. Davies of the University of Bristol, "Slavery, Commerce, and Empire." Professor Cobban's own interest in social history, well reflected in all these chapters by his collaborators, is richly exemplified in the fresh and sympathetic chapter by Olwen Hufton of the University of Reading, "Life and Death among the Very Poor."

A second reason why professional historians will find this book unusually instructive and stimulating is because of the skill with which text and illustrations are linked. There are almost six hundred illustrations, each of them specifically referred to in the text, with captions closely edited by the contributors so that the text is not distorted or misrepresented. In fact, these chapters read as though their authors planned first what they would use for illustrative material and then shaped their chapters around it. This is very conspicuously the case with Hufton's moving and frequently harrowing illustrations of "Life and Death among the Very Poor." An unusual and practical feature is that the footnotes are sidenotes: they stand on the margins of the pages and refer the reader to the apposite illustrations. It is rare to find so integral a connection between text and illustrations.

A final gratifying feature of this volume is its accuracy and sense of scholarly responsibility. Selective bibliographies, a very full index of topics and persons, and a complete and informative index of illustrations complete the volume. In editing and content, as well as in manufacture, this is a book of the highest quality.

Dartmouth College

ARTHUR M. WILSON

NAPOLEONE E L'EUROPA. By *Carlo Zaghi*. (Naples: Casa Editrice Cymba. 1969. Pp. 868. L. 9,300.)

Napoleone e l'Europa is an important book; it is stimulating and scholarly, but it is not the systematic or comprehensive analysis of Napoleon's European policy that one might have expected from the title. It is instead a collection of separate studies, all but one of them involving specific or local problems, and the majority focused on northern Italy. Their arrangement, under five principal headings, is appropriate and intelligent. We are guided, repeatedly, from questions to answers, from the general to the specific. The unity of the whole is strengthened through the re-statement, within new contexts, of earlier themes. But the over-all structure achieved by the author is essentially a personal structure, the natural and appropriate expression of his own long career as a scholar, as historian of Napoleon's struggle against the Directory (on which he published in 1938 and again in 1956) and as editor of Pisani's memoirs of Russia in 1812 (1942), and of the collected papers of Francesco Melzi (nine volumes to date, from 1956). It is Carlo Zaghi's Europe more precisely than Napoleon's.

Zaghi begins with an analysis and evaluation of the impact of Napoleon's career—militarily, politically, institutionally, socially, economically—upon the history of France, Europe, and the world. As against those historians who have emphasized Napoleon's dependence as military tactician and strategist upon his eighteenth-century predecessors, the author argues that "there is nothing more erroneous." Zaghi asserts his originality and uniqueness. He praises the young general and liberator, and condemns the subsequent emperor and despot. While Napoleon's civil legislation contributed to the progress of civilization, and his occupation policies nourished, however unwittingly, a growing sense of nationality, his social policy was regressive in championing the interests of the upper bourgeoisie against the working classes and, thereby, continuing the Revolution at its socially most unjust level. His wars, by killing so many young men (one and a half million between twenty and thirty-five years of age) crippled French demographic growth. Economically—and here Zaghi effectively sets French growth against Great Britain's—"the Revolution and Napoleon seem an authentic catastrophe. . . . On the economic terrain he worked essentially for Great Britain."

This interest in economic questions appears again in Zaghi's second essay on the development of French industry under Napoleon, in which he qualifies somewhat his earlier dark verdict, while at the same time underlining the crisis character of the final years of the reign. In the third essay he analyzes the interests and objectives involved in the expedition to Egypt. A military masterpiece, but a diplomatic and political failure, the expedition was the result of little real planning and many illusions. Its objectives were essentially economic and reflected France's economic rivalry with Great Britain: the desire to revise the treaty of 1786, exclude English trade from the Continent, and make the Mediterranean a French lake. But, it was also an absurd adventure, originating in the duel between Napoleon and the Directory for political mastery. It was in fact true, as Napoleon was to contend from St. Helena, that the Directors encouraged the expedition, thinking that it would destroy Napoleon. It was, however, equally true that Napoleon intended to exploit it against the Directory. Egypt was on both sides a maneuver in a larger internal struggle for control over France.

In section four, "Napoleon and Russia," Zaghi increasingly emphasizes the importance of Italy. It begins with a perceptive comparison between Tarlé's account of the campaign of 1812 and Madelin's interpretation, bringing out the contrasting strengths of each. The very long essay that follows centers on the activities of the Italian contingent within the Grand Army and on the reactions of these Italian soldiers to the

course of the campaign, as revealed above all in their letters—their initial blind faith in Napoleon's genius, their subsequent mounting perplexity, apprehension, dismay, and horror. The final essay in this section, on the crisis in Italy which was provoked largely by the Russian disaster, similarly has the evolution of Italian consciousness as its central theme. Napoleon decided against arming the serfs, not only because of his fear of the masses as "Emperor of the bourgeoisie" (as Tarlé had argued), but also because he continued to hope to win Alexander back to the spirit of Tilsit. Zaghi emphasizes the courage and patriotism of the Italian soldiers, their heroism at Maloyaroslavetz, the only victory of the retreat, and their steadfastness. It was the beneficiaries of the regime—the notables in Italy—who weakened, not the soldiers. He also, in contrast to Tarlé, stresses the rigor and the precocity of that Russian winter. To soldiers from Italy it must indeed have been both.

The final section of the book is concerned directly with that first Italian Republic and Kingdom of Italy of which Napoleon was in turn president and king. It is introduced by an admirable survey of recent scholarship, the sources and the problems that need investigation, and by a presentation of Zaghi's personal position as to the basic lines of development. He brings out in particular the contrast between the Republic, dominated by vice-president Melzi—relatively independent but socially conservative—and the kingdom, tightly controlled by Napoleon and thus regressive politically, but more broadly based socially because of Napoleon's preoccupation with gaining the support of the masses. What follows is less a history of Italy than a series of studies of Melzi from the Congress of Rastadt, where he represented the Cisalpine Republic, through the crisis of 1814, when he belatedly and unsuccessfully championed Eugene's candidacy as Napoleon's successor to the kingship of Italy. For Zaghi, Melzi was far more a man of the Enlightenment than Napoleon was, in respect to its liberalism as well as its absolutism; he was to the left of Napoleon in his radical anti-clericalism and to his right in the intensity of his anti-Jacobinism and his refusal to court the masses. Zaghi does not share all of these attitudes, and he admits that Melzi was occasionally mistaken, but Melzi, a man of courage and great integrity, is very much his hero, whom he defends against all of his critics: against Frenchmen who have condemned him as too friendly to Austria (including Eugene's editor, Du Casse) and against Italian democrats who thought him too friendly to France. He was instead a modern Machiavelli (as Haller said long ago), who sought to create an independent national Italian state equidistant from Paris and Vienna. "It was always, and only, the good of Italy that guided his steps."

The book is very readable, warm in its sympathies, occasionally contentious, and frequently eloquent. It has been handsomely produced and embellished with thirty plates (facsimiles and old prints). There is a full index; and the bibliographical data in the notes are remarkably precise, up-to-date, and wide-ranging, evoking the scholarship of at least a dozen languages, including Turkish and Arabic.

University of Washington

SCOTT LYTLE

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL UPHEAVAL, 1832–1852. By *William L. Langer*. [The rise of Modern Europe.] (New York: Harper and Row. 1969. Pp. xviii, 674. \$10.00.)

THIS is a difficult book to review intelligently and fairly. An expert critique of such a lengthy study of twenty years of turbulent European history presupposes a critic as learned as the author. Few European historians could match Professor Langer's breadth of reading, and I am certainly not one of them. I must therefore confine myself

to some general comments, save where the French revolution of 1848, with which I happen to be familiar, is concerned. As the structure of Professor Langer's book conforms to basic editorial decisions taken almost forty years ago, there is no point in rehashing criticism and plaudits that have punctuated the appearance of earlier volumes of "The Rise of Modern Europe" series. I have, however, some doubt as to whether a middle-aged historian makes the most suitable reviewer for this book. "The Rise of Modern Europe" volumes have chiefly served the advanced student of history rather than the general reader or the professional historian. Perhaps a book of this sort should invite the critical attention of a panel of graduate students; historians of my generation, weaned on the Langer series, may be peculiarly inhibited in passing judgment on it.

In terms of the central aim of the series, "to give the reader a clear idea of the main movements in European history, to embody the monographic contributions of research workers, and to present the material in a forceful and vivid manner," *Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852* is largely successful. After setting the stage in his first chapter, Professor Langer systematically analyzes industrialization, liberalism, socialism, and nationalism, as the dynamic forces in European society before going on to discuss the interaction of old and new in the convulsions of 1848-49. "The main movements in European history" do emerge; he does take a vast quantity of monographic literature into consideration; and the writing is lucid and readable. Considering the complexity of the mid-nineteenth-century revolutions, Professor Langer handles the narrative with a minimum of awkwardness and repetition. Langer's book, appearing in a series that he has edited for almost four decades and that bears his own name, offers a substantial contribution to historical synthesis.

I am nonetheless left with three reservations: first, the book is overlong; second, the integration of monographic research remains problematical; and third, the author's interpretive role is disappointingly modest.

Political and Social Upheaval, for no obvious reason, is about twice as long as most other volumes in the Langer series. Its six hundred pages of text are likely to make it less attractive to its traditional audience, but I am concerned with more than mere convenience. Judicious cutting would have reduced the narrative of the revolutions of 1848-49, whose non-essential detail tends to overwhelm serious analysis and interpretation. The more gratuitous the detail, the greater the likelihood of gratuitous error. Langer is hardly a careless historian, but not even he can adequately verify all the incidentals with which he embellishes his narrative.

Because of the snowballing of historical research, Professor Langer's problem in incorporating the findings of monographic research must have dwarfed the problems encountered by earlier contributors. The author's solution does not strike me as altogether felicitous. On the one hand, I sense an Olympian display of distributive justice; he who has sown should reap. Few scholarly articles, however esoteric, go unacknowledged—a subordinate clause alludes to this one, a couple of sentences sum up that one. On the other hand, major new findings are sometimes stored within a framework of conventional wisdom where they no longer fit. One example will do: Tudesq's monument to the Great Notables radically alters our traditional view of the July Monarchy's ruling class. Professor Langer accepts the new thesis of an elite of landed notables in one place, only to reheat the old chestnut, "that a capitalist oligarchy was running the country as an industrial enterprise" in another.

Finally I must regret the book's lost opportunities. A volume such as this gives its author a mandate to rethink a broad slice of history; yet Professor Langer's interpretive conclusions are cautious and sensible—and essentially familiar. Only occasionally are

there tantalizing hints of untrod paths, as when he asserts that "industrialism had gone far enough to upset the social equilibrium, yet not far enough to have produced notable benefits." Might not this perhaps fruitful hypothesis have been worth exploring?

But perhaps a reviewer has no business entertaining such great expectations. As "a reliable survey of European history," *Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852* is Rankean in its detached sympathy, skillfully written, competent in organization, and impressive in the breadth of its learning. If Professor Langer fails to offer new perspectives, he has nonetheless provided the most satisfactory summary available of what historians have learned about mid-nineteenth-century Europe, and that is a considerable recommendation.

University of Michigan, Dearborn

PETER H. AMANN

HISTORY OF BEDFORDSHIRE 1066-1888. By *Joyce Godber*. ([Bedford:] Bedfordshire County Council. 1969. Pp. 592. £3.)

HISTORIANS of England have long been indebted to Miss Godber for her valuable services both as Bedfordshire County archivist (from which position she retired in 1968) and as editor of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society. Under her guidance the County Record Office became a lively center of local historical research, the equal of Miss Wake's at Northampton or Mr. Emmison's at Chelmsford; and the series of Record Society publications poured forth in a steady stream, notable among them being the sixty-seventh volume (1968), Miss Godber's study of the eighteenth-century Marchioness Grey of Wrest Park, a charming picture of that indomitable noblewoman based on seven thousand family letters deposited in the Record Office.

Miss Godber has also earned our gratitude in writing this painstaking and voluminous history of her native county. She has deployed the large resources of published and unpublished Bedfordshire materials, including the several tons of papers recently transferred from the Woburn estate office, to write a general history of the county from the Anglo-Saxons to the twentieth century, arranged in eight chronological periods, each of which is itself subdivided under such headings as political, social, and administrative history. Technical terms are helpfully explained for nonspecialists—and who is not a nonspecialist over such a stretch of years?—and the possibility that history might amuse is happily not forgotten. I am grateful to learn of that Regency rector, the Reverend Edward Drax Free, "who in 1823 was accused by his own churchwardens of drunkenness, swindling, shop-lifting, selling the lead off the church roof, pasturing cattle and horses in the churchyard, and of having three illegitimate children."

I have, however, one serious complaint to make. Miss Godber's work raises a major question about the proper nature of local history. There are possibly three ways to write local history. The first, and least desirable, is the antiquarian's, cheerfully heedless of themes either national or local. The second, and more desirable, is Miss Godber's, whose facts are largely arranged according to national themes: thus, she begins, for example, with the Norman Conquest and ends with the Local Government Act of 1888. The third, and most desirable, is that of the Hoskins-Everitt school at Leicester, which proceeds on the assumption that local history is a mixture of national and local themes, that for most of English history there existed local communities each in an important sense independent of the larger national community. Because she falls short of this kind of local history, which is social history with a strong dose of geography, Miss Godber fails in some degree to recreate—in spite of her unrivaled knowledge of the local sources—what Professor Allen Everitt has called "the sense of county identity."

The Johns Hopkins University

DAVID SPRING

EDWARD VI: THE YOUNG KING. THE PROTECTORSHIP OF THE DUKE OF SOMERSET. By *W. K. Jordan*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1968. Pp. 544. \$7.50.)

THERE has long been a need for an adequate, full-scale history of the reign of Edward VI. The most detailed we have is Froude's, in the most flawed of his twelve volumes, now over a century old; the most balanced, those pages that Pollard devoted to Edward in his volume on the later Tudors. W. K. Jordan, the dean of American Tudor historians, has now undertaken to fill this need with a two-volume history of the reign. This is the first volume.

Jordan's major contributions heretofore have been in the areas of intellectual and social history, and his approach has been essentially analytical. In this volume he turns his hand to narrative history with conspicuous success, dealing with the complexities of foreign affairs, the bitter power struggles within the government, and even military history, with a narrative skill that compares favorably with the best of Froude. Unlike the conventional narrative historian, however, he has been able when necessary to interrupt his narrative, without prejudice to its development, with an essay in depth. He analyzes, for example, the structure of power in Edwardian England, the character of Somerset's administration, the economic and social background of the risings of 1549, or again, in an occasional excursus (in effect, an appendix in context) reviews the status of the old peerage or the financial resources of the Crown.

Jordan's treatment of the parliamentary history of the Protectorate is thorough and detailed. The picture of the Edwardian House of Commons which emerges is that of a body remarkably representative of the politically dominant classes of England, comparable in many respects to the Elizabethan Commons, not least in the nature of the conciliar leadership provided, leadership that, in a number of individual cases, was identical in both reigns.

In his review of the Edwardian reformation Jordan tempers the objectivity of the rationalist with a sympathetic understanding of the nuances of religious thought and feeling. It is his belief that the Protestant direction taken so definitely by Somerset and Cranmer in the early months of the reign was clearly foreseen by Henry in his last years. The Edwardian Reformation to this extent represents a continuation of the Henrician. But it is highly doubtful that Henry understood the extent and depth of Somerset's tolerance and certainly not the nature of the pressures, religious as well as political and social, to which he would be subjected and his inability to control them. Jordan concludes that, as a result of policies he attributes even more to Somerset than to Cranmer, "The gentry and the merchant aristocracy of England—the classes which in Tudor England possessed together the ultimate resources of power—had at some time in the course of Edward's reign become predominantly and irreversibly Protestant."

Although Edward reigned, his uncle ruled and gave to these years their indelible character. This is not to belittle the tremendous social and economic forces at work in the land and the ferment of religious ideas. But what Somerset did with these forces—what he failed to do and why—is the core of the history. This Jordan clearly recognizes. Somerset was a great man, greatly flawed. He "sought to build an England which would have provided a fitter habitation for Christian men; and he wanted neither courage nor resolution as he sought to translate his vision into social reality." But he was naive in his judgment of men and events and reckless in his use of power. Above all, "he was incapable of working with others in the Council chamber, and he was vested with a vision of society not shared, and on the whole feared, by colleagues like Paget whose feet were firmly planted on the solid earth of effective power."

Edward VI is based upon a re-examination of the manuscript sources now available and a judicious consideration of the secondary material that has accumulated in quantity over the past several decades. In place of a formal bibliography, impracticable in a work of this scope and unnecessary in view of the recent comprehensive bibliographies on the Tudor period, Jordan provides full and often critical footnotes, entered, it can be gratefully noted, upon each page rather than relegated to the end of the volume.

Denison University

W. M. SOUTHGATE

TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS. Volume II, THE LATER TUDORS (1553–1587); Volume III, THE LATER TUDORS (1588–1603). Edited by *Paul L. Hughes* and *James F. Larkin, C.S.V.* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1969. Pp. xxiii, 548; xiii, 439. \$40.00 the set.)

THESE volumes mark the end of the beginning of this monumental work. It is likely that over the next twenty years we shall have the Stuarts. And we will then have the full promise of an often-desired complete version of these most instructive instruments of government. Since reviewers with more space than I command will continue to treat technical questions opened on the publication of *The Early Tudors* in 1964, I will confine myself to some general observations and comments.

The editors have continued to serialize the documents chronologically by reigns, rather than by grouping the material in topical or other ways. The discussions of editorial canons, diplomatic, and the question of what constitutes a proclamation have not been reprinted from the first volume. There is only a short preface for each volume of the present group, but the detailed headnotes and footnotes to each item are admirable and complete. While these notes will not satisfy every demand nor the need professional historians will see for a synthetic essay on proclamations, I think the worth of the documents and the edition is beyond dispute. Others are at work on the interpretation of the raw materials provided by Professors Hughes and Larkin, and they have wisely kept the blinders on to avoid building a broken monument. The fine indexes, topical, personal, and statutory, as well as glossaries and a splendid bibliography, crown the editors' achievement.

Altogether, we now have the texts of 861 Tudor royal proclamations. And our editors tell us they expect their work is incomplete, that a number of unknown texts may lurk in obscure records collections. Be that as it may, the existing 861 raise exciting problems and many suggestions for study. For example, the distribution of these documents by reigns is 62, 218, 132, 62, and 377, from Henry VII to Elizabeth, or an average yearly output of 7.29 for the entire dynasty. Compare this average with the averages for the single reigns, again in order of appearance: 2.58, 5.73, 20.31, 11.70, and 8.76. That "new monarch," Henry VII, and his allegedly despotic son, Henry VIII, made far less frequent use of proclamations than did even the model, "parliamentary" Queen Elizabeth. And the champion users of proclamations were the modern "liberal" statesmen of Pollard's fantasy who misgoverned for Edward VI. Even Mary subsided in this respect. What I mean to suggest is that proclamations marked not the strength of arbitrary rule but the frantic efforts of weak governments to cope with matters beyond the scope of their skills and resources. The weaker the government, the more acute were the social problems and consequent disorder and the more likely the trumpeters to blow and criers to cry the royal will, for whatever it was worth. To correlate the use of proclamation, statute, and instruments of grace (such as letters

patent and clauses of exemption) is now possible for the historian interested in how governments tried to translate will into fact in Tudor England. Fortune smiles on us when we turn the pages of these handsome volumes, and the work reviewed here will be useful for generations.

University of California, Los Angeles

ARTHUR J. SLAVIN

RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN ELIZABETHAN SUSSEX: A STUDY OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT, 1558-1603. By *Roger B. Manning*. ([Leicester:] Leicester University Press. 1969. Pp. xvii, 310. 65s.)

RECENT work in the history of the English Reformation has pointed up the value of grass-roots studies of religious change, in all its aspects, on the local or regional level. This book is an admirable addition to the corpus of these monographs. Professor Manning has chosen for his investigations the post-1559 phase of the Reformation in the county of Sussex. Ecclesiastically the diocese of Chichester, Sussex was in many respects unique among the regions of southern England. Its physical geography was such as to cut it off from the life of the Thames Valley; many of the interior parishes lived an exceptionally isolated life. Its social geography was also archaic in many ways; it contained a surprising number of peers for so small a county and there was among them a preponderance of deeply committed Catholics. Catholics were also numerous among a gentry whose dominance in an almost entirely rural region went unchallenged by any entrepreneurial interest.

In addition, the diocese was unlucky in its Elizabethan bishops. With the exception of Bishop Curteys (1570-82), none gave vigorous leadership to the forces of reform. Consequently the establishment of Protestantism was a slow and halting process, though the problems facing both the ecclesiastical and the civil authorities were ones familiar in every part of the realm. Manning has very skillfully kept in view the larger national issues; his definitions of Catholic and Puritan are subtle and discriminating, and the whole organization of the book may well serve as a model for other, much-needed studies of this kind.

This book makes very clear the relationship between the political fortunes of the gentry—particularly their connection with the court—and the progress of religious change. It whets the appetite for more extensive county studies which would blend the political, religious, and economic ingredients in such a way as to give us a full picture of one of these extraordinarily important, but still little understood, regional societies.

Harvard University

WALLACE T. MACCAFFREY

THE ADMIRALTY COURT BOOK OF SOUTHAMPTON, 1566-1585. Edited with an introduction by *Edwin Welch*. [The Southampton Records Series, Volume XIII.] (Southampton: University Press. 1968. Pp. xxxiv, 148. £3 15s.)

THE Southampton Record Series has included some excellent books, mostly careful editions of the records of this major port, which were of general interest and significance. But the present volume, *The Admiralty Court Book of Southampton, 1566-1585*, seems mainly a work of local piety.

In his introduction the editor supplies a useful account of the fluctuating history of borough admiralty courts and of their struggle for survival against the encroachments

first of the Lord High Admiral and then of the vice-admiralty courts. The borough of Southampton won exemption from the admiral's jurisdiction during the reign of Henry VI, and the local admiralty court had its heyday in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as all the boroughs that enjoyed such privileges resisted the extended activities of the civil lawyers. Thereafter the court flagged, although it did not finally cease to exist until the Municipal Reform Act of 1835 quite specifically abolished such institutions. By that time, however, the court's only function seems to have been the appointment of "sandwalkers" who patrolled the foreshore.

As Mr. Welch admits, the Court Book that he prints is interesting not because of the significance of the disputes with which it deals—the court had jurisdiction over wrecks, obstructions to navigation, trade and fishing—but because it shows the establishment of a legal procedure. He admits, too, that the Southampton court was never as busy as similar institutions in other ports. These things being so, it is a little difficult to share the editor's sorrow at the court's demise or his evident surprise "that a privilege once highly prized could be swept away . . . with so little stir that the abolition is still not widely known 130 years later."

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

GILLIAN T. CELL

THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH QUAKERISM, 1655-1755. By
Richard T. Vann. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1969. Pp. xiv,
259. \$7.00.)

THIS book is a major contribution to the understanding of English religious history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Mr. Vann has read virtually everything written about the Quakers during this period as well as an immense amount that they wrote about themselves. He has subjected the literature to an intense and searching reappraisal and has buttressed his conclusions by a fascinating analysis of the social structure of the early Quaker leadership and of the Quaker rank and file in the counties of Norfolk and Buckinghamshire. The result is a happy combination of the best traditional scholarship with new demographic techniques, and the work is an excellent illustration of how essential one is to the other.

Mr. Vann succeeds in casting grave doubt on almost everything that has been generally accepted about Quakerism during the period. He suggests that, contrary to previous assumptions, there was a close connection between the early Quakers and the other emerging sects and that Quakers were very often drawn from restless souls who found no satisfactory spiritual resting place among Independents and Baptists. Far from coming almost exclusively from the lowest ranks of society, the early Quakers included a suprisingly high proportion of gentlemen and well-to-do merchants. The adherence of ex-army officers and wholesale traders seems to be a large part of the explanation of why Quakerism spread and took root. As with the other sects, Quakers appear gradually to have lost their upper-class members, and by the middle of the eighteenth century they had become almost entirely middle and lower class in their social composition.

In this social transformation, as well as in the broader transformation from what Mr. Vann calls a movement to a sect, the penal laws and social prejudice that they both reflected and perpetuated were crucial. Again, there is a close parallel with the histories of other Dissenting sects, but there were differences. Outside pressures seem to have been much more critical in shaping the distinctive Quaker organization, and the effort

to preserve the original spontaneity and tolerance of the movement persisted much longer than is usually supposed.

It is impossible in a brief review to do full justice to this excellent study. The only criticism that might be made is of the occasional assumption that the reader knows as much about Quaker history as Mr. Vann obviously does.

Washington University

R. W. DAVIS

THE YOUNGER PITT: THE YEARS OF ACCLAIM. By *John Ehrman*. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1969. Pp. xv, 710. \$14.95.)

THE career of the Younger Pitt is one of the wonders of political history—Chancellor of the Exchequer at twenty-two, Prime Minister at twenty-four, the exemplification of progress in the changing decade of the 1780's, "the pilot who weathered the storm" of the French Revolutionary Wars and the tragic patriot who died at forty-six in the dramatic aftermath of Trafalgar, the victim of Austerlitz and too much port wine. Pitt's career is fascinating, but his personality is not. As Mr. Ehrman puts it, "his mind and personality emerge in his public acts"; and insensitive and unskilled biographers in the past have made Pitt's life read like a government blue book.

This is a hazard that Mr. Ehrman has skillfully mastered. The necessary minima of personal details are coolly recorded and tied easily at appropriate intervals into the overwhelming pattern of Pitt's public life. More important, Mr. Ehrman surmounts the principal difficulty of modern political biography, and successfully rides the uneven team of analysis and narrative to the temporary (this is the first of two volumes) finishing post of the Regency Crisis of 1789. He does this by breaking his narrative into long analytical chapters on early politics, financial and administrative reform, trade and colonies, diplomacy and later politics. In the political, diplomatic, and, most notably, administrative chapters, Mr. Ehrman demonstrates an impressive, perhaps a definitive, mastery of very complex subjects. He is less sure with economic topics, but his narrative deals clearly and thoroughly with the problems of trade abroad, though very little with the economy at home. Throughout the book, the enormous range of materials—catalogued in an excellent bibliography—has been synthesized in a graceful, even account which should delight the general reader as well as the professional historian. This is a large, attractive, and enormously impressive volume.

Yet it seems an oddly old-fashioned one. Inevitably a great deal of political biography must be set in the atmosphere of policy making in courts and cabinets, and Mr. Ehrman, a practiced historian of administration, is very familiar with such an atmosphere. But he has a predilection for the corridors of power that wistfully echoes a bygone age. It was Pitt's distinction, as the first leader of an industrial nation, that he was attuned to innovation in the most significant decade of material change in the nation's history. The reform of public offices was a response, not merely to schemes of reform and administrative convenience, but also to a larger social change in which older tribal family loyalties and property interests in public office were giving place to the impersonal definition of rights and duties as the supreme bureaucratic value and in which the older tribal administrative class was giving place to a class that valued impersonality as their only way to a share in decision making. Similarly, changes in financial policy were not merely dictated by administrative neatness, but were more frequently responses to the larger pressures of the burgeoning economy than Mr. Ehrman seems prepared to allow. The atmosphere and influence of change far beyond the doors of government offices receives rather less attention in Mr. Ehrman's book than it

did in Mr. Pitt's reckonings. This shortcoming limits, not the attractiveness, still less the immediate authority, but perhaps the ultimate relevance of this otherwise admirable book.

University of British Columbia

JOHN NORRIS

SOCIETY AND PAUPERISM: ENGLISH IDEAS ON POOR RELIEF, 1795-1834.

By J. R. Poynter. [Studies in Social History.] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1969. Pp. xxv, 367. \$7.50.)

MR. Poynter, in *Society and Pauperism*, sets himself three tasks: first to describe the impact, from 1795 to 1834, of economic crises and rising pauperism on antiquated poor laws, secondly to discuss the many theories that those developments evoked from English writers, and, thirdly, to show how those developments and theories interacted to produce the New Poor Law of 1834.

An industrious and perceptive historian, Poynter is eminently successful in accomplishing the first two tasks. Building on the pioneering work of Sydney and Beatrice Webb and employing the extensive literature of the time, he draws a discriminating picture of the vast variety of schemes that local vestries and magistrates improvised to meet the pressures of mounting pauperism. No single solution was universally adopted, certainly not the famous Speenhamland system of granting relief in aid of wages according to the price of bread. What was universal in 1795 and after the French Wars were economic crises, population growth, and deepening poverty.

Nearly as universal were the spate of books and pamphlets on the causes and remedies of that pauperism. Poynter's discussion of these writings, which makes up the bulk of his study, is trenchant, solid, and always fair and balanced. It is, for example, obvious that he likes Jeremy Bentham more than Thomas Malthus, yet he does not overlook Bentham's warts nor Malthus' virtues. Bentham, in his grand solution for pauperism, the Panopticon workhouse, includes much that is harsh: child labor, badges for the poor, and excessive regimentation. Poynter does not hide these unhappy features. But he does see that behind them lay a passion for the comfort and education of the inmates and a utopian ardor for removing, by social planning, the causes of pauperism. Bentham's outlook was thus far more positive than Malthus', whose deep pessimism about all measures to end pauperism was hardly made more encouraging by a somewhat inconsistent optimism that moral restraint in marriage would check population and thus reduce pauperism. In his exposition of Bentham's and Malthus' ideas, and of the ideas of many others, Poynter is shrewd and incisive. But he is less incisive in his estimate of Malthus' and Bentham's influence on the New Poor Law of 1834.

Poynter calls Malthus "the grandfather" of that law because its "immediate sponsors were Malthusians of the second generation. . . ." He also estimates Bentham's ideas of influence because "it remains a remarkable coincidence that Bentham and Bentham alone had expounded the principle of less eligibility [adopted by the Poor Law Commission] in its full theoretical significance." But it is doubtful that the "sponsors" of the New Poor Law were very Malthusian, and it is also difficult to ascribe the less eligibility principle mainly to Bentham. Poynter himself notes that the principle of less eligibility, with its insistence that paupers never be better off than the industrious poor, not only goes back to 1719 but was elaborated by Lord Courtenay and others.

Poynter, in fact, is quite self-conscious, tentative, and unresolved about the influence of Malthus and Bentham. He perceives that it is risky to discount their ideas, yet a deeper shrewdness tells him that other forces were far more important. In his intro-

duction, for example, he offers the brilliant insight that "crises leave imprints on men's mind which determine reactions to the future, and the problems of the future are met with the solutions of the past." "Imprints of crises" and "solutions of the past" do not leave too much room for the finely spun theories of a Malthus or Bentham.

Dartmouth College

DAVID ROBERTS

MISSION TO THE MIDDLE CLASSES: THE WOODARD SCHOOLS, 1848-1891. By *Brian Heeney*. (London: S.P.C.K. for the Church Historical Society in association with the University of Alberta Press. 1969. Pp. 262. 45s.)

THE secondary schools founded by Canon Woodard in the second half of the nineteenth century have survived, as have so many other English schools and colleges, both to enrich the range of opportunities for education and as a monument to their founder's impossible dream. The Woodard schools were fashioned to draw England's dominant middle classes away from Nonconformity and Radicalism toward Conservatism and, above all, high church Anglicanism. This purpose was reflected in all the schools. Their architecture was Gothic; plainsong was sung in their chapels; the practice of sacramental confession was encouraged among the students, all of whom had to take Anglican religious instruction, be prepared for confirmation, and, if fit, be confirmed, regardless of the religious beliefs of their parents.

Apart from his religious policy and a classical curriculum, Woodard's school program reflected an acute appreciation of the country's needs. He recognized at mid-century that the need for educational institutions was greatest at the secondary level and also, paradoxically, that in a country dominated by its middle class, that class was more poorly served in education than were either the upper or the working class. But Woodard's dream was rendered impossible by his uncompromising Anglicanism and his refusal to recognize that no secondary school system equal to middle-class needs could be built without state support.

Professor Heeney has written a well-researched, thorough, and lucid study of Woodard's scheme, and has placed it in firm context. His concern with Woodard's scheme, however, tends to slight Woodard's achievement in founding eleven distinctive schools, seven of them large boarding schools. Woodard himself sensed, as Heeney indicates, that his lasting memorial would be his schools rather than his scheme. In the latter half of his career, fearful that he would overextend his resources, Woodard refused uncounted offers to take over the management of other existing schools.

Syracuse University

P. T. MARSH

LORD NORTHBROOK'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, 1872-1876. By *Edward C. Moulton*. (New York: Asia Publishing House. 1968. Pp. vi, 313. \$10.00.)

RECENT studies on British administration in India frequently perpetuate the bias and misinterpretations of imperial historians. They rely on private correspondence and focus on the "great man," the Governor General or the Secretary of State for India. Little concern is shown for what actually happened in the decision-making process or within Indian society. Professor Moulton has written a book that goes beyond the usual hackneyed accounts. First, his revised London University thesis treats only select problems relating to Northbrook's viceroyalty—education, finance, the civil service, the famine of 1873, affairs of the princely state of Baroda, and foreign relations. Second, because Northbrook is viewed in a broad administrative context rather than in terms of

relationships with India Office officials, he emerges as a sensitive ruler whose decisions were influenced by council members, the secretariat, and Indian commentators. The linking between the *raj* and its subjects also receives attention. Moulton uses newspapers and selections from the vernacular press to explore the British role in creating public opinion and the influence of that opinion on policy. Northbrook's "cautious and conciliatory" style counters the image of an imperialist bureaucracy dominated by Lyttons and Curzons. Finally, Moulton avoids the pitfall of reliance on viceregal correspondence. His discussion of the complex interactions underlying policy rests on a synthesis of letters and archival documents.

Studies on India written in England, nevertheless, have limited value, and this is no exception. Availability of source material dictates the direction and methodology of research. For example, how does a scholar go about discussing "public opinion" on the basis of the scattered Indian periodicals in the British Museum and India Office Library? Although references to the material are noteworthy, Moulton gives no background on the persons and organizations involved. Without such analysis, survey of press or generalized public opinion becomes virtually meaningless. The nature of British records also poses a fundamental problem. Research in the incomplete departmental or local proceedings forwarded from India can produce only a partial view of administration. The structure, focus, and interpretations of Moulton's work probably would have been altered in light of the documentary keys to the more formal proceedings, the keep-withs and secretariat notes located in the National Archives of India. As a result, this study of Northbrook represents the best in a succession of books based on India Office and personal collections, but we still lack research on the government of India that evaluates both London and Indian sources.

University of Missouri, Columbia

N. GERALD BARRIER

CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1914-1965.

By Michael R. Gordon. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1969. Pp. xiii, 333. \$8.95.)

AMONG the many recent books on aspects of twentieth-century British history, one of the most illuminating has been Samuel H. Beer's *British Politics in the Collectivist Age*, a triumphant vindication of the application of sophisticated political science techniques to the problems of history. Michael R. Gordon, who is an assistant professor of political science, acknowledges a heavy debt to Professor Beer, and himself applies some of the methods of modern political science to this study of Labour foreign policy since the First World War. His book turns out to be, unfortunately, a very thorough vindication of all the worst misgivings historians have ever had about the activities of political scientists. From the pompous title and the naive opening question ("Why has the Labour Party suffered recurrently and for prolonged periods from angry conflict over foreign policy?"), throughout page after page of appalling English ("its usefulness is that it helps to illuminate a perennial dilemma dogging Labour that we have already touched on"), this must be one of the most crashingly bad non-books to appear for a long time. Were it not the symptom of wider malaise in the academic world generally, it would not be worth reviewing at all. Briefly, the author has done nothing that, even on the most generous interpretation of the phrase, could be described as original research; he appears to have depended entirely upon a not very expertly chosen selection of secondary sources, eked out by some of the more obvious printed primary sources, which he frequently cites in the weirdest fashion (he thinks *ILP Annual*

Conference Reports were published by the Labour Party—which may explain why all his remarks about the ILP sound so crude and second-hand). The point of his inquiry, to quote his own inimitable phrasing, is to emphasize “political culture as a determinant of political behavior. It assumes that a fruitful way to study Labour’s foreign policy troubles is to examine the values, beliefs, and symbols that party members share. . . . But . . . political culture is only one determinant of behavior; also important is the objective environment, what Karl Popper has called the ‘logic of the situation’. . . .” Shorn of the jargon, what this says is: out of office Labour chaps tend to sound off in moralistic fashion; in office they have to face up to the hard facts of life. True, of course; but perhaps not quite such a brilliant thought as Mr. Gordon appears to believe. Beyond that, he has little understanding of the real nature of the British Labour movement, consistently underestimating the hard-headed, pragmatic quality of the “labour” elements, while wildly overrating the ideological commitment of the “socialists.” American scholars—Carl Brand, Robert Brady, Henry Winkler, Richard Lyman, and, most recently, John Naylor—have served British Labour historiography well. This book is a travesty of that fine tradition. Worse still, at a time when the prospect of a truly fruitful integration between history and the social sciences is brighter than ever before, Mr. Gordon has struck a powerful blow on behalf of the segregationists.

The Open University

ARTHUR MARWICK

THE PEOPLE’S WAR: BRITAIN—1939–1945. By *Angus Calder*. (New York: Pantheon Books. 1969. Pp. 656. \$8.95.)

DISCLAIMING any intention “to explode received ideas merely for the sake of the bang,” Angus Calder has unleashed a blitzkrieg upon popular memories of Britain’s “finest hour.” Like a Luftwaffe pilot, he is no respecter of persons, places, or national treasures. Even when he misses his target, he succeeds in producing the desired incendiary effect.

It is too easy to say that Calder, born in 1942, has misunderstood events that he is too young to recall: Do we expect historians of the Renaissance to enjoy personal recollections of their period? Calder’s disdain for sentiment reflects, rather, the fact that he writes self-consciously as a member of a generation that considers itself betrayed by the Suez fiasco, by Harold Wilson’s premiership, and, not the least indirectly, by the American war in Vietnam. Sad but true, the author speaks for many of his age when he declares it “harder, at this distance, to understand why men volunteered than to grasp the motives for conscientious objection.”

Calder has little use for the “stock quotations” from Churchill’s speeches that grace the textbooks of English schoolboys. Recounting Sir Winston’s familiar tribute to the RAF (“Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few”), he quickly appends the remark of “one fighter pilot”: “That must refer to mess bills.” The Prime Minister, alternately roaring and weeping, is treated respectfully on the dubious grounds that he had never been a politician; the same can be said of Ernest Bevin. Other politicians, by definition, fare less well, and Tory politicians (predictably) worst of all. There are sarcastic references to Anthony Eden’s boyish good looks, to Sir John Anderson’s computer-like mentality, and to Neville Chamberlain’s “‘reformist’” tenure (why the incredulous quotation marks?) at the Ministry of Health. Calder indifferently includes among members of the “old gang,” whom he cannot resist calling “old gangsters,” prominent anti-appeasers as well as Chamberlainites.

“Tory” or “Conservative,” in Calder’s vocabulary, is more a social designation than a political affiliation. As such, it often fails to carry conviction. Tories, frequently

described as "blimpish," include "the toiling poor of the West End clubs," middle-class householders who refused to open their coal cellars to inspection, "economists and other plump men in expensive suits," consumers of black-market goods, and those who left their East End offices at dusk for comparatively safe suburbs, where they retired to their Anderson shelters "perhaps to read Trollope." One must not forget the well-intentioned matron, presumably from South Kensington, who volunteered with her maid to "help in any way from five to seven any evening except at the week-ends, when we are always in the country." Would these people, like the Channel Islanders, greet the German invader with white flags from their rooftops?

However irritating certain of his pronouncements may be, Calder breaks new ground in the study of domestic responses to the diverse pressures of wartime. His style does justice to the drama that unfolds, and he makes expert use of the anecdotes that he has culled from a variety of published sources. At times he appears suspiciously selective in his use of literary materials: Evelyn Waugh's *Unconditional Surrender* is quoted as proof of upper-class self-indulgence, but *Put Out More Flags* is deemed too "snobbish" to be "relied upon" as a commentary upon billeting operations. One must, of course, await the release of official documents to evaluate Calder's thesis that the move toward social democracy was purposefully thwarted, as symbolized by the restoration of padlocked railings to London's Georgian squares. Meanwhile it is useful to be reminded that wartime Britain "was not a homogeneous nation of heroes and Stakhanovites," that approximately one person in fifty was found guilty of infringing blackout regulations, that society was not immune to such sentiments as defeatism and anti-Semitism, and that neither the burdens nor the bombs fell evenly on rich and poor. Yet despite moments of confusion, even shame, was this not a "finest hour"?

Barnard College

STEPHEN E. KOSS

LIVRE, POUVOIRS ET SOCIÉTÉ À PARIS AU XVII^e SIÈCLE (1598-1701).

In two volumes. By *Henri-Jean Martin*. [Centre de Recherches d'Histoire et de Philologie de la IV^e Section de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études. Series VI, Histoire et civilisation du livre, Number 3.] (Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1969. Pp. 551; 556-1091.)

THIS book is a landmark. From over 150,000 entries (generously deposited with the *Centre lyonnais d'histoire et de civilisation du livre*) of books printed in Paris, the provinces, and the Netherlands, Mr. Martin organizes a vast, learnedly annotated subject catalogue of French intellectual preoccupations as a basis for the even more ambitious task of describing the development of the Parisian public mind in the seventeenth century. Internally, Martin discusses briefly the history of each specialized theme emerging out of the topical and chronological categories he imposes on an enormous literature. Externally, he resorts to massive use of notarial and a wide range of archival sources to answer such questions as: Who bought what books? Were there fluctuations in demand for particular kinds of reading matter, and did they correspond to social, institutional, or political changes? What effect did Counter-Reformation educational programs have on the reading choices of different social categories? How did economic depression on the one hand and royal policy toward printers on the other coincide both to influence the type of book produced and to foster concentration in the printing industry generally? Although inconclusive on some points, Martin brings new knowledge to these and to many other issues he raises through the depth and range of his documentation.

Martin stresses, correctly, I think, one finding above all others: a profound separation dividing the cultural world of the Robe from that of the Sword. For the magistrate the works of the Church fathers, those of Plutarch, Seneca, and Cicero, along with modern *mémoires* and histories, formed the core of a library of erudition and of reference both at the beginning and at the end of the century. Aristocrats, in contrast, at first ignorant and possessing little to read, progressed in instruction so that by mid-century they purchased books widely, although predominantly of a certain kind. Rejecting titles of erudition, members of the Sword acquired instead works in the exact sciences along with a literature appealing largely to sentiment, such as poetry and writings in religious spirituality. Increasingly popular and supplanting gradually the production of erudite presses, the new literature of science and sentiment penetrated into literate homes of all types during the last decade of the century. The aristocracy had finally imposed its cultural dominance: the triumph of the *honnête homme* was the victory of an ideal, paradoxically an aristocratic one, glorifying practical learning destined for the many while condemning as "deplorable" traditions of recondite endeavor among an intellectual elite.

To discover so direct a correspondence between social groupings and cultural expression (a relation that, incidentally, explains in part why the aristocracy alone expressed the most radical opposition to Louis XIV) requires not only that we revise our thoughts about the Enlightenment itself, but also suggests how new research in the eighteenth century may find hitherto unsuspected relations between Enlightenment thought and the social backgrounds of the Revolution. Martin's work will long remain fundamental to studies of the *ancien régime*.

Sir George Williams University

LIONEL ROTHKRUG

THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF VOLTAIRE. By Ira O. Wade.
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1969. Pp. xxi, 807. \$20.00.)

PROFESSOR Wade's book is the coping stone of the edifice of Voltaire scholarship that he has constructed over a lifetime of sustained and fruitful labor. It required a scholar of great erudition and sympathetic (but not uncritical) appreciation of Voltaire and his cultural milieu to attempt this study. The subject is formidable. Voltaire had genius, and it was protean: poet, playwright, historian, crusader for human rights, popularizer of science, pamphleteer, diplomat, businessman, *bon seigneur*. Voltaire assumed every one of these roles and more, excelling in many of them, serious in all of them, and, whatever his guise, always drawing upon the resources of a powerful and fecund intellect. Professor Wade was under no illusions concerning the problem of tracing the development of such an intellect. He acknowledges his debt to the array of Voltaire scholars—Pomeau, Brumfitt, Besterman, Gay, Havens, Mornet, Lanson, Hazard, and many others—who have illuminated aspects of Voltaire's life and work and whose contributions he now draws upon in his own synthesis, the first ever attempted. These studies, combined with the 107 volumes of Voltaire correspondence and the sixty-nine volumes of *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, both edited by Theodore Besterman, encompass a mass of material that Professor Wade characterizes as "overwhelming." He notes that Voltaire led a life of "perpetual intellectual motion." Voltaire "seems to have been constantly on the move: from one place to another—from Paris to Sceaux, to Ussé, to Richelieu, or to Sully, and from France to England, to Holland, to Germany, or to Switzerland; from one kind of work to another—from poetry to a historical or philosophical treatise, from a treatise to a play, from a play to an epic, from

an epic to a mock epic; from one preoccupation to another—from aesthetics to religion, to politics, to economics, to morality, to metaphysics; and even from one idea to another—from Newtonian attraction to free will, to good and evil, to kinetic energy, to equality.” And the intensely mobile Voltaire complicated the problem by his penchant for clandestinity, which Professor Wade defines as “a masking of one’s intentions in order to achieve certain unified aims.” Small wonder that a synthesis of Voltaire’s intellectual development has not hitherto appeared.

To define the elements that made up Voltaire’s intellect, to trace their filiations and vicissitudes, to analyze their various influences, all with reference to Voltaire’s social and cultural context, such, then, was the nature of the task undertaken by Professor Wade. In his opening chapters he discusses Voltaire’s early training (emphatically classical), his literary masters (Horace, Vergil; Boileau, Racine), and his immediate predecessors in lyrical poetry (from Théophile de Viau to Chaulieu). He includes a survey of the state of poetry in France at that critical time when the Ancients were being shouldered aside by the Moderns, when prose was replacing poetry, and when “natural philosophy” was undermining revealed religion. Pagan and French classics, French freethinkers, and English and French deists and skeptics all contributed to the early intellectual development of Voltaire, who, Professor Wade notes, had become by 1726 France’s greatest poet. Ironically, as Voltaire himself perceived, his success as a poet came just as the age clearly decided in favor of prose as the medium for clear and accurate expression and mobility of ideas. Voltaire’s solution was to turn himself into a poet-philosopher, but the tension between the two tendencies could not be maintained: the poet gave way to the philosopher.

The “English Experience” carried Voltaire irrevocably into philosophy. Like most Voltaire scholars, Professor Wade views the years spent in England as a watershed in Voltaire’s intellectual development. History, philosophy, linguistics, the art of analyzing civilization (*moeurs*), politics, prose literature, and other intellectual pursuits challenged Voltaire’s curiosity and talents. Voltaire, Professor Wade concludes, was “overwhelmed by his English experience. . . . England as an organic culture . . . offered to Voltaire an opportunity for maturing, equipping himself, and reorienting himself.” Professor Wade elaborates upon Lord Morley’s dictum: “Voltaire left France a poet, he returned to it a sage,” showing quite clearly in what ways Voltaire did, in fact, reorient himself. He is most persuasive in his view that the years 1728–34, after his return to France, were for Voltaire a period during which he assimilated and prepared to build on his English experience, particularly its philosophical and scientific aspects. Professor Wade writes that this period of “gestation” “led to a complete reeducation of Voltaire, what might be called a modern education destined to be superimposed upon the classical education the Jesuits had given him. The five years between 1734 and 1739 were literally crammed with intellectual activity, ranging from history to metaphysics, to Newtonian science, to Lockean psychology, to Leibnizian optimism. One could say that Voltaire made every effort possible to unite the French intellectual and artistic achievements of the age of Louis XIV with the intellectual preoccupations of the English. He set out deliberately to temper the culture of the golden age of France with the present civilization of England. His one desire was to merge the taste which was the legacy of the previous age with the thought of his time. Seen in its true perspective, his undertaking was literally a *tour de force*, attempting to recreate the vitality of art through the expansion of thought, to retain the form of art while augmenting the content of thought.”

Differing from many Voltaire interpreters, Professor Wade characterizes the Cirey

period (1734–49) as a fruitful time throughout, a period of intense and diverse activity, effectively cloaked in Voltaire's customary clandestinity. Professor Wade is most informative on these years, covering as he does material that he has made his own, especially the relationship between Mme. du Châtelet and Voltaire. ("We can affirm," he writes, "that no association had ever promised so little in the beginning and yet produced so much in the end as this one.") He includes discussions of Voltaire and Frederick II, the wide diversity of activity of Cirey, Voltaire's serious study of Newtonian science, and his forays into Biblical criticism. He is particularly impressive in his chapter on Voltaire as historian, describing the historiographic tradition Voltaire knew and transcended, and analyzing the methodological and historical works Voltaire admired and utilized (Bayle, Lenglet du Fresnoy, and Espiard especially).

The long, central chapters on Cirey are followed by a survey of Voltaire the philosopher grappling with the great philosophers of the seventeenth century: Descartes, Pascal, Newton, Leibniz, Spinoza, Malebranche, Bayle, and Locke. These chapters struck me as among the least successful in the book, but the fault is perhaps not the author's so much as Voltaire's. We may agree with Professor Wade that Voltaire was "totally incompetent in the realm of systematic philosophy." It seems clear that, as a result, Voltaire could not appreciate such systematizers as Leibniz, Spinoza, and Descartes and preferred the more limited constructions of Locke and Newton. And yet, while he reacted negatively to metaphysics, general principles, and a priori thinking, Voltaire "discussed [them] interminably and with an incredible superficiality." Professor Wade is reluctant to so classify him, but nowhere else does Voltaire appear so much a philosophe as in his approach to such philosophical problems.

With these chapters Professor Wade closes his account of the intellectual development of Voltaire: after 1758, we move to "the epoch when Voltaire passed from the formulation of a philosophy to the translation of that philosophy into action." Such an intellectual odyssey must perforce entail selectivity and concentration of attention. But the reader may note that Professor Wade says very little about Voltaire's non-intellectual experiences, which must have colored his thought in some ways: his wealth, his shrewd business sense, his diplomatic experiences, his political interests and connections. His political views in particular are treated cursorily; Geneva and the Calas affair are not mentioned, nor are the Physiocrats. Voltaire's "clandestinity" itself may only be understood when we grasp the reality of the world he lived in, a dangerous world for men who dared to publish novel or unorthodox views. We learn nothing of Voltaire's nonliterary world or how it was changing: France in 1763 is a far remove from France in 1715 or even 1745. Voltaire did continue to develop intellectually, at least in certain areas of thought, after 1758. It seems clear, for example, that he grew more liberal politically in his later years. But, on the other hand, he would never forsake his deist beliefs, even when his younger contemporaries had moved beyond his position and conjured up a universe and a society in which God was probably dead and certainly silent. Voltaire the revolutionary was also, in certain basic ways, a conservative.

Given the enormous scope of Professor Wade's task, however, the foregoing remarks approach the level of cavils. The method, as usual, determines the results. Professor Wade has produced a synthesis that is rich in ideas and compelling in its sweep. It will occupy a permanent place among the works of Voltaire scholarship.

University of California, Berkeley

GERALD J. CAVANAUGH

CONSCIENCE RELIGIEUSE EN RÉVOLUTION: REGARDS SUR L'HISTORIOGRAPHIE RELIGIEUSE DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE. By *Bernard Plongeron*. (Paris: Éditions A. & J. Picard. 1969. Pp. 352. 40 fr.)

THIS book has the twofold objective of reviewing the historiography of French Catholicism from the end of the old regime to the Concordat of 1801 and of recounting the development of "religious conscience." Plongeron's point of departure is Gabriel Le Bras' familiar sociocultural approach to French church history, not religiosity or *sentiment religieux* alone, but the total social, spiritual-temporal, and ideological life of the Christian community.

Readers already familiar with this author's highly successful first book, *Les réguliers de Paris devant le serment constitutionnel* (1964), will find here the same tight logic, boldness of interpretation, and distrust of shopworn explanations. Plongeron sees the religious importance of the Revolution "not as the madness of the Year II, nor the aggression of Jacobin proconsuls or the anti-clerical masquerades of the popular societies, but as a symbiosis of the principles of 1789 and the Christian message," a period of religious renewal preparatory to spiritual experience utterly different from the old regime.

The book deals with three broad subjects. In the first, the four oaths exacted of the clergy between 1790 and 1797, the author tests the religious attitudes of Catholics who, in the main, were far more concerned about the "sacerdotal authenticity in attitude" of their priests than their status as Constitutionalists or nonjurors. In the second, on dechristianization, Plongeron extends the work of Cobb, Vovelle, Rémond, and Reinhard and reinforces Soboul's "Catholic-Revolutionary syncretism" and the popularity among the lower classes of the Revolutionary cults, which, he argues, represented new religious models and fresh forms of social expression rather than a progressive decline of the faith. In discussing the breakup of spiritual unity from "conformist Catholicism" to "evangelical reformism," the author gives ample scope to dechristianization as both a political device of government and a movement of the masses anxious to regain rights confiscated by the "elites." In his last section, on ecclesiology (or political theology), Plongeron points to the period 1796-97 as the moment of truth for Constitutional and refractory clergy alike who faced the dilemma of either repudiating the Revolutionary mentality and restoring the faith on Tridentine norms or reconciling the Christian message with the pluralism of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. From the latter synthesis, and the aftermath of the Concordat, the author sees the emergence of contemporary religious conscience, many of whose aspirations found final realization in Vatican II.

The historiographical portions of Plongeron's work demonstrate how rich, sophisticated, and unpolemical the scholarship of French Revolutionary church history has become in the last half century since Sicard and Mathiez. No student of the subject can afford to miss the most comprehensive bibliographical analysis available. Particularly valuable is the discussion of untapped sources in French libraries, diocesan archives, private collections, and key repositories like the *Société de Port-Royal* (which houses the Grégoire papers), the Seminary of Saint-Sulpice, and the Missions Étrangères.

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

LOUIS S. GREENBAUM

CHARLES COCHON DE LAPPARENT: CONVENTIONNEL—MINISTRE DE LA POLICE—PRÉFET DE L'EMPIRE. By *Paul Boucher*. (Paris: Éditions A. & J. Picard. [1969.] Pp. 306. 25 fr.)

THE ROLE OF FOUCHÉ DURING THE HUNDRED DAYS. By *Ray Ellsworth Cubberly*. [Logmark Editions.] (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin. 1969. Pp. ix, 146. \$3.50.)

PAUL Boucher's study of his distant relative, Cochon de Lapparent, is recommended despite its shortcomings. A career study rather than a biography, it belongs to the genre of family rehabilitation and utilizes a cache of documents uncovered in an ancestral chateau. The author's admiration for his subject is openly stated, so that bias is not really a problem and can be explicitly discounted. Genealogical considerations aside, Cochon is eminently worthy of study as an exemplar of the revolutionary mainstream and of the evolution of the middle-class elite from radical patriots to conservative Bonapartists. Cochon was an influential committeeman in the National Assembly, a provincial judge from 1791 to 1792, and was elected to the Convention and followed faithfully the leadership that navigated France through the revolutionary crisis. Regicide, moderate supporter of the Mountain, and influential member of the Comité de la Guerre, his special role was as liaison to Carnot on the Committee of Public Safety. Always conservative on social issues, he survived the Thermidorian period without becoming an outspoken reactionary. Under the Directory, however, he followed Carnot into a policy whose cornerstone was anti-Jacobinism; as police minister he supervised the purge of the Left that culminated in the execution of Babeuf and was known in the Jacobin press as "the assassin of Vendôme." Soon thereafter his career took its one deviation from the mainstream when his indulgent attitude toward the Clichyites caused him to be purged along with Carnot in the *journée* of 18 Fructidor. But Cochon's true role was quickly restored after Brumaire when he became a zealous functionary of the new order as prefect in Poitiers and then Antwerp.

The details amassed by Boucher to fill in this outline vary in quantity and quality. Perhaps familiar with French revolutionary scholarship, he invokes it sparsely and ineffectively. He has located many fruitful archival sources, but he exploits them somewhat erratically. Hence there are gaps and sometimes a thinness of detail, but, by the same token, the book never suffocates the reader and makes smooth reading. Its principal shortcoming is the absence of fresh generalization and insight into character or context. Only to the extent that many quoted documents speak for themselves, then, does the book prove illuminating. Even so, twenty comparable career biographies, combined with statistical studies of larger official groups like the Directory's commissioners, would bring us to a new plateau of comprehension about the revolutionary middle class.

The second volume under review takes a small slice of Fouché's career, examining his role in 1815 (already well known), and speculating on his motivations. Based on a judicious consideration of the memoir literature, it is highly analytical—but to what end? The contribution of the book, deriving from a foreigner's relative objectivity when it comes to French national biases, has been amply foreshadowed in Pieter Geyl's essay on Talleyrand. The latter was not a traitor; Fouché, not simply an opportunist. Aristocrats, Jacobins, and almost everyone in between had reason to appreciate Fouché's pragmatic policies during the ill-fated Hundred Days, Cubberly argues. A more interesting question, however, is not even raised by the author. What was the political and

social milieu that made Fouché's performance possible? What can we determine about the power-brokers who emerged from Napoleonic France?

Columbia University

ISSER WOLOCH

BILLAULT, MINISTRE DE NAPOLEON III, D'APRÈS SES PAPIERS PERSONNELS, 1805-1863. By Noël Blayau. [Institut Armoricaïn de Recherches Historiques de Rennes, Number 6.] (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck. [1969.] Pp. 423.)

BIOGRAPHY to implement understanding rather than merely to capture the imagination is commendable; Noël Blayau offers such a study of a neglected political figure. Adolphe Billault was not a great man, but he was an important one. A lawyer from Nantes, he rose through the ranks from deputy in the July Monarchy to President of the *Corps législatif* of the Second Empire; he was twice Minister of Interior and finally parliamentary spokesman for Napoleon III and a favored minister of state.

Two impressions are derived from a reading of this book. First, more needs to be known about the many similar unimaginative and uninspiring leaders of the past. Billault as a person appears frightfully dull, pedantic, and pedestrian. A stolid provincial from Brittany, never quite at home in Paris, modestly wealthy and unpretentious, he seems to represent every characteristic associated with the stereotyped nineteenth-century French bourgeois. Unlike Balzac's characters, Billault really lived, really influenced and determined events of consequence in French history. Perhaps the tragedy of Billault was to have been born a *Realpolitiker* in an age of romanticism. In many ways he bloomed too early and died prematurely. Blayau is too competent a scholar to make a hero of his subject.

There is another intriguing problem concerning Billault that is not atypical of statesmen of his era. Why did this man, who sat is the dynastic opposition criticizing the Orleanists and sponsoring political and economic liberalism with superb oratory, end up the champion of imperial authoritarianism? The key may lie in 1848 when Billault rallied to the democratic republic with uncertainty and appeared as an ambitious opportunist sacrificing ideological consistency for another term in the legislative halls of Paris. The book leaves such questions purposely unresolved. Blayau makes his reader move beyond the scholarly detail and seek for himself the bases of the psychology of the nineteenth-century French bourgeois statesman. Analytical biography teaches a great deal. Blayau and others must continue his high standards of inquiry to illuminate further the lives of Billault's colleagues from the July Monarchy through the Second Empire.

DePauw University

JOHN J. BAUGHMAN

COLLEGES IN CONTROVERSY: THE JESUIT SCHOOLS IN FRANCE FROM REVIVAL TO SUPPRESSION, 1815-1880. By John W. Padberg, S. J. [Harvard Historical Studies, Volume LXXXIII.] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1969. Pp. xiii, 321. \$9.00.)

THIS informative, lucid, and critical study of the Jesuit schools in France from 1815 to 1880 is very welcome, since the existing literature on the subject is polemical and superficial. Professor Padberg has based his work on a thorough investigation of the rich archives of the four Jesuit provinces in France, the general archives of the Society of Jesus in Rome, and the French National Archives. He opens with an account of the activities of the restored Society of Jesus in France from 1814 to 1850, notably of its

eight minor seminaries and of the colleges in exile which replaced the seminaries after their suppression in 1828. He regards it as unfortunate that these schools set the pattern for the twenty-nine Jesuit colleges founded after the passage of the Falloux Law in 1850, since the former were more rigid in their educational policies than was the Jesuit Order of the eighteenth century and developed a defensive and competitive attitude in reaction to the attacks upon them by anticlericals, Gallican Catholics, and supporters of the University monopoly.

The author then describes in detail the creation, educational philosophy, curriculum, methods of teaching, and atmosphere of the Jesuit colleges from 1850 to 1880. Their heavily classical curriculum and methods were based, until 1875, upon a revision made in 1832 of the *Ratio studiorum* of 1599; instruction was in Latin; modern languages, mathematics, science, history, and geography were relatively neglected. The professors failed to maintain contact with the intellectual currents of the day, had a strong monarchist bias, and did not have the time to engage in creative research. The students, who were drawn largely from aristocratic or upper bourgeois families, were trained in manners as well as in Christian principles and lived in a puritanical family environment, in which, however, corporal punishment was frowned upon. Serious financial difficulties forced the Jesuit colleges to establish boarding rather than day schools. They lacked competent personnel and were hard pressed to prepare students for the state examinations for the baccalaureate. Professor Padberg extolls the emphasis of the Jesuit colleges upon Christian humanism and spiritual values and their defense of freedom of instruction, but he rightly regrets their failure to adapt their programs to the conditions of the period and to the real needs of their students.

State University College, New Paltz, New York

EVELYN ACOMB WALKER

LA GUERRE DE L'INDÉPENDANCE GRECQUE VUE PAR LA PRESSE FRANÇAISE (PÉRIODE DE 1821 À 1824): CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DE L'OPINION PUBLIQUE ET DU MOUVEMENT PHILHELLENIQUE EN FRANCE. By *Jean Dimakis*. [*Ἑταιρεία Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν, "Ἰδρυμα Μελετῶν Χερσονήσου τοῦ Αἴμου*, Number 102.] (Thessalonike: Institute for Balkan Studies. 1968. Pp. 322. \$7.00.)

ALTHOUGH French philhellenism and French response to the Greek Revolution have long attracted scholarly attention, this is the first full-length study of French newspaper and periodical coverage of that event. The book is limited to the Parisian press, as representative of the French press, and confined to the first four years of the Greek Revolution (1821–24). It consists of two parts: the first deals with reportage, its sources, and its accuracy; the second analyzes newspaper opinion concerning the Revolution and its various aspects. Both reporting and editorializing are treated in the context of French domestic and European international politics during the Restoration period.

Jean Dimakis, professor of history at the University of Montreal, reveals that the Greek Revolution occupied the French press more than any other external event; it received fairly accurate coverage and often served as an occasion for liberals and conservatives to engage in party polemics. He demonstrates that philhellenism extended impressively beyond the liberal segment of the French press and found justification in terms of conservative as well as liberal political philosophies. Apart from these and other significant findings, the author is forthright about what his evidence—newspaper content—will not tell him, such as the role of interest groups in determining press opinion and the impact of the press on public opinion.

Though a solid study in ideas, the book's chief value is as a reference work. It is based on much spadework and, to spare others repetition of the laborious process, it summarizes major articles in detail, catalogues all relevant articles in an appendix, and organizes material thematically. This justifiably involves what the general reader may regard as excessive detail and too much repetition. It is regrettable that the book does not cover the latter period of the Greek Revolution, when official France took an active role in Greek affairs. It is to be hoped that Dimakis, or someone using his book as a model, will write the companion piece.

Amherst College

JOHN A. PETROPULOS

NAPOLEON III AND THE WORKING CLASS: A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA UNDER THE SECOND EMPIRE. By *David I. Kulstein*. (N.p.: California State Colleges; distrib. by Ward Ritchie Press, Los Angeles, Calif. 1969. Pp. xii, 250. \$7.50.)

THE Second Empire was hardly a democracy, but it was, after all, firmly based on public consent. This book amply demonstrates that Napoleon III and his officials not only never forgot the importance of public opinion but used surprisingly modern methods of persuasion to maintain their hold on public approval.

Professor Kulstein has sifted through the archives of the Ministry of Justice, particularly the reports of the *procureurs généraux*, and the correspondence of the Emperor and his ministers to show how the imperial government tried to influence the opinions of industrial workers. The regime kept a tight rein on the press by openly subsidizing imperialist newspapers, secretly suborning particular journalists, and threatening financial or judicial retaliation against potential critics. It also inspired pamphlets and books, covered the walls of France with placards, and encouraged worker education courses calculated to promote favorable views of society as it existed under the Empire. Every advantage workers gained was credited to the Emperor's kindness and every misfortune blamed on fate, foreigners, or unruly factions in the *Corps législatif*. The author finds that government propaganda aimed at workers grew increasingly sophisticated as the Empire was liberalized in the 1860's: calls for gratitude were muted, and hopes for a better future were stressed. This book, which emphasizes the Emperor's part in propaganda work, makes it obvious that the lack of his personal direction must have been a significant factor in the decline in effectiveness of Bonapartist propaganda after Sedan that John Rothney has traced.

This is a workmanlike monograph, carefully conceived and executed and fully equipped with scholarly apparatus. Though it contains no revelations, it elucidates a subject not systematically treated before. It is, however, a traditional study, eschewing any attempt at content analysis or quantification. It also lacks any discussion of the proportion of the imperial budget spent on propaganda.

The publisher deserves a word of praise, for the book is unusually handsome and well made.

University of Massachusetts, Boston

CARTER JEFFERSON

CROCE IN FRANCIA: RICERCHE SULLA FORTUNA DELL'OPERA CROCIANA. By *Graziella Pagliano Ungari*. [Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici in Napoli.] (Naples: the Istituto. 1967. Pp. 199. L. 2,500.)

FOR two generations at least Benedetto Croce held a place in Italian intellectual life without parallel in modern history. The question, therefore, of how he was received

in France has instant interest. The intellectual history of these two countries is closely tied, and questions central to the history of both are raised by the confluence and the divergences between Sorel and Croce or Bergson and Croce, by the Italian's closeness to German philosophers less well received in France, and by his rejection of positivism. The topic, then, offers many opportunities for a critical analysis of Croce, for an explanation of his remarkable influence in Italy, or for an analysis of some important aspects of modern French culture.

In her introduction and throughout her brief book, Graziella Ungari establishes that questions such as these prompted her study; but her achievement is in the bibliography, which seeks to list every translation of Croce's work and every book review or important comment upon him published in French between 1892 and 1966. Six hundred titles establish that Croce was known in France though, as the text insists, not well. The first chapter describes the strange and uneven editorial fate of Croce's works in translation. A second treats his special relations with Sorel and with Romain Rolland (both were neutralists in World War I, a fact that dimmed Croce's lustre for many French intellectuals), as well as his contributions to Marxist criticism. The third chapter, perhaps the least satisfactory, gives some evidence of the sympathy for Croce among a few Hegelians and more numerous Catholics and Bergsonians. The fourth establishes the rather negative reaction in France, especially among historians, to Croce's idealist history (though some of his most important historical works were little known), a reaction little softened by the similarities in approach of Jacques Maritain and Henri Marrou or the comparable concerns of Henri Berr. The last two chapters deal with the reception of Croce's esthetics, the part of his thought most closely studied in France, and of his literary criticism. If Croce suspected that the "intellectual formation" of the French obscured for them the philosophic problems of art, the suspicion clearly was reciprocal.

All of these topics are treated with some sensitivity and made enormously evocative by names and ideas referred to in text and footnotes. Yet all this is handled with a strange "objectivity." Writers minor and major receive equal treatment. Criticisms that sadly miss the point are recorded without assessment of whether the prejudices that produced them are significant or not. Insights of apparent power are never tested for whether they cut to the heart of what Croce said. Even the obvious distinction between works specifically confronting Croce's thought and those referring to him while concerned with something else is not carefully maintained.

Thus this triumph of bibliographic indefatigability sparkles primarily in its ironies. An Italian's surprise that Croce had so little impact in France leads only to the suggestion (perhaps unfair) that he seemed less original in Paris than in Naples. A Crocean concern for the role of ideas leads to a study more of what writing was done than what it said. The problems that make the topic important are constantly alluded to but not analyzed. Croce's influence shows on every page; yet the book proves again that his battle against what he condemned as positivist history was never wholly won, even among his Italian admirers.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

RAYMOND GREW

SPAIN UNDER THE HABSBURGS. Volume II, SPAIN AND AMERICA, 1598-1700. By *John Lynch*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. viii, 297. \$5.75.)

THE second volume of John Lynch's study of Spain under Habsburg rule, like the first, is a valuable contribution to Spanish social and economic history, based upon Antonio

Domínguez Ortiz's *La sociedad española en el siglo XVII*, and other secondary works. Yet readers who are acquainted with the earlier volume will likely be disappointed. Perhaps it is the dearth of personalities of the calibre of Charles V or Philip II—except for Olivares—that makes the present book less pleasurable to read. Lynch's task here is obviously harder. It is more difficult to put life into the account of a waning nation than one in ascent. And in the case of Spain, with its lack of natural resources and population, it is a less rewarding task to explain its rather natural decline than to understand its incredible rise. At any rate, Lynch is at his best when analyzing economic machinery and social patterns. His descriptions of the *valimiento* system, the structure of Crown finances, and the position of the Castilian nobility, are valuable and clear.

The thesis of the book is explicit. Since Castilian farming and New World mining constituted the twin pillars sustaining Spanish society, the decay of the first through excessive taxation and the collapse of the second through natural depletion and social exploitation are the principal causes of Spain's decline. The argument seems uncontested. But what constitutes national decline? Is it solely an economic and political condition, or is it also a cultural or collective psychological frame of mind? The Castilian peasants were ruthlessly exploited and overtaxed during Philip II's reign, and four times the king repudiated his debts for lack of resources. Yet the people and the soldiers considered themselves invincible. They almost were. The cultural glow of Spain during the first half of the seventeenth century was brilliant; yet if the economic indicators had been correct, it would have been in eclipse.

If this work was intended as a balanced and comprehensive study of Habsburg Spain, the author should have devoted at least some pages to Spanish thought, to the great swell of seventeenth-century Spanish literature, and to the maturing of its expressive art. Not a word is spent on these subjects (except some cryptic comments on the social criticism of the *arbitristas*), and only a little is said about the role of religion and the Church. Mr. Lynch seems to have been very anxious to get to the end of his book. Perhaps he became bored, as most people do, with Spanish history after 1660. But he neglects too much before that time. His subtitle might suggest that his interest had now shifted to America, but in ten chapters only one is devoted to the New World, and that one exclusively to economic matters.

As a lucid socioeconomic summation of seventeenth-century Spain, with some welcome clarification of the political scene, this book is the best to date in English. It contributes little else that is new.

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DE LAMAR JENSEN

LA ESPAÑA DE FERNANDO VII. By *Miguel Artola Gallego*. Introduction by *Carlos Seco Serrano*. [Historia de España, Volume XXVI.] (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe. 1968. Pp. xxxvi, 999.)

HAVING written two major works on the period of Ferdinand VII, Miguel Artola was the logical choice to do this volume in the prestigious *Historia de España*, known by the name of its late director, Ramón Menéndez Pidal. Much new archival research has gone into it, especially on the anti-Bonapartist governments of 1808–14 and the liberal triennium of 1820–23. The text is too long, however, probably to meet the dimensions of the series, and extended narrative overshadows the better, interpretive sections. Most drawn out is the chapter on the Peninsular War; but Artola uses it to vindicate Spain's role, convincingly laying to rest the myth that Wellington's genius defeated Napoleon's

armies. Routed in pitched battles, Spanish troops (and not the unarmed peasants of Goya's etchings) broke up into small mobile groups and discovered the "laws" of guerrilla warfare which modern revolutionaries have codified. Artola reassesses their effectiveness in the light of recent decades.

The remaining part of the book stresses political and institutional history. A general theme runs through it, something like this: The institutions of the old regime had lost their ability to rule the nation by the time Napoleon attacked it (witness their "cowardly" acceptance of Joseph Bonaparte). In the face of their failure, the rising against the French returned sovereignty to the people. Under the local juntas and the Central Junta, 1808-10, a widespread desire for a revolution in government became manifest. It sought to replace class and regional privileges and the structure of the monarchy with a unified centralized nation. Artola effectively discredits the worn cliché that Spain reverted to an inherent particularism in 1808. Even the Basques and Catalans urged centralism and legal uniformity. The best section of the book is the analysis of this reform movement. Artola believes that if someone with the insight and moderation of Jovellanos had guided the revolution to its end, it might have fulfilled popular wishes. (Artola joins such divergent historians as Menéndez Pelayo and Sarrailh in idolizing Jovellanos.) Instead the people fell victims of a struggle between the old privileged orders—aristocrats and clergy—and the new bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie seized control of the Cortes of Cadiz and later those of 1820-23 and sought to create a new order based on the sanctity of contracts and private property. They began to auction off church and public lands to pay the national debt and thereby sacrificed the peasantry, which the Old Regime had shielded from blatant exploitation. Conversely, the defeat of the Liberals, both in 1814 and 1823, was not a popular movement but a calculated attempt to defend the privileged orders. (Artola attacks the recent traditionalist historians who have tried to find a movement for "renovation" in Ferdinand VII's restoration.) On his death, however, Ferdinand gave power to the bourgeoisie as the only defense for his daughter's claim to the throne against the reactionaries around his brother Carlos.

Though not entirely new, Artola's interpretation merits serious discussion. While recognizing its importance, I question major features of it. The juntas of 1808-10 were less revolutionary than Artola makes out; most of their members wanted to defend the established social order which the Bourbon kings had attacked and Joseph Bonaparte now threatened. The Cortes of Cadiz were the revolutionary group, not nearly so bourgeois as Artola paints them. True, they advanced the right of private property, but before them Jovellanos popularized the doctrine and Charles IV initiated the large-scale sale of ecclesiastical property. The act of the Cortes that aroused the bitterest opposition was the abolition of the Inquisition, an instrument of ideological control rather than class privilege. Artola ignores the issue. Why see in the Cortes the agents of a bourgeois revolution? Who was this bourgeoisie anyway? Besides clergy, the Cortes Liberals were professionals and bureaucrats, and they were mostly *hidalgos*, hence nobles. Furthermore *hidalgo* landowners stood to gain most from the liberal land policies. Would that one could banish the term bourgeoisie, with its misleading connotations, from Spanish history!

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RICHARD HERR

LA PREMIÈRE INTERNATIONALE EN ESPAGNE (1868-1888). Volume I; Volume II, TABLEAUX ET CARTES. By *Max Nettlau*. Edited by *Renée Lamberet*. [Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.] (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 1969. Pp. xxvii, 683; unnumbered. 185 gls. the set.)

EVERY time a new aggregate of sources on anarchism is published, it becomes more difficult to understand how the image of the anarchist militant as a basically generous, but also unfailingly violent and inefficient, millenarian can have gained such widespread acceptance, even among so many sensible historians. This book by Nettlau is one of the harshest blows to that image yet.

Written in pigeon-French, frequently garbled and at some points almost incomprehensible, it is nonetheless an essential work for all those interested in nineteenth-century revolutionary history. While the chapters covering the years 1868-74 add little information to the existing books on this period, they confirm the soundness of previous analyses by Casimiro Marti and Jose Termes. The rest of the book is a fascinating account of one of the most complex and least known periods in the history of Spanish anarchism.

In 1874 the Spanish (anarchist) section of the International was outlawed and driven underground. Nettlau shows with what care and cool determination the leadership endeavored to maintain their organization as a going concern. The restraint and the discipline enforced by men like Francisco Tomas proved successful, and when the anarchist Federation was in 1881 allowed to venture into the open once more, there was a core of experienced and organized men who set about continuing the task which had been interrupted.

The story of the years 1881-88 opens with the conflict—within the Federation—between the two main bodies of anarchist workers: the Catalan textile hands and the Andalusian landless laborers. The former had constituted the main element of the Spanish section of the International prior to 1874. The latter, newcomers of the post-1881 years, could not accept the policies of caution and patience dictated by leaders who labelled the peasants revolting in the South common criminals.

Andalusian anarchists resorted to the doctrines of anarcho-communism—that the society emerging from revolution would be totally free and purely communistic—in order to justify their disregard of directives coming from the Catalan-dominated Federal Committee. The communist doctrines of Kropotkin and Malatesta were essential to the southern militants bent on discrediting the prevailing anarcho-collectivist doctrine, a doctrine stressing caution and discipline on the grounds that without these characteristics the network of anarchist unions would disintegrate. This network was to be not only the instrument for eliminating capitalism but also the framework for a future anarchist society.

The book traces the very intricate pattern that developed as more and more Catalan militants joined the anarcho-communist ranks, because they sensed that the practical reformism that the Federation was forced to adopt in order to preserve its organization was not likely to make revolutionaries of the workers. The triumph of the anarcho-communists over their rivals came at the Valencia Congress of 1888, when it was decided that while anarchist workers could go on fighting for material betterment through the existing unions, the revolutionaries should organize for propaganda purposes and for the final battle against existing society in separate anarchist groups. At a time when there was great faith in the underlying revolutionary spirit of the masses, that decision resulted in the predominance of those favoring propaganda by the deed,

and this in turn to the dissolution of all forms of organization. For, as Nettlau observes, once the terrorist course is adopted, even the least organization is too much of an organization.

Nettlau's explanation of why anarcho-communism prevailed in Catalonia is convincing and offers the only really coherent outline so far for the 1881-88 period. For the first time also one can understand the nature of the tradition inherited by twentieth-century anarchism in Spain. Historians will be glad to find themselves at long last emancipated from the unsatisfactory accounts of Anselmo Lorenzo and Ricardo Mella. Moreover, this book is of great value for its bibliographical information and for its constant reference to what was going on among anarchists in other countries. The latter subject is one in which area studies have tended to falter, but with which Nettlau, the retiring Viennese *rentier* who devoted his life to the study of the anarchist movement, was totally familiar.

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JOAQUIN ROMERO MAURA

DET SLESVIGSKE SPØRGSMÅL, 1850-1853. By *Jens Engberg*. [Skrifter, udgivne af Historisk Samfund for Sønderjylland, Number 37.] (Copenhagen: Danske Boghandleres Kommissionsanstalt. 1968. Pp. 405.)

THE Schleswig question is as old as the Kingdom of Denmark itself. This borderland between Danes and Germans has been hotly contested for a millennium, and it has given rise to an enormous body of literature, most of it highly chauvinistic, on both sides of the shifting borderline. The Danish historiography of this question has tended for more than a century to be less objectively informative and critical than mournful and inspirational, reflecting the attitudes of those national-liberal "Eider Danes" who precipitated the crisis leading to the wars of 1848-50 and 1864 and the loss of Schleswig to Prussia. Only occasionally have Danish historians risen above this ethnocentric tradition. Dr. Jens Engberg is one of these.

Engberg's concern is with the Danish government's efforts to re-establish its control in Schleswig after the wars of 1848-50, but he treats his topic from a European rather than an exclusively Danish perspective. The result is a diplomatic as well as a socio-political study, and on both counts it is praiseworthy. Taking the story from the Danish victory over the army of Schleswig-Holstein at the battle of Isted (July 25, 1850) to the convening of the newly created Schleswig Estates Assembly (October 5, 1953), he demonstrates convincingly how and why the Danish policy of incorporating Schleswig into the kingdom failed. It ran afoul, in the first instance, of the population itself: South Schleswig was solidly German, and North Schleswig—Engberg refrains from using the tendentious Danish term South Jutland—could muster only a thin majority of Danes. The decisive obstacle, however, was the resistance of all the great powers to the Danish incorporation policy, a resistance that prevented the Danes from forcing the issue by implementing the harsh military regime planned for Schleswig.

Engberg bases his dissertation almost completely on contemporary public records and firsthand accounts. He has not only re-examined the massive Danish archival sources, but also examined profitably such foreign archival collections as the Public Record Office and Historical Manuscript Commission in London, the Royal Archives in Windsor, the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth, the Deutsches Zentralarchiv in Merseburg, the Geheimes Staatsarchiv der Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, and the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesarchiv in Schleswig. The only impor-

tant foreign archives neglected by Engberg are those of Austria and Russia, both of which could no doubt shed additional light on his topic.

This book is a major contribution to the historiography of the mid-nineteenth century chapter of the Schleswig question, and it is to be hoped that Engberg will continue his research into the post-1853 period. The book has a fine index and excellent source references. It also has a thirteen-page English summary, marred somewhat by the translator's Danicisms. The bibliography is, unfortunately, severely selective.

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H. PETER KROSBY

PÅSKEKRISEN 1920. By *Tage Kaarsted*. [Skrifter udgivet af Jysk Selskab for Historie, Number 23.] (Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget. 1968. Pp. 426. 48 D. kr.)

ON March 29, 1920, King Christian X of Denmark dismissed Prime Minister Carl Theodor Zahle and appointed a new cabinet to be headed by Otto Liebe. The new government's life, however, was to be short-lived; it was succeeded by the Friis ministry on April 4. Known as the Easter Crisis, this interlude in Danish political history is today of great interest not only as a case study in pressures exerted by various political factions but also as an illustration of how a monarch, largely as the result of an unclear paragraph in the Constitution, could be instrumental in creating a situation of some gravity, to such an extent that he later was accused by some of having committed a coup d'état.

Some of the contributing causes of the Easter Crisis may be sought in the long period of political friction involving the status of Schleswig and the hope among many Danes during World War I of regaining the Danish-German border as it had been prior to 1864. The pressures exerted by nationalist groups (notably the so-called "With Circle") on the King, on the various ministries, and on members of parliament, paved the way for a complicated situation, one not to be fully resolved until after plebiscites had been held in the areas concerned. The background of the Easter Crisis was further complicated by the growing power of the Social Democrats. The Trades Union Congress threatened a general strike, and there were demonstrations and near-riots in Copenhagen during the week of crisis. Being prevailed upon to dismiss Liebe and to appoint M. P. Friis as premier, King Christian helped to re-establish a fair amount of harmony and a situation which before very long was to leave the field to Stauning and the Social Democrats.

Many of the circumstances and motives of the Easter Crisis have long remained obscure, one reason being that the present volume is the first full-scale study of that hectic week and what led up to it. Dr. Kaarsted, in what originally was a dissertation for a well-earned Ph.D. degree at Aarhus University, has sifted a large number of sources and other evidence. His book is in many ways a model of scholarship, and it is safe to say that future research will find it difficult to alter any of Dr. Kaarsted's conclusions.

The American-Scandinavian Foundation

ERIK J. FRIIS

FROM PARIAH TO PATRIOT: THE CHANGING IMAGE OF THE GERMAN PEASANT, 1770-1840. By *John G. Gagliardo*. ([Lexington:] University Press of Kentucky. 1969. Pp. xii, 338. \$8.25.)

"Men are not tormented by things, but by opinions about things," quotes John Gagliardo from the novelist Immermann toward the end of this excellent book. So-

ciety, from one point of view, is essentially a structure of expectations and hopes. What a man believes other men to be determines his expectations of their behavior and thus his own actions, and a man's hopes for the future enter into his present image of others. So it is perhaps surprising that historians have not concentrated more on the images of different groups that have prevailed in particular societies and on the problem of how and why such images changed through time. Done well, as it is here, such an approach can illuminate the problems of any one group by demonstrating what that group meant to the larger society. Conversely, general social developments are given body and clarity when refracted through the specific and concrete. Connections not usually made become apparent; there is a fresh perspective, a rethinking of the material.

Gagliardo's study is exemplary. He traces the revision, within less than a century, of the image of the German peasant from that of an inferior being, something less than fully human in stature, to that of a patriotic citizen and unique embodiment of virtue. This development is anchored firmly in the context of German society; it is made clear that the image of the peasant changed because the thinking about German problems changed. Economists wanted to increase production; liberals wanted self-government; nationalists hoped to preserve traditional folk values; both conservatives and liberals were alarmed by the new proletariat, and all created a picture of the peasant to buttress their own arguments and programs. At the same time, changes in the peasant's image reflected larger European trends toward economic freedom and political democracy and, insofar as the peasant could be made into a symbol of resistance to change, toward a self-conscious conservatism.

One would like to see certain aspects explored further. How was this change in attitude toward one section of the poorer classes related to the larger shift in sensibility that showed itself in the growth of a diffuse humanitarianism? And what of the town worker? Gagliardo indicates that parallel with glorification of the peasant went contempt and denigration of the city proletariat, and he explains this contrast by middle-class fears of the propertyless class that industrialization appeared to be producing. One hopes the author will someday amplify this contrast. Again, could anything be said about the peasant's own image of himself? Could his self-estimate be in any way related to the fact that the peasantry was less an initiating force, though not perhaps a less important one, than were other classes in the nineteenth century? But to raise these questions is in no way intended to detract from this fine book in which the author deals with a carefully defined problem in a fashion at once systematic, learned, and perceptive.

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LENORE O'BOYLE

A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY, 1840-1945. By Hajo Holborn. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1969. Pp. xv, 818, xxvi. \$9.75.)

THIS is the third and most successful volume of the late Professor Holborn's *History of Modern Germany*, and it is gratifying to see so distinguished a career concluded with so outstanding an accomplishment. This last volume provides a useful perspective for appreciating the difficulties of its two predecessors. Holborn's early volumes lacked a sense of unity and overall coherence and seemed marred by excessive subsectioning. Despite his many penetrating insights and his obvious command of the historical literature, these studies often mirrored rather than mastered the incredible complexity and disunity of the periods they discussed. The present volume, in con-

trast, holds together splendidly, and the subsectioning, although still slightly distracting, scarcely impedes the flow of the narrative. The lesson would seem clear. A truly talented historian attempting to write a general history cannot depend upon his erudition and organizational skills alone. He needs the stimulus of fresh scholarship and the atmosphere of lively historical debate. Both may be found in relative abundance for the period 1840–1945 and are discouragingly absent for the period 1500–1840. Thus, in writing his final volume, Holborn had the opportunity to apply his synthesizing powers and capacity for judicious assessment to a vast and stimulating body of historical scholarship.

Holborn does not present any bold new interpretations of the general course of German history. Instead he provides a richly detailed and continuously thoughtful narrative written from the standpoint of a sophisticated liberal critic of the German political tradition. The influence of Heinrich Heffter and Leonard Krieger is evident in Holborn's discussion of the failures of German liberalism and the sociopolitical functions of German nationalism. In this view, "Nationalism became the common denominator between the old ruling classes and the new domineering elements of German industrialization, with the latter proving to be the more dynamic force in transforming German nationalism into an aggressive imperialism." Holborn rejects the methodologically and politically narrow historiography of Erich Eyck, which blames Bismarck for the defeat of German liberalism and forgets "that German liberalism was a relatively willing victim." At the same time, the author implicitly rejects the apologia of conservatives like Gerhard Ritter, Hans Rothfels, and Ernst Huber, with their insistence upon the uniqueness of German history and their demand that it not be judged according to "external" standards. The author's fine chapters on the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich owe much to the analyses of K. D. Bracher and his collaborators, and Holborn agrees with their insistence that the Third Reich was no accident but, rather, an intelligible possibility in German history.

A fine sense of proportion and balance pervades the book, and it owes much to Holborn's enviable talent for combining the best of the older German historiographical traditions in which he was trained with newer concerns for the socioeconomic background of German politics. The tone and quality of Holborn's portraits of Bismarck and the elder Moltke are reminiscent of the classical biographical and intellectual portraits of the author's teacher, Friedrich Meinecke. But it is to Holborn's great credit that he is able to provide within the framework of a single chapter a lyrical passage on Rilke and a remarkably lucid discussion of German banking. Holborn's discussion of the social and economic background of the Revolution of 1848 and his discussions of the economics of the Second Empire, the two World Wars, and the depression are particularly outstanding. Nevertheless, Holborn cautions against an exclusive emphasis on social conflicts and argues that "The actual decline of German education goes far to explain not only why so many Germans voted the Nazis into power but also why they were willing to condone so many of their subsequent crimes." This theme necessarily is left rather undeveloped, but one may hope that it will inspire future researchers.

Since Holborn made notable contributions to diplomatic history, the excellence of his treatment of foreign affairs will come as no surprise. While the first part of the book is entitled "Liberalism and Nationalism, 1840–1871," the second and largest part has as its title and theme "The Age of Imperialism, 1871–1945." Holborn is particularly sharp in his criticism of the post-Bismarckian policy of the "free hand" and

argues convincingly that the ultimate success of German imperialism depended upon some connection with England. Here, as elsewhere, Holborn implicitly challenges the theses of A. J. P. Taylor, while by no means ignoring the latter's contributions. In his chapter on World War I (Chapter 9), Holborn comes down clearly, albeit carefully, on the side of Fritz Fischer in the controversy over war aims, and one wishes that Fischer had presented his own position with equal clarity and analytical power. Similarly, Holborn presents a thoughtful and critical discussion of Keynes's attacks on the Versailles Treaty in his exemplary discussion of that problem.

Needless to say, every reader will find something to criticize in a book of such length and scope. The sections on cultural and intellectual life, while stimulating at times, are often thin and conventional when compared to comparable sections in the earlier volumes. If the state of research may be blamed for this, the same cannot be said of the author's relative neglect of the economic foundations of German unification or the controversy over the councils movement in the Revolution of 1918-19. In most cases, however, the informed reader will know where Holborn stands on recent scholarly contentions, for example, that he agrees with W. E. Mosse's argument that the European powers did not present a serious barrier to German unification and that he disagrees with Erich Matthias' insistence that Socialist resistance to Papen's coup of July 1932 might have produced positive results. Of course, readers will not always agree with these conclusions.

Since this is the finest study of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in any language, it is to be expected that it will be read by students and scholars. Used as a text, it may solve the problem of getting beyond 1945 in some lecture courses. Let us hope, however, that this book will find an even broader audience. Holborn says more about the Third Reich in a hundred pages than William L. Shirer says in over a thousand, and this suggests that something remains to be said for "professionalism." Finally, at a time when the German example is being employed and misused for every conceivable political purpose by historians of every political persuasion as well as by laymen, Professor Holborn's latest volume should be particularly welcome.

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GERALD D. FELDMAN

THE DECLINE OF THE GERMAN MANDARINS: THE GERMAN ACADEMIC COMMUNITY, 1890-1933. By *Fritz K. Ringer*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1969. Pp. 528. \$13.50.)

THIS book is interesting and informative about details, but it is less satisfactory as a whole. The first chapter, entitled "The Social and Institutional Background," focuses on the most significant and characteristic features of higher education in Germany: the wide extent of government control over university affairs, the importance of the civil service status of the German professor, the crucial role of the humanist gymnasium in preparing for study at the university, and the class structure of the German educational system which made the gymnasium and the university prerequisites for participation in the ruling group. The author also gives attention to the critics of this educational system who, in the revolutionary times of 1848 and 1918, worked out thorough plans for reform; because these plans were politically inspired, their failure was almost unavoidable. The account of these developments is based on rich statistical material. Although the chapter contains little or nothing that has not been known

about the German educational system, it is an excellent, succinct outline which every student of German history will find valuable.

The second chapter deals with the ideas that determined the reform of the German universities in the early nineteenth century and, from then on, constituted their basic tradition. I miss here, as in many other treatments of the subject, adequate emphasis on the close connection between Protestantism and the Prussian state. The struggle against clerical influence, of "freethinkers" against theologians, contributed much to the development of a modern scientific outlook in France and Italy. It seems to me that it is an important fact that in Germany these contrasts remained muted because the professor, by being a servant of the Prussian King, was also a servant of the head of the Protestant Church; until 1918 the universities were administered in the *Ministerium der geistlichen, Unterrichts- und Medizinalangelegenheiten*. However, the author's general characterization of German academic thought as idealistic and historical is undoubtedly correct. These intellectual inclinations of the German academic seem to me somewhat less astounding than they appear to the author. I find it difficult to imagine that German scholars could develop any other attitude, considering the underdeveloped and preindustrial character of German society in the first half of the nineteenth century. It is astounding, however, that German academic life preserved this outlook even in the times of Germany's transformation into a modern industrialized society; this is a crucial question.

But it is also a question that needs to be placed into the political framework of the transformation of the Prussian bureaucracy into a part of a new upper class. (For a recent description of this development, see John Gillis, "Aristocracy and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-Century Prussia," *Past and Present*, XLI [December 1968], 105-29.) To what extent did the German professors participate in the attempt of the bureaucracy to erect barricades against the rising forces of the new mass society and to remain a small, closed group? On the basis of the social and institutional analyses in the first chapter of the book, one might expect the author to tackle these issues by continuing along the same line of social history. He might have examined the changes brought about by the rise of medicine and the natural sciences and the impact of the increasing popularity of these fields on the traditional attitudes and concerns. It might have been worth investigating whether, within the philosophical faculty, the students moved from fields like philosophy, history, and philology to modern languages, economics, and similar areas of more practical use. It would also be important to establish to what extent the professional aims students pursued at the university turned into new channels. It would seem that a thorough analysis of the new social setting into which academic life was placed in imperial Germany is prerequisite for answering the question of why so many professors were anxious to provide an ideology for the monopolistic political elite of the Empire.

But the author does not proceed with an investigation of these issues. After he has entered upon the realm of intellectual history with his outline of the traditional ideas of German academe, he continues along the lines of intellectual history, analyzing the ideas of leading members of the philosophical faculties—philosophers, historians, economists—in the period from 1890 to 1933. The author distinguishes between traditionalists and modernists, and he is inclined to stress that even the modernists had imbibed a good amount of traditional ideas and attitudes. Some of his discussions—for instance, the description of the emergence of modern psychology in Germany or of the intellectual development of Simmel and Sombart—are enlightening, but I found many characterizations doubtful or erroneous. To give two examples: Otto Hintze was

one of the few German historians who had understanding of Lamprecht's concerns and who was intensely concerned with sociological problems; to say that in his work "the old Rankean tradition of political and institutional history lived on" is entirely misleading. Or to draw—from Mannheim's conception of the "freischwebende Intelligenz"—the conclusion that Mannheim "was also a Mandarin" seems to me untenable. If intellectual attitudes are viewed as ideologies, the problem of maintaining the possibility of objective truth becomes necessarily a decisive issue; Mannheim's attempt to solve this problem results from his interest in the issue, not from eagerness to comply with the special character of the German intellectual tradition.

I think some of these errors are due to the fact that the author wants to find uniformity in the intellectual outlook of the German professors, and this again has something to do with the manner in which the book has been conceived. The word "Mandarin" which occurs in the title of the book is, as the author says, "meant to evoke the traditional elite of learned officials in China." I cannot help feeling that the author has succumbed somewhat to the spell of this word and to the analogy with China that it implies. A number of factors invalidate this analogy. Admittedly, the German professor was a high civil servant and, as such, a member of the German political elite. But he was not its dominating element, only one element next to other, more important ones. The influence that a German professor could exert within the ruling group depended on a number of factors, such as the status of his family, social connections, and wealth; his academic performance, his writings, and his "learning," were hardly more than contributory factors. The creation of and adherence to a unified intellectual tradition, therefore, were less important for the decline of the German academic class than were social and institutional factors.

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FELIX GILBERT

VORFORMEN PARLAMENTARISCHER KABINETTSBILDUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND: DER INTERFRAKTIONELLE AUSSCHUSS 1917/18 UND DIE PARLAMENTARISIERUNG DER REICHSREGIERUNG. By *Udo Bernbach*. [Politische Forschungen, Number 8.] (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1967. Pp. 389. DM 27.)

THE achievement of genuine parliamentary government in Germany's Second Empire depended upon the capacity of several political parties to overcome their differences and form a governing coalition. This was done only in the last weeks of the existence of the Reich, but an essential preliminary—cooperation in limitation of chancellors appointed by the Kaiser without consultation of parliamentary leaders—gradually and hesitatingly was achieved in 1916–17 and maintained with varying degrees of success from then on. Wanting to proclaim the desire of the Reichstag for a negotiated peace, leading Social Democrats, Progressives, and Centrists held an informal meeting on July 6, 1917, with National Liberals (some of whom hoped, rather, to prevent or to temper any joint resolution). The immediate result was the well-known Reichstag peace resolution. The contacts thus established were maintained, although the National Liberals often abstained, and the group of party leaders came to be called the Inter-Party Committee (IFA). It remained an entirely unofficial forum, and it could not bind the parties. Sharp differences continued to exist among and within them over reform and war aims. Yet the IFA played a central part in the fall of Chancellors Georg Michaelis and Georg von Hertling and in the creation of the Georg von Hertling and Max von Baden governments.

The beginnings thus made in the IFA in the direction of coalition government were valuable preliminaries to the creation and operation of the Weimar Republic. Possibilities of understanding these events were greatly enhanced when Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey gave us the two basic volumes of documentation: *Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss 1917/18* (1959) and *Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden* (1962). These volumes, the records of the Reichstag's *Hauptausschuss*, and other sources enabled Udo Bernbach to prepare this study, originally a doctoral dissertation in political science at Heidelberg (1966). The research is satisfactory, though one wishes he had used more than a couple of contemporary newspapers for 1917-18 and, for background, the basic work by Julius Hatschek, *Das Parlamentsrecht des Deutschen Reiches* (1915). Historians will find the organization annoying (departures from a chronological pattern result in discussion of some important matters at least partly out of context); and any reader might well long for better writing, for one must untangle too many very long sentences, cluttered with parenthetical insertions. Furthermore, serious reading virtually requires two copies, one for the text and another turned to the 1,368 notes at the rear. A full account of the IFA, furthermore, would need to treat more adequately its preoccupation with international questions. The intricate and all-important relationships of Prussia and the Reich deserve greater emphasis, particularly the significance of Prussian suffrage reform for the author's central subject. Nevertheless, this is an intelligent—indeed, quite superior—doctoral dissertation on an important theme. Part III, which treats the role of the IFA in the creation of the Hertling and Max von Baden governments, will remain essential reading for anyone concerned with the transition of Germany from constitutional monarchy to parliamentary republic.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

JOHN L. SNELL

THE GERMAN NAVAL MUTINIES OF WORLD WAR I. By *Daniel Horn*. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press. 1969. Pp. xiii, 346. \$10.00.)

THE revolt of the imperial navy in November 1918 that touched off the German Revolution has long been the subject of widely different interpretations. To German conservatives and nationalists it was a stab in the back of the armed forces by Communists and extreme leftist elements; to liberals and social democrats it was the reaction to an "admirals' revolt"; to Communists it was the German sequel to the Russian Revolution. Not until the German naval archives became accessible after World War II was it possible to gain an impartial view of these events.

Utilizing the naval and federal archives, together with provincial, municipal, and private collections, Professor Horn has given us a balanced account of conditions in the imperial German navy that led to the revolt in November 1918. His aim is "to describe the causes of the revolt in terms of the culminating effect of a variety of social and political forces that had been at work in the navy since the outbreak of the war." The most significant of these causes was the poor relationship between officers and enlisted men, particularly on the large ships. The different social and economic backgrounds of these groups, especially the traditional spirit of exclusiveness of the officers' corps, and the absence of combat activities by major units of the fleet, exacerbated their relationship until, toward the end of the war, it became impossible to bridge the gulf between them. Other divisive factors were the increasingly unbearable harassment of enlisted men by their officers; their fight over equitable rations, living conditions, and disciplinary measures; disagreement over domestic policy and German

war aims; and the weariness of the crews as-opposed to the officers' desire to fight to the end.

Professor Horn shows that, contrary to a long cherished myth, the influence of Communists and of events in Russia contributed almost nothing to the revolt. According to his carefully documented analysis, the November 1918 revolt in the German navy grew out of the sailors' reaction to an admirals' rebellion. The admirals, in defiance of government policy, and without the knowledge of the Chancellor, had planned a last sortie of the fleet against the Royal Navy. Their aim was not so much to defeat the British, but to preserve their own honor and prestige for the postwar period.

Washington, D. C.

GEORGE O. KENT

HJALMAR SCHACHT IN PERSPECTIVE. By *Amos E. Simpson*. [Studies in European History, Number 18.] (The Hague: Mouton. 1969. Pp. 202. 27 gls.)

GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN KRIEGSWIRTSCHAFT, 1939-1945. Volume I, 1939-1941. By *Dietrich Eichholtz*. [Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Number 1.] (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 1969. Pp. xi, 408. DM 25.)

Hjalmar Schacht in Perspective saddens the reader because the author has evidenced enormous energy in scouring books and newspapers and has made every effort not to be prejudiced against a "war-criminal"; yet perspective is precisely what the book lacks. Internal evidence indicates that the manuscript was completed over fifteen years ago. The text uses no source after 1953. A bibliographical appendix, "Recent Books," includes publications back to 1954, all ignored in the text. Not only have significant works like Schweitzer's (1964) been overlooked, but the book lacks that kind of documentation available in plenitude in the Bundesarchiv or even on microfilm.

If depth research were noticeable instead of a mosaic of 1933-39 quotations of journalists and the 1946 testimony at Nuremberg, the reader would be less perturbed by the near-adoration or the exaggerated importance given to "the economic dictator." The epilogue, recounting a visit to the grand old man in 1965, reaches a sentimental peak, but throughout the book the wise Schacht-Siegfried is beating back enemies of the holy mark.

Wild spending became one of Hitler's sins, albeit minor, but is it so obvious that the Republic spent "too much"? This uncritical acceptance of Schacht's judgment would be only annoying if the book displayed greater mastery of economics, theory and practice. There is more to economic policy than opposing inflation. Hitler was not brought to power by inflation but by its opposite, the deflationary-depression policies of conservatives like Schacht. Neither was it inflation, nor Schacht, that ended that power.

One begins Eichholtz with similar sadness, observing that the first footnote pays obeisance to leader Ulbricht. The feeling persists with the repetition of sacred words: fascism, imperialism, monopolistic capitalism. But among the slogans it becomes clear that a researcher has been diligently at work. The bibliography contains every major published source, including many by authors minimized as "bourgeois historians." Eichholtz had access to the Potsdam Archives, usually denied non-Marxians, and to the files of capitalist firms, now "Peoples' Own Companies." Yet much of his best material, particularly concerning his central figure, General Thomas, is derived from the bourgeois postwar trials.

This scholarship, with documents, is to prove again the correctness of the

Ulbricht analysis that monopolistic capitalism was the force behind Hitler and his greatest crime, the attack on Marxist Mother Russia. Another truism, working-class intelligence and bravery, is squeezed in, yet the book's core appears to a historian, no doubt ideologically ill trained, as rich testimony to the insufficiency of Marxian oversimplifications. Eichholtz could scarcely have been oblivious to the implication of his excellent material that there was no private monopoly because each company fought for its own profits and that there was no state monopoly (at least until June 1941, when this first volume stops) because the confused state failed to control the competition.

The study has a definite usefulness as an addition to Klein, Schweitzer, and Milward, and, despite its intent, would support their general argument of ineffective state planning and the persistence of private power. Its value lies in documenting these conflicts, Hitler's serious economic war problems, and the involvement of some industries in the aggression. A further value may be to reassure us that the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can communicate with historical facts, if not in theoretical conclusions.

Wisconsin State University, River Falls

E. N. PETERSON

VON HANDEL UND BANK IM ALTEN ZÜRICH. By *Hans Conrad Peyer*. (Zürich: Verlag Berichthaus. 1968. Pp. 323.)

ZÜRICH, in this century one of the world's major banking centers, was, prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, commercially and financially as insignificant as hundreds of other towns of its size in Europe. Between the mid-fifteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, the period under discussion, the Swiss cities of Basel and Bern, Geneva and St. Gall markedly surpassed the agriculturally oriented Zurich in trading and banking.

The author adduced from the widely scattered sources that attempts at manufacturing enterprises (especially in textiles), employing rural labor and the skills of Protestant refugees, and efforts to expand trade and credit activities were repeatedly if fitfully made in Zurich both through individual initiative and partnerships, usually within families. Yet the unwillingness or inability to raise and risk adequate capital, insufficient experience, and a far too narrow outlook led invariably to failure or, at best, mere holding actions. A journal entry of 1613 by Hans Baschi Kitt, a textile producer and merchant, appears to sum up a long prevailing business attitude: "Where feasible buy for cash. Spend as little as possible. Collect debts promptly. Do not extend the due date to anyone. It is always better to use your own money, for borrowed money does not work out for everybody."

By the middle of the eighteenth century private capital accumulation and a surplus in the city treasury encouraged a more daring outlook, a broadening of business and banking ventures, and an interest in overseas enterprises. Almost all these developments were interrupted or wiped out as a result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. One of the earliest attempts to reactivate the interrupted business connections abroad—a matter of interest, incidentally, to American historians—was made by Jacques Bidermann of Winterthur, who sent his son, Jacques Anton, to the United States in 1814 to look after his shares in the partnership with P. S. du Pont de Nemours. The young Bidermann, soon active in the management of E. I. du Pont's powder mills near Wilmington, Delaware, married E. I.'s daughter and subsequently built the mansion (today a museum) which he named Winterthur.

Zurich's rise to commercial and financial pre-eminence, which took place after the

formation of the Swiss republic in 1848, is beyond the scope of this work. The city's modest economic activity until so late a date makes the necessarily limited sources more manageable. The author, an archivist and an associate professor of history at the University of Zurich, has made excellent use of the available and widely scattered primary sources without, however, trying to find more in them than they have to offer. He has produced an admirable pilot study on the evolution of business and banking in a Swiss city-state. While similar studies for other Swiss cities may be more difficult to integrate because of the greater activity of these cities and the availability of more abundant source material, Professor Peyer has set the framework, a working pattern, and a high standard of scholarship to follow.

Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn

FELIX F. STRAUSS

BUCHDRUCKER UND BUCHHÄNDLER ZUR ZEIT DER GLAUBENS-KÄMPFE: STUDIEN ZUR GENÈVE DRUCKGESCHICHTE, 1565-1580. By *Hans Joachim Bremme*. [Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, Number 104.] (Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1969. Pp. 268.)

THIS excellent German doctoral dissertation studies the Genevan publishing industry during a period of transition. That industry had been a creation of the Calvinist Reformation and, until a few years after Calvin's death in 1564, it devoted most of its resources to distributing works of Calvinist piety and theology. Various pressures then forced the industry to diversify. It moved into the publication of political, historical, and legal works during the politicization and radicalization of the Calvinist movement that followed the St. Bartholomew's massacres in 1572. It moved into even more fields after 1580, losing its uniqueness.

Dr. Bremme has designed this monograph to complement earlier studies. Thus he does not dwell on such subjects as the legal structure within which the industry operated, described at length by Paul Chaix in his *Recherches sur l'imprimerie à Genève de 1550 à 1564*, or on the actual books printed in Geneva during this period, inventoried in the Chaix-Dufour-Moeckli bibliography. Rather, in the first part of his book, he concentrates on explorations of two relatively new subjects: the economics of the industry, and the controls imposed on it by the Genevan church and state. The second part of the book is an alphabetical repertory of the careers of some 376 individuals involved in the industry during this period.

The general quality of Bremme's work is very high. He explores fresh problems, for example the problem of how wealthy religious refugees surreptitiously transferred capital out of France. He produces new information that is based on exhaustive archival research. He uses judiciously, but critically, the work of other scholars in this field such as E. Droz, A. Dufour, and this reviewer. The end result is a monograph that will be indispensable to anyone interested in the mechanics of the Genevan Reformation, and valuable to anyone interested in the early publishing industry.

University of Wisconsin, Madison

ROBERT M. KINGDON

THE BORGAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF A RENAISSANCE DYNASTY. By *Michael Mallett*. (New York: Barnes and Noble. 1969. Pp. 351. \$10.00.)

HERE is a history of one of the more colorful families of the Renaissance, written, as the author tells us, for the "ordinary reader and the very busy student," and at that level it is quite good. The author has consulted the vast literature on the various

Borgias; and, given the enormous range of controversies involved in the subject, he has done a good job in balancing wildly divergent points of view and coming up with eminently reasonable judgments on many matters of Borgia mythology. In fact, if the book has any serious weakness it is ironically the author's attempt to be objective in handling so much biased material, for he tends to dismiss much of the Borgia legend, relegating some of the more infamous episodes to the footnotes and ignoring others altogether. However historically unsound much of this legend is, it was nevertheless an aspect of the Borgia image even in their own day; and no correct picture of these men can be drawn without some consideration of how their contemporaries chose to see them. Mallett keeps his narrative at such a low key that after reading his book one might wonder why the family had such a black reputation, even though the author dutifully tells us why in his introduction.

The book does not break any new ground, although occasionally the author's interpretations are refreshingly original; and he is especially good in regarding Alexander VI and Cesare in the context of the political and diplomatic problems that were their primary concerns. It is no easy task trying to pull together the history of a family like this one, which had no permanent institutional or geographical base, and the result is a loosely organized collection of biographies from Calixtus III to St. Francis Borja. Obviously, such an approach is strongest when dealing with narrative materials, and the book is notably weak in analyzing such problems as Alexander's role as ecclesiastical administrator and spiritual leader. Nevertheless, it is certainly the best introduction to the subject in English, and there is an annotated bibliography to lead the more demanding reader as far down the thorny path of Borgia history and legend as he may want to go.

The Johns Hopkins University

RICHARD A. GOLDTHWAITE

RENAISSANCE FLORENCE. By *Gene Brucker*. [New Dimensions in History: Historical Cities.] (New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1969. Pp. xiii, 306. Cloth \$9.95, paper \$3.95.)

Renaissance Florence is a welcome addition to what has been, on the whole, a spotty series. Within the restrictive and rather uninspired framework imposed on the series' authors, Professor Brucker has been able to tell us more about his subject than anyone else in so short a space, and he has done so with intelligence and verve. And, unlike many of the other authors, he has drawn deftly and imaginatively on archival sources throughout. Indeed, there is no other book about Florence in this period which combines such a broad range of archival sources—family records, economic records, records of church and state—with the standard literary sources in such an original and effective way.

The plan of the book is a local adaptation of the series plan. The range is wide, but the years covered are roughly from the fall of the Ciompi to the fall of the Republic. There are chapters on the city itself, its geography, its population, the way its streets and buildings looked; on economic and political life; on society (only a part, the patriciate); on the Florentine church, church-state relations, and relations between Florence and the Papacy; and on culture. There is a brief epilogue on the Republic of 1494–1512 and an excellent bibliography.

The chapter titles are misleading. Brucker obviously cannot say in thirty or forty pages all he has to say about "The Economy" or "Politics"; rather he has had to choose what he thinks are the important aspects of each vast subject and make points

about them. For the most part he has chosen carefully and well, bringing together his own ideas with the latest scholarship. If there is a theme, it is the effect of change on Florentine society and institutions and modes of thought. Thus, in the chapter entitled "Politics," he emphasizes the role of war in transforming the machinery of government and communal values. In "The Patriciate" he assesses the trauma produced by the fragmentation of the extended family; in "Culture" he examines the nature of patronage (I wish he had enlarged this discussion, leaving out his discussion of the plastic arts entirely). Particularly good are chapters on "The Renaissance City" (its equivalent is the best chapter in several of the books in the series) and on "The Church and the Faith." The Florentine church, as he points out, has been studied hardly at all, and Brucker has done us service by his research and thinking on the subject. But of all things about the book, I liked best his use of the pointed, personal example—product of his labor in the archives. His stories about Florentines, from slave girl to priest to patrician, truly bring them and their city to life.

New York University

DAVID L. HICKS

SINISTRA HEGELIANA E PROBLEMA ITALIANO NEGLI SCRITTI DI A. L. MAZZINI. With an appendix in two volumes. By *Armando Saitta*. [Italia e Europa; Collezione per il primo centenario dell'Unità.] (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età Moderna e Contemporanea. 1968; 1967; 1967. Pp. ix, 535; 426; 428–788. L. 5,000 each.)

THE three full-sized volumes of this work, the first of which is a huge, rich study of A. L. Mazzini's major piece, *De l'Italie dans ses rapports avec la liberté et la civilisation moderne*, and other lesser writings, offer a substantial critical and editorial contribution to students of social and intellectual history of nineteenth-century Italy and Europe. After careful study of Saitta's volume and of *De l'Italie* itself, two related questions come to mind. What has tended to persist and what has really changed during a generation of scholarly interest in Mazzini's major work, and is *De l'Italie* reducible to the exegetical emphases of his modern interpreters, particularly Cantimori and Saitta? It is clear that early curiosity has become very serious and elaborately sustained inquiry, as in Saitta's case. If Mazzini has not thereby joined the select circle of European social thinkers and Italian political philosophers to which his contemporaries Buonarroti, Carlo Cattaneo, Giuseppe Ferrari, and Carlo Pisacane belong, he has come almost fully into his own as a significant if not wholly representative figure among the exponents (not necessarily the molders) of European revolutionary thought before Marx. I use the phrase "before Marx" to describe the intersection of two interpretive lines along which different, perhaps contradictory, answers to the second question may lie.

In Cantimori's *Utopisti e riformatori*, Mazzini, "though isolated among the other social thinkers of the Risorgimento," belonged nevertheless within the "heterodox currents" of Franco-Italian, Saint-Simonian, Utopian social thought and socialist ideology; these in turn were affected by the Hegelian-idealist philosophy of history prevalent in certain Italian and German quarters during the 1830's and 1840's. For Saitta, the roles, at least with respect to Mazzini's thought, are apparently reversed. The influence of Saint-Simon's Utopian doctrines seems to have been almost completely subordinated to Hegel's system. Saitta strains hard to pull Mazzini into the mainstream of "Left-Hegelian" thought in pre-1848 Italy and Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, Saitta bitterly criticizes Cantimori's interpretation by saying that Cantimori's

approaches to the problem are "purely rhapsodic," that they lack "intimate connections among one another." Furthermore, "his conclusion has the defect of isolating a single element from the complex question in so far as it wants to explain everything only through that element." The criticism can be reversed and applied to Saitta's own general interpretation of Mazzini's thought. In emphasizing the influence of Hegel's philosophy, Saitta tries to reduce *De l'Italie* to a species of proto-Marxist "communist" vision of Italian and European social history. The effort seems to succeed in that Italian "Left Hegelianism" was undeniably a function of social-"communist" ideologies before 1848. But it founders within the larger context of cultural and intellectual currents that, I believe, played crucial parts in the formation of Mazzini's ideas.

Somewhat ironically, Saitta concludes his extensive, richly documented evaluation of *De l'Italie* by stressing its eclecticism rather than its apparent monistic origins. *De l'Italie* "belongs on its own merits to the history of nineteenth-century political thought wherein it constitutes one of the numerous connecting links between the era of the Restoration and that of Europe's Revolutions of 1848, between Guizot's lectures on the history of civilization and Victor Hugo's efforts in behalf of a universal republic and of the first peace congress of 1849, between Hegel and Marx, between Giuseppe Mazzini . . . and Bakunin." True. But I wonder whether, as a mere student, an "outsider," who has only recently pondered the meaning of Mazzini's strange work, I may not tentatively propose a different alternative, a theoretical third way out of the interpretive dilemma in which Cantimori's "romantic"-Utopian and Saitta's "realistic"-Hegelian emphases have placed *De l'Italie*. Is it not likely that Mazzini belongs less to the history of Italian social or political thought than to that as yet not-fully-explored European "underground" of messianic expectations that swelled at the spiritual foundations of the post-revolutionary "world restored" and the pre-1848 Italian and European way of life?

University of Rochester

A. WILLIAM SALOMONE

EPISTOLARIO (1861-1862). By *Francesco De Sanctis*. Edited by *Giuseppe Talamo*. [Opere, Volume XXI.] ([Turin:] Giulio Einaudi Editore. 1969. Pp. li, 554.)

THIS fourth volume of De Sanctis' letters covers the period from January 1861 to December 1862. Elected to the first Parliament of the Kingdom of Italy, he became in turn the Minister of Public Instruction in its first government. The 340 items included in this volume begin with an invitation from De Sanctis' predecessor in the Piedmontese ministry, Terenzio Mamiani, to attend a meeting devoted to discussion of a new law for public education. The last letter, from his erstwhile student and beloved friend Angelo Camillo De Meis, explains the latter's decision not to accept a professorship of Italian and French at Dublin, even though the post would have been quite lucrative. In between are letters of varying content, some relating to De Sanctis' ministerial duties, some personal, and others inclusive of both aspects. One of the several items in French is a letter from Johann Kappeler indicating acceptance of De Sanctis' resignation from his educational post in Zurich and requesting his aid in finding a replacement. Another, from a former Swiss colleague, Johann Stocker, congratulates De Sanctis on his appointment as a minister of united Italy.

As in Volume XX, the largest single body of correspondence is with Camillo De Meis. Other figures familiar to the student of the era, Diomede Marvasi, his cousin Giovanni De Sanctis, Luigi Settembrini, and Pasquale Villari, are represented by several letters.

A considerable part of the correspondence on educational matters concerns Naples and Turin. Proud of the university at Naples, which he later told Parliament he had "created in three or four months," De Sanctis wrote to its chancellor, Scipione Volpicella: "If you want to do something nice for me, help me with your advice, give me news about public education there, and above all tell me about the university, destined to be the foremost university of Europe." The personal letters show the warmth, kindness, and concern for friends characteristic of the author.

The introduction by Giuseppe Talamo provides excellent background for the collection. He discusses contrasting points of view on the future direction of the new kingdom illustrated by the Cavour-Garibaldi contrapositions, and he describes the broad scheme supported by De Sanctis to overcome the high rate of illiteracy, which the latter regarded as the "most powerful ally of reaction. . . ." Talamo notes that the minister saw education as the only way to make plebeians into free people, and he quotes De Sanctis: "They are not free, the ignorant peasants of the Neapolitan provinces, subjected to reaction, to the merciless doings of other times . . . their soul belongs to the confessor, to the notary, to the lawman, to the landowner, to all those who are interested in directing and dominating them." As with the other volumes in the series, this one is more for the specialist in the history of the *Risorgimento* than for the general student. Many of the writers will be known only to the scholars of that era.

Wisconsin State University, La Crosse

GEORGE R. GILKEY

STORIA POLITICA DELLA GRANDE GUERRA, 1915-1918. By *Piero Melograni*. [Storia e Società.] (Bari: Editori Laterza. 1969. Pp. vii, 579. L. 5,000.)

IN Italy, as elsewhere, the fiftieth anniversary of the termination of World War I has stimulated the publication of numerous articles and books pertaining to that conflict. Piero Melograni's book is a signal contribution to this literature.

The author started his research with the intention simply of analyzing the changes that occurred in the morale of Italian troops during the war. Very soon, however, he sensed that the problems of the foot-soldier could not adequately be explained unless one took into account the multiplicity of political, economic, and social factors that were conditioning the life of the entire Italian people in those years. Thus his aim shifted to that of analyzing the relationships of the Italian army to politics and to civilian life, and of seeking "to reconstruct the history of the first World War as it was experienced by the masses."

Despite its title, Melograni's book focuses more on the psychological and socio-economic dimensions of the war in Italy than on the political side. It ignores almost completely Italy's wartime diplomacy, on the ground that this has already been studied. Thus, the author's first chapter begins with the declaration of war on May 24, 1915; the circumstances that led to the secret Treaty of London are skipped almost entirely. Except for a few passing references to Albania, one will find no mention of Italian ambitions elsewhere than along the Austrian frontier. Strictly military and strategic aspects of the war are largely sidestepped with the explanation that little more can be said about those topics until Italian military archives are opened to historians.

Melograni has made excellent use of those Italian archives that are now accessible. Thus he has exploited materials in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato that came from the Public Safety division of the Ministry of Interior; the presidency of the Council of Ministers; the King's First Adjutant; the Commission of Inquiry into the Caporetto debacle; the newly published reports of the secret parliamentary committees of 1917;

the papers of Premier Antonio Salandra; and other sources. He has also utilized memoirs, letters, and secondary sources extensively. The author's familiarity with foreign publications, however, tends to be restricted to books that have been translated into Italian. Melograni apparently did not have a chance to see Christopher Seton-Watson's solid work, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925* (1967). Viewing the war from a less ethnocentric perspective than Melograni, Seton-Watson shows how Allied military operations were sometimes undertaken to help relieve the Austrian pressure on Italy; how the Allies put pressure on Italy in 1916 to extend its declaration of war to cover Germany; and how the Allies responded to the Caporetto debacle.

In spite of certain omissions, Melograni's study is extremely useful. It is well organized and lucidly written. Seven lengthy chapters deal successively with these topics: "From the 'Radiant Days of May' to the Funereal Autumn"; "The Soldier's Adjustment to the War"; "The Disputes between the Government and the General Staff in 1916"; "Soldiers and Officers during the Deadlock Phase of the War"; "1917 Prior to Caporetto"; "The Battle of Caporetto—Causes and Course"; and "The Final Year of the War." The chapters pertaining to Caporetto are particularly gripping. Footnote references to all of the sources, a full index, and sketches of the battlelines add to the scholarly quality of the book.

The author tries to be fair in his judgments and sets forth the relevant evidence on all sides of controversial questions. He is generous to the socialists in his discussion of their difficult role during the war. Melograni does not hesitate to criticize the quality of unimaginative generals like Luigi Cadorna and Pietro Badoglio, and he is no less ready to point out the deficiencies, as well as merits, of such controversial political figures as Salandra, Sidney Sonnino, Paolo Boselli, and the feisty V. E. Orlando. Although he does not try to whitewash the behavior of many Italian military personnel during the Caporetto retreat, he emphasizes rightly that the debacle was caused by military rather than morale factors, for it was the new infiltration tactics employed by the Austrians and Germans that brought on the disaster. Italian military leaders had not paid attention to the fact that similar tactics had been employed against the Russians at Riga. But the Italians were not the only ones to be caught off-guard by such infiltration; the same thing happened to the British on the Western front in the spring of 1918.

A brief epilogue emphasizes the deleterious impact of the war on the middle class and suggests that this was the chief reason for the downfall of Italian liberalism.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

ITALY'S AUSTRIAN HERITAGE, 1919-1946. By *Dennison I. Rusinow*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. ix, 423. \$10.50.)

ETHNIC minorities are usually studied as the victims of dominant majorities. Not so in this book. Taking the long view, the author argues that Italy was the victim of its own territorial acquisitiveness after World War I. He then proceeds to trace this theme up to the end of the Second World War. In the author's concluding words, the annexation of the Germans of the Alto Adige (South Tyrol to the hopelessly "unredeemable" Germans) and of the Slavs of former Venezia Giulia was "a starting point for national disintegration under Fascism and a source of political weakness at home and abroad." In fact, the author blames everything, including the loss of the humanitarian spirit of Mazzinian nationalism, the collapse of liberal Italy, the rise of Fascism, and

the ambiguity of Fascist foreign policy on the proximity of these tantalizing territorial tidbits.

The theme of Italy as the victim of its own greed has an undeniable poetic quality but also carries within itself the danger of historical distortion. Those who believe that aggressive nationalism has its roots deep in the Risorgimento will challenge the author's contention that Italy inherited this dangerous virus by grafting onto itself the infected limbs of the deceased Austrian Empire. The danger of distortion is also apparent when the author discusses Italian Fascism almost entirely as a function of frustrated nationalism, thereby omitting such considerations as the presence of deep-seated class conflicts, the widespread desire for the restoration of law and order, and Mussolini's peculiar style of leadership. Granted that the author is not writing a history of Italy, the problem of emphasis still remains. The author's theme intrudes strongly in situations that should be considered as part of a larger context. The problem of emphasis is also aggravated by the author's curiously circular style. Having made a point once (for instance, that Mussolini's puppet regime of 1944-45 had no authority over the German-controlled provinces of the Alto Adige and Venezia Giulia), the author feels compelled to make the same point again and again, often using the same evidence.

With these reservations, this work stands out as an important contribution to a subject of timely interest (Austria and Italy have recently concluded an agreement that may provide for the first time a mutually acceptable basis for protecting the autonomy of the German minority in Italy). Most of the existing literature on the subject is unabashedly partisan, with some outstanding scholarly exceptions such as Mario Toscano's *Storia diplomatica della questione dell'Alto Adige* (1967). The author's biases are certainly not those of nationalism. He criticizes Italian nationalists for losing sight of the larger issues of self-determination, the value of amicable relations with neighboring countries, and the economic advantages that such a friendly policy would have entailed. Such was precisely the position of liberal democrats like Carlo Sforza and Gaetano Salvemini and of social democrats like Leonida Bissolati. Theirs was unquestionably the voice of reason, a voice that unfortunately could hardly be heard above the passions aroused by the war and by the peace settlement.

Along with these value judgments, the author also provides many useful insights and dispels some lingering myths. Few would argue his point that nationalists and Fascists used the idea of *italianità* to distract public attention from social problems. He clearly indicates that the army's support of Fascist violence in the border territories, far from being due to the insubordination of local commanders, was a deliberate government policy. He disposes once and for all of the notion propagated by the Fascist regime that Italy's and Germany's objectives abroad were perfectly compatible. Such contributions more than justify the author's exhaustive research into the vast memorialistic literature and into such out-of-the-way archival collections as the records of the Italian administrations of former Fiume and Pola, the only post-1918 Italian provincial archives open to scholars, by courtesy of the Yugoslav government.

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

ROLAND SARTI

JOHN HUS: A BIOGRAPHY. By *Matthew Spinka*. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1968. Pp. v, 344. \$10.00.)

THE story of the life and death of John Hus has been told very often, but there has not been a proper biography of him in English since that by David S. Schaff (1915).

Climaxing and summarizing a lifetime of research in Czech religious history, Matthew Spinka here recounts the story, from the native origins of the Hussite movement in the reforms sparked by Charles IV through the preaching of Hus and the dramatic events of Constance (which Spinka has described in his edition and translation of the documents, *John Hus at the Council of Constance* [New York, 1965]) to the modern repercussions of Hussitism in the work of the Second Vatican Council.

In the course of his biography, Professor Spinka has drawn together much information that has never been available in English before. For example, his summary of Hus's early preaching at Bethlehem Chapel and his systematization of the doctrinal and moral content of Hus's Czech writings will bring to Western readers a much more satisfactory picture of the Hussite message than previous accounts in English and German have provided.

What is missing from this biography is any significant *Auseinandersetzung* with the work being done on Hus by the scholars of contemporary, Marxist Czechoslovakia. There are a few books of the post-1948 period in the bibliography (those of Souček, Šmahel, and Zelinka, for example); but the treatment of Hus's thought would have benefited from the monograph of Milan Machovec, *Husovo učení a význam v tradici českého národa* [Hus's Teaching and Significance in the Tradition of the Czech Nation] (Prague, 1953), and the account of Hus's impact on other nations should have taken account of the symposium edited by Josef Macek, *Mezinárodní ohlas husitství* [The International Echo of Hussitism] (Prague, 1958). The center of research in Hussite history will continue to be Prague, be it Marxist or Catholic or Protestant, and the attempt of the current generation of Czech scholars to come to terms simultaneously with the Hussite tradition and the Marxist ideology is, to say the least, historiographically fascinating.

Yale University

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

SLOVENSKO V 20. STOROČÍ [Slovakia in the 20th Century]. By *Lubomír Lipták*. (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry. 1968. Pp. 366. Kčs. 22.00.)

SLOVENSKÁ OTÁZKA V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [The Slovak Question in Czechoslovakia]. By *Samo Falt'an*. (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry. 1968. Pp. 350. Kčs. 20.00.)

RIEŠENIE VZTAHU ČECHOV A SLOVÁKOV [Solving the Relationship of the Czechs and Slovaks]. By *Jaroslav Barto*. (Bratislava: Epoque. 1968. Pp. 242. Kčs. 16.00.)

THE three studies here under review are discussions of different aspects and periods of relations between Czechs and Slovaks by Slovak Communist historians. The manuscripts of their books had lain in carefully locked drawers of their desks until the short-lived Czechoslovak "springtime" of 1968 when they were rushed into print.

In the preface of his study, Falt'an, a member and historian of the Slovak partisan movement in World War II, finds it an "incredible paradox" that Czechoslovak Communist historiography, which had grown "quantitatively and qualitatively" during the preceding two decades of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, had produced no "serious Marxist analysis and synthesis" of the development of Czech-Slovak relations. Indeed, since the expulsion of the Sudeten German minority from Czechoslovakia after World War II the "Slovak question," that is, the problem of adjusting satisfactorily relations between the Czechs and Slovaks, has become the foremost internal problem of Czechoslovakia. Falt'an's astonishment was, of course, rhetorical. As a highly placed

Communist party functionary, he knew that the silence on the Slovak question was official policy. In the official view, the Slovak question no longer existed. It had been one of the many evils of royal Hungary and the bourgeois Czechoslovak republics that were happily and definitely solved when the Czechoslovak proletariat took power in February 1948. Any further discussion of it was, therefore, officially discouraged as an unnecessary and harmful raking over of the unhappy past.

Before 1948 Czechoslovak Communist policy toward the Slovaks oscillated widely, from support of Slovak independence or autonomy to Czech centralism, according to the tactics and requirements of the international Communist movement directed from Moscow. After 1948 Czechoslovak Communist policy became increasingly centralist. Despite official pretenses, the Slovak question continued to exist. It festered under the surface of Czechoslovak politics and placed an increasing strain, not only on the relations between the Slovaks and Czechs, but also on those between the Communist party of Slovakia (KSS) and the parent Communist party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ). Although this was scarcely noticed abroad, it was the dissatisfaction of the nationalist (formerly called Titoist) wing of the KSS that precipitated the struggle for the de-Stalinization and liberalization of Czechoslovakia in the 1960's. The successful assault of the Slovak Communist nationalists against the Stalinist leadership of the KSS (V. Široký) in 1963 led to the overthrow of the Stalinist leadership of the KSČ (A. Novotný) in 1968.

Among the crowded events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was a thorough airing of Czech-Slovak relations. The present volumes constitute significant contributions to that debate. The authors of all three volumes are Slovak Communist nationalists. They treat Slovak nationalism as if it were a Communist invention and exclusive property. Lipták, who is at present editor of the official Slovak historical review *Historický časopis*, is perhaps the ablest dialectician and polemicist among them. His volume is an extended essay rather than a factual account of Slovak history from about 1900 to 1967. He wrote it between September 1967 and February 1968 and meant it as a weapon in the evolving struggle for Czechoslovakia's liberalization. He aims his fire successively at the old Magyar oligarchy in royal Hungary, the Czech bourgeoisie, both wings of the emerging Slovak bourgeoisie (the pro-Czech Agrarians of Milan Hodža and the anti-Czech Populists [*L'udáky*] of Father Andrej Hlinka), the wartime pro-German regime of Father Jozef Tiso as well as the exiled government of President Edvard Beneš in London, the postwar Slovak Democratic party of Jozef Lettrich and Ján Ursiny, and finally the Stalinist regime of Gottwald, Zapotocký, and Novotný, all of whom he regards as enemies or exploiters of the Slovak people. His analysis and denunciation of Stalinism, to which he denies the character of a socialist social system, conceding it only that of a "non-capitalist" one, is the most penetrating that I have read. Critiques of Stalinism by skilled Marxist dialecticians are not common. For that reason alone, as well as for the intellectually stimulating character of his book, it would be worthwhile translating into English.

Falt'an covers roughly the same ground, but concentrates on the period of World War II and ends in 1948. Barto reviews exhaustively the constitutional aspects of the Slovak question, from the Slovak national uprising in 1944 to the Communist takeover in 1948. His book was written in 1965-66, and is more guarded in its criticism of the leadership of the KSČ. All three books are documented, but only Falt'an's and Barto's contain bibliographies. All three lack indexes.

The conflict of nationalism and internationalism within Communist parties is an old story. There are many examples of Communists harnessing nationalism to their

purposes. These three books, however, raise the question of whether the process has not been reversed, that is, whether Slovak nationalists have not harnessed Communism to their purposes. They certainly reveal a complete identification of Slovak Communists with the national interests of the Slovak people, and a readiness to place these interests above those of the international Communist movement. This state of mind, together with parallel manifestations of nationalism among the Czech Communists, may have frightened the Soviet government into occupying Czechoslovakia.

The events of 1968 marked a triumph of the Slovak Communist nationalists. Their demand for the federalization of Czechoslovakia was realized, and it remains one of the few reforms of 1968 that has not been revoked. Gustáv, Husák, Dubček's rival and successor as head of the KSČ, is a Slovak Communist nationalist. Of course, Slovak politicians have a tendency to become centralist when they move from Bratislava to Prague. Federalism is not popular with Czech Communists. He may yet surrender to their pressure to abolish it. If he does, he will certainly encounter the opposition of his Slovak comrades. The Slovak question will have moved into another cycle.

University of Georgia

VICTOR S. MAMATEY

THE RUMANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN TRANSYLVANIA, 1780-1849. By *Keith Hitchins*. [Harvard Historical Monographs, Number 61.] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1969. Pp. xi, 316. \$8.00.)

THE early history of the Rumanian national movement in Transylvania was neither particularly dramatic nor very effective in immediate consequences. Yet the necessary steps of establishing and defining the national identity, and of developing, refining, transmitting, and popularizing it were achieved. Moreover, the story of this process has an intrinsic interest in extending our understanding of the emergence of national self-awareness among the nationalities of Eastern Europe. Professor Hitchins' careful and substantial monograph carries us well beyond the picture thus far available in such works as R. W. Seton-Watson's general history of the Rumanians.

In the eighteenth century only a handful of men were involved in the initial "awakening" in Transylvania, where the Rumanians, though comprising a majority of the population, still found themselves at the bottom of the social and political ladder—or, rather, under the ladder, not even on the lower rungs. The first portion of the book deals with this handful, preponderantly Uniate priests or sons of priests: Samuel Clain, Gheorghe Șincai, Petru Maior, and Ion Budai-Deleanu (much less well known than the other three). It was this group which, through their studies of the language and the past, developed the themes of Roman origins and geographical continuity that have remained, despite endless polemics and significant revisions, at the emotional core of Rumanian nationalism.

After the abortive excursion into politics associated with the petition *Supplex libellus Valachorum*, there was an ebbing of the tide (as elsewhere in the Habsburg realms) until the resurgence of the 1830's. The new generation of intellectuals, although also associated with the Uniate center at Blaj and certainly representing a continuity of tradition, were broader in their intellectual contacts and outlook, more closely associated with the Rumanians in the Principalities across the Carpathians, and faced with the new danger of nascent Magyar nationalism. By the time of the crisis of 1848, the national movement had achieved a considerable popular base, directed by such figures as Simion Bărnuțiu, Andreiu Șaguna, and Avram Iancu, and came into open conflict with the Hungarian revolution; this in turn forced the Rumanians to

rally to the imperial cause and subsequently to be the beneficiaries of Habsburg gratitude.

While the book offers no startling historical revelations or revisions, the story has been well told, and it includes a helpful bibliographical essay.

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HENRY L. ROBERTS

SOTSIAL'NO-POLITICHESKAIA ISTORIIA ROSSII KONTSA XV-PERVOI POLOVINY XVI V. [Sociopolitical History of Russia from the End of the 15th to the Middle of the 16th Century]. By S. M. *Kashtanov*. [Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii.] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka." 1967. Pp. 391.)

THIS impressive study unravels the Muscovite government's grant and immunity policies toward the major northern monasteries from the 1490's through 1547. Kashtanov has combed through all the extant documentation with admirable thoroughness, examining the character and frequency of grants as well as their regional patterns, seeking moments of change in policy, and suggesting political motivation for niggardliness and liberality. From the 1490's to the second decade of the sixteenth century, Ivan III and his son Vasilii III were stingy with concessions, desiring to increase Crown revenue and jurisdiction at the expense of the monastic establishments. Though Ivan III's ambitious scheme to secularize Church lands failed by 1503, his son continued the restrictive measures in his early reign. Fear of the resurgent power of the appanage princes thereafter induced a reversal in strategy. Vasilii III began to cultivate the goodwill of the powerful monasteries as a political device in his drive to neutralize the aspirations of family princes and their supporters. Despite oscillations in policy and some changes in the character of grants and immunities, this pattern of alliances remained fundamentally unchanged during the minority of Ivan IV. In Kashtanov's view, containment of secular opponents explains the dispensation of bequests and immunities to clerical institutions. The thesis has considerable merit, though some of Kashtanov's premises will, in time, be modified. The major concern of the government was not the family princes, whose powers had long been curtailed, but the powerful nobility, who sought privilege, power, and profit. Until we discover more about the areas of their estates and the specific roles they played in politics, we will continue to be plagued with unhistorical models. If the appanage princes played a role in the political maneuvering, their importance had a direct relationship to the amount of support they could generate among the serving aristocracy.

A brief summary can hardly do justice to Kashtanov's study. More than half the volume covers the later reign of Ivan III (1492-1505). Here Kashtanov allowed himself to be seduced by the latest rage occupying the historians of this period: the dynastic crisis of 1497-1500, about which the volume of speculation far exceeds the fragmentary evidence. Despite his efforts, we are far from an acceptable explanation. Conjectures abound concerning the identity of the supporters of the future Vasilii III and Ivan III's grandson, Dmitrii, the relationships of the disgraces of the mighty and humble to the primary struggle, and the roles played by those who sought personal gain in choosing sides. Too much of the explanation offered depends upon an imposed conceptual framework, and Kashtanov has to force his evidence to achieve his conclusion. Neither Kashtanov nor his predecessors have been able to make a convincing case for the existence, underlying the dynastic crisis, of a struggle between the proponents of centralization and those advocating regional autonomy. To Kashtanov's credit, he does try to follow the evidence where it leads in other directions. In his

discussion of Vasilii's defection in 1500, he admits that the grand prince's son sought aid from Moscow's avowed enemy, Lithuania. Only lack of any deep, exploitative internal divisions could have forced such a decision. The untenability of the major thesis should not obscure some genuine contributions. As a result of this re-examination, we now know more about the chronology of Ivan III's uncertainties and his proposed solutions. Interspersed in the discussion are some sparkling historical nuggets, such as a definitive reconstruction of the battle on the Vedrosha in 1500. If Kashtanov's book cannot be called definitive, it nevertheless ranks as one of the more important studies to appear in this field in recent decades. The analyses of immunities, the dating of documents, and their regional patterns will be of great use to others who are seeking alternative constructs to the grand prince-appanage ruler centrifuge.

University of Oregon

GUSTAVE ALEF

LA SIBÉRIE: PEUPLEMENT ET IMMIGRATION PAYSANNE AU XIX^e SIÈCLE. By *François-Xavier Coquin*. [Collection historique de l'Institut d'Études slaves, Number 20.] (Paris: the Institut. 1969. Pp. 789. 60 fr.)

THIS book deserves instant recognition as the definitive work on nineteenth-century migration to Siberia. There is a brief introduction. The first part begins with the law of 1799 on migration to Transbaikalia and ends with the creation of the Ministry of State Domains under Count P. D. Kiselev in 1837. The second part covers the Kiselev era, up to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. The third deals with the twenty-year pause in migration that followed. The fourth, "*Le retour à la mobilité*," assesses the legislation of 1881 and 1889 and the relation of the Trans-Siberian Railway to colonization. The fifth describes the peasant settlement occurring up to the end of the century in several different sub-regions of Siberia. A semifinal chapter, "*Bilan et perspectives*," is followed by a short conclusion. A substantial bibliography, glossary, and a Continental-style index (of persons only) are added, and a number of maps and charts are interspersed throughout the text. M. Coquin has worked to a large extent from manuscript sources, in particular the state documents of the Central State Historical Archives of Leningrad (TsGIAL), but he has also been attentive to rare printed materials, notably the *gubernskie vedomosti* of the Siberian provinces and local journals.

There is an error in the very first line—Astrakhan was taken in 1556, not "*deux ans plus tard*" than 1552; thereafter I can detect virtually no errors of importance, either typographical or of other kinds. It is of course impossible to check the author's use of manuscripts or of many of his printed sources. He challenges my book *The Great Siberian Migration* (1957) twice (footnotes, pp. 237 and 731), both times attributing to me opinions that I do not express but that he evidently suspects me of holding. One trusts that the sources, with which he feels less compulsion to argue, are not similarly misunderstood, and I am prepared to believe, partly on the basis of spot checks, that such is the case. In sum, the weaknesses of the book do not lie in its scholarship.

Such weaknesses as there are derive largely from the book's impressive virtues. M. Coquin writes elegant French. Sometimes it has a tendency to be a trifle vague; for example, the phrase, "*l'apparition des Européens sur les rivages chinois et japonais*," presupposes that the reader will have in mind the significance of the Opium War (1839-42) in China and the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan (1853-54). More often his style is of a spare and even severe sort, better suited to the evaluation of laws and regulations than to the evocation of the thoughts and emotions of human beings.

There is little room in his long narrative for individual human stupidity and inefficiency, joy and pain, though the sufferings of the migrants in the mass are quite properly not slighted. As a result, not all of his 746 pages of text make fascinating reading. By the same token, however, his work inspires confidence. The author is factual and critical; he is not writing an apologia for anyone or any party, or an indictment. One might frequently suspect that he believes that facts simply speak for themselves, and yet he does not. He has certain economic beliefs, or, perhaps, wishes to invoke certain principles of economics, in concluding that the old kind of immigration to Siberia, based exclusively on extensive agriculture, had by 1900 had its day and that only a degree of industrialization and the formation of a Siberian market could have vouchsafed any future to peasant migration. His final question asks if private enterprise could have adequately developed Siberia, or "*les structures communautaires trouveraient-elles à se réaffirmer sous une forme et sur un terrain que la paysannerie seule était désormais impuissante à définir?*" Plainly he leans toward the second alternative. In view of his emphasis on this issue, it becomes the more puzzling that he chose to terminate his story at 1900 and to devote only a portion of his brief *Sixième Partie* to the 1900-14 period. He partly raises but hardly exhausts the crucial question of whether the original, wasteful, squatter type of Siberian tenure was bound to be replaced by the same redistributory or, at any rate, communal type of tenure that still survived in European Russia, or whether some form of individual tenure could have been, and in fact was beginning to be, implanted in place of both forms. If the peasantry alone was "*impuissante à définir*" the basis on which new social and economic institutions were to grow in Siberia, was the fiat of Moscow or Petersburg/Leningrad then the necessary prerequisite for Siberian prosperity?

M. Coquin offers us ample raw material for further reflection on these issues. He finds that the facts alone produce no unequivocal answer, and he is doubtless right.

University of Washington

DONALD W. TREADGOLD

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALEXANDER I: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE CONDUCT OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY, 1801-1825. By *Patricia Kennedy Grimsted*. [Russian and East European Studies.] (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. xxvi, 367. \$9.50.)

THE historiography of Russian diplomacy is rather meager, and any addition is to be welcomed. Mrs. Grimsted has substantially contributed to our knowledge of the principal aides who assisted Emperor Alexander I in conducting foreign relations at the height of the Empire's influence in Europe. We are given a comprehensive picture of the diplomatic careers and contributions of N. P. Panin, A. R. Vorontsov, V. P. Kochubei, A. J. Czartoryski, A. G. Budberg, K. R. Nesselrode, and I. A. Capodistrias who, under one title or another, acted as the Emperor's foreign ministers. Mrs. Grimsted is quite correct in pointing out that throughout his reign Alexander I was his own chief diplomat and foreign minister. As their careers show, these dignitaries were in office (or had influence) only as long as they supported and implemented the basic policy decisions taken by the monarch. This was in the good eighteenth-century tradition of personal royal diplomacy, and in this respect, too, imperial Russia did not enter the nineteenth century until it had well passed its first quarter mark.

While Mrs. Grimsted gives us a characterization of Alexander's diplomacy and personal political views, she does not analyze in sufficient detail and depth the emperor's actual conduct in foreign affairs; he remains a somewhat shadowy figure. Too much

in his relations to his foreign ministers is explained away by uncritical references such as friendships, sympathy of outlook, aspirations. Mrs. Grimsted is quite right in maintaining that considerations of domestic policy did not play a determining role in foreign affairs; yet certain aspects of domestic policy were indubitably factors in Russian diplomacy. Except for making the questionable assertion that Alexander's diplomacy turned active and "expansionist" when he became disappointed with domestic reform plans, Mrs. Grimsted does not give sufficient attention to such vital elements of foreign policy as military and economic resources, social stability, domestic conflicts of interests, and court intrigues. As a result, her treatment of the actions of Alexander's ministers appears suspended in mid-air, an impression reinforced by her neglect (beyond some rather sweeping generalizations) of the policies and actions of Russia's European diplomatic partners and antagonists.

The amount of documentation gone over by Mrs. Grimsted is astounding; it includes a vast array of unpublished materials, as well as nearly exhaustive coverage of all published sources (which are much more extensive and revealing than Western diplomatic histories might suggest). Yet this documentary wealth is not used to best advantage. With the exception of the chapters on Czartoryski and Capodistrias the archival documentation is mainly adduced to illustrate further facts and judgments found in the published material. One has the feeling that Mrs. Grimsted was overwhelmed by her material and carried away by a simple-minded and personalized view of diplomacy and political forces. Her sketches of the Russian foreign policy makers are lively and informative, but rather short on analysis and understanding of the specific circumstances, mentalities, and problems of the time. Her own scale of values, which comes out quite clearly, is that of late nineteenth-century liberalism, democracy, and nationalism which obviously was not one to be shared by either Alexander or his associates. To the extent that Czartoryski and Capodistrias came closest to sharing such beliefs, they proved also to be most congenial and understandable to Mrs. Grimsted; and the two chapters dealing with them and their political views and plans are the best in the book.

The volume ends with a very extensive and most valuable bibliographical guide to both unpublished and published sources. Mrs. Grimsted's bibliography ranges over a very wide front, although one may question the relevance of some items listed. It is a most useful tool for researchers and students alike, but her assessments of individual titles should be taken with some caution. While a short review is not the place for criticism of specific formulations, judgments, facts, and interpretations, I cannot forbear voicing shock that a historian should write Baron Friedrich von Stein and turn an individual into the patron of a quartet!

Columbia University

MARC RAEFF

Near East

HISTORY OF THE ORDER OF ASSASSINS. By *Enno Franzius*. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls. 1969. Pp. xviii, 261. \$6.95.)

THE ASSASSINS: A RADICAL SECT IN ISLAM. By *Bernard Lewis*. (New York: Basic Books. 1968. Pp. 166. \$4.95.)

WITH the publication of Marshall Hodgson's *The Order of Assassins* (1955), our knowledge of the earlier history of the Nizari sect of Islam (the Assassins) was for the first time established on a scientific basis. In spite of an often confusing organiza-

tion and a few minor errors, Hodgson provided a well-documented study of the political evolution of the Assassins in Iran and Syria from their seizure of Alamut (1090) to the fall of that fortress to the Mongols (1256). With this, he intermingled a study of the Nizaris' doctrinal development, showing how their changing political fortunes were mirrored in the ideology of the sect.

Neither of the two books under review seems to have been intended to supplant Hodgson, either through new information or through a major reinterpretation. Both are written for that elusive creature called "the educated public," although both carry a scholarly apparatus and hence might potentially be of use to the specialist as well.

Professor Lewis' book raises the greatest ambiguities in this regard. On the one hand, it will convey to the uninitiated a very clear sense of who the Assassins were and what they were trying to accomplish; on the other, it raises hopes in the specialist, aware of the author's numerous and valuable contributions in Ismaili and Nizari studies, which it leaves in large part unfulfilled. On the positive side, it provides an extremely useful guide for the person who is making his first approach to the Assassins. The book is composed of four central chapters which relate successively the origins and development of the Ismaili movement in Islam, the establishment of the Nizaris as an independent branch of Ismailism, the political history of the Nizaris in Iran, and the role which they enjoyed in Syria. These chapters are written with Professor Lewis' customary clarity of organization and style, and with a sure sense of what will further the knowledge of the novice and what is likely to confuse him. This core section of the book is flanked by two other chapters: an attractive essay on the stages in the growth of Europe's awareness and understanding of the Assassins, and some concluding remarks that place the Assassins in the context of the quasi-religious concept of tyrannicide and that suggest that they are perhaps the oldest example of a revolutionary terrorist organization.

The specialist will not go away empty-handed from Professor Lewis' work, to be sure. In the first place, it is solidly documented, and this documentation is fully presented in the annotation; it includes two important new sources—Kashani's version of the Alamut tradition (supplementing Juvayni and Rashid ad-Din), and Kamal ad-Din's life of Sinan—neither of which was available to Hodgson. Likewise, the chapter on the Syrian Assassins brings this branch of the movement into clearer focus than does Hodgson. Nevertheless, the two chapters on the Assassins in Iran contribute only a few details to Hodgson and leave out much that he included. Indeed, these pages are heavily devoted to citations from Boyle's translation of Juvayni. This author is our oldest continuous source for the Assassins, but he is also bitterly hostile, highly rhetorical, and generally less detailed than Rashid ad-Din, who had access to the same materials. If Lewis had to use the somewhat questionable technique of quoting rather than interpreting his sources, he should have drawn on Rashid ad-Din or Kashani, neither of whom is available in translation.

Whatever one's reservations about Lewis' work, he has clearly succeeded in attaining his major goal. The same cannot be said of Mr. Franzius, though his book is not without virtues. He tries to avoid the traditional lurid romances that have grown up around the Assassins. He has assembled a comprehensive bibliography of the studies and source materials available in Western languages. Finally, he has essayed the laudable but extremely difficult task of carrying on the history of the Nizaris after the fall of Alamut down to modern times.

Leaving aside the author's cavalier way with proper names and his errors of fact,

his book is marred essentially by his failure to create a comprehensive interpretative framework for the materials he has gathered. We are given little more than a coherently organized string of anecdotes, entertaining enough in themselves but seeming to lead nowhere. At times, the Nizari revolt against the Islamic world becomes no more than a clash of personalities: Hasan-i Sabbah versus Nizam al-Mulk, Buzurgumid against Sanjar, and others. Moreover, his attempt to discuss the post-Alamut Nizaris is vitiated by his inability to make sense of his sources; one suspects he sorely misses the guidance of Hodgson and Lewis for the early centuries. At any rate, one cannot do justice to the Khojas of modern Gujarat and East Africa by restricting himself to highly laudatory comments on the activities of the Aga Khans.

For the time being, then, in spite of the great advances since 1955 in our knowledge of Islam in the age of the Seljukids and the Crusades, Hodgson's book remains the most authoritative account of the Assassins. A major re-evaluation of the movement will apparently have to await further studies and new perspectives on this crucial epoch in medieval Islam.

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R. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS

TÜRKEI UND AFGHANISTAN—BRENNPUNKTE DER ORIENTPOLITIK IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By *Johannes Glasneck* and *Inge Kircheisen*. [Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Allgemeine Geschichte an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Number 3.] (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. 1968. Pp. 306. DM 42.)

THIS volume contains two separate and distinct studies. The first one, by Glasneck, covers in great detail Turkish relations with Germany from the outbreak of war in 1939 to the break in those relations in 1945. In a chapter that analyzes Turkish foreign affairs during the 1930's, as well as in all subsequent ones, Turkish relations with the USSR, Great Britain, France, and the United States are introduced to show the problems of İnönü and his ministers in the face of the bitter rivalry and competition among the powers for Turkey's goodwill and her strategic position and to assert İnönü's usual predilections for anything anti-Soviet.

In 1929 over forty per cent of Turkey's imports came from Western Europe and less than a quarter from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. By 1938 these figures had been more than reversed: Western Europe supplied only sixteen per cent whereas Central Europe enjoyed half the market. To explain this marked change the author presents an impressive account of the German investment in Turkey between 1935 and 1938 and the economic development fostered there in railroads, shipping, mining, textiles, armaments, munitions, and light industries by German firms such as Siemens, Krupp, Otto Wolff, and Hanschel and Son, with the aid of many of the larger German banking concerns. Though on May 27, 1938, Turkey signed an agreement with the West for a general credit of £10m. plus £6m. for war materiel and came to an understanding on the return of Alexandretta, she had no commitment to join an anti-German combination.

There follow a dozen accounts of the steps of Turkish policies and the influences upon them from September 1939 to February 1945, but they are all colored by inordinate pro-Soviet contentions with which British and American officials were continually confronted. The Anglo-American Coordinating Council in Ankara is depicted as an American instrument to take over the trade and position of Britain in Turkey. American officials involved with this activity at that time would have been amazed at

such a contention and probably would have labeled it as British anti-American propaganda. There is a well-documented, inclusive account that presents a balanced view of the German ambitions and endeavors and relates the unusual impact upon the Turks of the German invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, only four days after the signing of an important economic and political agreement between Turkey and Germany.

The other study by Kircheisen covers first the open attempt on the part of German authorities through the embassy, consulates, and trading missions to destroy British influence and to bring Afghanistan to full cooperation with German aims. After October 1941, when the British and Soviet governments forced Afghanistan to oust the German colony, only German officials remained and led a clandestine operation of agents feeding back to Hitler political and military information from south Asia. No great success or coup was recorded.

There is an adequate bibliography, but no index, and three-page résumés are given in German, Russian, English, and French.

Ohio State University

SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY. By *C. H. Dodd*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. xvi, 335. \$7.95.)

DESIGNED as a comprehensive study of recent developments in Turkish government, politics, and administration, especially during 1961–65, this is a most useful and informative volume. Professor Dodd lends perspective to his work through his introductory historical analysis of the Ottoman legacy, the constructive achievements in Ottoman reform and change, especially during the nineteenth century, and in his discussion of the political and administrative problems of the so-called First Turkish Republic during the period of 1923–60. The military coup of May 1960 inaugurated a new period in the history of the Turkish Republic, with the military gradually receding into the political background, the elaboration of a new Constitution (1961), and the establishment of a multi-party political system.

Professor Dodd examines the development of Turkish political history during 1961–65 in some detail. Perhaps his most notable contribution lies in the light he throws on recent Turkish political organization and administration. In Part III, for example, the author presents brief, basic analyses of the elaboration of the Constitution of 1961; thumbnail sketches of the political parties (the Republican People's party, the Justice party, the Turkish Worker's party, the New Turkey party, the Republican Peasants' Nation party, and the Nation party); the pressure groups (the military, students in politics, and the trade unions); elections; the Grand National Assembly (National Assembly and Senate); and the Council of Ministers and the President. Part IV provides an excellent discussion of administration, with analyses and description of the organization and central functions, departmental functions, the central administration in the provinces, and the Turkish civil service.

Professor Dodd's study concentrates "on the problems in Turkish government as they appear to those who study Turkish government in Turkey," which has necessitated description of the basic elements of Turkish political experience and stress on the institutions through which decisions are made. While Turkey's problems, as the author observes, are not those of societies like those in Western Europe or the United States, Turkish political institutions make "crucial decisions," and are not a sham. "The democratic institutions are not merely social clubs for traditionalist groups." He also

notes that the Turkish heritage of modernization "by autocratic leadership" is a notable characteristic of Ottoman development, as it is of the Kemalist period. Moreover, the fact that Turkey was never subject to political imperialism has left an enduring impress. Despite the development of multi-party politics in Turkey, as Professor Dodd states, the essential contest thus far is between the dominant Justice party, successor of the defunct Democrat party, and the Republican People's party, which has moved somewhat left of center. The author well stresses that, in a liberal, democratic political system in an underdeveloped society like that of Turkey, "the agreed means of changing governors must be shown to be real," and that too much stability "can be a dangerous thing."

This volume is based on sound research both in Turkish and other sources, as the bibliography well demonstrates, and on the author's thorough grounding in the field of Turkish politics.

American University

HARRY N. HOWARD

Africa

COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960. Volume I, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF COLONIALISM 1870-1914. Edited by *L. H. Gann* and *Peter Duignan*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1969. Pp. xi, 532. \$17.50.)

THIS book is a collection of fourteen article-length chapters, and the editors' reflective, interpretive essay (Chapter III), all written by outstanding scholarly Africanists especially for this occasion. The result is happy in that it is an excellent introduction and summary for the vast monographic work of each contributor. This book, therefore, may be more satisfactory, as an anthology of effectively balanced knowledge and ideas, than is the usual alternative—a collection of either reprinted articles or sample documents.

Some critics have chided the editors for conservative sympathy toward the phenomenon of colonialism. In fairness, however, it should be noted that while these opinions are candidly argued in the introduction and in Chapter III, they have not restricted or dominated the other contributors, some of whom, already well known as critics of colonialism, express their arguments as clearly as ever. Only one writer, J. F. A. Ajayi, is African, but one should note that he has contributed a provocative, wide-ranging, short conclusion, which in many ways serves as an independent critique of this very book. And it cannot be denied that the other fifteen editors and authors—nine British or American, four Francophonic, one South African, one German-Rhodesian-American—have reasons within both their own nations' imperial histories and their individual expertise, for undertaking these studies.

Elizabeth Colson introduces the volume with an anthropologist's analysis of the dynamism in African society during the scramble. Following is Colin W. Newbury's fresh description of West African trade and the structure of authority in the third quarter of the nineteenth century.

The editors' essay, "Reflections on Imperialism and the Scramble for Africa," stresses the diplomatic, psychological, and ideological factors behind European actions, while pointing out areas in which we lack knowledge, such as the social background of colonial service officers, and areas in which a priori assumptions may have warped understanding, for example, extension of the ancient faith that Africa is a "tropical

treasure house" to both the unbounded capitalist optimism of John Stuart Mill and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, and the Marxist-Leninist belief that finance capital was based upon colonial exploitation. It disappoints those who look for a clear-cut villain that the editors find "a pluralistic explanation [for the imperial scramble] appears to make more sense:" local African politics; "white men on the spot"—civil and military officials, merchants, farmers, missionaries—and assumptions and pressures within European thought, internal affairs, and diplomacy. One wonders whether historians can reject a polycentrism such as that which is the thrust of this article: "Whether we deal with white expansion in Africa, or with any other great instance of cultural diffusion of a continental scale, no unitary theory will ever untangle for us the richness and variety of the historical skein."

In sequence, Henri Brunschwig and Cathérine Coquery-Vidrovitch re-examine French exploration and conquest and French colonial administration and economic development. John D. Hargreaves takes a long view of the whole conquest process in West Africa, and John Flint reviews critically the evolution of British power and the ambiguities of indirect rule in Nigeria from 1880 to 1914. Jean Stengers on the Congo (to 1914) and Terence O. Ranger on African reaction in East and Central Africa represent two modern critical academic approaches. For the British in South Africa, the Portuguese, and the Germans, the essence of recent analyses is extracted respectively by D. W. Krüger, Richard J. Hammond, and Robert Cornevin. Harold Marcus' view of the European position in Ethiopia in the final third of the last century is an example of views that, while polycentrist, have significant variations from the editors' interpretations. As the distillation of long, fruitful, sympathetic study, Charles Pelham Groves' résumé of the "Missionary and Humanitarian Aspects of Imperialism" is well-placed just before Professor Ajayi's conclusions.

There is a helpful bibliography at the end of each article, augmented by footnotes to substantiate specific points in each contribution. A selection of fifteen maps, mostly reproduced or modified from significant ones that have already appeared in specialized works, complements the text, and in some cases makes available in convenient form, cartographic presentations of substantial worth (for example, a reduction of George Peter Murdock's tribal map of 1949).

The primary value of this work is its collection in one place of the positions currently held by noted, established scholars; its limitations are in large part those inherently unavoidable in any attempt to deal with a subject so charged with emotion and contention as colonialism.

Temple University

DONALD L. WIEDNER

EASTERN AFRICAN HISTORY. Edited by *Daniel F. McCall et al.* [Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs. Boston University Papers on Africa, Volume III.] (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the African Studies Center of Boston University. 1969. Pp. ix, 245. \$17.50.)

WESTERN AFRICAN HISTORY. Edited by *Daniel F. McCall et al.* [Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs. Boston University Papers on Africa, Volume IV.] (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the African Studies Center of Boston University. 1969. Pp. x, 258. \$15.00.)

THESE two volumes are collected occasional papers of the type that might well have appeared in *African Historical Studies*, which also emanates from the African Studies Center of Boston University. The papers are arranged chronologically within the

volumes, but there is no particular theme pursued throughout either of the volumes. The preface to the West African volume promises that future volumes in the series will evolve from the study of single themes.

The East African volume reproduces eight papers accumulated from Boston University's African history seminar, and if they are in any way representative, provide a tribute to its quality. There are two highly competent studies of history through linguistics in which Harold C. Fleming analyzes the classification of West Cushitic and Daniel F. McCall produces some interesting deductions about Swahili history from the use of loan-words in that language. Bruce G. Trigger's essay on "The Personality of the Sudan" brings the approach of historical geography to bear suggestively, defining a nuclear area where agricultural surpluses could be created, surrounded by pastoral economies, and might well be used as introductory reading for students starting out to prepare for essays on Kush, Meroe, and the Christian kingdoms. Robert Hess presents a most useful essay on the Falasha, the Ethiopian community whose religion is a variant of Old Testament Judaism. The remaining chapters of the volume are concerned with modern themes: Ralph Austen introduces some of the historical problems of the Nyamwezi-Sukuma relationship, Norman Bennett writes on France and Zanzibar before 1846, and Alison des Forges on the activities of the White Fathers in Ruanda, the latter a penetrating commentary on the results of missionary intrusion into an already complex African situation complicated by German overlordship. The final chapter, by Elizabeth Hopkins, deals with the problems resulting from international boundaries in the area of southwestern Uganda, and is marred by two introductory pages of sociological jargon (for example, "The area we have selected for analysis maximizes these various dimensions of marginality").

The West African volume brings to mind the curate's boiled egg, which was good in parts. Some of the contributions are of little significance (though David Bronkensha's little piece about a ritual murder in Larteh in 1886 was worth publishing as a historical thriller), while others are pedestrian pieces of documentary research which add a few facts to knowledge. Three of the chapters, however, make it necessary to put the book in any self-respecting university library. Jan Vansina writes on the Great Makoko kingdom with his customary professionalism, tracing the history of the kingdom through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries down to the coming of de Brazza. His conclusions on political fragmentation in the nineteenth century show remarkable similarities to the analysis he offers for the Kongo and other nearby states in *Kingdoms of the Savanna* (1968), but he does not develop the parallels. Douglas L. Wheeler offers a historiographical essay on Angolan history that is full of insights, and that will serve as an excellent introduction for the serious student beginning his reading in this area. W. W. Schmokel's study of the early development of settler attitudes among Americo-Liberians, though exploring a well-worn theme, nevertheless holds attention by the economy of its language and the pointed use of quoted evidence.

Dalhousie University

JOHN E. FLINT

WEST AFRICAN TRADE AND COAST SOCIETY: A FAMILY STUDY. By Margaret Priestley. [West African History Series.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 207. \$7.75.)

THIS study covers the period from the middle of the eighteenth century to the 1920's and deals specifically with the commercial, political, and administrative activities of significant members of an Anglo-African family, the Brews, who were based in the

adjacent towns of Anomabu and Cape Coast in the Gold Coast—present-day Ghana.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the interaction between the Fanti and the European settlements among them in the eighteenth century. These settlements took the form of fortified forts and their immediate environs from which Europeans traded textiles, weapons, gunpowder, and alcoholic spirits in return for African slaves, gold, ivory, and beeswax. As yet, the African trade formed "the bedrock of Britain's national power" and, in contrast to the colonial period, British success in commercial dealings required from them respect for and adaptation to the mores of African society. In the Gold Coast, British traders were completely dependent on the Fanti middlemen who brooked no European encroachment on their role. Many European traders entered into stable unions with Fanti women, in part to facilitate their commercial relations with Africans. Such was the case of the male founder of the Brew family in the Gold Coast, Richard Brew, an irascible Irishman who, during a stay of thirty years on the Gold Coast (1745–76), established from his base at Anomabu one of the greatest trading coastal networks in eighteenth-century West Africa. His success was due in large part to his union with a daughter of the most powerful Fanti Chief of his time, and his full acculturation to Fanti life. Part II of the book centers on the life and activities of Richard Brew.

In Part III the careers of five native-born Brews are used to illuminate the major historical developments in the Gold Coast in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the British attempt after 1808 to substitute "legitimate" trade for the slave trade; the increasing encroachment of the British on Fanti jurisdiction culminating in Fanti colonial status in 1874; the Fanti-British conflicts with the powerful inland Ashanti Kingdom which, too, by the early twentieth century was brought under the rule of the Gold Coast colony as part of the process of the European partition of West Africa. The Brews reacted to these several developments in the roles of traders, civil servants, educators, journalists, and early nationalists.

There are still important gaps in our knowledge of the Brews and their various activities, but this seems to be so only because of the absence of personal papers of the Brews and the author's forced dependence largely on limited official documents. Dr. Priestley has made excellent use of the available material in this family study that is the first of its kind in West African history.

Columbia University

HOLLIS R. LYNCH

LES VILLAGES DE LIBERTÉ EN AFRIQUE NOIRE FRANÇAISE, 1887–1910.

By *Denise Bouche*. [École Pratique des Hautes Études—Sorbonne. VI^e Section: Sciences économiques et sociales. Le monde d'outre-mer passé et présent. First Series, Études, Number 28.] (Paris: Mouton & Co. 1968. Pp. 278. 30 fr.)

In an attempt to help freed slaves in their West African territories begin life anew, the French created *villages de liberté* between 1887 and 1910. Professor Bouche's study suggests that these were not exactly freedom villages, however, and that Africans entering the settlements usually exchanged an African master for a new one—the French administration. Captives fleeing to French protection, more often than not, found themselves put into paternal bondage, forced to work as porters, road-builders, or farmers, or were recruited for the French army. The necessity of procuring cheap labor in the field was the reality that tempered the idealistic concern, expressed in France, for abolishing African domestic slavery. This illuminating study, which is based upon twenty years of careful research in the archives of West Africa, is divided into two

parts. The first concentrates on the villages established by the French government and administered by military commanders in the field; the second describes the effort of the Antislavery Society of France and the disciples of Cardinal Lavigerie to create freedom villages.

The government villages were important for providing food and services for the French army during and after the conquest of West Africa; consequently, many former slaves living in villages eventually gained true freedom only by fleeing from them. Among Africans in the Sudan, they were derisively known as "villages of the captives of the government." In 1904 Governor General Ernest Roume, to his credit, recognized the hypocrisy of the villages and urged that they be discontinued. Paradoxically, several years earlier, optimistic reports on the villages had filtered into France and convinced the Antislavery Society to launch its own program of Church-related freedom villages. More than thirty enclaves were sponsored by the Society throughout West and Equatorial Africa, but they fared badly for similar reasons and were abandoned in 1910. Professor Bouche correctly concludes that the *villages de liberté* did not generally contribute to repopulating certain decimated areas as they were supposed to do, and that their importance in emancipating slaves was even more doubtful because they could not take a refugee and stamp him "freedman"—an act which ignored the social realities of traditional Africa. The villages were creations of the conquest and when French rule was consolidated, they no longer served a useful purpose and were abandoned.

This book is a model for the African historian who uses archival material. The first chapter contains an admirable essay on sources, set out in great detail, but unfortunately makes no mention of oral data. Since the sources are all French in character, one wonders if the author might have interviewed informants capable of presenting an African interpretation of the events described. Even without this perspective, which might be the task of another scholar, this volume is an important contribution to the literature of reassessment of the French conquest and should be a useful reference for the historian interested in studying slavery and forced labor in Africa.

Stanford University

G. WESLEY JOHNSON

ETHIOPIA: THE ERA OF THE PRINCES. THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM AND THE RE-UNIFICATION OF THE CHRISTIAN EMPIRE, 1769-1855.
By Mordechai Abir. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1968. Pp. xxvi, 208. \$7.50.)

BETWEEN 1769 and 1855 Ethiopia ceased to exist as a political entity. The five-hundred-year-old Solomonic empire disintegrated into a number of kingdoms and petty principalities whose warlords continued to pay homage to the concept of Ethiopian unity under the Imperial Crown as they ignored the weak monarchs who sat on the throne of the descendants of Solomon and Sheba. The period is regarded by Ethiopians themselves as a period of anarchy, a time of troubles, an Era of Princes (or Judges), which they compare to that of ancient Israel: "In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes."

To undertake a history of this period is a challenging task, yet one that Professor Abir has accomplished with considerable success. In eight chapters, each of which validly stands as a separate essay, he investigates political relationships between the rival contenders for power and explores the ethnic, religious, and regional bases of such power. Of particular significance are Abir's analysis of the role played by the

Galla in northern Ethiopia; the great importance of abstruse theological questions in influencing the politics of the Christian Tigrean, Gondarine, Gojjami, and Shoan *rases*; the revival of trade in Ethiopia and the Red Sea area in general; the nature of the Ethiopian economy in the first half of the nineteenth century; the revitalization and spread of Islam among the Galla; the expansion of Egyptian power under Mohammed Ali to the borders of Ethiopia; the rise of Teodros (Theodore, or Tewodros, against whom the British later launched the famous Napier expedition of 1868); and the ambitions of Sahle Selassie of Shoa, great-grandfather of Emperor Haile Selassie. Historians of Africa will welcome his treatment of the complex political rivalries and his reconstruction of trade routes between the Galla-dominated kingdom of Jimma to the south and the Red Sea ports of Massawa, Tajura, Zeila, and Berbera; they will be disappointed in his brief treatment of Teodros, the least satisfactory chapter in an otherwise excellent book. Perhaps those who laud Abir's admirable work will also encourage him next to undertake a study of the basic question raised by his book: why did the idea of a unified monarchy persist in Ethiopia throughout this lengthy era of extremely strong centrifugal tendencies and political disintegration?

To those who believe that very little written material is available for the study of internal African history before the great wave of imperialism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Abir's work is something of a contradiction. His diligent and impressive research in the archives of the India Office, the British Foreign Office, the French and Belgian foreign ministries, and the Church Missionary Society, and his profound knowledge of the writings of the four dozen or more Europeans who traveled in Ethiopia during and shortly after the Era of the Princes and of Arabic and Amharic materials demonstrate how much can be accomplished in readily accessible archives that have a lesser attraction to graduate students than the accumulation of oral traditions. In this respect his book is recommended as a model of synthesis.

University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

ROBERT L. HESS

ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA. By *M. P. K. Sorrenson*.
[British Institute of History and Archaeology in East Africa, Memoir Number 2.]
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1968. Pp. xii, 320. \$5.50.)

THE original title of this work was *Land Policy, Legislation and Settlement in the East African Protectorate 1895-1915*, and it sums up accurately the subject matter with which Mr. Sorrenson deals. He gives us a detailed history of white settlement, which started even before the building of the Uganda railway and which so powerfully encouraged it, and all the consequent arguments about African rights and colonial obligations between government and settlers and within governmental circles themselves. The constant conflict between governors and London which resulted in the dismissal of two governors, the pressure by settlers on local officials to act in their favor, the disputes between the district administration and the Land Office, are considered at length. Mr. Sorrenson, a New Zealand historian, is also interested in such questions as comparative colonial land and frontier policy, and he has several interesting points to make about the Turner thesis and its applicability in South and East Africa. He also brings out very clearly the important early role of Governor Sir Charles Eliot, who sent recruiting agents to South Africa, the general white attitude that segregation was clearly the right policy for Kenya, the very vacillating position of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, which were terrified of questions in Parliament but otherwise largely

concerned to avoid open scandal over land and native policy, and the failure of early missionaries to act as spokesmen for African interests. His account adds to our detailed knowledge of British policy in East Africa without markedly changing its general outlines. This remains, however, an account of government policy and settlers' attempts to influence it; it is based primarily on official archives and leaves unanswered many interesting questions about the settlers themselves. While Lord Delamere and E. S. Grogan, both of them flamboyant personalities, emerge as individuals, we end up knowing very little about other settlers except for their opinions and ideas as expressed in the *East African Standard*. We are not always very sure who they were. Elspeth Huxley, writing Lord Delamere's biography in *White Man's Country* (1935) used those personal documents and memoirs that must exist for other settlers as well, and that remain to be utilized before we have a really thorough picture of settlerdom.

Smith College

MARGARET L. BATES

Asia and the East

CHINA: THE PEOPLE'S MIDDLE KINGDOM AND THE U.S.A. By John K. Fairbank. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1967. Pp. xi, 145. \$3.95.)

GATHERED in this slim volume are eleven sparkling essays in which Professor John K. Fairbank set forth, during the 1960's, his thoughts on contemporary China and how America should respond to its challenge. He observes in his preface that area specialists try to stand between cultures, interpreting one to the other, but when the area is a big public problem like China, the specialist may soon become a pundit dispensing instant wisdom. The success of the specialists in depicting the cultural gap, he wryly adds, "is measured by whether they are attacked from only one side or (preferably) from both sides." Judged by this criterion, the author had achieved notable success when the collection was published in 1967.

Professor Fairbank's evident purpose was to turn American thinking about China away from the rigidity and hostility of cold-war anti-Communism toward a policy which might head off military collision and lead to accommodation. He warned that the process would be painful, with much irascibility from both sides, for he sees each protagonist imprisoned in history and illusion. The pages are full of pithy insights into why Chinese leaders behave as they do—the psychic wound from the devastating encounter of China with the West—and why they have automatically recreated an authoritarian state. Fairbank explores various avenues that link Mao's way of ruling to the past, and many disjunctures as well; for "Mao's considerable achievement—everyone fed, everyone marching—is a triumph . . . of vision and will, as he is not the last to proclaim."

In two essays Fairbank prescribes American policy toward the Republic of China: cultivate the friendship, economic health, intellectual and cultural vigor of the people on Taiwan as an alternative model of a modernizing Chinese society. It is in the American interest, he argues, to preserve the substance of Taiwan's independence; but he rejects the "two China" terminology because of the sensibilities of both claimants. Instead he suggests dual representation in the UN, by analogy with Russia's triple representation. This circumlocution, however, does not appease the Nationalist lead-

ers, and Fairbank has been bitterly assailed from Taiwan both for his unflattering interpretations of recent Chinese history and for the policies he advocates.

As policy toward the People's Republic of China, Professor Fairbank urged in 1966 that we lower the level of polemics, eliminate most embargoes, strive for more contacts in both directions, acquiesce in the effort to bring Peking into all aspects of the international order, but that we hold our military line in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan and stand fast in Vietnam. "In short," he said, "my reading of history is that Peking's rulers now shout aggressively out of manifold frustrations, that isolation intensifies their ailment and makes it self-perpetuating, and that international contact with China on many fronts can open a less warlike chapter in its foreign relations." He placed this thesis before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1966. It seems to forecast the policy being cautiously explored by the Nixon administration four years later.

Columbia University

C. MARTIN WILBUR

THE TRANSITION IN BENGAL, 1756-1775: A STUDY OF SAIYID MUHAMMAD REZA KHAN. By *Abdul Majed Khan*. [Cambridge South Asian Studies, Number 7.] (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 376. \$13.50.)

In the late nineteenth century, the British answer to the question, "How was India taken by a handful of men, and how was it held?" was often a succinct statement: "Our moral superiority to the natives." With the nationalist and anti-imperialist writers came an emphasis on the realities of power, spelling out what old conquistadors like Napier never concealed: that conquest was "a very advantageous piece of rascality." Of late there has been a tendency, no doubt a reflection of the experience of our own times, to examine the role of the collaborationists, the groups within the beleaguered society that helped in the conquest and then, more importantly, through their administrative skills and local knowledge made the continuance of alien rule possible. Reza Khan was the leading collaborationist in Bengal during the early years of British rule, and perhaps more than anyone else, even Clive and Hastings, assured the transition of power from the Nawabs of Bengal, the titular representatives of the Mughal Emperor, to the East India Company. Like many collaborationists, while Reza Khan was a member of what may, with some inexactitude, be called the ruling group in Bengal, he was not of absolutely the first rank. He knew, however, how to walk the corridors of power, what levers to pull, how, in short, to remain Vicar of Bray in a collapsing social and political order.

This is the story that Abdul Majed Khan tells in his carefully researched and scrupulously documented study, although he deals only with Reza Khan's rise to power and his period of maximum influence. He wisely begins by emphasizing that men like Reza Khan did not see their age as the beginning of British rule and certainly not as a time of transition; it was simply an episode in Mughal rule in which they sought with skill and patience to maintain the old order. Unfortunately the author has loaded his study with such a mass of details that the point he is trying to make—the significance of Reza Khan in the politics of the age—is often obscured. His bibliography and footnotes confirm the impression that he has quarried deeply in the immense amount of relevant material in the British Museum, the India Office Records, and the National Archives of India as well as in the printed records. What is missing is some indication that Persian and other Indian language sources might provide a new dimension to studies of the period. Possibly there is nothing of substance to be gleaned

from these sources, but this seems unlikely. Reza Khan remains a one-dimensional figure, seen almost entirely through his relations with the Company's officials, with little sense that his deepest allegiances, other than to his own survival, must have been to the Indo-Mughal society that had produced him.

Duke University

AINSLIE T. EMBREE

THE JANA SANGH: A BIOGRAPHY OF AN INDIAN POLITICAL PARTY.

By *Craig Baxter*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1969. Pp. x, 352. \$12.50.)

THE Jana Sangh has emerged as India's second largest political party. It has increased its share of the popular vote at each successive general election. While most other political parties are secular in character and their leaders are former congressmen, the Sangh has a religio-political ideology, and its leaders have been alien to the Congress tradition. Its infrastructure is as tightly and as militantly organized as that of the Naxalites.

Such a party needs an exhaustive study, a political biography. Mr. Baxter's outline is sound. He seeks to analyze the Sangh's predecessors, especially the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and its position on such crucial issues as the North-South conflict, the role of non-Muslim minorities in a state based on *Bharatiya Sanskriti*, the limits of economic and social modernization, and the policy toward Communist and Arab states. Since the Sangh's ideology and rhetoric and personal life styles of its leaders are imbued with the traditional Hindu idiom, Mr. Baxter promises to look into the mental state of the party together with its social and political functions.

Alas, noble intentions and sound outline alone do not make a worthy book. Though Mr. Baxter studied Hindi for a year at the Foreign Service Institute and lived for some years in India, it is all too clear that he cannot handle Hindi sources. This is a pity. A monograph on a political party based on the Hindu idiom and the concept of *Bharatiya Sanskriti* requires outstanding competence in Hindi. Mr. Baxter's principal informant is the *Organizer*, a slim weekly in English, which supports the Sangh. His primary sources are eight pamphlets. The footnotes list no private papers, no in-depth interviews, nor extensive references to Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, and various Vidhan Sabha proceedings. The chart in which the caste of Jana Sangh leaders has been analyzed is full of errors.

The book at its very best is a journalistic essay; as a monograph it is a failure. An excellent and timely opportunity to do a first rate study has been wasted.

University of Rochester

BRIJEN K. GUPTA

1688: REVOLUTION IN SIAM. THE MEMOIR OF FATHER DE BÈZE, S.J.

Translated into English with introduction, commentary, appendices and notes by *E. W. Hutchinson*. (Hong Kong: University Press; distrib. by Oxford University Press, New York. 1968. Pp. xxiii, 179. \$7.25.)

THE story of Constantine Phaulkon, the Greek adventurer who rose to be a minister of the Siamese King Narai in the late seventeenth century, is well known to readers of Thai history, thanks in large part to the excellent account given by E. W. Hutchinson in his *Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century* (1940). The present volume makes available in English one of the most important of the basic sources on the Phaulkon story and Siam during the reign of King Narai.

The author was part of a Jesuit party sent to Siam in 1687 to help in the mission of converting the King and other Siamese to Christianity. He arrived at a moment of crisis in Franco-Siamese relations and saw, during his fourteen months' stay, the operations of the large French military, diplomatic, and clerical force in Siam; the Siamese reaction, including the rise to dominance of an anti-French party; the execution of Phaulkon; and the precipitate withdrawal of the French.

Father de Bèze's account is by no means dispassionate; he stands, in fact, as one of the strongest defenders of Phaulkon and sharpest critics of the "weak" policy pursued by the French military and diplomatic contingent. But despite de Bèze's bias, one still gets a portrait of Phaulkon as a man not without his faults, a man who was possessed of a "hot and inflammable temper" but who could "when it suited him" be cool and self-controlled.

Hutchinson's translation faithfully adheres to the admirable transcription of the *Mémoire du Père de Bèze* published by Jean Drans and Henri Bernard in 1947. The specialist, however, will still want to refer to the French text for its numerous explanatory footnotes and its appendix of ten letters concerning Phaulkon, which were not translated by Hutchinson.

University of Hawaii

WALTER F. VELLA

MURRAY OF YARRALUMLA. By *Gwendoline Wilson*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1968. Pp. xvii, 334. \$9.95.)

FRONTIERSMAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE ELPHINSTONE DALRYMPLE. By *Jean Farnfield*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1968. Pp. xi, 171. \$6.75.)

THE LETTERS OF F. W. LUDWIG LEICHHARDT. In three volumes. Collected and newly translated by *M. Auroousseau*. [Works issued by the Hakluyt Society, Second Series, Numbers 133-35.] (New York: Cambridge University Press for the Society. 1968. Pp. xvi, 423; v, 425-819; v, 821-1174. \$19.50 the set.)

THIS review covers biographical treatments of three men who came to Australia in the nineteenth century when expansion from the coastal settlements was of commanding interest. The earliest to arrive was the Irish-born Terence Murray, who was brought to Sydney as a child and later obtained extensive pastoral lands in the outback southwest of Sydney. Murray was active as a large landowner and as a representative of the area in the legislature, becoming ultimately the President of the Council. The title is misleading, as much is added on the other families connected with the Murrays, along with a great deal on the social development of the infant colony. The confusing intermingling of interests other than the life of Murray seems to detract from the supposed main purpose of the book. The author, a resident of Canberra, is intrigued by the coincidence that the choice of Canberra in 1909 as the Commonwealth capital included lands held by Murray, who died in 1873.

The biography of George Dalrymple is concerned with the opening of north Queensland after the northern part of New South Wales became the colony of Queensland in 1859. The immense territory extending to Cape York on the Torres Strait was largely opened to settlements along the coast and to sheep stations in the interior by the explorations of Dalrymple, who came from Aberdeenshire in Scotland just as the new colony was created in 1859. Dalrymple was a restless pioneer who led various expeditions for the government of Queensland. His brief career as officer-in-charge at Cape York ended in 1874. By that time his health had given way in a semi-tropical

climate. He returned to the mother country and died in 1876. The author, a lecturer in the University College of the area (Townsville) has written a well balanced account of the "Father of North Queensland."

Mr. Aurousseau has completed a much more ambitious task by preparing for the Hakluyt Society a three-volume edition of the letters of Ludwig Leichhardt. Leichhardt left his native Prussia after attending a university, left partly to avoid compulsory military service and partly from an intense desire to add to geographical knowledge. He made the acquaintance of two English brothers, John and William Nicholson, who were studying in Germany. They, especially William, became patrons, so to speak, of the needy Leichhardt, who finally went, with their financial assistance, to Sydney in the early forties. At that time little was yet known of the interior of the continent. Leichhardt carried out a successful expedition to the north coast at Port Essington. The restless newcomer then proceeded to his "Grand Plan," no less than an attempt to cross the continent from Brisbane to the Swan River on the west coast of Australia. This meant a journey of at least 2,500 miles through unknown country before the shorter north-south axis from Adelaide to Port Darwin had been traversed. Leichhardt was confident that he could go "right across the continent." His party consisted of seven men, six horses, twenty mules, and fifty oxen. As this cumbersome cavalcade could not travel more than fifteen miles a day, Leichhardt assumed that it might take two years to reach the Indian Ocean. According to Leichhardt's last letter, the expedition started west in April 1848 from a pioneer sheep station 300 miles west of Brisbane and then disappeared. Nothing has ever been found to indicate when and where the expedition collapsed. Leichhardt's foolhardy scheme, however, served to imprint his name indelibly in the list of daring explorers of a continent about the shape and size of the United States south of Canada. Leichhardt had lived only six years in Australia.

Mr. Aurousseau has edited the letters in a thoroughly admirable manner. Of the 205 letters, 156 were written in Australia. If a letter was written in German, an English translation was added to the original. He has provided useful maps, a calendar of related events, abundant notes, and a critical account of each letter. As Leichhardt wrote well and was a keen observer, the volume is a worthy addition to the Hakluyt Society's second series.

Oberlin, Ohio

HOWARD ROBINSON

POLITICS OF THE NEW ZEALAND MAORI: PROTEST AND COOPERATION, 1891-1909. By *John A. Williams*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1969. Pp. xi, 204. \$8.50.)

In this slim volume Williams seeks to examine the Maori role in the formation of New Zealand's race relations following the destructive wars of the 1860's. The outward placidity of these relations when compared to situations elsewhere has often been ascribed to the attitudes of the Europeans and to the responses of the Maoris in accepting and cooperating with European institutions. The willingness of the Maori to accept European stimuli, however, was but one way in which the Maori gained a place in the European-dominated society. Williams, with freshness and originality, shows that the Maori also employed a variety of forms of protest to gain protection for his lands, economy, and culture. To Williams it was the interplay of cooperation and protest, and not cooperation alone, that determined the pattern of relations between the Maori and the European.

By the 1890's, Maori leaders began to utilize European political practices in order to state their needs to the government. Through the Maori parliaments, committees, and the continuing king movement, the leadership exerted pressure for protective legislation and consultation. Such activities were renewed whenever existing safeguards were modified or further legislation was sought. In defining the forms of protest, Williams contributes a long-needed analysis of Maori political activity, and in general he is successful in identifying Maori goals and the instruments used to achieve them.

The volume's brevity is its main fault. The author's approach is hampered by his sparing treatment of how the protest movements came to be organized and operative; the general outlines of courses of action are not supplemented by detailed and refined commentary on the interworkings of Maori politicians. The response of the European to the pressures generated by the Maori communities is measured mainly in terms of legislation and policy statements. Nonetheless, the author demonstrates his thesis and provides an excellent introduction to a better understanding of Maori-European relations.

University of Nebraska

LESLIE CLEMENT DULY

Americas

CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT. By *Raoul Berger*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1969. Pp. xiii, 424. \$15.00.)

THERE never was a time when the decisions of the Supreme Court, born as they are of controversy, have not also met with controversy. The same may be said, of course, of the decisions of Congress and the Executive. But the controversy that has swirled about the Court has continually struck at the very roots of the institution, at its claim to authority. From attacks of this sort, other branches of government have been relatively immune. They have seldom been charged with usurpation of power, whereas it is perhaps the oldest of American national pastimes to level that charge against the Supreme Court's exercise of the power to interpret and enforce the Constitution.

"Lack of historical scholarship, combined with fierce prepossessions," Felix Frankfurter wrote in some exasperation in 1924, "can alone account for the persistence of this talk [of usurpation]. One would suppose that, at least, after publication of Beard, *The Supreme Court and the Constitution*, there would be an end to this empty controversy." There has been no end, even though Beard, writing in 1938, thought that his *The Supreme Court and the Constitution*, which was published in 1912, had settled the matter, and "fairly laid" the ghost of usurpation. There may never be an end, but Raoul Berger's excellent new study deserves to produce at least a lengthy interruption.

Mr. Berger has gone back to the evidence—the common-law background, the colonial experience, the Constitutional Convention, the ratifying conventions, the first Congress—in sum, not only what the framers said and wrote, but the perceptions and assumptions that informed their utterances. As firmly as Beard, but more persuasively, since the evidence he canvassed is more extensive, Mr. Berger concludes that there has been no usurpation.

Mr. Berger is hardly in a position to adduce a mass of newly discovered evidence. He plows fields much plowed before. But his analysis is independent and rigorous, and so his book offers much fresh interpretation and insight. Moreover, Mr. Berger

addresses himself in careful detail, not only to the original materials, but to the rather vast literature that has grown up since Beard. He does not deal with the critics of Beard's economic interpretation—to the extent that they may overstate their case, they do not touch Mr. Berger's—but there can hardly be an argument going specifically to the intention of the framers, rather than their motivation, that Mr. Berger fails to take account of and meet. He is always deeply informed and powerful, and altogether convincing in his basic contention that the Constitution was intended to lodge in the Supreme Court a power to interpret and apply the Constitution against legislation that the judges deemed to be in conflict with it. Not unnaturally—how prescient can we expect men to be?—the historical evidence tells us a great deal less about the reach of the intended judicial power, about the modalities of its exercise, and about adjustments and accommodations between the power of the judges and the function of the other branches of government.

For many years, Raoul Berger has combined distinguished legal scholarship with law practice. "Like Molière's bourgeois who discovered that he had been talking prose all his life, I was much edified," says Mr. Berger, "to find that throughout my law practice I had unwittingly employed 'historical method'"—defined, following Hugh Trevor-Roper and G. R. Elton, as the practice of grounding "detail upon evidence and generalization upon detail." Faithful to that method, Mr. Berger has given us a distinguished work.

Yale University

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL

NATHANIEL WARD (CA. 1578–1652). By *Jean Béranger*. [Études et recherches anglaises et anglo-américaines, Université de Bordeaux, Number 1.] (Bordeaux: SOBODI: Société Bordelaise de Diffusion de Travaux des Lettres et Sciences Humaines. 1969. Pp. 290.)

CONSIDERING the devout attention American scholars pay to the New England Puritans, it is startling to discover that a Frenchman is the first to produce a full-scale study of Nathaniel Ward, who drafted Massachusetts' earliest law code, the Body of Liberties (1641), and wrote the only witty Puritan book to come out of early New England, *The Simple Cobler of Aggawam* (1647). M. Béranger is the third person to write a doctoral dissertation on Ward, but the first to publish it. In composing this meticulous work, he seems to wonder himself whether the simple cobbler deserves such extended treatment. Béranger's opening two chapters on Ward's life and times do not penetrate far beyond Samuel Eliot Morison's brief sketch in *Builders of the Bay Colony* (1930), for there are only a handful of biographical documents to work with. Béranger is primarily a textual critic; two-thirds of his book is devoted to an analysis of Ward's published ideas, literary form, and style. But Nathaniel Ward's literary output was also slender. Béranger attributes four pamphlets to him in addition to the Body of Liberties, and rejects eight other pamphlets that have at one time or another been added to his canon. In essence, he concentrates on two thoroughly dissimilar works, the Body of Liberties and the *Simple Cobler*. He argues that the Body of Liberties is essentially Ward's work and plays down the role of the General Court in revising it. His analysis of this code draws heavily, as it should, on George L. Haskins' interpretation. Béranger is very good at dissecting the tumbling wit and frolicsome bigotry that graces the *Simple Cobler*. He regards Ward's explosive outbursts against ladies' finery as "*bien anglaise et bien puritaine*," yet he places much more emphasis on Ward's sturdy eloquence in espousing his small-minded concept

of truth. All in all, this is an attractive but limited appraisal of an attractive but limited man.

University of Pennsylvania

RICHARD S. DUNN

POCAHONTAS. By *Grace Steele Woodward*. [The Civilization of the American Indian Series, Volume XCIII.] (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 227. \$6.95.)

This scholarly study cuts through legend and romance to delineate the role of Pocahontas in assisting the struggling settlements of early Virginia against the twin enemies of hostile natives and devastating hunger. As background for the intriguing story, the author describes the political, social, and cultural life of the Powhatan Indians, drawing upon the limited number of available studies in anthropology and ethnology. While this material is presented with clarity, it is rather brief and underscores the urgent need for more archeological work before a better ethnohistorical account of the early Virginia Indians can be written. Searching out other relevant material both in this country and in England, the author makes excellent use of letters, particularly from the British Public Record Office, Oxford University, and Cambridge University.

Upon a carefully sketched historical background, the activity of Pocahontas is traced from her appearance at the age of ten, during the first year of the Jamestown settlement, to her increasing significance in subsequent years. Having adopted a friendly attitude toward the English, she was responsible for the rescue of Captain John Smith, a highly controversial event in historical writing. Later, when she was abducted and held as a peace hostage by the English, she became a Christian and was baptized. Her marriage to John Rolfe further contributed to peace during Powhatan's time, and her well-organized visit to England in 1616 effectively publicized the campaign to gain support for the Virginia colony in England. She died while awaiting the return voyage and was buried at St. George's Parish Church in Gravesend; she was only twenty years old. The efforts of interested persons in both England and the United States to preserve the church site of her interment still continue.

This is a sympathetic study of Pocahontas, but it contains a minimum of over-enthusiastic claims for her contributions. Apparently the author accepts without question John Smith's accounts and his story of rescue by Pocahontas; it is unfortunate that there is no reference to the long controversy over Smith's veracity that has involved such writers as Henry Adams, a group of Virginia defenders, and the more recent scholarship of Bradford Smith, Philip Barbour, and Laura P. Striker.

The volume contains portraits, photographs, and John White drawings, including several in color that are particularly well done.

University of Kansas

W. STITT ROBINSON

DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES: THE ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA. By *Michael Kammen*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1969. Pp. xiv, 212, iv. \$6.95.)

This systematic review of available data on the origins of colonial legislatures is divided into two parts. The first contains three short essays that trace the seventeenth-century rise of the legislature as a governmental institution. Many thoughtful questions are put to the reader, and some are answered, but the legislature as a lawmaking

institution is narrowly conceived. While attention is given to its founding, its division into two houses, and its place in society, the emphasis is always upon structure. Little is done to relate such intangibles as the rise of leadership, factionalism, lawmaking, and debate in the discussion of origins. Nor is anything included on the committee system, which became early a device for controlling legislative business. The legislature is thus treated as a rather sterile body, certainly without the vitality and excitement it enjoyed in colonial times.

The second part of the book, almost two-thirds of the whole, is divided into eight brief chapters, each containing three or four documents that illustrate the legislative history of England or the colonies. Each chapter is well introduced, with appropriate remarks on the documents. The last chapter curiously expands the coverage of the book into the eighteenth century and the Revolution. The four documents in this section plainly give the wrong impression of legislative developments during the century and diminish the overall impression of the book, principally because the documents do not illustrate what really happened in the century.

Except for this final chapter, the selected documents are mostly traditional ones. The English background documents cover developments from 1604 to 1628, with nothing from the Long Parliament, the Revolution of 1689, or the eighteenth century, and nothing from the writings of Harrington, Shaftesbury, or Sidney. This lack of philosophy may not be a serious omission because the emphasis is upon the colonies and institutional development, but this neglect of the philosophic base illustrates the narrow conception of the legislature and the idea of its origins. Probably the book's contribution is the accumulation of data and the review of its significance.

University of Southern California

JOHN A. SCHUTZ

THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER, 1606-1609: DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE FOUNDATION OF JAMESTOWN AND THE HISTORY OF THE JAMESTOWN COLONY UP TO THE DEPARTURE OF CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH, LAST PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL IN VIRGINIA UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER, EARLY IN OCTOBER, 1609. In two volumes. Edited by *Philip L. Barbour*. [Works issued by the Hakluyt Society, Second Series, Numbers 136 and 137.] (New York: Cambridge University Press for the Society. 1969. Pp. xxviii, 247; viii, 249-524. \$13.50 the set.)

THE founding of the first permanent English colony in America remains a subject of pre-eminent interest to students of early American history. Many of the documents concerning the founding of the colony have been published over the years. The only general collection of such documents is Alexander Brown's *Genesis of the United States*, published in 1890, which is both rare and lacking in the detachment and care that the best twentieth-century editors have lavished upon the documents of our past. The present volumes deal with the Virginia colony during the life of the original charter of April 10, 1606, which was superseded by the second charter of May 23, 1609, and which effected a major alteration in the government of the struggling colony. Barbour's edition of the documents of this period follows the arrangement utilized by David Quinn in his edition of the *Roanoke Voyages* (Hakluyt Society, Second Series, CIV-CV, 1952). Barbour also seeks to emulate Quinn's persistence in searching out new documents and his meticulousness in presenting them to the public. In this attempt Barbour is, to a large degree, successful. Steeped in the history of Captain John Smith, the major protagonist of the period, widely traveled, and fluent in

several European languages, Barbour possesses impressive qualifications for his task, and he has used these qualifications to good advantage. Specialists in Indian linguistics, however, will question some of Barbour's interpretations of Indian words and phrases that appear in an appendix on the subject. The two largest documents in the collection are reprints of Smith's *A True Relation* (1608) and his *Map of Virginia* (1612). Notable among the minor documents are the dispatches to Philip III from Pedro de Zúñiga, Spain's ambassador to England. Though Zúñiga's letters have been published, at least in part, in Brown's *Genesis*, Barbour's translations often vary from Brown's. In sum, the Hakluyt Society, by the work of Quinn, Williamson, Barbour, and others, has provided us with an increasingly complete documentary history of the beginnings of England's colonial adventure in America.

Smithsonian Institution

WILCOMB E. WASHBURN

EDUCATION IN THE WILDERNESS. By *Floyd R. Dain*. [A History of Education in Michigan, Volume I.] (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission. 1968. Pp. xviii, 345. \$6.00.)

THE MICHIGAN SEARCH FOR EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS. By *Charles R. Starring* and *James O. Knauss*. [A History of Education in Michigan, Volume II.] (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission. 1969. Pp. xii, 225. \$6.00.)

SCHOOLS FOR AN URBAN SOCIETY. By *Donald W. Disbrow*. [A History of Education in Michigan, Volume III.] (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission. 1968. Pp. xiv, 337. \$6.00.)

THESE volumes, taken together, constitute a descriptive history of primary and secondary school education in Michigan from the earliest European penetration until 1964. The breaking point between volumes is 1850 and 1908. None of the volumes is critical or analytic; together they constitute simply a chronicle of events as reported largely in newspaper accounts and in public documents. Volume II, particularly, is largely based on reports of school officials and legislative agencies.

All three volumes tend to be eulogistic; this is a conventional story of the onward march of truth, wisdom, and virtue. Most of the important educational leaders are identified, and their major activities noted, but only in Volume I, by Floyd R. Dain, do individuals come through in somewhat full humanity. Moreover, this reader was often infuriated by the glib assertion of cause and effect, motive, and generalized statement. I found the Dain volume entertaining to read; I waded through the others.

Yet oddly enough, while pondering a somewhat negative review, I found myself in another document recommending these volumes as providing a good concrete case study of events that other historians and I tend to describe from a national perspective in highly abstract terms. The hard data are here: one knows the detailed economic and political pressures under which educators worked; one knows of the teacher supply and demand factors that have plagued those who, through formal teacher education and certification, have tried to upgrade the teaching profession and the quality of instruction in the schools; one sees the hard decisions made by those who wanted public as opposed to religiously controlled education at a time when the churchmen constituted perhaps the only significant supply of dedicated teachers; and one knows how much education how many children received and at what cost. One also can trace from legislative action here reported the emergence of a large and complex school system from its simple roots. If we had more such detailed histories of what

actually happened in many states, a good many misconceptions passed on by historians might well be corrected.

Two important kinds of data are missing: by deliberate design, the volumes do not concern themselves significantly with collegiate and university education; and, perhaps, either because the data are not available or because the authors did not look in the right places, one gets no feeling of what it was like to sit in the classrooms of Michigan's schools. On neither point can one seriously fault the authors. They certainly had to define their universe, and they wrote of an important one. Even with their delimitations, the world they try to describe was huge and complex. All three volumes, especially Volume III, are choked with potentially relevant information. Moreover, as far as I know, no historian has looked extensively at the schools from the inside out. As have many others, these authors view history from the state superintendent's offices, the legislative halls, the churches, the headquarters of the PTA, and the teachers' associations; still, it would have been interesting had they been able to see it from the perspective of the student.

I assume the authors made a choice to provide encyclopedic data even at the expense of critical analysis. A different choice would have permitted more interesting and thought-provoking volumes to be written; it might also have made these volumes less useful to other historians who have their own questions to explore.

Having made their choice, I do think the authors of Volumes I and II might well have abstained from many cosmic, unsubstantiated judgments, such as these not isolated examples: "fortunately, Michigan attracted a larger proportion of educated people than any of the other newly-formed states or territories" (Dain); and "the basic cause of the change [reduction in corporal punishment] seems to have been that Michigan had ceased to be a pioneer state with its crude recreations and rough fights" (Starring and Knauss).

The three volumes are, of course, quite different in style. As I have said, I found the Dain volume most readable. It also seemed to me that the Disbrow volume was least marred by eulogy and unsubstantiated judgment. Finally, I thought Dain and Disbrow were more imaginative in their use of sources. Starring and Knauss spent relatively too much time in the archives of the state superintendent.

University of California, Riverside

MERLE BORROWMAN

ETHAN ALLEN: FRONTIER REBEL. By *Charles A. Jellison*. ([Syracuse, N. Y.:] Syracuse University Press. 1969. Pp. viii, 360. \$9.95.)

Nor since John Pell's biography of Ethan Allen appeared in 1929 has a comparable study of Allen been published. Now room must be made for Charles Jellison's excellent volume. While the Pell work remains useful, Jellison's is fuller, avails itself of new material, and fulfills the author's hope that it would be a more penetrating study.

Writing about Ethan Allen, known chiefly for his seizure of Fort Ticonderoga, poses serious problems not always encountered in biographical studies. Allen was a folk hero, and the line between reality and myth is not readily discernible. Pell made a start in partially rescuing him from the realm of folklore, and Jellison carries on where Pell left off. What emerges is an extraordinary character, colorful, magnetic, enormously self-confident, and toweringly ambitious. If he had not possessed such attributes, a persuasive if bombastic tongue, and an indomitable spirit, Vermont might well have been divided between New York and New Hampshire or devoured entirely

by New York. Allen fought by fair means or foul, and sometimes both, before, during, and after the Revolution against such a fate.

Another problem is that much of what we know about Allen is drawn from his own writings. After all, he was not only soldier, politician, publicist, land speculator, and leader who sought finally to return Vermont to Britain when Congress refused it entrance into the United States and New York was making menacing gestures at invasion; he was also a writer of pungent prose—occasionally lighted by philosophical insights and acute comments on human nature—which was damned by Tories, New York politicians, and New England clergymen (though no atheist, Allen had doubts about conventional religion). Jellison does a superb job of balancing Allen's accounts, usually long on self-praise or justification and short on facts and objectivity, with accounts from other sources; these last, often unfriendly to Allen, not unnaturally exaggerated his less admirable qualities and the controversial nature of his activities.

Notwithstanding his supporters, Vermont itself was not taken in by Allen; it gave Seth Warner command of its Continentals and made Thomas Chittenden its president. But, as Jellison points out in his lively, perceptive, humorous way, based on exhaustive documentary research, Allen, without official position, exercised a degree of influence that often surpassed that of any individual or even, at times, the entire government of the republic of Vermont.

This is a book to learn from and to enjoy.

Wesleyan University

WILLARD M. WALLACE

THE GOLDEN VOYAGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM BINGHAM, 1752-1804. By *Robert C. Alberts*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1969. Pp. xvii, 570. \$10.00.)

WILLIAM Bingham was a business leader of the early Republic who has never been accorded the recognition he deserves. Generally considered to be the wealthiest American of his generation, he engaged in a wide range of mercantile, banking, transportation improvement, and land speculating activities. He was also one of the architects of Hamilton's funding system, and, as United States senator from Pennsylvania from 1795 to 1801, played an important role in formulating Federalist policies.

"Golden Voyage" is indeed an apt description of Bingham's career. As procurement agent of the Continental Congress in Martinique from 1776 to 1779 he made a large fortune outfitting privateers and participating in the trade funneling through that island from France to the United States. Inheriting money and good mercantile connections from his own family, he married more of both when upon his return to Philadelphia he took to wife Anne Willing, daughter of the merchant prince Thomas Willing. Largely through the graces of his beautiful and captivating wife, social eminence followed business success. Anne Bingham became not only the reigning queen of the republican "court" of Philadelphia during the nineties, but an important figure in high English and French society as well. The marriage of the Bingham's eldest daughter to the English banker, Alexander Baring—later to become Lord Ashburton—laid the basis for an enduring Anglo-American dynasty with a foothold in the peerage.

With a bright, terse style, a sure ear for vivid quotations, and a narrative focused on the more colorful aspects of the Bingham's career and fitted snugly into a detailed background of social and political history, Mr. Alberts has produced an eminently readable volume. But as a biography of one of the nation's wealthiest and most successful businessmen of the Federal period it has shortcomings. Although based on a wide

range of manuscript and printed sources, the book gives no comprehensive description of Bingham's manifold business activities, nor does it in adequate detail indicate how he acquired his fortune nor even its precise magnitude. Although a comparison of Bingham's business methods with those of his merchant contemporaries would be very much in order, Alberts does not even mention in his voluminous bibliography the biographies of these men by Hedges, Porter, Bruchey, and Weaver, nor does he take notice of the periodical literature devoted to entrepreneurship in the early Republic. Nowhere does Alberts give an adequate analysis of Bingham's character—an omission all the more unfortunate, because Bingham was apparently not highly regarded by most of his contemporaries. In sum, although Mr. Alberts' book is a strikingly graceful example of the biographer's art, it is a rather superficial biography of William Bingham.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

ELISHA P. DOUGLASS

THE EARLY JEWS OF NEW ORLEANS. By *Bertram Wallace Korn*. [American Jewish Communal Histories, Number 5.] (Waltham, Mass.: American Jewish Historical Society. 1969. Pp. xxi, 382. \$12.50.)

At the beginning of the nineteenth century New Orleans was the melting pot of America. In small numbers at first and in a flood after the Louisiana Purchase, Frenchmen and Spaniards, Yankees and German Jews, Englishmen and West Indians poured into the exciting, expanding, bustling, bawdy city at the mouth of the Mississippi. New Orleans was a boom town. In the seething cauldron of commerce old barriers of color, nationality, and creed melted away. Jews, among others, became Louisianans.

The history of the early Jews of New Orleans is that of scores of individuals who came as aliens to seek their fortunes and were blended into the paradoxically uniform diversity of the city, which still retained an overtone of easygoing Creole life. The first Jew known to have established himself in New Orleans was Isaac Monsanto, who was born in Holland of mixed Sephardic and Ashkenazic parentage. In the fall of 1758 he bought some property at an auction, and thereafter he and other members of his family engaged in a widespread trade from a New Orleans base. They were forced out of Louisiana by a new governor who invoked a Spanish exclusionary act forbidding the residence of Jews in the colony. Under more lenient administrations the Monsantos returned, and many other Jews followed them.

Dr. Korn has traced the careers of the Monsantos and the others whom he has mentioned tirelessly—and, alas, frequently tiresomely—through land records, business ledgers, court archives, newspapers, church rolls, and graveyards. His research has been exhaustive. We usually learn about almost every Jew who came to the city before 1840—where he came from, what property he held, whom he married and who were his children, what law suits he was engaged in, what public or institutional offices he held, when he failed in business or how much of an estate he left, and when he left New Orleans or died. In only a few instances do we get a picture of a man, a place, or an era. One of the better studies is that of Judah Touro who emerges cleared of the sentimental shroud in which his posthumous philanthropy wrapped him. Most of the facts concerning most of the persons dealt with are footnotes made into text.

These are in the form of separate biographies and make the same historical point over and over again. Most Jews were small merchants, as they were elsewhere in the United States. When a severe depression, caused by cotton and land speculation, hit

New Orleans in 1837-41, many merchants, including, of course, Jews, were ruined. Since there were far more Jewish men than Jewish women, most of the men, following the human drive to marry and multiply, wed Christian wives; but this was the rule in small communities where there was no organized Jewish life. There are few records of formal conversion, but many of the mixed couples were married in a church. Catholicism seems to have been a formality with a religiously indifferent citizenry. There were few, minor expressions of anti-Semitism.

As for Jewish life, there was little of it. A congregation, Shanarai-Chasset, was founded in 1827, and survived with difficulty until numbers made it viable. It was only near the end of his life that the wealthy Touro showed any interest in the synagogue. I wish that Dr. Korn had worked his characters into the fabric of New Orleans history instead of dealing with them seriatim, largely outside the context of time and place. With such details in quantity one wonders how Dr. Korn overlooked Dr. Moses Levy, who left New Orleans to achieve minor fame in Texas, and Jacob I. Florence, who, an 1846 Philadelphia list of wealthy men said, made "the chief of his large fortune," \$500,000, in New Orleans. There is a wealth of information in this work, but no synthesis or overview.

The Library Company of Philadelphia

EDWIN WOLF II

JOHN BRECKINRIDGE: JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN. By *Lowell H. Harrison*. Introduction by *Thomas D. Clark*. [Filson Club Publications Second Series, Number 2.] (Louisville, Ky.: Filson Club. 1969. Pp. x, 243. \$8.50.)

THIS is the first full-length biography of John Breckinridge, and it should prove a useful addition to the growing literature on the early national period of American history. This is so not merely because Breckinridge was an important Kentucky politician during the 1790's and an influential national statesman during Jefferson's first administration, but also because he was in many ways representative of the kind of Jeffersonian who was to dominate national politics for almost three decades following the Republican party's triumph in 1800. This latter point is important because while in recent years there has been a steady stream of literature dealing with politics during the Jeffersonian period, it has generally been concerned with the mechanics of party organization or with such out-of-power groups as the Federalists and Old Republicans after 1800, and has only indirectly dealt with the mentality of those Jeffersonians who so tenaciously held power and formulated policy.

Born in Virginia in 1760 and educated at William and Mary College, Breckinridge had already achieved some minor prominence as a planter, lawyer, and politician before moving in 1793 to Kentucky, where greater opportunities beckoned. He did well for himself in the Blue Grass state, he founded a profitable plantation, achieved a reputation as one of the best lawyers in that part of the country, and won acceptance by the ruling faction headed by George Nicholas and Isaac Shelby. In the years that followed he helped to revise and liberalize the state's penal code, introduced Thomas Jefferson's resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Acts in the state legislature in 1798, led the group that helped thwart the attempt to democratize the state's constitution that same year, and was Kentucky's leading Jeffersonian in the election of 1800. Entering the United States Senate in 1801, he was one of the new administration's most important spokesmen, shepherding the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 through the Senate, and playing a key role in the legislative handling of the Louisiana Pur-

chase. He was appointed Attorney-General in 1805, only to die a short time later at the age of forty-six.

Unfortunately, while the major episodes of Breckinridge's life are described with care, no real effort is made either to resolve the seeming inconsistencies of his career or to relate his thoughts and actions meaningfully to the more important developments of his day. No attempt is made, for example, to explain why in 1798 Breckinridge appeared to be so radical on national issues and so conservative on local issues, or to place the Kentucky Resolutions within the broader framework of the development of the states' rights argument. Yet if this book does not present any startling new information or any special insight into how late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century politics operated, it does, in a scholarly fashion, trace the life of an important second-echelon Jeffersonian. This book and others like it will eventually allow the profession to undertake its long overdue reassessment of the meaning of Jeffersonian democracy.

University of Virginia

RICHARD E. ELLIS

THE RIVER AND THE ROCK: THE HISTORY OF FORTRESS WEST POINT, 1775-1783. By *Dave Richard Palmer*. [The West Point Military Library.] (New York: Greenwood Publishing Corporation. 1969. Pp. xii, 395. \$23.50.)

At first glance this book appears to be an antiquarian exercise, and there are traces of antiquarianism in it. After reading it, however, I would say that it is much more. *The River and the Rock* is a good monograph on an interesting topic, West Point during the Revolutionary War. Historians of West Point usually concentrate on the evolution of the Military Academy. As a rule, they give a perfunctory nod to the value of West Point as a fortification complex and to the treason of Benedict Arnold, but then move into the beginnings of the Academy. Palmer's story ends where others' begin.

The control of the Hudson River was an obvious prize to both the British and the Americans during the Revolutionary War. In the fall of 1775 the Americans fortified Constitution Island opposite West Point and garrisoned it with a couple of militia companies. From that time until the end of the war, Fortress West Point evolved in an uneven course. Fits of construction were followed by periods of deterioration. Plans changed; engineers came and went; and various commanders (good, bad, and indifferent) held sway. For a few days in October 1777 the British captured the area only to give it up after learning of Burgoyne's defeat. The Americans built new forts, put a giant chain and a boom across the Hudson, and held throughout the remainder of the war. According to the author, possession of this strongpoint meant victory for the Americans.

Palmer tells his story in a leisurely manner. Although this approach is generally pleasing, there are times when he should have been more concise and used a less flowery style. He explores and analyzes the relationships of the commanders with the engineers and with higher authorities. To his credit, he also places the development of Fortress West Point within the larger context of the war. He could have spent less space on the latter and still provided enough background to give a proper perspective. Another case in point is the biographical sketch of Benedict Arnold, which consumes most of a chapter where a page would have been sufficient.

The author does not neglect the social aspects of the story. Life was hard for the garrison, particularly in the miserable winters, and Palmer is successful in depicting

this as well as the amenities. The fabulous party in May 1782 must have been unforgettable to anyone who was there. Yet, in recounting the life that soldiers lived at West Point, he again could have made his point in fewer words. For example, he gives detailed descriptions of several executions. Of course these were a part of the story, but a detailed description of one or perhaps two should have served the purpose. Such extensive detail is more suitable for chronicles than for monographs.

Palmer also has a thesis to prove. As he states it: "In brief, if there was a way the British could have won the war, it was through capturing and keeping the Hudson River." The fortifications in the area of West Point controlled the river and hence the course of the war. In Chapters 21 and 22 he marshals an impressive case for this thesis. Given a war such as the Revolutionary War—in which a professional army, across the Atlantic from its base, was grappling with a people in a vast territory—one wonders if holding a particular terrain feature would have brought victory. Would Washington's army have surrendered and the colonists generally have ceased all military operations? Would the English have held the area long enough to have the desired effect? After all, they did capture it once and then gave it up after a brief occupation.

This is a handsome book with excellent illustrations and beautiful maps. Palmer apparently enjoyed writing it, and this reviewer enjoyed reading it.

University of Wisconsin, Madison

EDWARD M. COFFMAN

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE BRITISH PRESS, 1775-1783. By Solomon Lutnick. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1967. Pp. xi, 249. \$6.00.)

EDMUND Burke once remarked that "newspapers are a more important instrument than is generally imagined; they are a part of the reading of all; they are the whole of the reading of the far greater number." While widely quoted, Burke's contention for his eighteenth-century contemporaries has long gone unproven, and Solomon Lutnick's study contributes little in the way of substantiation. Just how many Englishmen read the news accounts of colonial discontent and rebellion still seems more speculative than need be. Professor Lutnick prefers to address the printed manifestation of press behavior in Britain during the American Revolution: he furnishes a long-needed extension of the pathfinding work of Dora Mae Clark and Fred J. Hinkhouse, but the sum total seems much less than many scholars might have hoped for.

Certainly it is good to have a study of the Revolution as viewed in the British press. It is good to be reminded that "even by present standards the press was free," that it was able to say what it wanted within modest limits. There is no little fascination in looking at events in America through the eyes of partisan British journalists, in viewing the changing British focus, the adroit political responses to news that was sometimes heartening but usually depressing to the Tory ego. *Scot's Magazine* (September 1775) affords wry amusement with its insistence that Benjamin Harrison was "busy DEBAUCHING all the pretty girls in his neighborhood, on purposes to raise a squadron of whores to keep his old General warm during his winter quarters." And some readers may be terribly tempted to think of the Vietnam conflict as they compare the opposition to the American war—see Edward Gibbon's remark that it was better to be humbled than ruined, and the press bitterness over inflation and rising prices. Newspaper treatments of the defeats at Saratoga and Yorktown have their own intrinsic value and interest, particularly the opposition newspapers' vigorous sympathy for Burgoyne and Cornwallis, depicted as victims of ministerial incompetence.

But is this sufficient? Lutnick's study seems too selfconfining, too limited in

scope. His treatment of the press takes place in a near vacuum and lacks even a minimum sense of context for the most part. Much has happened in the world of the eighteenth-century scholarship since the pioneering efforts of Professors Clark and Hinkhouse. Surely we deserve more than a fleeting reference to Manier, and at least some deployment of the insights handed us by Professors Robbins and Bailyn? As Lutnick admits, he does indeed find himself ignoring major events and major historical findings, but the press proclivity to do the same seems hardly an adequate excuse. In fact, the very omissions of the press can have their own significance, albeit one here unexplored. Professor Lutnick does seem to oversimplify the reputed ease with which the North ministry and George III managed Parliament between 1775 and 1782. But he is more persuasive in his contention that George III probably became more intransigent when confronted with criticism in the public press, a proclivity hardly limited to a British head of state two hundred years ago.

There is a convenient appendix which identifies the newspapers, their publishers, politics and circulation (estimated), and which is titled, "Some Pertinent Facts About the London Press During The Era Of The American Revolution."

University of New Hampshire

TREVOR COLBOURN

THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840. By *Richard Hofstadter*. [Jefferson Memorial Lectures.] (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. xiii, 280. \$6.95.)

OURS is a time of disenchantment with American party politics. Recent surveys of college students show that only 18 per cent rate parties as "good" or "excellent," as compared with 68 per cent who so evaluate the universities they are presumably rebelling against. Meanwhile, 52 per cent call themselves Independents rather than Democrats or Republicans. An annual tabulation of letters to the *New York Times* reveals that only 3.45 per cent of correspondents approved party nominating conventions. Yet it is perhaps appropriate as well as ironic that Professor Hofstadter's brilliant study of the American party rationale appears at this juncture.

His central themes are expressed in his title and subtitle. He is not primarily concerned with party development and behavior, although he offers many useful insights into such questions. His emphasis is on the slow acceptance into American political culture of the role of party action and competition.

Eighteenth-century attitudes were not auspicious on this count. Anti-party sentiments were dominant in England at least until Edmund Burke spoke out for a party "connexion" in 1770. Early American thoughtways reflected this "cant against Parties," as Martin Van Buren put it later in his struggle against such views. Thus Professor Hofstadter is able to draw a number of telling parallels: Bolingbroke with Alexander Hamilton or James Monroe, David Hume with James Madison. Parties were self-ish; they stood in the way of national purpose or unanimity; they were "divisive"; they threatened to disrupt society. At best, parties were unavoidable evils that might have some useful side effects. There was, of course, great irony in all this. Even as they decried the legitimacy of parties, men like Hamilton, Madison, and Monroe were all at work making parties; and they also perceived on occasion the essential role of party and even of party competition. Only the Adamses really eschewed party, and they paid a price accordingly.

The result was a kind of political schizophrenia, what might be called the Maria Theresa syndrome: "she weeps, but she keeps on taking." Thus "national unity" was

the "unity" of Hamilton's party, or of Monroe's, not the unity others might prefer. So also Jefferson protested: indeed he was often the most ambivalent of all in his utterances, even as he was establishing the first, great record of a president who was a strong party leader as well. Practice outran profession; men protested their anti-party virtue while they wrought a functioning party system.

That first system, of course, foreshadowed the elements of American party politics to come. It provided energy and some coherence in government. It carried politics beyond narrowly personal and factional bounds. It came to accept the practical role, if not yet the theory, of a legitimate opposition: an "out"-party that could criticize the "ins," represent excluded interests or voices of dissent, and provide alternations in power and policy. It learned to undertake crucial activity in recruiting leaders, making nominations, and conducting elections. It helped to shape a policy agenda, popularized issues, and offered a substantial choice to the electorate.

Practice was not really accepted in political culture, however, until the advent of the second party system. Only in the mass democracy of Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison, of Van Buren and Thurlow Weed, did men voice open approval of parties. One of the most fascinating parts of Professor Hofstadter's account is the role of the Albany Regency of New York as the vanguard of a rounded theory of party and party competition, all in the face of the collapse of party elsewhere. "The Regency way," Professor Hofstadter remarks, "was to become in effect the American way." It brought with it heavy emphasis on organization, on the professional politician, "regularity," the virtual monopoly of parties in nominations and elections, and the spirit of compromise. These aspects of our politics are all under fire today, even as actual party organization and the role of party in elections decline under the impact of mass media, merchandizing politics.

Professor Hofstadter treats one question after another sensitively, in a prose style that is always clear and felicitous: the book is too full of riches to encompass even in an extended review. There are occasional dubious interpretations or small errors. Thus it is odd to find the DeWitt Clinton Professor of History at Columbia making DeWitt Clinton vice-president in 1804 instead of his Uncle George, and having him "passed over for the presidential succession" four years later. But Hofstadter triumphs over such trivia as even the "Magnus Apollo" did.

In our age of party disrepute, *The Idea of a Party System* may have a salutary corrective effect. Today, the last sentence declares in part, "the party system is . . . most typically criticized not for divisiveness but for offering a superficial and false conflict to the voters, for failing to pose the 'real' issues with clarity and responsibility, and for blocking out dissent." Indeed responsiveness, reconstruction, a new departure, are overdue; our major parties may not survive as significant institutions unless they generate new life.

Against the background of the struggle to establish a viable party system and party rationale, however, another question stands out: short of some such system, how, in an increasingly complex and divided society, are we to meet our national problems at all?

Washington University

WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS

THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON. Volume V, 1 AUGUST 1782-31 DECEMBER 1782. Edited by *William T. Hutchinson* and *William M. E. Rachal*. ([Chicago:] University of Chicago Press. 1967. xxx, 520. \$12.50.)

VOLUME V of Madison's papers devotes 500 pages to 201 documents written during the last five months of 1782 when Madison and his colleagues in the Confederation

Congress seemed suspended uncertainly between war and peace and the touch-and-go peace negotiations kept everyone's "anxiety on fire," as Edmund Pendleton wrote. Hostilities between the American and British armies had virtually ceased after Yorktown, the North ministry had fallen, and peace overtures were under way in Paris, but Congress remained completely in the dark about the proceedings until December 13, when they learned that George III had authorized Richard Oswald to deal with the American commissioners as representatives of the thirteen United States rather than the thirteen colonies. On December 23 Congress received letters from Benjamin Franklin and John Jay which mentioned several preliminary propositions made in October, but the year closed with Madison and Congress unaware of the provisional peace treaty signed on November 30.

Throughout 1782 Madison continued to advocate close cooperation with France in the peace negotiations. Late in the year he was shaken by the revelation that Barbé-Marbois, secretary of the French legation in Philadelphia, had advised Vergennes to exclude the Americans from the Newfoundland fisheries and by a letter from Jay warning that France would not support American claims to lands west of the Appalachians for fear of alienating Spain. But he opposed a move by his colleague, Arthur Lee, to exempt American commissioners from the obligation to conduct negotiations with the knowledge and concurrence of the French.

On the domestic front Madison worked persistently for some means of dealing with the national debt, favoring "the Impost which alone promises a chance of establishing that credit, by which alone the inadequacy of taxation can be supplied." He was especially critical of Rhode Island's veto of the impost proposal, noting that "the indignation against this perverse sister is increased by her shameful delinquency in the constitutional requisitions." He was almost equally critical of Virginia's failure to make any contribution in 1782 toward its quota of the federal requisition. Throughout the year he pressed for the completion of the cession of Virginia's western land claims in order to create a fund "for the general emolument," as the General Assembly of Virginia phrased it, and thus provide income from land sales for discharging the national debt. As a member of a congressional committee, Madison was also instrumental in persuading the Pennsylvania legislature that the Confederation would be imperiled if the federal creditors in the state were to be paid by the state out of money earmarked for the federal requisition, arguing against "the pernicious tendency of such unconstitutional appropriations."

Edward Randolph and Edmund Pendleton were Madison's most constant correspondents in Virginia, and the two-way correspondence furnishes clues to the factional alignments in both state and Confederation politics. The only evidence of the Jefferson-Madison friendship in this volume relates to Madison's motion to reappoint Jefferson as a peace commissioner after his wife's death. Finally, Madison's "Notes on Debates" in Congress, which he began in November, and his weekly letters to Randolph, who did not resign as a delegate to Congress until December, though he was in Richmond serving as Attorney General of Virginia, are invaluable supplements to the official journal and other records of Congress.

The editors have continued their policy of full and meticulous annotation, a boon to scholarship, but something of a drag to the production schedule of this important and fascinating series.

Cornell University

JAMES MORTON SMITH

ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE BRITISH ORIENTATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1783-1803. By *Helene Johnson Looze*. [Studies in American History, Number 8.] (The Hague: Mouton, 1969. Pp. 132. 21 gls.)

ANYONE with scholarly knowledge of foreign policy in the Federalist era would probably agree with the author of this book that Alexander Hamilton's diplomatic statesmanship merits closer study than it has received. The author attempts to remedy what she feels is scholarly neglect, by investigating and assessing Hamilton's role in one of the most important aspects of American foreign policy in the first twenty years of the nation's existence—relations with Great Britain. She tries to measure Hamilton's power and influence on foreign policy through the decision-making methodology of the social scientist and also to give her work contemporary relevance by portraying it as a study of diplomacy as practiced by a developing nation. Her basic thesis, that Hamilton developed a program for building a nation, is well known. But she claims more: he brought together a body of diplomatic methods—including concepts of national interest, peace and neutrality, negotiation, and obligation of contract—that constituted a valuable legacy to future American statesmen. This approach emerges as a theme summarized in her conclusion, that "Hamilton's diplomatic reasoning and argument . . . are adaptable to the national and international politics of today and tomorrow."

In this book, in keeping with its theme, Hamilton stands out as the supreme manipulator, the nationalist hero who is always in command and who can seldom do wrong. He is pictured as a genius of diplomacy, a master diplomat, "a diplomatic theorist and technician," a diplomatist "unequaled in his day"; yet he never held a diplomatic post or a position in government directly concerned with the conduct of foreign policy. Mrs. Looze implies that Hamilton singlehandedly shaped foreign policy, saying, for example, that "he maneuvered the United States into almost twenty years of peace. . . ." In attributing so much to Hamilton she slights other statesmen, such as Washington, Jefferson, and John Adams, who were at least as influential as he was, and probably more important, in the making of foreign policy.

Aside from its laudatory treatment of Hamilton, this book tells a conventional story that can be found in most good accounts of foreign policy in the Federalist period. Its scholarship is limited and lacks balance. The book is based mainly on *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge (1882 and 1904), and on a limited number of other printed sources. It virtually ignores the scholarship of the past twenty years that deals with Federalist policy, and itself offers no new knowledge, interpretation, or synthesis. By bringing together Hamilton's ideas and attitudes on foreign policy in a topical synthesis, Mrs. Looze does succeed in one of her purposes: she shows that Hamilton, whether on stage or off, had an important part in the making of foreign policy, and that he deserves study and recognition as a diplomatic statesman.

University of California, Santa Barbara

ALEXANDER DeCONDE

THE LION OF THE LORD: A BIOGRAPHY OF BRIGHAM YOUNG. By *Stanley P. Hirshson*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. xx, 391, xxvi. \$8.95.)

IN 1965 P. A. M. Taylor called Brigham Young's life "a biography which will not be written." The difficulties of research and interpretation that Taylor discussed have not deterred Stanley Hirshson from attempting a full-scale examination of one of the

two central figures in Mormon history. To this venture, Hirshson brings some fresh research, but his shallow analysis does not fulfill the need for a penetrating and incisive study of "The Lion of the Lord."

The author has read diligently in newspapers and manuscript collections and has gathered the material for a suitable biography of Young. At this point Hirshson backs away from the troublesome problems of his subject's career and supplies only a surface narrative of events. Despite a claim that he has dealt seriously with Mormonism, he gives cursory treatment to Young's religion and grants at best a grudging recognition to any theological content in Mormon history. Hirshson's brief discussion of Joseph Smith's thought rests on three newspaper citations and displays none of the subtlety that marks the work of scholars like Mario De Pillis and Klaus Hansen. The bibliography indicates that Hirshson is unfamiliar with a Mormon journal like *Dialogue* and the rich lode of analytic material about these issues presented there.

The sensational aspects of Young's life receive lavish coverage. A chapter devoted to an expanded list of his wives, as well as a detailed recounting of domestic mores in Salt Lake City, testifies to the author's relentless fascination with polygamy. No story about Young and his spouses has escaped the author's eye. While plural marriage was central to the Mormons' problems during Young's leadership, Hirshson approaches the matter more in the spirit of the Sunday supplements than as a serious biographer.

Preoccupied with Young as a husband, the author slides over his work as a politician and colonizer. Young's dealings with the Union Pacific are misunderstood, and Hirshson misses the significance of organizations like the Zion's Co-operative Mercantile Institution. A reading of recent studies on Utah territorial politics would have improved Hirshson's comprehension of Young's public career.

But further research would not remedy the failings of this biography. Hirshson's anecdotal and discursive method reduces Young to a cardboard character. The qualities that made him the savior of a uniquely American religion disappear beneath descriptions of household furnishings, extended and often irrelevant quotations, and the author's tone of mocking condescension. Hirshson remarks that his labors made him wish "for the wisdom and powers of a prophet." Reliance on the traditional weapons of the historian would have helped him more.

University of Texas, Austin

LEWIS L. GOULD

ULYSSES S. GRANT: WARRIOR AND STATESMAN. By *Ulysses S. Grant 3rd*. (New York: William Morrow and Company. 1969. Pp. 480. \$12.50.)

IN what the author aptly terms a "family portrait," the late Major General Ulysses S. Grant 3rd—himself a distinguished soldier—strives to enhance the reputation of his grandfather, the eighteenth president of the United States. In a preface-letter to his own children, the author states, "you should know more of the truth about him than has been told by the conventional historians, who have apparently never been able to understand him, and the political writers, who for some reason have hated him as the politicians did."

Although the book is undocumented, the author used family records—including the private journal of President Grant's wife—as well as standard sources. Its chief contribution is the full, sympathetic, and persuasive portrait of Grant's pre-Civil War career, of his fine role as husband, father, and family man, and of his character and personality traits. The book is also good, on the whole—though defensive in tone—in

discussing Grant's Civil War military services. In trying, however, to explain away and cushion the charges leveled at Grant about being surprised at Shiloh and in seeking to absolve him of criticisms for the bloody Federal repulse at Cold Harbor, the author goes too far in efforts that are, on these points, as unconvincing as those made recently by Bruce Catton. But the brilliance of Grant's Vicksburg masterpiece is well presented, as is the majesty of the final scene at Appomattox.

More controversial will be the author's eulogy of Grant's presidency, although the defense of his grandfather against Andrew Johnson's charges that Grant broke a promise to him not to return to Edwin M. Stanton the office of secretary of war, which Grant was holding *ad interim*, is credible. But the author's attempts at vindicating Grant's roles in the Santo Domingo affair, in civil service reform efforts, in the belated thwarting of Gould's and Fisk's gold corner attempts, and in the half-hearted efforts to check corruption in the executive departments, are unconvincing.

One of the ablest and most delightful parts of the book covers Grant's post-White House years; here, some genuine historical contributions are made. While the author's chatty, informal writing style is not unusually graceful, it is effectively muscular, apropos of its subject. The index and brief uncritical bibliography are weak, but there is a handsome set of illustrations.

Owing chiefly to the use of personal records, this book will be consulted as a matter of course and profit by future historians seeking to understand this enigmatic and complex soldier-president.

Pennsylvania State University

WARREN W. HASSLER, JR.

THE BEST-DRESSED MINERS: LIFE AND LABOR IN THE MARYLAND COAL REGION, 1835-1910. By *Katherine A. Harvey*. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1969. Pp. xiv, 488. \$14.50.)

THE Maryland coal region lies in one of the north-south valleys of the Allegheny Mountains in western Maryland. As a region, it has numerous advantages from the viewpoint of historical study. It is relatively small, geographically compact, isolated, and was worked for a long span of time. Since it was the only coal region in Maryland, source materials about it in the state records are manageable and very rewarding.

It has often been observed that working people leave few records. Mrs. Harvey has overcome this barrier to writing labor history with an ingeniously researched and intelligently organized study. She has set the history of the region in the national context, and she has written not simply a history of unions but a social history of the labor force in the district. The result is first-rate grass-roots history which illuminates many facets of national labor history from the bottom up.

The Maryland coal field was opened very early with the coming of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In terms of conditions found in American mining communities, the region was near the best end of the scale. The coal vein was high, and the mines were dry and free from gas. The coal was a superior grade preferred by the US Navy and steamship companies. Transportation to the port of Baltimore was short and reliable. Thus working and economic conditions were optimal. The operators were able to escape somewhat from the effects of over supply which kept so many coal regions—miners and operators alike—on the edge of ruin. Hence, the phrase that makes the title, "the best dressed miners." The Maryland field is an instructive point of reference for the comparative study of other coal regions. At

the same time, most of the problems encountered by coal miners were present to enough of a degree to make the study germane to the larger picture.

There is much that is typical of American labor's experience in the book: the continuous struggle for ameliorative legislation which, when finally passed, is drawn so as to be almost meaningless; the incredible ineptness of the Knights of Labor; the enormous influence of British immigrants on the American labor movement. Cornell University Press deserves double honors for this volume. It is a splendid job of book production, but more than that, it is an important book. Although the physical scope of the study is not large, its value is unquestioned.

State University of New York, Stony Brook

HUGH G. CLELAND

ALL ABOARD! A HISTORY OF RAILROADS IN MICHIGAN. By *Willis Frederick Dunbar*. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1969. Pp. 308. \$7.95.)

THIS is a comprehensive, reasonably well-balanced, general account of virtually every mile of Michigan's railway system, which reached a high point of nearly 9,000 miles in 1915, and still operates over 6,600 miles. Although Professor Dunbar occasionally tips his hat to freight traffic and finances, he is more interested throughout in passenger service. This does not prevent him, however, from delving into many aspects—corporate, operating, and strategic—of the broad picture. Hence the account portrays—and in a lively style—most key points in Michigan's varied and fascinating rail history. It is profusely illustrated.

The story starts with the completion of the pioneer Erie & Kalamazoo in 1836, but shifts quickly to the ambitious state plans for pushing three lines across the peninsula. These plans were abandoned when the Michigan Central and Michigan Southern were sold to private interests in 1846; both lines reached Chicago on their own in 1852. By 1856 Michigan had received 5.5 million acres that could be used for rail building; how these grants opened isolated areas and colonized them is a story in itself. Rail mileage in Michigan grew from under 1,000 to 6,959 miles in the golden quarter-century following Appomattox. Activity in the South was largely limited to the Michigan Central and Michigan Southern lines, both of which eventually came under Vanderbilt's control, though even he could not prevent the Grand Trunk from pushing a third line across to Chicago by 1880. Roads in the Northlands were built primarily for lumber, copper, and iron, and their fortunes were tied to those industries. Some through lines survived largely by developing ferry service across Lake Michigan.

Dunbar lovingly tells of the golden age of rail travel from the Civil War to World War I, and rounds out the picture with an account of the interurban lines. A chapter on consolidation and regulation spells out the well-known developments in those fields; another rehearses the familiar present struggle of the rails against subsidized competitors and antiquated labor laws. Dunbar closes on a note of optimism. Citing such things as piggy-back, auto-rack cars, computerized operations, and more high-level planning, he concludes that rail transportation may yet be revolutionized; he is convinced the railroads are "here to stay."

All Aboard is partially documented, but there is no bibliography; the numerous sketch maps are woefully lacking in detail. As a whole, however, the book is a useful history.

University of Western Ontario

RICHARD C. OVERTON

EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISM IN AMERICA. By *William L. O'Neill*. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1969. Pp. xi, 369. \$7.95.)

As interest in women increases among American historians, the need for a careful analytical history of American feminism grows more acute. Although this book attempts to trace the feminist movement from the 1840's to the present, it fails to meet the need.

There are fatal flaws if this is to be judged as a serious historical enterprise. First, and most serious, is the fact that the author begins with his conclusion rather than allowing it to emerge from an examination of the evidence. His research was guided by an a priori judgment that American feminism failed because most of its leaders were too timid to realize that the central obstacle to what he calls "feminine freedom" was the institution of marriage and that only socialism could solve this problem. With this thesis in hand Mr. O'Neill measures each woman; if she did not share his view, though he may admire her, he regretfully consigns her to the scrap heap of tragic failures. Not until page 315 does the author define feminism, and at that point he confirms what the reader has by then long suspected: that he has little understanding of the complexity of the feminist movement.

The second major flaw is the peculiar character of the evidence. It is hard to believe that anyone would seriously essay an analysis of American feminism using, for the most part, printed sources. To ignore the rich manuscript collections at Radcliffe and Smith, to pass over the Susan B. Anthony and the Carrie Chapman Catt Papers, the Suffrage Archives, and the League of Women Voters Papers, is like a right-handed tennis player perversely insisting on using his left hand. He may get the ball over the net, but he is unlikely to place it accurately. The need to use many manuscript sources is particularly true in the case of feminism since so few good monographs exist and since most of the astute leaders were very careful about what they said in print.

The book suffers from the author's tendency to interpolate sermons for our times (a diatribe against suburbs and the FHA in the midst of a discussion of Charlotte Perkins Gilman is a typical example). This habit is symptomatic of a problem that pervades the book. O'Neill never quite decided whether he was writing a monograph or a tract for the times.

The book contains occasional interesting insights, and there are some useful ideas in the ten biographical sketches forming Chapter iv. For the most part historians of feminism will read this book for the stimulus it provides to work harder and do better.

Duke University

ANNE FIROR SCOTT

SURFBOATS AND HORSE MARINES: U.S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE MEXICAN WAR, 1846-48. By *K. Jack Bauer*. (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute. 1969. Pp. xii, 291. \$12.50.)

Few institutions, civilian or military, can boast of a more inspiring history than the United States Navy during the first seventy-five years of its existence. Often viewed with suspicion and generally neglected during peacetime, the navy nevertheless carried out with distinction its roles in the American Revolution, the "quasi-war" with France, the Tripolitan War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. The naval operations of the war with Mexico took place in widely separated theaters of action. In the

Atlantic the navy engaged in convoy, blockade, and the capture of coastal towns. The landing of over eight thousand men with their supplies at Vera Cruz on March 9, 1847, was a brilliant success. It is doubtful that a modern force with radio, radar, and computers could do any better. Rockets, whose design had been improved over those used in 1812, were employed during that campaign but to what effect is not altogether clear. Operations in the Pacific consisted primarily of blockading and seizing port cities. In both theaters there were some problems of command and jurisdiction between land and sea forces, but these differences did not seriously interfere with operations in the face of the enemy.

If the Mexican War with its enormous territorial acquisitions had long-lasting and complex results for the general course of American history, its impact on naval history was revolutionary. A relatively small force had the task of defending a nation with two long sea frontiers, and these shores were 2,500 miles apart by land and more than 14,000 miles apart by sea. "Fulfillment of that mission," writes Bauer, "with the means at hand when the war ended was impossible, and the decade following the war became the second peace time period of expansion that the Navy underwent in the first ninety years of its existence."

Though it is without footnotes, this book is based on a thorough examination of both primary and secondary sources. It is logically organized, nicely balanced, and well written. Clear maps, many well-chosen illustrations, and a good job of printing add to its interest and attractiveness. In short, it is the best treatment of the subject and very likely will remain the best for several years to come.

Ohio State University

HARRY L. COLES

BLOOD ON THE BORDER: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE MEXICAN IRREGULARS. By *Clarence C. Clendenen*. [The Macmillan Wars of the United States.] ([New York:] Macmillan Company. 1969. Pp. xviii, 390. \$12.50.)

CLARENCE C. Clendenen, the curator emeritus of military collections at the Hoover Institute of Stanford, has followed up his prize-winning volume, *The United States and Pancho Villa*, with a lively and readable account of the series of undeclared "brush-fire" wars along the Mexican border from 1848 to 1920. The border episodes and campaigns are viewed as a part of American military history.

Beginning with the activities of Juan Cortina—a legendary Robin Hood figure—the author recounts military activity during the Civil War, the campaigns against the Kickapoos and Apaches, and border problems during the Díaz and revolutionary periods. Clendenen views the years 1900–16 as a period of transition from the old to the new army and devotes better than half of his book to Villa, the Columbus raid, and the Punitive Expedition. He provides illuminating material on the role of the National Guard and the innovative use of airplanes and motor transport, as well as details on daily life, communications, and camp followers.

His reiterated view that the Punitive Expedition was not a "humiliating failure" is suggestive of his whole approach. He contends that military activities in this region have been neglected, partly because they were overshadowed in the earlier period by the wars with the Plains Indians and later by World War I. He argues, however, that as much care and thought went into the planning of these campaigns, as much hardship was endured, and as much heroism was demonstrated as in better-known operations.

To document these views and to bring to light the achievements of American soldiers, Clendenen makes excellent use of interview materials, diaries of participants, published articles, and United States archival sources. He tends to give unquestioned credence to "those who were there," preferring these accounts to subsequent studies, whether by United States or Mexican writers. In fact, the use of Mexican sources—both published and archival—is less than minimal. Mr. Clendenen feels that no apology is needed, since he argues that his goal is to describe the basis on which American commanders formed their decision. It would seem that the reader is also entitled to as balanced a historical account as it is possible to provide.

University of Texas, Austin

STANLEY R. ROSS

ONEIDA: UTOPIAN COMMUNITY TO MODERN CORPORATION. By
Maren Lockwood Carden. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. xx, 228.
\$8.50.)

THE last ten or fifteen years have witnessed a remarkable recovery of our communitarian past in a series of excellent monographs on particular utopias. Escaping from the older tradition of condescension or, at best, the treatment of utopianism as a minor current of American thought, historians have produced studies of the actual workings of particular communities. Professor Carden, a sociologist by training, has now contributed a first-rate account of the Oneida Community.

Mrs. Carden's short but comprehensive book divides neatly into two parts. The first half deals with the origin and communal history of Oneida and its breakup. This does not supplant the standard accounts of R. A. Parker or of John Humphrey Noyes himself, nor is it at all original, but it gives us the best-balanced summary now available. The author convincingly analyzes Noyes's psychological and social conformity to the culture of his day as well as the peculiarities of his personality and his sexual doctrines. Although she concludes that members were probably unhappy in their utopia (because of "excessive psychological demands"), she is persuasive in showing the practical success of "complex marriage" and the advantages, for the female, of *coitus reservatus*.

More original and more interesting is the second half of the work, which traces the remarkable success of Oneida after its dissolution in 1881, first as a joint-stock company united only by a declining ideology and the predominance of former members and their descendants among the stockholders, and then, since the 1930's, as a modern corporation with no tie to Oneida. During the last thirty years the "descendants" have given way to "outsiders," and the town of Kenwood, the geographical and social center of the former community, has become the very model of middle-class suburbia, concerned with the community only as a good advertising image to be shielded from salacious publicity.

The only weakness of the book is its somewhat unhistorical stance. Professor Carden does not show much awareness of the extensive historical literature on communitarianism and does not come to grips with the causes of historical change. Thus, her historical explanation of the causes of secularization is indecisive; she cannot decide whether the breakdown of Noyes's leadership and religious zeal was crucial or not.

Yet, all in all, this is an excellent work—well-researched, clearly organized, outstandingly illustrated, and historically illuminating.

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

MARIO S. DE PILLIS

THE SUSPENSION OF HENRY ADAMS: A STUDY OF MANNER AND MATTER. By Vern Wagner. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1969. Pp. 268. \$8.95.)

In his vaunted career of "failure," how serious was Henry Adams? The degree of failure is a central consideration in taking the measure of his accomplishment, especially of his late historical speculation. In Vern Wagner's opinion, the extremes to which critics have gone in assessing the historical essays range from Yvor Winters's assertion in *The Anatomy of Nonsense* that Adams had simply gone somewhat soft in the head toward the end of his life, to those who have taken Adams too seriously, such as Ernest Samuels, J. C. Levenson, and myself.

Setting aside for the moment the question of whether any of the scholars whom Professor Wagner cites (except possibly for Winters) has quite taken the extreme position that he implies, it is surely true that any extreme position about Adams' late and ultimately catastrophic views of history automatically assures a verdict of failure. On the one hand, he failed because of senility; on the other, because of presumption. Wagner, however, argues that he did not fail at all, or at least that he did not fail by much. Adams was first and foremost a writer; hence, an artist. It was the essence of his artistry that he invented a mode of writing that lies outside the customary genres, a mode deliberately devised to maintain a state of "suspension" between belief and disbelief that is ultimately "humorous." A phrase that appears in the preface and again at the very end of the *Education* serves as the leitmotif for Wagner's study: namely, Adams' recommendation for "silence with good spirit." The silence of deliberate noncommitment is to be balanced by the good spirits that humorously keep the reader engaged with the issue.

In studying Adams' mode of writing as the essence of his creativity, Wagner makes a number of interesting observations about Adams' style. Among the most interesting to historians are those observations pertaining to the style of the *History of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations*. As he moves on to the center of his discussion, on *Mont St. Michel and Chartres* and more especially on the *Education* and the late historical essays, Wagner's thesis dissolves into a series of mere asides to competent précis of Adams' writings.

This is unfortunate, because Wagner's thesis merits consideration, and many of his observations are thought-provoking, even if disjointed. I personally believe that his thesis falters on three interrelated issues. First, to what degree did Adams consciously set out to make his artistry his career? It is one thing to decide as a young man to be a writer and another to grope unsuccessfully toward other possibilities and to settle (more or less inadvertently) on writing. And even when Adams did so, it was hardly as a professional, but as a secretive amateur. Second, if one does not take some aspects of the "failure" more seriously than Wagner seems to recommend, then what sustains the astringency of the writing? Surely "failure" has something to do with Adams' life and is not simply a figure of speech invented by a man whose sole thought was of his artistry, however much his actual failures in life were eventually subsumed in his doomsday imagery. Finally, I would question whether Adams is a humorist in Wagner's sense, or whether he is not more of an ironist. Irony does not exclude humor, nor a sincere desire for some sort of belief, nor the deliberate cultivation of doubt, nor the possibility of some genuine sense of failure. It seems to me that most of the critics whom Wagner sees as taking Adams' failure too seriously have left room, to varying degrees, for the ironical image that he made of failure toward the end of his life.

Brown University

WILLIAM H. JORDY

BOURBONISM AND AGRARIAN PROTEST: LOUISIANA POLITICS, 1877-1900. By *William Ivy Hair*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1969. Pp. viii, 305. \$7.95.)

NEW ORLEANS IN THE GILDED AGE: POLITICS AND URBAN PROGRESS, 1880-1896. By *Joy J. Jackson*. ([Baton Rouge:] Louisiana State University Press for the Louisiana Historical Association. 1969. Pp. xi, 355. \$8.50.)

THE last two decades of the nineteenth century have long been a neglected period in Louisiana history. Yet in that era the social forces began developing that eventually contributed to the rise of Huey Long. Now, thanks to the sound works of William Ivy Hair and Joy J. Jackson, a significant gap in Louisiana history has been filled. Hair devotes most of his attention to the politics of the Bourbon regime, although he also includes valuable material on agricultural conditions, farmer movements, the Negro exodus of 1879, and the labor strikes on sugar plantations in the 1880's. Dr. Jackson surveys the political, economic, social, and cultural history of New Orleans.

Hair's study conforms closely to the image of Southern Bourbonism that C. Vann Woodward developed in *Origins of the New South*. The Louisiana Bourbons were ultraconservatives who considered any "whisper of moderation" as "rampant pseudo liberalism." Without pretense of subscribing to a *noblesse oblige* attitude, they identified closely with the propertied interests and espoused rabid racism that elsewhere was identified with the poor whites. Nowhere else did public services sink so low, as was well illustrated by the fact that in the 1880's Louisiana was the only state, North or South, to show an absolute rise in the per cent of native white illiterates. Clearly, a study of Bourbonism in Louisiana helps one to understand why the state later embraced Huey Long.

Hair's description of the deteriorating plight of Negroes by the 1890's is especially strong. He correctly notes, for example, that mounting racism undermined the Farmers' Alliance Movement in Louisiana. Yet it is on a closely related subject that Hair's analysis weakens. He argues that Populism resulted in a genuine softening of racial animosities between blacks and whites; "yet Louisiana Populism, for all its limitations, represented a brave and essentially sincere effort to break down some of the awful barriers which lay between ordinary whites and blacks." This view of the Populist attitude toward Negroes has recently come under mounting attack, and there is strong evidence that the Louisiana Populists actually offered little hope for blacks. In 1896 the Populist nominee for governor, John N. Pharr, was a sugar planter who in 1887 had driven Negro strikers from his plantation. In 1897, moreover, the Louisiana Populists favored a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting.

During the Bourbon era, Louisiana's only city, New Orleans, suffered as did the rest of the state. Largely untouched by the new waves of immigration and unable to attract a sizable amount of industry, New Orleans did not grow as rapidly as did other major cities in the late nineteenth century. The city was faced by such common urban maladies of that time as an inadequate sewage system, miles of unpaved streets, sporadic garbage collection, and a high rate of disease; little progress was made in meeting these problems. Dr. Jackson attributes this urban stagnation to the fact that the city was then undergoing a period of transition in which men concentrated primarily on solving problems inherited from Reconstruction. Only after the city's commerce revived and the debts of the Reconstruction regime were settled—both of which had been achieved by the turn of the century—could New Orleans begin modernizing. The author, however, too readily attributes New Orleans' plight in the Gilded Age to the Reconstruction period, and thereby moves onto dangerous ground. Unfortunately,

there is not a sound study of either Louisiana or New Orleans during Reconstruction. Admittedly, some of New Orleans' troubles could be partly attributed to Reconstruction, but, as Hair clearly indicates, most of Louisiana's troubles of the late nineteenth century stemmed directly from the Bourbon regime, not from what preceded it.

University of Georgia

WILLIAM F. HOLMES

SAINT-GAUDENS AND THE GILDED ERA. By *Louise Hall Tharp*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1969. Pp. xii, 419. \$8.50.)

REVIEWERS receive from this journal, with their review copy, a list of suggestions. One is to advise the Editor if a book ought not to be reviewed. After a first reading of Mrs. Tharp's biography of Augustus Saint-Gaudens, this reviewer was inclined to offer such advice. Mrs. Tharp has been writing books steadily since the early 1940's—books about the Peabodys, Manns, Howes, Wards, Agassizes, and Gardners; however, only three were reviewed here, one in 1950, one in 1954, and another in 1960. Thus, it seemed appropriate that Mrs. Tharp's *Saint-Gaudens and the Gilded Era* should be reviewed in the *AHR* in 1970.

If it was possible for America to produce a famous sculptor in the nineteenth century, Augustus Saint-Gaudens was he. His work was exhibited, and he was honored, in America and Europe. His patrons were great cities, established architects, renowned authors, and other prominent people. Saint-Gaudens added to their luster and they to his, which was what much of the Gilded Age was all about. Henry Adams, Stanford White, Theodore Roosevelt, Richard Gilder, Henry James, John Singer Sargent, and Robert Louis Stevenson were among Saint-Gaudens' friends. How Saint-Gaudens developed as an artist and a public figure was, presumably, the story Mrs. Tharp would tell. But she does not tell it.

For Mrs. Tharp, the Gilded Era was "America's brief passion for the Renaissance in art." But she never questioned Saint-Gaudens' passion for allegorical figures in his sculptural compositions. She did not attempt "to mention all of the works of Saint-Gaudens," only those illustrative of a period in his career or those "of human interest . . . or of national importance and easily visited." Even then she appended no lists of major works. In truth, Mrs. Tharp was far more interested in the Saint-Gaudens' drawing room than in his studio, for there she found what has always been her subject, no matter what she titled her books—the beautiful people of nineteenth-century America.

In this, her most recent book, Mrs. Tharp offers her reader yet another charming, gossipy peep at the last century's well-born and well-received with no concern for how they got that way. The result is pleasant, light reading, but not history. The best the reader can hope to take from the book is entertainment. For an understanding of art in the Gilded Age and life in Saint-Gaudens' world he will have to go elsewhere.

Dalhousie University

DAVID H. CROOK

ROBERT HENRI AND HIS CIRCLE. By *William Innes Homer*, with the assistance of *Violet Organ*. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1969. Pp. xvii, 308. \$17.50.)

ROBERT Henri went through the training prescribed for aspiring painters in late nineteenth-century America. But both the realistic canons of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts and study in Paris only confirmed his stubborn individualism. He lived

principally in New York and became famous for teaching a humane open-mindedness toward art ideas. He helped form "The Eight," who staged a controversial exhibition of "Ashcan" works in 1908 that mirrored the varieties and tensions of urban life and spurned academic rules.

Henri was methodical and reflective rather than innovative. He produced many arresting landscapes; yet, like most Americans, he distrusted the Impressionists' concern with ever-shifting light rather than with the substantive scene and the figure. Though his late painting was thin, Henri's best portraits incorporated a firm realism gained partly from studying Velasquez and the Flemish masters and paralleled the work of William Merritt Chase and John Singer Sargent. He also displayed bravura "painterly" qualities in street scenes and character studies.

Henri's friends were artists rather than social reformers. Painting had a general social mission, but was primarily an individual interpretation of the world. Henri opposed academies, juries, and medals that circumscribed subject matter and style, but he did not reject training and the study of past art. Intellectually, his circle upheld individualistic expression. Artistically, their modified realism, especially in cityscapes, reflected concern for pluralism and vitality, but risked becoming conservative local color. They were not as "modern" as either friends or foes thought.

Professor Homer's biographical treatment, which rests on rich new sources, outlines the cultural setting. Sharper conclusions are in order at some points, but he does not overrate Henri's work or ignore his limitations. Homer offers many fascinating glimpses into the art world of 1880-1920, and his book reflects a steadily growing interest in the era's culture. This urbane, well-illustrated, and sensible work is a good model for everyone interested in that subject.

University of Texas, Austin

H. WAYNE MORGAN

ADLAI STEVENSON: PATRICIAN AMONG THE POLITICIANS. By Bert Cochran. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls. 1969. Pp. 424. \$10.00.)

IN this sprightly piece of iconoclasm Bert Cochran analyzes the role played by upper-class liberals in post-Civil War political life. The book is not so much a biography of Adlai Stevenson as it is a using of Stevenson's career to illustrate a thesis about the politics of industrial America. Indeed nearly half the volume consists of two extended essays on this theme, one preparing the scene for the particular Stevensonian illustration of the thesis, the other reflecting on the role of liberals in the post-Stevenson phases of the cold war.

Mr. Cochran's argument is scarcely new, yet his presentation of it is readable, caustic, and persuasive. Writing as if he had somehow managed to combine in his person the skills of I. F. Stone, Matthew Josephson, and a rather insouciant Christopher Lasch, Cochran argues the need to study the upper-class reformer as a social type. The type emerged as essential to American politics when, during the Gilded Age, "the two parties became identical for practical purposes." While real power remained where it always must—with the owners of great wealth—"the upper-class reformer played an indispensable role in imparting vitality and supplying purpose to the political game. . . . What happened after the Civil War was that a new generation had come up whose family fortunes had been established by the fathers or grandfathers. The gentleman reformer had been reared in luxury or solid comfort, had gone to the best schools and entered the top clubs as a matter of course. . . . The sons, as they followed their fathers into business or the professions, had a chance to look around.

The more sensitive, fastidious, or intellectual did not like what they saw. . . . The reformer-to-be sniffed with dissatisfaction; he was alienated from his class and, at the same time, was very much a part of it through ties of money, association, and elitist outlook. . . ."

Initially a critic more than a practitioner, the reformer had as his high priest E. L. Godkin, and, as a signpost to participation in politics, Carl Schurz, who declared that "we want a government which the best people of this country will be proud of." As a kind of "surrogate of a British aristocracy" the reformers believed that they alone could rise above special interest and speak for the "good of the whole community of free individuals." As moral critics they cannot be designated simply as members of W. A. Williams' "national class," which includes John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson; being mildly alienated from trade, they are excluded from Gabriel Kolko's class of "political capitalists"; touched by Puritanism, they are certainly not among Lasch's "new radicals"; unaware of any serious status problem, they are difficult to fit into Richard Hofstadter's Progressives. Yet, since their reformism was tempered always by consciousness of their origins and the material basis of their influence, they never attacked the system of possessive individualism but confined themselves to opening up within the system the paths of excellence.

Cochran's central proposition is that the upper-class liberals have been the essential aids in piloting popular upheavals into parliamentary reform politics. Thus they supported Grover Cleveland, the Roosevelts, and Wilson. And in the age of the Kennedys and Johnson they have learned to be nonideological social democrats. But enough of the scorn for dissembling remained with most of the upper-class reformers that they could be better second- than first-rank politicians or public servants. Stevenson could accept the general premises of the cold war and yet be tortured by having to lie abroad for his President. Nor could he "like a Roosevelt or a Churchill, manage easily the dual roles of demagogue and patrician. He had undertaken to play the politician with hesitation and conditions, but he resented it. They were mistaken who attributed his resentment to his attachment to abstract morality. It was upper-class fastidiousness."

While Cochran's delineation of the role of the upper-class liberal may be faulted in some of its specifics, it provides a generally valid and often very revealing context for his caustically sympathetic analysis of Adlai Stevenson's turn on stage.

University of Toronto

KENNETH McNAUGHT

THE RHETORIC OF EMPIRE: AMERICAN CHINA POLICY, 1895-1901.

By Marilyn Blatt Young. [Harvard East Asian Series, Number 36.] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1968. Pp. viii, 302. \$7.50.)

THE importance of this volume lies in its treatment of a highly formative period in the history of the relations of the United States with China. Attention is focused on the growing importance of commercial ties and the rapid development of the missionary movement as causative factors in the emergence of a new energy in diplomacy. The growth of trade in the 1890's, in terms of percentage, was impressive. There was also a sprightly new development of interest in investment. Mrs. Young renders a service in presenting detailed information on the speculative adventurers who sought to enter the banking and railroad fields. These enterprises came to naught, except in the case of the American China Development Company. However, the China market gave rise to a lively rhetoric and some substantial results in the sale of cotton goods. Together

these economic and religious interests gave John Hay what he sought: a public interest in China that justified a more energetic China policy.

The chapters dealing with the writing of the Open Door notes of 1899 and the shaping of policy during and immediately following the Boxer uprising constitute a most valuable contribution. Mrs. Young's analysis, in this reviewer's opinion, is the best of the available accounts. Her presentation of John Hay's handling of the crisis in 1900 is especially praiseworthy. She has made excellent use of a variety of sources hitherto inadequately used and has used them with insight and imagination, yet with due scholarly restraint.

The questions that arise concern only minor aspects and in no way diminish my respect for this fine volume. Were not the diplomatic notes and reports of Denby a more accurate reflection of his own ignorance and insensitivity than they were of American ethnocentrism? When all of Conger's reports are considered, do not his imperial pronouncements appear to be the products of an occasional fever and his overall position more nearly one of ambivalence? Rockhill was not, as the author states, a consistent admirer of the mass of Chinese, and he utterly disliked Li Hung-chang, as did a great many others. However, he understood the Chinese as did none of his contemporaries, and when he appeared to be highhanded in holding the officials responsible for the acts of the populace, he was giving vent to his strong dislike of Manchu officialdom rather than the Chinese. His letters to John Hay in the late summer and fall of 1900 reveal both understanding and sympathy.

Michigan State University

PAUL VARG

SEEKING WORLD ORDER: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO 1920. By *Warren F. Kuehl*. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969. Pp. xi, 385. \$8.95.)

THE history of America's internationalist impulse has not been a popular subject. Overshadowed by isolationism, suspect as an aberrant tradition without firm roots until after World War II, American internationalism has had no full-scale study.

Warren Kuehl's chronicle of American efforts to build a political world order, 1890-1920, goes far to fill the gap. Drawing on a wide array of manuscript and printed sources, Kuehl argues that American internationalism can be traced back to the early years of the nineteenth century when Americans organized themselves into local, state, and national peace societies to abolish armed strife. These men, however, were pacifists first and internationalists second. The distinction is an important one, for as Kuehl shows, pacifists took a negative approach to international affairs—urging no more than the abolition of war—while internationalists, who first appeared in significant numbers in the United States in the 1890's, accepted the need for positive programs of action leading to a politically organized world. This American movement for world order grew so rapidly in the early years of the twentieth century that European internationalists looked to it for leadership. Moreover, by the time of the First World War America's internationalists were able to persuade a majority of their fellow citizens of the need for a league or association to assure postwar stability. Unfortunately for these Americans, however, they could never knit themselves into a sufficiently unified group to determine the nature of the world body agreed upon at Versailles; indeed, the hallmark of their movement was an insurmountable diversity of views on how to achieve their goal. As a consequence, internationalist reaction to Wilson's Covenant was only general approval qualified by numerous suggestions

for improvement. "In making their proposals for change, they [the internationalists] encouraged, if they did not initiate, the strategy which eventually resulted in the Senate's rejection of the treaty."

Kuehl's excellent narrative account leaves a number of important unanswered questions. Why did Americans become internationalists? Why did the movement gain momentum in the first years of the twentieth century? What was its relationship to American Progressivism? What comparisons can be made between American and European internationalists? Why did the United States spawn a more active internationalist movement than Europe?

If Professor Kuehl carries his story beyond 1920, as he says he may, it is hoped that he will enrich his study with substantial attention to these questions.

University of California, Los Angeles

ROBERT DALLEK

THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH: AN ADVENTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. By *Eugene P. Trani*. ([Lexington:] University of Kentucky Press. 1969. Pp. 194. \$6.75.)

As the present century began, Theodore Roosevelt, being youthful and activist, presented Americans with a new kind of presidency. But in international affairs at least, he played a game that was old-fashioned. The game centered on the notable desire of strong national leaders to be the directing hand in great strokes of diplomacy, behind the scenes, or, if necessary, at the center of the stage. Roosevelt's inclination to enjoy such glory was redeemed, if not fully explained, by the fact that he played the game well, and never better than in helping to bring about the Treaty of Portsmouth. Professor Eugene Trani of Southern Illinois University has documented this arresting drama from the abundant English, Russian, and Japanese sources. And in what he calls "wistful retrospect" he concludes: "Roosevelt's mediation . . . marked the last time a great international dispute proved susceptible to personal arrangement. His momentary success closed the diplomacy of the nineteenth century."

Roosevelt's ready interest in being a peacemaker arose out of his own needs as well as those of America as he divined them. After the Russian naval debacle at Tsushima Straits, Theodore Roosevelt concluded that if, through defeat in the war, the Russians lost all of their Far Eastern possessions, then Japan, immensely more powerful, would immediately constitute a grave threat to the burgeoning interests of the United States in the Western Pacific. As a result, Theodore Roosevelt, working as a matchmaker, brought about the marriage of Japan's interest in ending the expensive war, and Russia's fear of revolution at home, and produced a peace the world would applaud ever after.

Trani has mined the English-language sources carefully (but has been less thorough with Russian and Japanese materials), and he has extracted the ore from the slag. Unhappily, his account is marred by infelicities of expression that force the reader in too many instances to backtrack in order to make a second try at discovering the purport of phrases and sentences. A young scholar working on his first book merits better editing from his publisher—especially a university press—than this one seems to have received.

Nevertheless, the story Trani recounts is intrinsically fascinating: its themes include a memorable confrontation of East and West, a major American foray into *Realpolitik*, and the destiny of a continent in the balance. And out of it all, Theodore Roosevelt emerges not in a fresh light but in a bright old light bubbling with energy and

rectitude, a Peck's bad boy considerably less irresistible today than sixty-five years ago when millions of Americans were pleased to believe that the world revolved around him.

Columbia University

HENRY F. GRAFF

POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM IN ALABAMA. By *Sheldon Hackney*. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 390. \$10.00.)

To a greater extent than a brief review can summarize, this balanced and measured study offers new perspectives on a period that was a major watershed for Southern history perhaps even more than for national history. It is a challenging work of interpretation, firmly grounded in research and carefully developed in a well-ordered and often felicitous prose. The author's use of the quantitative method, moreover, exemplifies the computer's potential as a tool for the historian, adding a different kind of source material to supplement but not supplant the more traditional kinds, manuscript and printed.

The central historical issue with which Hackney grapples is "the idea of continuity between Populism and Progressivism." He finds little continuity in voting patterns, in leadership, or in outlook. One of the most startling revelations is the absence of any significant correlation between Populist voting and Progressive voting (at least voting for Braxton B. Comer). Populist voters, Hackney argues, mostly relapsed into inactivity or went Republican. Such Populist leaders as the silverites enticed back into the Democratic party soon moved opportunistically to its conservative wing, including the chief leader, Reuben F. Kolb.

The basic difference between Populism and Progressivism, Hackney suggests, lay in the difference between mass movements and interest-group politics. The Populists' failure as a mass movement resulted largely from their failure to develop an ideology that would supply a new system of values. Neither "backward-looking nor revolutionary" they viewed society as essentially static. Although receptive to new ideas, they "gave voice to the continued desire for minimum government in the Jeffersonian mold." They remained ambivalent about the competitive system. Consequently "Populism did not offer the exciting new vista of the future that would have motivated an uneducated, insecure, but obviously susceptible electorate."

Progressives, on the other hand, "viewed reality in dynamic terms." They agreed with Populists on equality of opportunity, but believed that greater opportunity "could only come through greater economic growth to multiply the chances of success, and such a goal could only be realized through increased governmental services to stimulate growth and enable individuals to take advantage of the greater opportunity." Thus Alabama Progressivism "resembled more the Eastern, urban, Roosevelt brand than the Western, rural, Bryan variety." And in several respects Alabama Progressives differed from the typical Progressive described by George Mowry: they were not optimistic about human nature, not motivated by status anxiety, not dominated by producer values, and not opposed to reform in the 1890's.

From analysis of voting patterns in the Constitutional Convention of 1901 Hackney arrives at four broad categories or "systems of political sentiments" in Alabama, whose adherents he labels "Agrarians," "Planters," "Bosses," and "Progressives." Of these the Agrarians were weakest and most isolated, although paradoxically in agreement with their old enemies, the Bosses, in favoring limited government. Paradoxically,

too, the Progressives would most readily find allies among the Planters. For this reason "eliminating the theft of Negro votes by eliminating Negro voting" in the 1901 convention, an action most vigorously supported by the opponents of reform, weakened the Bosses, reduced the inhibition of anti-Negro fixations among Planters, and opened the way "for the Progressives to assemble from the purged electorate a winning coalition, a coalition that owed little to Populist antecedents."

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

GEORGE B. TINDALL

LIBERALISM IN THE NEW SOUTH: SOUTHERN SOCIAL REFORMERS AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT. By *Hugh C. Bailey*. (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press. 1969. Pp. 290. \$10.00.)

For the past quarter of a century historians have been elaborating Arthur Link's discovery that the South developed an indigenous Progressive movement in the early years of the twentieth century. Though there were perhaps some differences as to timing and as to the relative emphasis placed on agrarian, industrial, political, and social issues, Southern Progressivism exhibited all of the features of the national phenomenon even though the South deviated sharply from so many national norms and is generally thought to have been an economic colony of the North. This paradox is deepened by Hugh Bailey's most recent book, *Liberalism in the New South*. Professor Bailey's central concern is to demonstrate not only that Progressivism existed in the South but that the South produced reformers of the comparatively rare social welfare variety, that these reformers were well integrated into the national movement, and that on occasion they provided leadership and played important roles on the national scene.

The author achieves his purpose through seven essays focused primarily on the public careers and social thought of George Washington Cable, Walter Hines Page, Alexander J. McKelway, Edgar Gardner Murphy, Booker T. Washington, and T. Thomas Fortune. Concentrating narrowly upon the epiphenomenon of Progressivism of which these men were a part, Bailey ventures few generalizations, and those ventured are less reliable and less interesting than the abundant details concerning the complex matrix of political and intellectual relationships in which his middlebrow social reformers were involved.

Secondary but insistently pervasive motifs of Professor Bailey's collection of essays are the salience of race relations as a social problem and the great variety of points of view among the reformers. One important lesson is that there is no necessary incompatibility between liberalism and racism. The author is aware that "many Southern progressive politicians used racism as a basis for their rise to power and sustained themselves by its exploitation," and he adds examples of how the welfare and liberties of black Americans were sacrificed in the interest of goals higher up on someone else's list of priorities. Nor has this been peculiar to the South. As was true with Southern Progressivism, Southern race relations were fully in consonance with the national trend. All of these points have been made before, but they are worth making again.

That a scholar in Birmingham, Alabama, should be writing of reformers sympathetically and of racism critically deserves applause. It is perhaps another instance of the divided mind of the nation's most paradoxical section.

Princeton University

SHELDON HACKNEY

BURZHUAZNYI REFORMIZM V SShA (1900–1914) [Bourgeois Reformism in the USA (1900–1914)]. By I. A. Beliavskaia. [Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii.] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka." 1968. Pp. 414.)

THIS is an interesting and useful book, for it represents a diligent and informed examination of the American Progressive era by a Soviet scholar who has clearly taken pains to go beyond the surface views and sweeping condemnations of American policies that have filled the pages of others of her countrymen. Although Mme. Beliavskaia's outlook is, of course, that of a committed Marxist-Leninist, she has written something more than a schematic reflection of the major articles of belief of the "diamat." As the bibliography and footnotes of this volume will show, she has drawn upon such widely ranging sources as the works of Admiral Mahan, the *International Socialist Review*, and even on "Mr. Dooley," and has thereby given a more balanced and finely shaded picture of the era than a reader scarred by the pejoratives of the Soviet mass circulation press might expect. Her evaluations of American political figures of the period from 1900 to 1914 are judicious and free from exaggerated praise or blame. She writes, for instance, about Tom Johnson of Cleveland as a man who, though "he remained to the marrow of his bones a representative of his class," hoped to reform the corruption of city government and "sincerely wished to improve the life of the city poor." Even Daniel De Leon, whose theories are called "deeply mistaken," is spoken of as a masterful writer and the principal American socialist theoretician.

Mme. Beliavskaia is equally careful in her handling of events and in her final assessment of the Progressive movement, which she views as having had some positive results even though it was principally an expression of petty bourgeois self-defense against both the monopolies and the growing socialist and labor sentiment. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson adroitly used a policy of concession to the Progressives, she writes, and so satisfied the critics of capitalism without disturbing the basic structure of American society. This is, of course, quite a natural conclusion for a Soviet historian of the United States, but it is arrived at by one who is aware of the complexities of American development and who has taken into account a broad selection of the written record of the era. Although, as she notes, Soviet libraries may lack much of the American press of the period—even the *New York Times* for the years before 1913—she was able to use American libraries, and even some archival material, during a short visit to the United States.

Not all of Mme. Beliavskaia's conclusions would be acceptable to American students of the Progressive era, nor does she manage to avoid some errors and misinterpretations, but she has written as a scholar and analyst and not as one intent upon scoring debating points. It is unfortunate that, since this book is issued in but 1,800 copies, relatively few Soviet readers can have access to it, and it is equally unfortunate that so few American historians know Russian.

Library of Congress

ROBERT V. ALLEN

CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM AND THE LAW IN CALIFORNIA: 1919–1927. By Woodrow C. Whitten. [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Volume LIX, Part 2.] (Philadelphia: the Society. 1969. Pp. 73. \$3.00.)

THE author states the theme of this study as "the attempt by legislative enactment and judicial process to define a new crime in California—the crime of syndicalism."

This account is a case study of the California law, one of some twenty-four similar state acts. The research is thorough, and the account is interesting, but it is a bit annoying to have so much of the text in the footnotes.

In explaining the passage of the act on April 30, 1919, Whitten provides an excellent description of general hysteria in the country. Other factors he considers were the desire of California agricultural and lumbering employers to suppress organized labor, and, important in tipping the balance, a series of bombings in California from 1917 to 1919. The only opposition came from organized labor.

The purpose of the law was "to reach the advocate of sabotage because it was impossible to catch him in the actual act." The provisions of the law made it a felony to speak, print, teach, aid, or advocate violence aimed at accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or to become a member of any organization, group, or assemblage that advocated the same.

The method of conviction was simple. First, two or three professional witnesses who claimed to have been bomb throwers in the IWW described the purported beliefs and acts of the organization. The final step was to prove that the victim was a member of the IWW, usually admitted by the defendant. Of the 531 indictments between 1919 and 1925, 164 were convicted, and 128 were returned to prison.

The higher courts, including the US Supreme Court, sustained the law. Even the traditional dissenters Brandeis and Holmes joined in a separate but concurring opinion. This book has considerable relevance for the current period. Although the author makes no such reference, it would be of interest to know if the law is still on the books.

University of Wisconsin, Madison

ROBERT OZANNE

REPUBLICANS AND LABOR, 1919-1929. By *Robert H. Zieger*. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1969. Pp. x, 303. \$8.25.)

THE labor problem in the 1920's represented an unresolved holdover of nineteenth-century industrialization; and, if three of its major facets are kept in mind, the complexity of the issue and its social ramifications are dramatized. For the general public, the labor question was external and could be satisfactorily answered by tranquil workers and labor stability. For the Republican party and organized labor, however, the problem was internal and vastly more complicated. The one aimed at peaceful, prosperous workers gratefully supporting the party at the polls; the other was chiefly concerned with maintaining wartime gains and in extending labor's rights during the postwar years. Zieger's account deals with the subtle interplay of these three factors, although his primary focus is on the internal debate among Republicans as they struggled to fashion a workable, defensible labor policy during the Harding and Coolidge administrations.

In dealing with labor, Republicans had the choice of at least four alternative policies, each ardently supported by contending segments of the party coalition. Zieger classifies these as the open shop, the political, the progressive, and the efficiency-engineering approaches, and he describes fully the leading exponents of each viewpoint, their rising or falling fortunes with Harding and Coolidge, and the use that was made of one or more of these strategies in the labor issues of the new era: the open shop, the antistrike proposal, unrestricted immigration, the twelve-hour day, and the government's response to serious strikes by railroad and coal mine workers.

As the Republicans shifted their labor policies from the confused responses of the vacillating Harding to the tranquilizing effect of the cleverer and more expedient

Coolidge, it became evident that Hoover's counsel had triumphed over all rival options. Zieger's exposition of the role of the Secretary of Commerce in formulating the party's labor policy, his leadership in the fight against the twelve-hour day in the steel industry, and the application of his method of voluntarism to the coal industry in the Jacksonville agreement is both thorough and valuable. But his judgment that the success of the party's labor policies was more apparent than real—that Republican leaders in fact failed to confront the labor problem effectively—unfortunately resembles an unexamined assumption more than a well-reasoned and argued conclusion.

Zieger's study is grounded in extensive manuscript and archival research and will be of great interest to those concerned with the 1920's, the Republican party, and the cabinet career of Herbert Hoover.

New York University

ALBERT U. ROMASCO

THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND HIS ADMINISTRATION. By *Robert K. Murray*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1969. Pp. ix, 626. \$13.50.)

IN 1948 Frederick J. Paxson published *Post-war Years: Normalcy, 1918-1923*, the most balanced survey of the Harding administration written prior to 1969. The Harding papers were not then available to researchers, but Paxson at least scraped away the muck that frequently obscures the early years of the 1920's and considered questions essential for any analysis of an administration: How complex were the problems facing the administration in 1921? What kind of appointments did the President make? What were the program and accomplishments of the administration? What were the President's contributions? Paxson provided a relatively favorable assessment, but it was lost in the colorful pages of Frederick Lewis Allen and Samuel Hopkins Adams. And although Andrew Sinclair and Francis Russell in biographies of the 1960's used the Harding papers, their focus was on the negative rather than the positive; and Russell seemed so fascinated by Nan Britton and Carrie Phillips that more important, but pedestrian, activities received comparatively little consideration.

Now Robert K. Murray, professor of history at Pennsylvania State University, has returned to the balanced detachment of Paxson, buttressed by impressive manuscript research and the historical scholarship of the past two decades. Murray's thesis is that "by all standards of political compromise, the Harding administration was a success," and that "Harding's personal contribution as an emollient and mediator was immense." Chapter by chapter, in an excellent survey, he builds up the record on the background of the confusion and emotionalism of postwar America: the organization of the new administration; the liquidation of the war; the Washington Conference; the establishment of the Bureau of the Budget; the development of a tax and tariff program; the provision of help for the farmer; the negotiation of short-range solutions to Latin American, Middle Eastern, and European problems; and the recognition of new problems involving the radio, the airplane, the automobile, and interstate rivers. Murray gives Harding considerable credit along with Hughes, Hoover, Mellon, Wallace, and other advisers for the success of these policies and sees his greatest contribution as being the "president of all the people and a champion of no specific interest."

Murray puts the scandals, the Veterans Bureau, Teapot Dome, Jesse Smith, Daugherty *et al.*, in proper perspective. He finds no evidence of Harding's connection "with the corruption in any direct way," but blames him for trying "to save his own reputation as well as that of his friends by inaction." According to Murray, Harding

should have thrown "the scoundrels to the dogs," and withdrawn "behind a cloak of presidential rage." Nan Britton is not mentioned until the publication of her book is noted on page 487. Murray is perhaps unduly skeptical of the detective work of Francis Russell, who in his Harding biography accepts Nan Britton's story, but he does grant that letters discovered in 1964 conclusively show that Harding had had an affair before 1920 with Carrie Phillips, and that the fact of one affair suggests that "the Nan Britton allegations were to some extent probably true." Murray insists, however, that "amorous detours" and personal habits "had little to do with his administration's success or failure," and that "ultimately, his historical significance, if any, lies in the nature and effectiveness of his presidency."

Murray considers the program of the administration, the President's contribution, and that of his cabinet clearly and comprehensively. Less successful is the treatment of Congress. The farm bloc is well described, but any other treatment of congressional organization and committee structures seems incidental, and there is little systematic roll-call analysis comparable to what Grassmuck has done with the foreign policy of the 1920's and 1930's.

In spite of Murray's thesis, which is clearly a favorable assessment supported by many positive contributions, a reader might well be confused after reading this otherwise excellent book as to what the author's final assessment is. He describes the administration as "oftentimes shallow and makeshift," its approach to such questions as the tariff and war debts "outmoded," its attitude toward labor insensitive, and its treatment of farm problems unduly conservative. Harding, Murray found, wasted his energies too much on trivial matters, disliked making difficult decisions, and lacked outstanding intellectual talents, a first-class education, and self-discipline. Murray concludes that "Harding probably should never have been president," and "possibly . . . in view of his personal shortcomings and his past," his "own native intelligence should have prevented" such a mistake. Yet Murray plays the presidential sweepstakes game and states flatly that as president Harding, "was certainly the equal of a Franklin Pierce, an Andrew Johnson, a Benjamin Harrison, or even a Calvin Coolidge." To such a list, if such games are to be played, might be added a William Henry Harrison, a John Tyler, a Taylor, a Grant, a Garfield, and—Theodore Roosevelt would certainly have insisted—a James Buchanan.

Duke University

RICHARD L. WATSON, JR.

THE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION: EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1930-1960.

Edited by *Donald Fleming* and *Bernard Bailyn*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1969. Pp. 748. \$12.95.)

THE title of this compilation echoes, I think intentionally, the entire course of the history of thought in America. That record would be greatly different if it had not been periodized by several immigrations that brought with them intellectual equipment that the New World was ready to use. While earlier migrations of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians had been no more than occasional contributors to the life of the mind in the United States, somehow the Hitler emigrés, who are the subjects of this volume, largely and quickly altered the content of urban culture, and no less than transformed the development of several sciences and the technology of defense and communications in the United States. While it may still be too early to delineate the movement with sharpness, the suggestion of Fleming and Bailyn that we make that effort is one of many services they render.

Only one section of the book, at the end, a forty-five page list of "300 Notable Refugees," with a few lines of identification for each, offers any degree of coverage. The editors acknowledge that the number is arbitrary and includes, as the text does not, a sizable component of French refugees who did not stay long in America. Probably if the list were three times as long it would still be arbitrary; that quality seems to inhere in this kind of selecting. Yet, for the sake of proportion, a reader would do well to examine the list ahead of the text. He would discover, for instance, about two dozen eminent musicians (including a few composers and musicologists), such people as Bartók, Boulanger, Hindemith, Leinsdorf, Milhaud, Schnabel, and Szell. They comprise the largest professional group that is not represented in the text; the editors reason that they would have come to America in any case, quite apart from the political breakdown of Europe. Creative writers form a less numerous category of those not discussed elsewhere. Including Brecht, Feuchtwanger, the Manns, and Werfel, some of them were political enough, but as a total group they did not much affect American letters. Other categories, which the list suggests but which are not discussed, include economists, international lawyers, painters, and theologians—such men as Machlup, Morgenstern, and von Mises; Kelsen, Lemkin, and Sohn; Chagall and Grosz; Kroner and Tillich.

Historically-minded readers will be pleased that, among the series of contributions into which—following Peter Gay's lively, analytical background essay on Weimar culture—the book is divided, the first concerns some of the physicists and mathematicians who had the largest effects on life in the United States. The second concerns leading sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and one lawyer and political scientist, that is, people who, among their many influences, greatly affected American historiography. To have the "Reminiscences" of Leo Szilard in first place was a happy decision: within fifty pages they narrate that physicist's decision to leave Germany, his search for the chain reaction, and his part in assembling the human chain—including Fermi, Einstein, Teller, and Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt—which would link the emigrés with the Manhattan Project and with Los Alamos, Hiroshima, and all that followed. Less fortunately for the reader, this first memoir confronts him with a problem that inheres in the nature of the book: a frustrating mixture of historical narrative which is almost too easy with technical matter which will be opaque to most historians as it was to this one, and which contributes little to the main theme of men and ideas in motion. In the same series John von Neumann is represented by a conflation of articles about him which appeared soon after his death in the *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*; as much as any member of the migration, the man behind the computers had to be represented, but the present discussion of him must be put down as historical makeshift. On the other hand, in the same series, the essays on the physicists by Charles Weiner and Donald Fleming which tell, respectively, how they left Europe and, keeping in contact with one another, recommenced in America, and how they applied themselves to problems—now amply realized—of the origin of life, are superb accounts of great minds attacking problems that American scientists were not ready to tackle and that they themselves had not undertaken at home.

In the second series, memoirs by the sociologists Adorno and Lazarsfeld and memoir-articles by the psychologists Jahoda and Mandler account for grand assimilations between European and American learning. Especially where the quantification of social knowledge was the reform and the method, where methods of discussing motivation entered, and where America's readiness to institutionalize innovative work had effect, these convergences concern historians. Although there is cause for disappoint-

ment that the book gives no space to the refugee historians—who in the list of three hundred are about as numerous as the musicians—either as a group or as individuals, considerable compensation may be taken from Stuart Hughes's essay on Franz Neumann, whose uneasy but inspiring middle course between Marxism and liberal democracy beautifully affected young historians, the author included.

The third series takes up humanists of four types: analysts of language and literature, architects, art historians, and philosophers from the Vienna school of positivism. The more because academic historians over fifty will have known personally some of these refugees, essays about them come closely home. The problem of opaqueness does recur here; the memoirs are sometimes so particular and technical that the reader has to be his own historian. On the other hand William Jordy's illustrated essay on "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America" is strong as to movement and grasp; and probably Colin Eisler's "*Kunstgeschichte American Style*" is the most historically conceived contribution by any of the refugee authors.

This is no book to sum up, but I do report an over-all impression that it helps us see, perhaps better than anything else does, how the migration adds up to much more than the sum of the refugees. From department to department of learning, they brought a readiness for generalization from their studies, a disciplined quality of freedom and courage of mind, which the American academic community at the time was only beginning to achieve. Even so, the United States was equipped to receive the gift. According to Lazarsfeld, "While in Europe the development of social science was arrested with the coming of Hitler, in America the evolving trends broadened." And in the words of the author of *The Authoritarian Personality*: "There is an inherent impulse in America toward peaceableness, good-naturedness, and generosity. . . . Probably the power of resistance to fascistic currents in America is still greater than in any European country, with the possible exception of England, which in more respects than we are accustomed to recognizing, forms a link between America and continental Europe."

The Johns Hopkins University

CHARLES A. BARKER

PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. By *Dean Acheson*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1969. Pp. xiv, 798. \$15.00.)

MR. Acheson's memoirs, covering his diplomatic career from 1941 to 1953, will disappoint scholars. Although he has consulted "innumerable documents" plus a goodly sample of secondary works, his description of the creation of the postwar deadlock is basically familiar. One finds no trace here of the tightly sealed archival remains of the Truman presidency. Security requirements are perhaps more stringent than a generation ago, for Cordell Hull revealed much more only four years after his retirement.

Hence we have here no fresh answer to the heated question: Did the Soviet expansionist timetable divide a world, rendered supervolatile by a revolution in weaponry, into two hostile camps? Or, are the New Left historians justified in their belief that the cold war was triggered, in large measure, by the dynamics of American capitalism?

The author disposes of such polemics by observing in a footnote that fortunately the revisionists are not "called upon to analyze a situation in which the United States had not taken the action which it did take." Granted this premise, Acheson can then view with pride his role as Assistant Secretary, Undersecretary, and Secretary of

State. The Truman Doctrine thwarted Russian penetration into three continents, the Marshall Plan restored the vitality of Western Europe to the point where it could resist Marxism, while American farsightedness transformed two of the major defeated enemies into firm friends. The aims of NATO, the author holds, were "achievable," and would have been realized but for the unmanageable French.

Understandably, Acheson is more cautious in assessing Far Eastern developments. His admiration for Marshall is unrestrained, but he argues that the general's 1946 mission to China was doomed by the death wish of the Kuomintang and its war-lord mentality. When he spoke of allowing the dust to settle over the Chinese collision, Acheson explains, he was merely stating that it was impossible at the time to scan the future. He concedes, however, that the Truman administration never publicly clarified the true import of the Chinese convulsion, a "credibility gap" later exploited to the full by the Republicans.

Since Acheson, in 1968, helped persuade President Johnson that a military victory against Hanoi was impossible, it is surprising that the author does not compare his Korean ordeal with the trials of his protégé, Rusk, during the protracted Vietnamese struggle. Much can be said, however, for Acheson's conscious effort to resist the temptations of hindsight. Still smarting from Republican charges that his speech of January 12, 1950, induced the attack on South Korea, Acheson insists that his announced defense perimeter followed MacArthur's similar delineation. His critics, Acheson states, "tortured the facts" by refusing to concede that he had carefully refrained from predicting steps that Washington might take in the event of unforeseen exigencies.

To Acheson, the North Korean thrust, engineered by Moscow, marked the high point of Stalin's grand design on the territory of the free world. Washington originally contemplated only a limited response to repel the invaders, but MacArthur, "the sorcerer of Inchon," turned a small-scale operation into a debilitating war. Acheson also holds the vainglorious general primarily responsible for the McCarthy miasma, arguing that the Wisconsin senator was only an incompetent small-town bully, made and broken by the Taft Republicans in the wake of the Truman-MacArthur uproar.

Acheson's recollections bristle with paradoxes about his own personality and career. He helped lobby the United Nations Charter through the Senate and revamped its structure during the Korean War, but he dismisses collective security as a nineteenth-century utopian legacy, unworkable in a divided world. He served as Brandeis' private secretary, considered Frankfurter his most intimate friend, and yet is censorious of Truman's decision to recognize Israel. Currently, the New Left has marked Acheson as a favorite target because he announced, in 1944, that the future of American prosperity hinged on foreign markets. But, at the apex of the author's power, the Republicans thought him "soft" on Marxist subversives, and a future President once called Adlai Stevenson a graduate of the "Acheson School of Cowardly Communist Containment." What havoc time plays with ideological stance! Today, Acheson stands as a symbol of the established power structure; he is associated with a law firm reputedly representing almost half the country's most influential corporations.

The author is at his best in etching pen portraits of his contemporaries. He evaluates the Presidents of our time, and all of them suffer by contrast with the incomparable Truman whose record, foreign and domestic, is now under heavy revisionist fire. Acheson feels that FDR was too prone to entertain secret deliberations that resulted in fuzzy decisions, Eisenhower was too often the simple soldier innocent of complexities; Kennedy lacked reliability, and Johnson, by preserving his options, prevented "continuity of decisive action."

Many explanations are offered for the stormy political waters of the final Truman years. Acheson might have added that his own acerbic tongue and biting wit, which enliven these memoirs, helped envenom some of the political feuds that he describes so well.

State University of New York, Buffalo

SELIG ADLER

THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL LEADER: KENNETH S. WHERRY AND THE UNITED STATES SENATE. By *Marvin E. Stromer*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1969. Pp. xiii, 202. \$7.95.)

RELUCTANT SERVANT: THE STORY OF CHARLES G. ROSS. By *Ronald T. Farrar*. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1969. Pp. ix, 255. \$7.00.)

BOTH of these books belong to a genre that historians declare to be useful, even if they often do so somewhat grudgingly. The biography of minor historical figures adds information, usually by examining fully sources that might otherwise receive only cursory treatment. It may not be an efficient method, but it does provide an unfamiliar window on otherwise familiar events, and that may be its unique function.

As is too often the case, Mr. Farrar's title will assure his book even greater bibliographic obscurity than the subject's name would have. Charles G. Ross was an unusually interesting editorial writer and Washington correspondent for the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*. The author adds some background detail to the story of the newspaper's efforts to adjust political attitudes of its famous editorial staff to the equally responsible enthusiasms of its publisher. Ross became Truman's press secretary in 1945 and served until his death in 1950. Again, there are some interesting anecdotes and views from another vantage point of such events as the conflicts with Henry Wallace and Douglas MacArthur, Potsdam, and the dropping of the atomic bomb; but they serve only to give slight tint to facts with which we are already very familiar. In spite of the author's work in the Truman papers and his interviews of associates, the real information, as the footnotes testify amply, is from well-known, published sources. Indeed, some of his main generalizations concerning the relations between a president and the press through the mediation of a press secretary are brought into question by his evidence. Despite all of Ross's many talents and despite the author's faithful defense of them, one cannot avoid the feeling that Truman might have been better served.

Mr. Stromer's image of Wherry is a better illustration of the operation of the genre under similar limitations, although historians again may have something of a struggle. Kenneth S. Wherry is known in most historical accounts of the recent past as the Nebraskan who took George W. Norris' Senate seat away from him. It is a distinction that contains corollaries concerning the reaction against the New Deal in the late war years and congressional hostility to Fair Deal foreign policy.

The author is a political scientist, and the key to his admiration of Wherry, like the source of structure in the book, can be found once again in a generalized title. Beginning with a rambunctious, aggressive stance that ran counter to the manners of the Senate's establishment, Wherry learned to manipulate the power open to him and to retain the respect of friends and opponents alike, developing that peculiarly Rotarian image that in American politics takes the place of class. The "Merry Mortician" was a political enthusiast who stuck honestly to his principles and fought openly for what he believed to be right. Mr. Stromer is not concerned with judgments about that right,

or comments on the content of those principles, or the historic consequences of all that skillful exercise of power.

In deference to his profession, one presumes, the author calls forth Charles E. Merriam's "criteria for judging political leaders," although I found no reference to the book by title or publication date in his footnotes or bibliography. *Four American Party Leaders* appeared in 1926 and hardly qualifies as the latest in methodological refinements, even though it still speaks well for its time. Moreover, Merriam also calls for "intelligence of a high order, in most cases of an unusual kind," which the author mercifully omits from his "guideline" judgment of Wherry.

The book suffers under the weight of excessive quotation and more than a touch of memorial padding, among which are the documents reproduced with all the care of a newly discovered draft of the Constitution. One cannot help wondering, from time to time, what the significance of one's own irritated puzzlement might be until one nagging point comes through.

It is undoubtedly the case that the legislative process in the United States at all levels of government is controlled by men who look much more like Kenneth Wherry than like George Norris, or any of the other heroes happily memorialized by historians. Even our periodic villains have a monumentality that substitutes for stature. None of that monumentality can be found in Wherry. Men like Wherry, revered by blocks of their constituents, granted continuing effect by a party organization they are absolutely devoted to serving, men like Wherry champion a system of politics that fits them like a comfortable skin of which they need not be aware because it clothes the inhabitants of the world they see around them. Whatever the parochialism of that view, it attaches them to a crucial reality in American life. They may do little to provide that life with its direction, or indeed with any of the critical cushioning that accompanies change in direction; but they sustain a continuity, the fundamental nature of which may be measured by the aspirations of the public they serve. We ought to know more about them than we do; and we ought to know it not simply in the light of the men and the policies they oppose, but in that of the affections borne for them by the constituencies who feel themselves amply represented. Mr. Stromer helps.

Brown University

BARRY D. KARL

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1945. Volume VII, THE FAR EAST: CHINA. [Department of State Publication 8442.] (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1969. Pp. vi, 1506. \$7.25.)

PORTIONS of the diplomatic correspondence concerning China in 1945 were released in 1955 in volumes subtitled *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*. The present collection, however, covers a vast and confusing scope: wartime China, the mixed interlude between V-E and V-J days, the Japanese surrender, and political efforts to halt a civil war already begun but not yet fully perceived as such.

While Ambassador Patrick Hurley firmly held the idea that wartime China had to "furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions and be responsible for her own domestic and international policies," he rejected principles or actions that "would weaken the National Government or the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek." His initiatives in seeking reconciliation of Kuomintang-Communist differences, colored by impatience with conversations that would not "immediately accomplish the unification of the armed forces of China," were therefore doomed. During Hurley's absence in

Washington, George Acheson (the chargé) declared: "Although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct, if this situation continues and our analysis of it is correct, chaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated." In this seed of the eventual breach between Hurley and Acheson one also sees the basis for the subsequent bitter and divisive general American debate over postwar China policy. Meanwhile, General Wedemeyer, considering that his job was "to get on with the war" without interfering in politics, lectured the Chinese on their "wonderful opportunity to get together right now while they are fighting a common enemy." The basic question was whether American influence should be brought to bear to create within the Chinese political system values and patterned conduct corresponding with American ideas of what "China ought to be," or whether the US would accept the established framework of Chinese politics and more patiently play the game according to Chinese conventions.

Failure to follow the latter course engendered a premature attachment to sentimental ideas of a China soon to be "united, free, democratic" (or "strong, united, democratic"), fostered a host of clichéd attitudes, gave fallacious attachment to a search for contrived verbal formulas devoid of meaning—and contributed to the eventual total exclusion of the United States from a presence or influence on the Chinese mainland. The lesson was not appreciated. We were to suffer later the consequences of persistent affection for policies not rooted in the actualities in our political relations with Korea, Vietnam, and other areas in Asia.

The papers reveal the futility of thinking "reasonably" in wartime situations strongly colored by the irrational. The concept of a wholly-evil enemy encouraged the notion that partisan politics was not a serious or respectable activity and could therefore be set aside to serve the assumed greater need for unifying the national war effort. The wartime effort to pre-plan the transition from war to peace collapsed when the hostilities terminated in an unplanned, unexpected, and unpredicted way, and the persistence of wartime visions of the future contributed to the ensuing chaos. The professional diplomats could not escape involvement in the simplified slogans of their political masters, for whom a war was a crusade rather than a controllable political event. Some of them were aware of the dangers and risks, but their voices could not filter through the cumbersome environment and influence those with responsibility for central decisions. No one who digests this bulky volume and grasps the intricate web of ever-changing currents and subcurrents it portrays will fail to see that the "China problem" was beyond the scope of the diplomat working in the Chinese environment.

University of California Study Center, Hong Kong

H. ARTHUR STEINER

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1946. Volume VI, EASTERN EUROPE; THE SOVIET UNION. [Department of State Publication 8470.] (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1969. Pp. ix, 993. \$5.50.)

ONE of eleven volumes for 1946, this collection of documents treats the questions of free elections, Communist political machinations, Soviet policy, nationalization, freedom of travel, American loans, and American trade principles in one of the early diplomatic battle grounds of the postwar era, Eastern Europe. A section devoted to Soviet-American relations gives special attention to internal Soviet conditions, the

settlement of lend-lease, and the abortive loan issue. Noteworthy are George F. Kennan's analytical cables from Moscow, reports of the ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Laurence A. Steinhardt, and an interview by Richard C. Hottelet with Maxim Litvinov, who gave us a perhaps useful definition for the cold war: "prolonged armed truce."

It was American policy to reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe through demands for free elections, nonrecognition, and loans. The latter was determined to be the most viable diplomatic lever in an area in which the United States had minimal influence. In an attempt to persuade nations (especially Czechoslovakia) to enter the American camp, or at least to cease embracing Russia, Washington offered, then withdrew, economic aid. But a frustrated James F. Byrnes in a major decision in September simplistically divided the world: "We must help our friends in every way and refrain from assisting those who either through helplessness or for other reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand." Henceforth Eastern Europe was defined as a closed bloc, and aid was cut off. This approach ignored the obvious complexity of events in Eastern Europe (anti-Communist election results in Hungary, Czech independence, and a rough Soviet hand in Rumania, for example). Byrnes also persisted in demands for free elections, even though it was evident that the anti-Soviet results would antagonize Russia. Yet Washington bent its scruples about elections in accepting the Groza government in Rumania. It appears that Molotov's argument that the United States was following a double standard (accepting US control in Italy and Japan but denying to Russia control over Rumania) had some effect. Very importantly, too, the United States meddled in Eastern European politics, especially in Poland and Rumania, through secret meetings with anti-Communist opposition groups. American and British officials also cooperated closely there. This volume supports two general notions: that Russia deeply feared for its postwar security in Eastern Europe and that American activities contributed to an exacerbation of that fear.

Kennan's cables are informative, thoughtful, and confident, although some of them seem to be simplistic today (for example, that Communists always win elections in Communist-dominated nations). Yet Kennan apparently believed he had a basic job of reporting to perform in order to persuade Washington that the Russians were deceitful, uncompromising, expansionist, warlike, and bent on disrupting American life. His famous cable of February 22 (precursor to the "X" article) dismissed Soviet security fears as "neurotic" and the "sheerest nonsense," and he advocated the exertion of ill-defined American power. If Kennan did not change or influence Washington opinion, he certainly reflected it.

This volume adds some precision to published works on the loan question. Somewhat surprisingly, the documents here testify to the accuracy of the *New York Times*, at least on this issue. The loan was, for American officials, a diplomatic "lever" to pry concessions in Eastern Europe. It is obvious that the Russian loan request of August 1945 was not lost, despite the strange State Department announcement of March 1946 that it had been. Yet some important questions remain puzzling: Why did the United States wait for the Russians to initiate talks over the winter of 1945-46? And then why did Washington abruptly shift in February and approach the Russians to begin discussions? It is clear, however, that even after Soviet concessions on the agenda (Russia agreed to hold "preliminary" talks on Eastern Europe in conjunction with the loan), Washington adhered to its rigid policy of using the loan as a preconference weapon rather than as a diplomatic tool at the bargaining table.

Historians are once again indebted to the State Department's Historical Office staff for providing us with valuable diplomatic sources. Yet some friendly criticisms or queries arise. Almost no intra-State Department papers or messages between the White House and State are printed. Almost all of the material consists of cables to and from Washington. It is, therefore, very difficult for the scholar to determine the development of policy. Who is responsible? Where does policy originate? What are the stages of growth? Did Truman ever change minds in State, or vice versa? There are almost no military or intelligence reports in this book. Questions about Soviet troop strength and threats to Western Europe and their relationship to American assessments go largely unanswered. If such military reports do not exist, if intra-departmental position papers do not exist, then perhaps an explanatory introduction would be helpful in alerting the reader to the omissions, scope, and missing materials of this series. This introduction could also explain the editors' criteria in selecting or rejecting documents and would clarify the "not printed" footnote. A number of cables from lesser lights in the State Department like James Riddleberger are not printed; these documents are crucial to an understanding of policy development (some can be found in the Steinhardt Papers, Library of Congress). It is annoying, too, that the editors in a few places attempt to replace official sources with references to published works, such as Arthur Bliss Lane's *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (1948). This practice should be discontinued, for there is at least one example (from my research in the Lane Papers at Yale) of differing accounts of the same matter in a dispatch sent by Lane on September 16, 1946, and in his own book.

These criticisms regarding selection are particularly relevant because there will be only eight volumes for 1947 and only seven for 1948. Be they budget or time considerations, security decisions, deference to diplomats who wish not to be printed, or the editors' scholarly choices, the historian is entitled to know precisely what the limitations and criteria are.

University of Connecticut

THOMAS G. PATERSON

WAR IN PEACETIME: THE HISTORY AND LESSONS OF KOREA. By J. Lawton Collins. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1969. Pp. xiii, 416. \$8.95.)

ALTHOUGH the name of J. Lawton Collins flits through the Korean war reminiscences of all American leaders, none dwells upon the handsome general who was Army Chief of Staff between 1949 and 1953. That high post, however, capped the career of a soldier who etched a name as "Lightning Joe" on Guadalcanal and in Europe, where his corps' breakthrough at St. Lo has been called a masterpiece. No autobiography, *War in Peacetime* does little to amplify our personal knowledge of a brave and modest officer. The emphasis is preponderantly upon the period of the Korean war.

Other than Truman's memoirs, we have had no central account, and only Bradley (the chairman) and Collins remain from the Joint Chiefs of Staff team which included Vandenberg and Sherman. Despite evidence of hasty preparation, *War in Peacetime* arrives none too soon; the author is already seventy-four years old. His description of the fighting in Korea draws heavily upon well-known sources, but the story is told in compact and clear fashion, from the broadest standpoint and in gripping detail, and is supported by excellent cartography. Until MacArthur marches "like a Greek hero of old to an unkind and inexorable fate," it is the five-star generalissimo who tends to dominate Collins' book and the Washington military

scene. Who but MacArthur would not acknowledge telecon items transmitted by highest officials? Repeatedly, Collins asserts that it would have been inappropriate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "interfere" with MacArthur's command, although the Army Chief of Staff reveals a sincere loyalty to Truman as man and chief executive. With the departure of MacArthur, one discerns metal in Collins' make-up, as when he excoriates three American generals for bungling the Kojedo prisoner riots.

Collins weaves an extremely useful account of his own role within the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. He is particularly informative on the unified department of defense and connections of the system with budget and Congress. He also is highly knowledgeable about the chronic disharmony between national estimates of hostile capabilities versus intentions, and about pitfalls of cease-fire negotiation involving cantankerous allies. Nevertheless he sidesteps some crucial topics: the reasons for rejecting the proffered Chinese Nationalist troops; MacArthur's alleged recommendation of radiological measures in the Yalu region; and possible use of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Continued secrecy of records may contribute to Collins' reticence, but other authorities have provided information, and his views would be of inestimable value.

More distressing is the skimpy nature of Collins' conclusions. Although in the subtitle he promises to discuss lessons, he devotes only a dozen pages to limited warfare in Korea and Vietnam, and he ends the book, however sincerely, with a fourth-of-July peroration. One expects more sophisticated reflections. Did Korea, for example, illustrate a "2½ war" strategy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whereas Vietnam has come to typify a "1½ war" strategy? This would mean that the United States had lowered its sights from the capability of waging major wars in *both* Europe and Asia to a capability in Europe *or* Asia, and a minor action elsewhere.

Much of the battle narrative could have been sacrificed for detail regarding day-to-day Joint Chiefs of Staff activities and first-hand recollections of overseas inspections and meetings. While Collins lacks the vim of Ridgway, the explosiveness of Truman, the rhetoric of MacArthur, undoubtedly it is these very shortcomings that recommend him: cool, objective, and methodical, he is the perfect executive agent for Staff operations in the Far East. Martin Blumenson may have exaggerated when he termed Collins "the George C. Marshall of the Korean war [who] gained additional honor and glory as a military statesman." Mark Clark, for one, has written bitterly of earning "the unenviable distinction of being the first United States Army commander in history to sign an armistice without victory." Yet is this not in the nature of what Collins aptly calls "war in peacetime"? If he was a cold-war warrior, Collins was of the most responsible breed: a general of intelligence and balance who recoiled from the insanity of playing with global fire.

San Diego State College

ALVIN D. COOX

THE LIBERATORS: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN SPANISH AMERICA. By *Irene Nicholson*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1969. Pp. 336. \$8.95.)

ACCORDING to the publishers, the late Miss Nicholson's book is a "carefully drawn historical study," containing a "significant, fresh analysis of a basic aspect of Latin American history." The layman will also find it eminently readable and comprehensive: Part I deals with colonial antecedents and Part III covers the national period. Well-placed maps, a glossary, and a "Chart of Dates" are useful additions. A Chilean by birth, the author wished to impart her empathy for things Latin to an

English-reading public. As the daughter of an English businessman, she understandably magnifies the British role in Spanish America's independence, although she is critical of their economic motives and doubts their alleged altruism.

Unfortunately, this attractive account is a dangerous one for the nonspecialist, who will come away from it with many old distortions of Latin America's history. Limited source material, usually the reports of Englishmen, is handled uncritically, and secondary references are, in some cases, forty years behind current historiography. She ignores, for example, the notable contributions of David Bushnell, Charles Arnade, Harold Bierck, Hugh Hamill, Robert Gilmore, Nettie Lee Benson—to name only a few. Miss Nicholson's review of the colonial years is pathetically inadequate and littered with errors; she reflects no awareness of the ultramontane-regalist controversy, and she is not familiar with the research of John Tate Lanning, Richard Herr, and Arthur P. Whitaker *et al.* into the impact of the Enlightenment upon the Spanish world. We are treated instead to the hoary view of French ideas being smuggled into the colonies for the perusal of unprepared eyes! Since her sources are dated, there is nothing new in her presentation of the liberators. She allows herself to be influenced too much by Simón Bolívar's statements, and she accepts too easily the "mystique" created by Mexican and Chilean nationalistic historians. As villains and heroes run across her stage, it is evident that this is the work of an amateur.

Considering the publications of Dr. Benson and others, it is a first-class blunder to treat the independence of Spanish America without taking into account the peninsular scene after 1808, a period of reform and of the famous Constitution of 1812. Dr. Benson's 1955 book on the *diputaciones provinciales* is not even cited, and the recent volume she edited on Mexico's participation in the Spanish Parliament is mentioned, but summarily dismissed in a footnote on the grounds that, in the 1820's, Henry Ward did not consider the Cádiz experiment significant. By ignoring the liberal constitutional movement in Spain and Spanish America, the author deprived herself of a key insight into the thinking of prominent liberators. What she has to say about Central America is sheer nonsense; students of other areas will no doubt find the treatment equally superficial or erroneous.

In short, the layman would be well advised to consult more authoritative volumes and to be highly skeptical of blurbs on the jackets of books.

George Washington University

MARIO RODRÍGUEZ

THE APACHE FRONTIER: JACOBO UGARTE AND SPANISH-INDIAN RELATIONS IN NORTHERN NEW SPAIN, 1769-1791. By Max L. Moorhead. [The Civilization of the American Indian Series, Volume XC.] (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1968. Pp. xiii, 309. \$6.95.)

BETWEEN 1786 and 1790, when Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola served as Commandant General of the Interior Provinces, the Apache-plagued northern frontier of New Spain entered a period of relative calm lasting for nearly a quarter of a century. The peace that began under Ugarte is usually thought to have been a product of Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez's well-known Instrucción of 1786, which made peace more palatable than war for Indians by rewarding them with firearms, firewater, and gifts. Although Professor Max L. Moorhead of the University of Oklahoma makes no such claim, he demonstrates in *The Apache Frontier* that the initial success of Gálvez's Instrucción was due more to Ugarte's implementation than to the policy itself. In fact,

Moorhead finds that Ugarte, an experienced frontiersman who had earlier served as governor of Coahuila and of Sonora, probably helped to formulate the policy.

By examining Spanish-Indian relations from Ugarte's viewpoint, Moorhead is able to analyze the effect of Spanish policy, as well as its intent. The view from Ugarte's desk also provides valuable perspective. For example, Juan Bautista de Anza's celebrated peace with the Comanches in New Mexico in 1786 takes on added significance when seen as part of a broader plan to pacify the entire frontier. Yet the complexities of bureaucracy make it seem incredible that Spanish plans worked at all. In addition to fighting Apaches, whose prowess and geographical advantages Moorhead neatly describes, Ugarte battled for funds, men, supplies, and armaments to make his policy work. In the process he quarreled with civilian leaders, with the viceroy himself, and even with an ambitious subordinate who once attacked the same Apache bands with whom Ugarte was attempting to negotiate.

Written almost entirely from archival sources and constructed with Moorhead's characteristic attention to detail, *The Apache Frontier* contains eight fine maps and is remarkably free from errors (rendering Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín as Capuchín is a notable exception). Together with Luis Navarro García's *José de Gálvez y la Comandancia General . . .* (Sevilla, 1964), *The Apache Frontier* is one of the most important books to appear in recent years on Spain's military policy in the Borderlands—that most studied area of all colonial Latin America.

San Diego State College

DAVID J. WEBER

THE MEXICAN INQUISITION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By Richard E. Greenleaf. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969. Pp. x, 242. \$8.95.)

THE thousands of documents surviving from the colonial Mexican Inquisition, though of vast potential value, have been little used. Students have tended to rely excessively on the writings of José Toribio Medina and Henry C. Lea and to repeat the original numerical tabulations concerning heresy trials and heretics. Richard Greenleaf, who has spent some fifteen years studying in inquisitorial archives, is the scholar best qualified to apply the abundant documentation to new interpretations of the inquisitorial office and to a broader understanding of colonial society and culture. In his *Zumárraga and the Mexican Inquisition* (1962) he covered the years 1536-43 in detail and for the first time described the operation of the episcopal Inquisition of those years as it related to Christianized Indians.

The present volume is not a full treatment of the sixteenth-century institution (as one might suppose from the title), but consists of a series of essays that illustrate the Inquisition's changing position and role between 1522 and 1601, particularly with reference to political disputes. It depends upon the important or representative cases, including the auto-de-fé of 1528, the Gonzalo Gómez litigation in Michoacán, and the subsequent acts involving English Protestants, Mexican clergy, doctors, Judaizers, and censorship. The author's conclusions merit careful attention. They are that the number of Protestants and Jews in sixteenth-century Mexico was larger, and the actual conduct of the Inquisition less repressive, than we have assumed; that harsh sentences and exemplary punishments were most frequently directed against foreigners; and that Spanish colonists tended to regard the Inquisition as a relatively benign protector of religion and society. Along the way the reader learns much about sixteenth-century

blasphemy, prejudice, social relations, and standards of morality. This is an important scholarly work, with a full bibliography of published and manuscript material.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

CHARLES GIBSON

PRECIOS DEL MAÍZ Y CRISIS AGRÍCOLAS EN MÉXICO (1708-1810): ENSAYO SOBRE EL MOVIMIENTO DE LOS PRECIOS Y SUS CONSECUENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y SOCIALES. By *Enrique Florescano*. [Centro de Estudios Históricos, New Series, Number 4.] ([México, D. F.:] Colegio de México. 1969. Pp. xix, 254.)

THIS monograph applies current French statistical methodology to a historical phenomenon: cyclical fluctuations in the price of maize in Mexico City during the last century of Spanish rule. The chief primary sources are the daily account books of the *alhóndiga* and the *pósito*, which together comprised the official grain marketing and storage facilities in the Mexican capital. Florescano criticizes the work of those who earlier investigated colonial prices, analyzes his sources and methods, and interprets the significance of this material, which he reproduces in four appendixes.

Some of the conclusions hardly come as a surprise. Periodically, when the weather was "bad," not enough corn was harvested, and the urban masses of Mexico City did not have enough to eat. This happened before the Spaniards came, while they were there, and after they left. To alleviate such crises, the Aztec rulers stored grain from abundant harvests for use in lean years, as did the Spaniards and their successors. We learn from Florescano's work that this occurred between 1708 and 1810. Equally to be expected, during those years corn scarcity was accompanied by higher prices, by disease in a population weak from hunger, and by an increase in vagrancy, crime, and other social and economic ills. It is regrettable that the author sometimes ignores his documents and makes statements that I find unconvincing. He emphasizes the greed, chicanery, and callousness of maize growing hacienda owners, although his sources show that through most of the period under consideration they made little profit, and it is not explained how they would benefit in lean years from the penury and mass starvation of maize consumers. Florescano often projects his conclusions to New Spain when his information is applicable only to the valley of Mexico, a unique urban concentration quite unlike the rest of the country.

While perhaps relying too much on secondary sources and interpolation, the author has performed a real service in publishing a large body of data hitherto unused. This is apparently the first volume in an ambitious project that, with somewhat more objectivity, could become a valuable contribution.

Cuernavaca, Mexico

PETER GERHARD

FRONTIER SETTLEMENT IN MEXICAN CALIFORNIA: THE HÍJAR-PADRÉS COLONY, AND ITS ORIGINS, 1769-1835. By *C. Alan Hutchinson*. [Yale Western Americana Series, Number 21.] (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 457. \$10.00.)

THE fear of Russian aggression in the contemporary United States is not solely an aspect of twentieth-century history, for it antedated the independence of the American Republic. As the present work, the twenty-first of the Yale Western Americana Series, makes abundantly clear, the tottering empire of Spain made a convulsive effort in the late eighteenth century to strengthen its claim to modern

California against the encroachments of Russian traders by founding a series of missions there. When Mexico subsequently broke from the feeble grasp of the mother country, it inherited this fear in an even more acute form. By 1821 the Russians had planted trading posts at Fort Ross and Bodega bay above San Francisco and were already threatening the latter strategic port. Thus, from the very beginning, Alta California was a matter of deep concern to the shaky republican regime in Mexico City, for that outpost on the Spanish borderland was prey to the aggressions of Americans as well as Russians. Moreover, its internal affairs presented problems difficult to solve at so great a distance. The missions hardly enjoyed the idyllic existence later ascribed to them, for the Indians persisted in their paganism and showed little enthusiasm for the more civilized mode of life thrust upon them. The egalitarian ideal of the Mexican Republic to free the Indians by secularizing these missionary establishments met with strong resistance from Spanish clergymen who were disinclined to accept the fact of Mexican independence. On the other hand, the support of the effort by lay elements of the white population was suspect, for many were eager to exploit the Indian neophytes as peon labor.

Much of the present work is a case history of the intrigues and confusions of Governor Figueroa's endeavor in the early 1830's to resolve the problems of the status of the missions and of the Mexican desire to frustrate Russian ambitions by buffer settlements north of San Francisco. This study is more complete than those of H. H. Bancroft, C. E. Chapman, Engelhardt, and other predecessors who concerned themselves with this particular period of California history. The author's scholarship in assembling exhaustive documentary and printed sources is impressive, and his treatment of this aggregation of material is meticulous. The tendency to adhere closely to the text of these sources, document by document, results in a density of detail that is likely to limit the appeal of this authoritative work to the specialist rather than to that vaguely defined reader, the intelligent layman.

Goldenrod, Florida

IRVING A. LEONARD

LOS ORÍGENES DE LA INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN DE MONTERREY: UNA HISTORIA ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL DESDE LA CAÍDA DEL SEGUNDO IMPERIO HASTA EL FIN DE LA REVOLUCIÓN (1867-1920). By *Isidro Vizcaya Canales*. [Publicaciones del Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. Series: Historia, Number 9.] (Monterrey: [the Instituto.] 1969. Pp. xxi, 194.)

It has become a commonplace, the author of this brief but useful study states in his introduction, to ask why Monterrey, sometimes known as the Pittsburgh of Mexico, became an industrial center, and he adds that the purpose of his book is to suggest some answers to this question.

He points out that before 1867 Monterrey was mainly a trading center, distributing merchandise over a large area of northern Mexico. With the advent of the telegraph, railroads, and the telephone during the next twenty years, however, its trade declined, and the capital amassed over the years by its merchants began to be put into industry. From 1867 to 1890 the industries were light, except for textile plants that were flourishing by 1889. It was during the next twenty years, from 1890 to 1910, that heavy industry came to Monterrey and the city gained prominence as a manufacturing center. The large industries for which the city is well known today

began during those years—the famous Cuauhtémoc brewery in 1890, a steel mill in 1900, and a glassworks in 1909. The author ascribes these developments to a variety of causes: the law and order of the Díaz regime; the entry of foreign capital, especially from the United States; the influence of Governor Bernardo Reyes; the presence of skilled labor; and numerous other reasons. The final chapter of the book discusses the problems Monterrey underwent during the revolution of 1910 and the difficulties it had in restoring its industries. It should be noted, as the subtitle points out, that the author also discusses the social history of Monterrey. Rather less than half of the volume is in fact concerned with education, the theater, sports, and similar matters.

While the book is helpful, it is hardly more than a brief beginning to the full-scale study that such an important subject demands. It is unfortunate that the work contains no maps of Monterrey, although a selection of some forty photographs at the end has its value. A number of studies in English, such as Mary Catherine Megee's *Monterrey, Mexico: Internal Patterns and External Relations* (Chicago, 1958) are missing from the otherwise useful bibliography.

University of Virginia

C. ALAN HUTCHINSON

FUENTES COLONIALES PARA LA HISTORIA DEL TRABAJO EN COLOMBIA: TRANSCRIPCIONES DEL ARCHIVO HISTÓRICO NACIONAL DE BOGOTÁ. By *G. Colmenares et al.* [Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Artes y Ciencias, Departamento de Historia.] (Bogotá: Ediciones de la Universidad de los Andes. 1968. Pp. 525.)

THIS collection of documents deals with the conditions of Indian labor in Colombia, principally during the seventeenth century. Roughly half the documents deal with agricultural labor; the rest deal with the Indians as porters, miners, and urban laborers.

Each section contains three types of documents. One describes in bitter, graphic detail the pitiful plight of specific groups of laborers. Official protectors of the Indians, priests, and private individuals complained to the king of the overwork, overloading, inhuman conditions, lengthy forced absences from home, frightful loss of life due to malnutrition and disease, and social disorganization and disintegration of entire Indian communities. Second, there are stern orders from the king and his resident officials demanding detailed answers to the accusations, explicit commands forbidding the abuse of Indian labor, and very detailed rules, with severe penalties, designed to ameliorate each excess. Then there are the self-righteous defenses of the settlers, either blandly denying all accusations of evil, pleading ignorance of any alleged atrocity, or else stating repeatedly the simple fact that food cannot be produced, gold or salt mined, or goods transported over the impossibly rugged Colombian terrain without labor. And, in the virtual absence of Spaniards, the only possible source of labor was the Indian.

These transcriptions from the National Archives in Bogotá are by members of the department of history of the University of the Andes. Included are a detailed table of contents and exhaustive indexes of names and places. The editors express their bias in the selection of documents rather than in critical introductions or analyses.

San Francisco State College

DONALD S. BARNHART

A MUITO LEAL E HERÓICA CIDADE DE SÃO SEBASTIÃO DO RIO DE JANEIRO: QUATRO SÉCULOS DE EXPANSÃO E EVOLUÇÃO. EM COMEMORAÇÃO DO IV^o CENTENÁRIO DA FUNDAÇÃO DA CIDADE. Texts and organization by *Gilberto Ferrez*. Edited by *Raymundo de Castro Maya*. (Rio de Janeiro: Raymundo de Castro Maya, Cândido Guinle de Paula Machado; Fernando Machado Portella; Banco Boavista S.A. 1965. Pp. 259.)

THE late lamented Raymundo de Castro Maya of Rio de Janeiro, intelligent collector and patron of the arts, is ultimately responsible for this lavishly illustrated volume on his historic city. Being a man of wealth and able to count upon the financial support of rich friends, Castro Maya did not hesitate to ask Gilberto Ferrez, a leading art historian of Brazil, to do the job and to spare no expense in organizing a book that, by evoking the more remote and more recent past of Rio de Janeiro, would fittingly commemorate the fourth centennial of the founding of the city (1565-1965). What resulted is a volume of magnificence, a monument to the printer's art of the twentieth century that may never be duplicated.

The contents include a preface by Castro Maya, a summary of the history of Rio de Janeiro from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries by Ferrez, and "Rio de Janeiro quatro séculos de história através da imagem," an extravaganza of 298 illustrations selected and described by the author. The illustrations, chosen with a marvelous sense of history, are the outstanding feature of the book: 195 are in black and white, 99 in superb color; 2 are facsimiles of title pages. The typography—hand-set Caslon type—was directed by Marcel Mouillot of Paris and represents an achievement of the highest order. The printing is on linen paper filigreed with the coat of arms of Rio de Janeiro, especially made in France for this edition. The printing began in Paris in 1960 and was concluded in 1965, the centennial year. A limited edition of 1,000 copies, numbered in Arabic numerals, has been placed on the market. An additional 100 copies, numbered in Roman numerals, are for private distribution. (I have used copy No. XCVII at the Oliveira Lima Library, The Catholic University of America.) All plates have been destroyed.

The illustrations were chosen from public and private collections in various parts of the world. There are items from the private collections of two of the backers, Castro Maya and Paula Machado, from the Ferrez Collection, and from the collection of Ambassador Joaquim de Sousa Leão. The United States is represented by items from the collections of Cornell University and the Hispanic Society of America. Other items were reproduced from originals in Argentina, Austria, Brazil, England, France, Germany, and Portugal.

The Ferrez volume is a far cry from the art books that people buy for their coffee tables. It is instead a uniquely rare book for great collectors and great libraries. And it comes at an opportune moment, to remind us again, in a civilized and beautiful way, that Brazil is far more a part of the West than of the third world that social scientists have invented. The traditionally-minded historian will be grateful for the book's message, and for the society that made it possible. It is of course regrettable that the book had to wait so long for a notice in these pages, but it is as timely six years after its publication as it will be in 2065, when Rio de Janeiro will celebrate its 500th birthday. The removal of the national capital to Brasília has not destroyed the position that Rio de Janeiro has long enjoyed as the pre-eminent (though no longer the largest) city of Brazil. The book that Castro Maya and Gilberto Ferrez brought into being will serve to explain why that position is justified.

Catholic University of America

MANOEL CARDOZO

HISTORIA DE LA MARINA DE CHILE. By *Carlos López Urrutia*. Foreword by *Guillermo Feliú Cruz* ([Santiago:] Editorial Andrés Bello; distrib. by Ediciones de la Frontera, Hollywood, Calif. 1969. Pp. 448. \$7.00.)

CHILE has been obliged to depend on naval power on a number of occasions, beginning with its struggle for independence. At that time the navy was created and led by Lord Cochrane, a pugnacious Scot who had been cashiered from the British service after a brilliant career in the Napoleonic Wars. Before leaving England, Cochrane arranged for the construction of a steamer, the *Rising Star*. In 1822 it was the first steamship in the Pacific, but it arrived too late to serve in the war. Cochrane, whose penchant for fighting causes drew him to Chile, Brazil, and Greece, rejected an offer from Spain to accept command of the embryonic Chilean squadron in 1818. By feats of daring comparable to those that had won him fame in Europe, Cochrane drove Spanish warships from the South Pacific and escorted the Chilean-Argentine army to Peru in 1820. Typical of Chilean exploits under Cochrane was the taking of the "impregnable" port of Valdivia by only three hundred men. He declared that Chilean seamen equaled the crews of the best British warships, and these were the men who created the Chilean naval tradition. Naval battles are won by men, not ships, and the traditions established during the Wars of Independence survived the disbanding of the navy and sustained Chilean seamen on many later occasions when the nation again had to rely on its ships.

In 1863 a Spanish "scientific" expedition arrived in the Pacific, with the primary purpose of forcing Peru to pay the claims of Spanish citizens. The Spaniards captured Peru's Chincha Islands. When the Chileans protested, the Spanish ships blockaded the Chilean coast, bombarded Valparaíso, and destroyed the Chilean merchant marine. Convinced that they must maintain a naval force at all times, the Chileans ordered the construction of ironclad warships in Britain.

Peru had also purchased ironclads, but they depended on Chile for gunners. In 1879, when the War of the Pacific began, the gunners had to be left on shore. The highlight of the war was the Chilean pursuit and capture of the Peruvian ship *Huáscar* in a battle that made naval history as one of the first clashes of ironclads on the high seas. Parenthetically, Alfred Thayer Mahan was stationed in Lima a few years later, and it is likely that the War of the Pacific helped shape his theories on sea power. This war was also instrumental in convincing the US government that it was time to build a fleet of ironclads.

Historia de la Marina de Chile is an excellent study by a descendant of Chilean mariners. The foreword entitled "Un Hermoso Libro," by the distinguished Chilean historian Guillermo Feliú Cruz, is a penetrating essay on the sources of Chilean naval history. This book should be translated and made available to a wider audience.

Texas Christian University

DONALD E. WORCESTER

ARGENTINA. By *H. S. Ferns*. [Nations of the Modern World.] (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1969. Pp. 284. \$7.50.)

THE ARMY & POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1928-1945: YRIGOYEN TO PERÓN. By *Robert A. Potash*. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1968. Pp. ix, 314. \$8.95.)

THESE two works by North Americans, one a Canadian and the other from the United States, undoubtedly constitute some of the best works in English on Latin

America published during 1969. Although the objectives and audiences for these two focuses on contemporary Argentina are different, sound scholarship and thorough understanding of the subject matter underlie each study. H. S. Ferns brings to his political history of modern Argentina the laurels won with two previous monographs, *The Age of Mackenzie King* (1955) and *Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century* (1960). Robert A. Potash has devoted a decade of research to this first of a two-volume examination of the Argentine military and has revealed the same painstaking attention to detail and exactness as in his *El Banco de Avío de México* (1959).

Ferns has attempted and, in large measure, has succeeded in unraveling for the general reader the complexities of recent Argentine politics. At the same time he stimulates and occasionally perplexes his audience with judgments about pre-1900 Argentine social and economic development. His relative lack of interest in the Spanish period of colonial rule accounts for questionable interpretations that discount slavery as a labor institution, attribute declining silver production in Upper Peru to revolutionary strife, or suggest a peaceful absorption of the Indian population of northwestern Argentina. With Argentine independence, Ferns moves to firmer factual ground, but he also challenges the reader with the thesis that the breakup of the Spanish Empire in the Río de la Plata spelled dramatic socioeconomic revolution as well as a change of political masters. Less disputable is Ferns's contention that the revolutionary struggle and the ensuing anarchy destroyed the state and left the military, the cattlemen, the Church, and the merchants as the only arbiters of power. From this crucible emerged Rosas, the builder of a true capitalist order in Argentina's pastoral economy. The discussion of the second half of the nineteenth century, reduced to a mere twenty pages, has as its strongest point a succinct résumé of the financial role of Baring Brothers in the crisis of 1890.

The twentieth century clearly is Ferns's principal concern, and on this he spends three-fifths of the book. He accurately attributes to Yrigoyen the blame for drawing the military into the political arena, although he moves to shakier ground when he finds the source of most Argentine university problems in Yrigoyen's encouragement of the Reform Movement. Despite a clear anti-Peronist bias, Ferns provides one of the best summaries to date of the man and his accomplishments: the blindness of politicians, especially Perón, to economic realities; the military frame of mind that placed prime value on the making rather than the enforcing of decisions; and the creation of a labor elite with its inflexible demands on society and economy. Students of Latin American affairs will also appreciate the post-1955 chronicle for its thoroughness.

Ferns's work ends, as must any review of modern Argentina, on a note of conjecture. He suggests that shadows of military rivalry and power blocs once more may fall across the Río de la Plata area. Yet, at the same time, he holds guarded hope for the economic plans and stability of the Onganía regime. Argentines will relish his closing charge to the British government to return the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) to Argentine sovereignty.

Potash has provided quite a different kind of work in his penetrating treatment of Argentina's restless military between Yrigoyen's second presidency and the advent of Perón. Unencumbered by social science methodology and unimpressed by the recent flood of hypotheses about Latin America's military elite, Potash has focused on "the real-life figures who have led the armed forces, on the details of institutional development, and on a broader spectrum of political behavior than the occasional coup." The

result is a fascinating biography of the Argentine military that emphasizes the interaction and influence of individual officers with the political authorities and the resultant treatment accorded the armed forces. Within a chronological framework Potash seeks to detail social origins, attitudes, and role conceptions of individual officers as well as to provide some understanding of the political factionalism that has divided the military establishment.

Readers may criticize Potash for not doing more with his subject, specifically for not pursuing some of the methodology advanced in social science literature on the armed forces. To such critics, this book carries its own rebuke: namely, that the time has come for hard facts rather than vague hypotheses. Potash draws few conclusions and largely lets the narrative speak for itself. The inescapable conclusion that these documents and interviews set forth is that the political parties themselves drew officers into the political processes. Finally the politicians' very ineptness convinced these colonels and generals that they, not the political parties, should govern. Perhaps even more important is the clear evidence that the military provided no monolithic structure and that officers were, after all, people who responded to many diverse pressures. As Potash concludes with regard to the 1943-45 struggle for power within the military regime, "personal ties and private ambitions proved stronger than ideological consistency."

In sum, Ferns and Potash have added two basic works to the bookshelves of Latin Americanists. Ferns's masterful political overview has achieved its objective in making contemporary Argentina more comprehensible to expert and layman alike. Likewise everyone, whether they agree or not with Potash's methodology and conclusions, will hail the solid block of information he has contributed on a relatively unknown era and aspect of Argentine development.

Indiana University

JAMES R. SCOBIE

Other Books Received

General

ADAMS, D. K., and RODGERS, H. B. *An Atlas of North American Affairs*. New York: Barnes and Noble. 1969. Pp. vii, 135. Cloth \$5.00, paper \$2.50.

BINDER, FREDERICK M. *Education in the History of Western Civilization: Selected Readings*. [New York:] Macmillan. 1970. Pp. x, 390. \$4.95. Textbook.

BRAVO, GIAN MARIO. *Les socialistes avant Marx*. Vol. I. Gracchus Babeuf—Sylvain Maréchal—Henri de Saint-Simon—Charles Fourier—Giovanni Momo—Auguste Blanqui—Albert Laponneraye—Victor Considérant; Vol. II, Georg Büchner—Robert Owen—Wilhelm Weitling—Louis Blanc—Robert Lahautière—Félicité Robert de Lamennais—Premier banquet communiste—Jean-Jacques Pillot; Vol. III, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon—Étienne Cabet—Alphonse Esquiros—Alphonse Constant—Lorenzo Valerio—Théodore Dézamy—Qu'est-ce qu'un communiste?—August Becker—Andrea Luigi Mazzini—Enrico Gentilini. Petite collection Maspero, No. 52-54. Paris: François Maspero. 1970. Pp. 229; 253; 241.

BULLOUGH, VERN L. *Man in Western Civilization*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1970. Pp. viii, 504. \$5.95. Textbook.

CORNU, ROGER, and LAGNEAU, JANINA (comps.). *Hierarchies et classes sociales: Textes*. Collection U2. Paris: Armand Colin. 1969. Pp. 320.

COUTTS-SMITH, KENNETH. *The Dream of Icarus*. New York: George Braziller. 1970. Pp. 237. \$5.95.

DANCE, E. H. *La place de l'histoire dans les établissements secondaires*. Conseil de la Coopération Culturelle du Conseil de l'Europe. L'éducation en Europe. Ser. II, Enseignement général et technique, No. 10. Paris: Armand Colin-Bourrielier. 1969. Pp. 131.

DELORME, JEAN. *Chronologie des civilisations*. 3d rev. ed.; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1969. Pp. xvi, 509.

DURAND, GEORGES. *Etats et institutions, XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles*. Collection U, Ser. "Histoire moderne." Paris: Armand Colin. 1969. Pp. 308.

FARRELL, R. BARRY (ed.). *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 1970. Pp. xi, 359. Cloth \$12.50, paper \$4.95.

FINES, JOHN. *The History Teacher and Other Disciplines*. Teaching of History Pamphlets No. 28. [London:] Historical Association. 1970. Pp. 16. 3s. 6d.

GREENSTEIN, FRED I. *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptuali-*

zation. Markham Political Science Ser. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co. 1969. Pp. xiii, 200. \$5.95.

HOAR, VICTOR (comp.). *The Great Depression: Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the United States*. [Vancouver:] Copp Clark Publishing Co. 1969. Pp. vi, 232. \$3.75.

HORY, ANDRAS. *Behind the Scenes of World War II*. Tr. by EMMA EROES. [Astor Park, Fla.]: Danubian Press. 1968. Pp. 63. \$3.00.

LARKIN, PASCHAL. *Property in the Eighteenth Century: With Special Reference to England and Locke*. With a new introd. by the author. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. xix, 252. \$9.50.

LEE, DWIGHT E. (ed. with an introd.). *Munich: Blunder, Plot, or Tragic Necessity? Problems in European Civilization*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1970. Pp. xvi, 106. \$2.25. Textbook.

MOOTE, A. LLOYD. *The Seventeenth Century: Europe in Ferment*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1970. Pp. xii, 489. \$6.95. Textbook.

PIPES, RICHARD. *Europe since 1815*. Introd., WILLIAM L. LANGER. Harper-American Heritage Textbook. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co. and Harper and Row. 1970. Pp. 609. Textbook.

REIF, RITA. *The Antique Collector's Guide to Styles and Prices*. New York: Hawthorn Books. 1970. Pp. xii, 276. \$12.95.

STRAUSS, HERBERT A. (ed.). *Conference on Anti-Semitism, 1969*. Papers delivered at the fourth *Lerntag* of the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe, Inc., New York City, March 23, 1969. New York: the Federation. 1969. Pp. 53.

WALLIA, C. S. (ed.). *Toward Century 21: Technology, Society, and Human Values*. New York: Basic Books. 1970. Pp. xvii, 318. \$8.95.

Ancient

DEMOUGEOT, ÉMILIENNE. *La formation de l'Europe et les invasions barbares*. Vol. I, *Des origines germaniques à l'avènement de Dioclétien*. Collection historique. Paris: Aubier. 1969. Pp. 615, 18 maps.

HARDY, W. G. *The Greek and Roman World*. Rev. ed.; [Cambridge, Mass.]: Schenkman Publishing Co. 1970. Pp. iv, 124. Textbook.

HOOD, DAVID (ed. with an introd.). *The Rise of Rome: How to Explain It*. Problems in European Civilization. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1970. Pp. x, 101. \$2.25. Textbook.

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► Books listed were received by the AHR between January 1 and March 15, 1970. Books that will be reviewed are not listed, but listing does not preclude subsequent review.

of the Greek and Roman World, Vol. II. Reprint of 3d ed.; London: Methuen; distrib. by Barnes and Noble, New York. 1970. Pp. xv, 492. Cloth \$10.00, paper \$5.00. See rev. of 1st ed., (1936), *AHR*, XLII (Apr. 1937), 506.

RIDDLE, JOHN M. (ed. with an introd.). *Tiberius Gracchus: Destroyer or Reformer of the Republic?* Problems in European Civilization. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1970. Pp. xvii, 94. \$2.25. Textbook.

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BENTON, JOHN F. (ed. with an introd. and notes). *Self and Society in Medieval France: The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent (1064?-c. 1125)*. The tr. of C. C. SWINTON BLAND, rev. by the ed. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper and Row. 1970. Pp. 260. \$2.95.

PRAWER, J. *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*. Vol. I. Tr. from the Hebrew by G. NAHON. Rev. and completed by the author. Le monde byzantin. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 1969. Pp. 686. 130 fr. See rev. of Hebrew ed. (1963), *AHR*, LIX (July 1964), 1115.

RENOUARD, Y. *Les villes d'Italie de la fin du X^e siècle au début du XIV^e siècle*. In 2 vols. New ed. by PH. BRAUNSTEIN. Regards sur l'histoire. 2d ser., Histoire générale. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur. 1969. Pp. 261; 270-573. 19.50 fr. each.

SCHOLZ, BERNHARD WALTER, with BARBARA ROGERS (trs.). *Carolingian Chronicles: Royal Frankish Annals and Nithard's Histories*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1970. Pp. x, 235. \$8.50.

British Commonwealth and Ireland

DAICHES, DAVID. *Scotch Whisky: Its Past and Present*. [New York:] Macmillan. 1970. Pp. 168. \$9.95.

JAMES, G. F. (ed.). *A Homestead History: Being the Reminiscences and Letters of Alfred Joyce, of Plaistow and Norwood, Port Phillip, 1843 to 1864*. 3d rev. ed.; New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. 206. \$8.75.

KNIGHTLEY, PHILLIP, and SIMPSON, COLIN. *The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1970. Pp. xiv, 333. \$8.95.

MCGOVERN, JOHN P., and ROLAND, CHARLES G. *Wm. Osler: The Continuing Education*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas. 1969. Pp. xvii, 365. \$13.75.

MATHIAS, PETER. *The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1969. Pp. xiv, 522. \$10.00. Textbook.

MINCHINTON, W. E. (ed. with an introd.). *The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Debates in Economic History. New York: Barnes and Noble. 1969. Pp. viii, 196. Cloth \$5.25, paper \$2.50.

SHAW, WILLIAM A. (prep.). *Calendar of Treasury Books, January 1704 to March 1705, Preserved in the Public Record Office*. Vol. XIX. Reprint; London: H. M. Stationery Office; distrib.

by British Information Services, New York. 1966. Pp. ccxlviii, 744. \$37.80 postpaid. See rev. of 1st ed. (1938), *AHR*, XLV (July 1940), 956.

SKELTON, R. A. *Captain James Cook—After Two Hundred Years*. A commemorative address delivered before the Hakluyt Society. London: Trustees of the British Museum; distrib. by Columbia University Press, New York. 1969. Pp. 32, 24 plates. \$1.20.

WILKINSON-LATHAM, ROBERT and CHRISTOPHER. *Cavalry Uniforms: Including Other Mounted Troops of Britain and the Commonwealth, in Colour*. New York: Macmillan. 1969. Pp. 215. \$4.95.

WOODS, FREDERICK. *A Bibliography of the Works of Sir Winston Churchill, KG, OM, CH*. 2d rev. ed.; [Toronto:] University of Toronto Press. 1969. Pp. 398. \$27.50.

France

CROSLAND, MAURICE P. (ed. with introd. and commentary). *Science in France in the Revolutionary Era: Described by Thomas Bugge, Danish Astronomer Royal and Member of the International Commission on the Metric System (1798-1799)*. With extracts from other contemporary works. Society for the History of Technology Monograph Ser., No. 7. Cambridge, Mass.: Society for the History of Technology and the M.I.T. Press. 1969. Pp. xiv, 239. \$10.00.

ROUSTAN, M. *The Pioneers of the French Revolution*. Tr. by FREDÉRIC WHYTE. With an introd. by HAROLD J. LASKI. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. 302. \$9.50.

THOMSON, DAVID. *Democracy in France since 1870*. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 5th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. 344. \$2.50.

YACONO, XAVIER. *Histoire de la colonisation française*. "Que sais-je?" No. 452. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1969. Pp. 127.

Spain and Portugal

DEVOS, J.-P. *Description de l'Espagne par Jehan Lhermite et Henri Cock, humanistes belges, Archers du Corps de la Garde Royale (1560-1622)—(1554?- . . .): Extrait du Passetemps, Manuscrit II, 1028 de la Bibliothèque Royale de Bruxelles*. Bibliothèque générale de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, VI^e Section. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N. 1969. Pp. 135. 30 fr.

JELLINEK, FRANK. *The Civil War in Spain*. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. 641. \$16.00.

Germany, Austria, and Switzerland

BAYNES, NORMAN H. (ed.). *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939: An English Translation of Representative Passages Arranged under Subjects*. In 2 vols. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. xii, 987; 988-1980. \$60.00 the set.

CRANKSHAW, EDWARD. *Maria Theresa*. New York: Viking Press. 1970. Pp. 366. \$6.95.

FRÖLICH, PAUL. *Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work*. Tr. by EDWARD FITZGERALD. With a new preface by SEBASTIAN FRANCK. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. xii, 10-339. \$10.00.

GANOCZY, ALEXANDRE. *La Bibliothèque de l'Académie de Calvin: Le catalogue de 1572 et ses enseignements*. Études de philologie et d'histoire, No. 13. Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1969. Pp. ix, 343.

NELSON, WALTER HENRY. *The Soldier Kings: The House of Hohenzollern*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1970. Pp. 506. \$8.95.

Italy

CAMAITI, ROMOLO. *Statistiche bancarie ed economiche al principio del XVII secolo*. Università di Siena, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Istituto di Statistica, No. 17. (Siena: the Università. 1969. Pp. 51, 4 tables.

DAGNA, P., et al. *Figure e gruppi della classe dirigente piemontese nel Risorgimento*. Pubblicazioni del Comitato torinese dell'Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento, New Ser., No. 6. Turin: the Comitato. 1968. Pp. 313.

MANSON, RICHARD. *The Theory of Knowledge of Giambattista Vico*. [Hamden, Conn.:] Archon Books. 1969. Pp. xiii, 83. \$5.00.

Eastern Europe

AVAKUMOVIĆ, IVAN. *Mihailović prema Nemačkim Dokumentima*. Biblioteka "Nase Delo," No. 15-17. London: Savez "Oslobodjenje." 1969. Pp. 181. \$3.00.

CIEPLEWICZ, MIECZYSLAW, and ZGÓRNIK, MARIAN (eds.). *Przygotowania Niemieckie do Agresji na Polskę w 1939 R.: W Świecie Sprawozdań Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego WP (Dokumenty)* [German Preparations for the Aggression on Poland in 1939: As Reflected in the Reports of the Chief Command of the Polish Armed Forces, Second Division (Documents)]. Polska Akademia Nauk—Oddział w Krakowie. Materiały Komisji Nauk Historycznych, No. 17. Krakow: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk. 1969. Pp. 199, 9 plates. Zł. 25.

History of the Hungarian Nation. Pt. 1, 830-1919 A.D., based on the works and former publications of Dominic G. Kosáry; Pt. 2, 1919-1968 A.D., by STEVEN BÉLA VÁRDY. Hungarian Heritage Books, Vol. II. Astor Park, Fla.: Danubian Press. 1969. Pp. 421. \$14.50.

HOMOLA, IRENA, and BROŻEK, LUDWIK (eds.). *Korespondencja Pawła Stalmacha* [Paweł Stalmach's Correspondence]. Polska Akademia Nauk—Oddział w Krakowie. Materiały Komisji Nauk Historycznych, No. 16. Krakow: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk. 1969. Pp. 172. Zł. 28.

LOCHMAN, JAN MILIČ. *Church in a Marxist Society: A Czechoslovak View*. New York: Harper and Row. 1970. Pp. 198. \$5.95.

ŁUCZAK, CZESŁAW. *Wysiedlenia Ludności Polskiej na Tzw. Ziemiach Wcielonych do Rzeszy 1939-1945: Wybór Źródeł i Opracowanie*. [The

Expulsions of the Polish Population from the Territories Incorporated within the German Reich 1939-1945: Selections of Sources and Works]. Documenta Occupationis, No. 8. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni. 1969. Pp. xiii, 134. Zł. 25.

MOUTAFCHIEVA, VERA, and TODOROV, NIKOLAI. *Bulgaria's Past*. Tr. by GEORGINA YATES. [Sofia:] Sofia-Press. 1969. Pp. 164.

SZEMAK, J. *Living History of Hungary*. Problems behind the Iron Curtain Ser., No. 5. Astor Park, Fla.: Danubian Press. 1969. Pp. 74. \$2.00.

TSOUICALAS, CONSTANTINE. *The Greek Tragedy*. Penguin Special. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1969. Pp. 207. \$1.45.

VARGA, LÁSZLÓ. *Human Rights in Hungary*. Problems behind the Iron Curtain Ser., No. 4. Gainesville, Fla.: Danubian Research and Information Center. 1967. Pp. 199. \$3.00.

Soviet Union

PAGE, STANLEY W. (ed. with an introd.). *Lenin: Dedicated Marxist or Revolutionary Pragmatist? Problems in European Civilization*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1970. Pp. xiv, 113. \$2.25. Textbook.

PORETSKY, ELISABETH K. *Our Own People: A Memoir of 'Igance Reiss' and His Friends*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1969. Pp. x, 278. \$7.95.

Near East

ABBOUSHI, W. F. *Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century*. New York: Dodd, Mead. 1970. Pp. xiii, 345. \$8.95. Textbook.

JACOBS, PAUL. *Between the Rock and the Hard Place*. New York: Random House. 1970. Pp. 155. \$4.95.

LANDEN, ROBERT G. *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Readings*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1970. Pp. xiii, 366. \$5.75. Textbook.

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DUVIGNAUD, JEAN. *Change at Shebika: Report from a North African Village*. Tr. from the French by FRANCES FRENAYE. With a foreword by CECIL HOURANI. New York: Pantheon Books. 1970. Pp. xiii, 303. \$6.95.

Equiano, Olaudah, The Life of, or Gustavus Vassa the African. In 2 vols. With a new introd. by PAUL EDWARDS. The Colonial History Ser. Reprint; New York: Humanities Press. 1969. Pp. lxxii, vii, xi-xvii, lxxiv-lxxxii, v, 272; 255. \$31.50 the set.

HOBSON, J. A. *The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects*. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. viii, 324. \$10.00.

MOREL, E. D. *Great Britain and the Congo: The Pillage of the Congo Basin*. With an introd. by SIR A. CONAN DOYLE. Reprint; New York: Howard Fertig. 1969. Pp. xxvi, 291. \$9.50.

PAGE, THOMAS NELSON. *On the Nile in 1901*. Coconut Grove, Miami, Fla.: Field Research Projects. n.d. Pp. v, 50, 9 plates.

Asia

ALLEN, RICHARD. *A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1970. Pp. x, 306. Cloth \$6.50, paper \$2.50. Textbook.

HEIMBACH, ERNEST E. (comp.). *White Meo-English Dictionary*. Linguistic Ser. IV. Data Paper No. 75. Ithaca, N. Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University. 1969. Pp. xxv, 497. \$5.00.

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LANG, DANIEL. *Casualties of War*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1969. Pp. 123. \$4.50.

LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY, CHANTAL. *La paix mongole: Joug tatar ou paix mongole? Questions d'histoire*. [Paris:] Flammarion. 1970. Pp. 124.

LI, DUN J. (ed.). *The Road to Communism: China since 1912*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1969. Pp. xii, 403. \$6.40.

MEYERSON, HARVEY. *Vinh Long*. With an introd. by JOHN V. TUNNEY. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1970. Pp. xxiv, 220. \$5.95.

POPE-HENNESSY, JAMES. *Half-Crown Colony: A Historical Profile of Hong Kong*. Boston: Little, Brown. 1969. Pp. 149. \$6.50.

SCHWARZ, HENRY G. *Liu Shao-Ch'i and "People's War": A Report on the Creation of Base Areas in 1938*. International Studies, East Asian Ser. Research Publication, No. 3. [Lawrence:] Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas; distrib. by Paragon Book Gallery, New York. 1969. Pp. 61. \$2.50.

Three Documents of the National Liberation Front. Introd. by GABRIEL KOLKO. Boston: Beacon Press. 1970. Pp. 41. 95 cents.

WELTY, PAUL THOMAS. *The Asians: Their Heritage and Their Destiny*. 3d ed.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1970. Pp. viii, 351. \$6.95.

United States

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967. Department of State Publication 8495. [Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.] 1969. Pp. lvi, 1324. \$6.75.

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Communications

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TO THE EDITOR OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW:

Professor Alfred G. Meyer's review of *The Red '48ers. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels* (AHR, LXXV [Dec. 1969], 527–28) gives me credit for a “well-written book.” But I now have doubts regarding my own “very good story,” because the review contains materials that appear to spring from a misunderstanding of what I wrote. My book contains a dozen items that clearly challenge some of the widely accepted views of “Marxologists,” “Marxists,” and “followers.” Instead of mentioning these (which would have been informative), the review takes up for criticism two questionable matters in which I am allegedly in opposition to a scholarly consensus. In the first instance, Professor Meyer has no case; the second seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the text.

The review objects to my statement that Marx and Engels in 1850 entered “the darkest period of their careers” (p. 410). I do not deny there that the period was also “fruitful and creative,” as should be clear from a concluding sketch on the rest of that page where I speak of “time for research and writing,” especially with reference to *Kapital*. But, in the 1850's, Marx faced a struggle just to survive physically and Engels accepted a hated office job in the Ermen-Engels firm in Manchester so as to make a living and to be able to send Marx an endless number of monetary enclosures; they both never felt so isolated as then. Anyone who doubts that need only read the under-utilized Marx-Engels *Briefwechsel*. And few do doubt it.

Later, I would agree with the “Marxologists” and others who are “reluctant to concede this much to Hammen” where the review attributes to me, as one of my “major theses,” the belief that the differences between Marx and Engels and “their former radical friends have been exaggerated for political and personal reasons. . . .” My “well-written book” must have faltered here, otherwise Professor Meyer could not have written what he did in this connection. It is not a thesis of mine, let alone a “major” one.

The review asserts that my interest is in Marx and Engels “only as makers of revolution,” if that is possible, allegedly with a neglect of the “ideological” side. I hardly neglected the latter, but I do insist on a certain primacy of the former. A study of the *Briefwechsel*, Engels' talk at the graveside of Marx, and much else supports my position. The purpose of Marxian critiques themselves, the major source on theory, was not to analyze the existing society but to denounce it, to create a polarization for revolutionary purposes (see *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. Werke*, I, 380–81). Yet Marxian scholars seem reluctant to welcome a study of Marx and Engels as active revolutionists, notably in 1848–49—perhaps because the study of theory is more intriguing; perhaps because such a study may disturb many theoretical formulations. My work is the first reasonably thorough study of the matter in English, and in almost any language. Professor Meyer, if I remember correctly, also greeted a comparable and competent East German study, Gerhard Becker's *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels in Köln 1848–1849* (Berlin, 1963) rather coolly.

Professor Meyer apparently regrets the fact that I failed to go beyond “mere hints” in portraying the “radical intellectual, specifically the Hegelian Left,” as being similar to certain current phenomena. I can only say that those parts of my book were written during the somnolent years just before 1964–65. They remained unaltered, except for

drastic deletions and condensations in line with the editor's request that I reduce the manuscript by a third. I saw no point in inserting even "hints" in a study of this sort to make it perhaps more "relevant."

I admit that the translation of "many [isolated] German words" in my book may appear to be "poor," namely that the translation was not the first that comes to mind nor the first listed in a dictionary. But Professor Meyer knows that the preferred translation of a given word (other than very concrete items) will be determined by the context in which it appears. Here and there I did allow myself certain liberties, as when I translated *klugscheissen* as "talked wisely," which is not as literal and graphic as it might be.

University of Montana

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

PROFESSOR MEYER REPLIES:

Klugscheissen, I agree with Professor Hammen, is difficult to translate. I did have other instances of mistranslation or sloppy translation in mind when I criticized him: *Zwitter* (p. 28) means hermaphrodite, not bastard; *schmierig* (p. 30), conveying a suggestion of pornographic content, should be rendered as smutty, not dirty; *Compagnie-Geschäft* (pp. 32, 85) means partnership, not company business; *wurzelhaft* (p. 33) is a romantic term probably meaning earthy, not radical; *überfließen* (p. 68) means to spill, not to flow; *Schwindel* in the context in which it is used (p. 138) means fraud or swindle rather than dizziness, although someone consulting a dictionary might find dizziness or vertigo listed first. Also, *Wirrnisse* (p. 22) is spelled with two r's; a mob of soldiers is called *Soldateska*, not *Soldeska* (p. 234); *bellum servile* is the Slave War, not Servile War (p. 246); and someone ought to tell Professor Hammen the difference between immanent and imminent (p. 77). There are several other translations of his I would criticize.

As for the substance of the book, I don't understand why he is so sensitive. I meant to praise him in calling his a controversial book which raises an interesting issue. At most, I would maintain that he has overstated his case: in dwelling, quite interestingly, on the day-to-day revolutionary activity of Marx and Engels he tends to lose sight of the coherence—if any—of what they wrote in subsequent decades. He should be pleased that I am grateful to him for certain hints that are left undeveloped in the book and that he did not even mean to make. By denying some of the major themes which his book suggests he is, in effect, decreasing its value.

University of Michigan

ALFRED G. MEYER

TO THE EDITOR OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW:

I would like to clarify some remarks made by Thomas Skidmore, who reviewed my *Nationalism in Brazil, A Historical Survey* (*AHR*, LXXV [Oct. 1969], 79–80) and who apparently did not understand the nature of that general work. The failure to grasp the point suggests a pattern for Skidmore, who in recent reviews has shown a distressing inability to understand the purpose of the book he is reviewing.

In this particular case, he did not understand that he was reviewing a general introductory book, not a monograph. Despite the printed warnings, he seemed to expect in those 132 pages of text the definitive study of Brazilian nationalism in all its multitudinous ramifications. Brazilian nationalism is largely an unexplored field. As such, there are probably three stages through which studies of the subject might pass. First,

someone should indicate the direction studies might take, point out the present state of knowledge, or trace the development of the manifestations of nationalism in Brazil. Second, scholars should write the detailed monographs needed. Finally, there should be a synthesis of the monographic studies. Obviously—or perhaps not so obviously to the reviewer—my short book fits within the first stage. It sought to illustrate the forms by which nationalism has manifested itself in Brazil. The organization of the book was simple: four broad chronological periods in which manifestations and trends of nationalism are discussed topically.

Failure to grasp that simple organization led Skidmore to waste considerable verbiage on what he termed my “chronological oversight.” For example, he admonished me for quoting Raul Pompéia, a novelist who lived at the end of the nineteenth century, in a discussion of mid-nineteenth-century nationalism. Nonsense. That particular discussion centered on a topic: the novelists of the nineteenth century who displayed nationalistic tendencies. Pompéia was a nineteenth-century writer; he did express nationalist sentiments. The quotation emphasized a point in a topical, not a chronological discussion. Further evidence of a hasty reading is displayed in the reviewer’s statement that I relied on a speech by Gustavo Corção in 1950 to prove that he was an anti-nationalist in the 1956–64 period. The quotation from Corção came, indeed, from a speech, entitled “Patriotismo e Nacionalismo,” originally made in 1950, but as Mr. Skidmore chose to ignore—and as my footnote pointed out—Corção reprinted that speech in the early 1960’s in a book which bears the title *Patriotismo e Nacionalismo*. Senhor Corção published at least four essays and books under that title (perhaps here is Skidmore’s confusion): one in 1950, two in 1957, and one in the early 1960’s. If nothing else, these publications reveal that Corção was extremely consistent in his ideas.

The reviewer complained that the book took the point of view of the Brazilian nationalists. That criticism makes me feel that I achieved one of my major goals. In truth, I did give preference to the Brazilian viewpoint. As far as possible, as far as I was able, I let the Brazilians express their own ideas and feelings about their own nationalism. The Brazilian viewpoint is what we desperately need to know and understand in this country. The different significances which Skidmore and I assign to Alberto Tôrres indicate the gaping distance separating our attitudes toward Brazilian nationalism. The reviewer emphasized the agrarian nationalism of Tôrres. That being the case, I doubt very much if Senhor Tôrres would have anything but an antiquarian appeal in Brazil. However, despite the best efforts of Mr. Skidmore to condemn our hero to the dust of the archives, Tôrres has had a lasting impact because Brazilian nationalists consider him a precursor of modern economic nationalism. I happen to agree with them. But whether I agree or not, whether Mr. Skidmore agrees or not, misses the point of the discussion in the book: Tôrres is considered by Brazilian nationalists to be a font of modern economic nationalism. Since I published my book, a lengthy and zesty biography of him has appeared, *Presença de Alberto Tôrres (Sua Vida e Pensamento)* (Rio de Janeiro, 1968), by a leading nationalist intellectual, Barbosa Lima Sobrinho. Voicing the opinion of contemporary Brazilian nationalists—and their views, more than those of Mr. Skidmore, are the ones of importance for a knowledge of what Brazilian nationalism means—Mr. Barbosa Lima confirms Tôrres in his position as a precursor of modern economic nationalism. I limited my scope and my space, and for that reason many of the details of Mr. Tôrres’ life that for one reason or another fascinate Skidmore but unfortunately are peripheral to his main contributions to the development of Brazilian nationalism will have to be left to more specialized monographs of the future.

In conclusion, I might note the surprise it was to discover that Mr. Skidmore has

shown at last some interest in the definition of nationalism, both as a term and as a concept. What a pity he never manifested that interest in his own book.

University of California, Los Angeles

E. BRADFORD BURNS

PROFESSOR SKIDMORE REPLIES:

I am surprised at Professor Burns's "surprise." Has he forgotten his pointed but helpful criticism at a conference in 1966 of my paper on Brazilian nationalist thought (both later published in *Portugal and Brazil in Transition*, ed. Raymond Sayers [Minneapolis, 1968])? Like many other readers of the *AHR*, I have a weakness for chronology. A half-century usually makes a difference—without those years Raul Pompéia would not have had any young Republic to defend against foreign and monarchist threats. Even twelve or thirteen years can count—especially if Vargas' "nationalist" presidency comes between Corção's original speech and its reprinting.

Meanwhile the dialectical process grinds slowly on. When my book on Brazilian nationalism is finished, interested readers will no doubt want to watch for Professor Burns's review.

University of Wisconsin

THOMAS E. SKIDMORE

TO THE EDITOR OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW:

While I am happy to get by with the bland kindness of Herbert J. Muller's review of my book, *The Global City* (*AHR*, LXXV [Dec. 1969], 453–54), I am bound to take offense at his opening clause: "Making no effort to disarm criticism. . . ." My efforts to do just that begin in the eighth line of the opening paragraph of the Preface; they run through the entire book; they are explicated again in the Afterword. I may not have disarmed my critics, but I certainly cannot be accused of not protesting the hubris of my undertaking nor of failing to profess my ignorance in the face of the vast perspectives that I raise.

Washington University

THEODORE H. VON LAUE

PROFESSOR MULLER REPLIES:

I do not have at hand a copy of my review of Mr. Von Laue's book and cannot recall just what I wrote, but evidently I failed to make myself clear. Anyway, I thought I had emphasized that he was very modest about his ambitious project, which did not strike me as at all pretentious in tone.

Indiana University

HERBERT J. MULLER

* * * * *Association Notes* * * * *

Miss Ann Hofstra, formerly managing editor of *Victorian Studies* and instructor in English at American University, has joined the staff of the *American Historical Review* as assistant editor. In addition to her work for the *Review*, she will have particular responsibility for editing the AHA pamphlet series.

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Recent Deaths

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WILFRID HARDY CALLCOTT, president of Coker College, died September 20, 1969. He was previously professor of history at the University of South Carolina. Professor Callcott was the author of *Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929*, *Caribbean Policy of the U.S., 1890-1920*, and *Hemisphere Policy of the U.S.*

OLLINGER CRENSHAW, former chairman of the history department and official historian at Washington and Lee University, died suddenly on March 19, 1970, in Lexington, Virginia. He was 65. Professor Crenshaw had been a member of the Washington and Lee faculty for forty-four years. Through the years, he was summer school visiting professor at five other universities, and in 1956-57 he held the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the US Naval War College in Providence, Rhode Island.

Professor Crenshaw's historical research was concentrated on the fields of American higher education, the Old South, and the Civil War. His *General Lee's College* was published last year; he was also author of *The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860* and of several articles.

CHARLES C. CUMBERLAND, professor of Latin American history at Michigan State University since 1955, died suddenly in Lima, Peru, on March 25, 1970. At the time of his death he was engaged in research on contemporary social movements in South America and had recently completed a survey of conditions in Bolivia.

Professor Cumberland was born in Kingsville, Texas, in 1914. He attended Texas A and I University and did his graduate work at the University of Texas. During World War II he served with the navy in the Pacific. At the close of the war he taught at Princeton and at Rutgers.

In the course of his career, Professor Cumberland published six books and many articles. He is best known for his work on the Mexican Revolution. His writings are distinguished by a rare combination of meticulous accuracy in detail, cautious interpretation, and an imaginative empathy with the poorer classes. Professor Cumberland completed his second volume on the revolution, with the exception of a concluding chapter, prior to leaving for South America. In 1968 the Oxford Press published his one-volume history of Mexico, a work that has been widely reviewed.

His colleagues will remember him as an outstanding classroom teacher and understanding adviser to both undergraduate and graduate students. He maintained high standards and at the same time gave generously of his time to help students meet these standards. His seminars gained him a reputation for rigorous questioning, frankness in admitting the limitations of what he knew and what could not be known, and generous praise when a student showed promise of excellence. These qualities earned for Charles Cumberland a distinction that he cherished more than his reputation for significant scholarly contributions.

Michigan State University

PAUL A. VARG

JOHN L. EICHMY, chairman of the division of social sciences at Oklahoma Baptist University, died February 19 in Shawnee, Oklahoma, after a heart attack. He was 42.

Professor Eighmy taught at Ouachita Baptist University, Arkadelphia, Arkansas, before coming to Oklahoma Baptist University in 1961. He was an ordained Baptist minister and a member of the Southern Historical Society, the American Association of University Professors, and the Oklahoma Civil Liberties Union Executive Board. A John L. Eighmy Memorial Fund has been established at OBU, with contributions to be administered at the discretion of Professor Eighmy's family.

OTTO EMIL GEPPERT died suddenly on April 14, 1970, in Wilmette, Illinois, following an automobile accident. Mr. Geppert's long association with educational publishing began in 1905. In 1916 he was co-founder of the Denoyer-Geppert Company, where he served as secretary-treasurer until 1964 and as president from 1964 to 1968, when he became chairman of the board of directors. Mr. Geppert was also a trustee of Roosevelt University and a member of many educational, civic, business, and professional organizations.

SIR BASIL LIDDELL HART, one of the most profound, original, and influential military thinkers of modern history, died January 29, 1970, at his Buckinghamshire home at the age of 74.

The future prophet of *Blitzkrieg* left Cambridge in 1914 to join the British Expeditionary Force in France. He was gassed during the Somme offensive, an experience that led to his first writing in military history, the "Impressions of a Company Commander." Although the War Office withheld permission to publish, a typescript copy of the book did attract the attention of historians, among them John Buchan, and when his disability later forced him out of the army, Captain Liddell Hart promptly set aside his sword for the pen.

His first contribution to military theory was in the realm of infantry tactics. Liddell Hart's new and simplified "battle drill" infiltrated the postwar training manuals, and his *Framework of a Science of Infantry Tactics* (1921) provided the principles both for an attack against an entrenched position like those of 1914-18, and for the mechanized warfare of the future. As the pre-eminent military correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, Liddell Hart soon became a distinguished exponent of mechanization. He fought as vigorously for disarmament in 1932 as he had for the creation of an experimental armored force five years before. The failure of these efforts and the rise of Hitler caused him to intensify his campaign to reform and modernize the British army.

When he joined the *Times* in 1935 his interests naturally widened from military affairs in Britain to the defense of Western Europe. The obvious military superiority of the Axis powers on the eve of the Second World War caused Liddell Hart to recommend a strategy of active and mobile defense, an apparent contradiction, in the eyes of some critics, to his earlier emphasis upon the offensive capabilities of armored forces. If he was a prophet without honor in Britain, his theories found wide acceptance in Germany, with the result that Liddell Hart's name has often been associated with the fall of France in 1940. During the war his penetrating analyses of the military situation reached the public through the press, and his confidential views were circulated among high-placed friends in the government and the army, but he held no official position.

His postwar years were largely devoted to the constant study and re-examination of defense problems in the nuclear age. In the judgment of the late President Kennedy, "No expert on military affairs has better earned the right to respectful attention. . . . For two generations he has brought to the problems of war and peace a rare combination of professional competence and imaginative insight."

This insight came primarily from his study of history. As his knowledge of the First World War deepened, Liddell Hart grew increasingly critical of the generalship that had permitted such senseless slaughter, and he hoped that his history of *The Real War* (1930) might help to avoid recreating "those mental attitudes produced by preconceived ideas combined with insufficient education and imagination." His six books on the war, including provocative biographies of Marshal Foch and T. E. Lawrence, have made a lasting contribution to our knowledge of that titanic and often shapeless conflict. His forthcoming *History of the Second World War* promises to be of equal historical importance.

Liddell Hart's writings reveal his personal debt to history. His early study of the Mongol campaigns contributed to his understanding of the proper use of armor in battle, while his biography of Sherman provided the inspiration for his much-publicized "strategy of indirect approach." Believing that military history "to be of practical value should be a study of the psychological reactions of the commanders," Liddell Hart in a dozen books probed the minds of the great captains from Genghis Khan to Rommel. He has been accused of special pleading and his interpretations of men and events occasionally have drawn fire, but he yielded ground to no one in his respect for facts. The late General J. F. C. Fuller once confided that he would never take Liddell Hart on in debate whenever the Captain had been able to explore the facts. Liddell Hart himself always maintained that "the search for truth for truth's sake is the mark of the historian."

Few obituaries have mentioned the immeasurable personal debt owed Liddell Hart by students of history the world over. For twenty-five years his house was a Mecca for historians as well as generals and politicians. He never hesitated to make available his famous files, even to an undergraduate wrestling with an honors thesis, and he gladly shared his unrivaled knowledge and his time with others involved in the study of war. He was particularly kind to visitors from America, often at excessive cost to his own leisure and productivity. No inquiry, however trivial, went unanswered, and no error, however small, passed unchallenged. He has been described as the captain who teaches generals: in a very real sense he was also the foremost teacher of a generation of military historians in the United States as well as in Britain.

Those of us who were privileged to receive help and guidance from this unusual man can truthfully say that he encouraged, corrected, and on occasion intervened to give our careers—and our spirits—a generous boost.

Thus the historian, along with the soldier and statesman, mourns the loss of a respected friend and scholar.

Allegheny College

JAY LUVAAS

CYRIL EUGENE SMITH, a professor in the department of history, Marquette University, until his retirement in 1967, died on October 11, 1969, in San Francisco. Professor Smith was 68.

WILLIAM ERNEST SMITH, who retired in 1962 from Miami University, died December 12, 1969. Professor Smith joined the staff at Miami University in 1926 and held the positions of chairman of the history department (1935–57), dean of the graduate school (1950–59), and research professor (1959–62). From 1947 to 1962 he was also director of the William Holmes McGuffey Museum. Among Professor Smith's publications are *The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics* (1933), *The McGuffeys and Their Readers* (1963), *The American Civil War* (with Carl Russell Fish), and numerous contributions

to the *Dictionary of American Biography*, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and the *People's Encyclopedia*. With his wife, Ophia D. Smith, Professor Smith was co-author of *Colonel A. W. Gilbert, Citizen Soldier* (1934), *Colonial Labor* (1941), *Colonial Inventions* (1940), *Contributions of the Puritans* (1940), and *The Miami Valleys* (1964). Professor and Mrs. Smith received the Ohioana Library Award in 1949, which led to their joint publication of *The Buckeye Titan* in 1953. Professor Smith was also an active public speaker and contributor to historical publications. He is survived by his wife and one son, Joseph W., of San Francisco.

MASAYA D. YAMAMOTO, professor of history at Alaska Methodist University, died January 12 in Anchorage, Alaska.

Other members of the Association who died recently are: WILLIAM M. HARRIGAN of Canisius College, Buffalo, New York; E. N. JOHNSON of Regis College, Weston, Massachusetts; and J. C. MCGRAW of Hardin Simmons University, Abilene, Texas.

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
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
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
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


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